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    Abstract 
 
 
The Cambodian genocide and its aftermath are unique in that key leaders are on 
trial thirty years after their regime fell. This creates particular problems : the UN-
backed trials (ECCC) assume the normative aims of the transitional justice 
paradigm, but exist in context of multiple ‘transitions’ preceding or running 
concurrent to them, creating complex competing and complementary ideas about 
what constitutes ‘justice.’ Over the previous thirty years transition was a social 
process; alongside legalistic input it included (and still includes) religious 
discourse, ceremony, ritual and modes of expression not employed or recognised 
in courts. This thesis concerns the many and dynamic ways in which the concept 
of justice is discussed, narrated and manifested both inside and outside formal 
mechanisms.  
 
The thesis concludes that the meaning of justice resides in a nexus of memory, 
time and imagination emergent from the act of telling the story, in a way that 
effectively lodges it within intergenerational cultural memory. Justice is a process 
without fixed ends.  
 
Justice necessarily involves narrative; the way the past is narrated is key 
to the application and realisation of justice. Expanding on Lyotard’s theory of 
Grand Narratives, I contend that justice narrates itself through ‘phrase regimes’ 
which I explore within three legalistic processes : the People’s Revolutionary 
Tribunal , the trial of Pol Pot , and the narrative streams emerging from the hybrid 
United Nations/ Royal Government of Cambodia Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) . I contend each of these demands narrative 
conformity to ideological and political templates (Marxism, Liberalism). I further 
contend that these grand narratives collapse in Cambodia. Their limitations are 
exposed on encounter with what Ricœur calls ‘the small voices of history.’ In 
‘small’ narrations, via socio-cultural processes such as religious ritual, legalistic 
narratives of justice may overlap, but the individual voices often transgress, or are 
marginalised by, the grand narratives.  
 
The latter part of the thesis goes on to explore transition and justice 
from ‘outside’ legalistic mechanisms, and discusses ideas of justice arising from 
within the society in whose interests these mechanisms allegedly 
act. Through observing and attending numerous religious ceremonies and 
personally collecting 59 ethnographic interviews with monks, former KR cadres, 
witnesses, civil parties, historical and cultural figures from multiple communities 
in 10 provinces in the country I have established some basis for situating 
individual voices into a specifically Cambodian intellectual context.  
 iii 



















Chapter 1 :Historical Literature Review…………………………………………11 
 
Chapter 2: Methodology and Theory…………………………………………….55 
  
Chapter 3: Trials and Narratives: Performing Ideologies?…………..…………..95   
 
3.1: The Peoples Revolutionary Tribunal………………………………………..98 
 
3.2: The Trial of Pol Pot………………………………………………………...111 
 
3.3:  The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia………………...119 
 
Chapter 4: Between Trials and Ceremonies: A Bridging Chapter ……………..147 
 
Chapter 5: Contained narrations………………………………………………..159 
 
Chapter 6:  The Transgressive/ Forgotten / Silenced /Marginalized…...............196 
 

















   Acknowledgments  
 
I was very generously funded for three and a half years by the University of 
Westminster PhD scholarship. This covered not only my fees but also living costs.  
I would never have been able to afford this independently and this research 
scholarship has truly provided me the freedom to pursue my work.  
 
There are many people to whom I owe thanks in realizing my thesis.   
 
At the University of Westminster my supervisors in the two departments that 
jointly supervised me: in the department of Advanced Legal Studies, Dr. Radha 
D’Souza and in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Prof. 
David Chandler. I thank them both for assisting me to realize the project that I 
envisioned and the time they spent reading and commenting on my drafts. At the 
Law School also I would like to thank Prof.Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 
for his support over the course of the PhD process.  
 
 Outside the university I particularly wish to thank:  
 
Mr Sina Thor, my friend and translator , was my constant help and support over 
the field work period, including guiding me over me over difficult terrain to 
remote places and assisting me throughout the fieldwork. Without him the 
fieldwork would not have been as interesting and fulfilling as it was.  
 
Dr. Alexandra Kent of the University of Gothenburg for her invaluable advice and 
reading of some of the drafts and for sharing some contacts with me. Dr. Inger 
Agger of the University of Copenhagen for reading my chapters and also 
providing me with valuable insights and Prof. Malcolm Voyce of Macquarie 
University, again for his useful feedback on my chapters. Dr. Craig Etcheson for 
providing me with his paper on religion. Prof. Puayliu Ong from the National 
University of Malaysia and her feedback on my first presentation prior to going 
out on fieldwork.  Prof. Mohammad Zain Musa, also of National University 
Malaysia, who generously gave me copies of his history of the Cham people. Dr. 
Astrid Noren-Nilsson, who gave me useful feedback following the ICAS 
conference in Macau. 
 
Mr Sophearn Phan, my Khmer language teacher, who spent many hours teaching 
me the Khmer language in the months preceding my fieldwork. 
 
 
My friend and later colleague Mr Billy Chia-Lung Tai, for reading my drafts and 
discussing my work with me.  And the team at the Cambodian Human Rights 
Action Committee (CHRAC), especially the executive of the secretariat Mr Suon 
Bunsak.  
 
Ms. Sonjia Myers and Mr Man Sokkoeun, for assisting me in accessing their 
contacts.  
 
Caroline Bennett and Paul Christensen, my fellow Cambodia Studies PhD 
students with whom I shared contacts and exchanged ideas in Phnom Penh.  
 v 
 
My fellow ECCC interns who educated me and became great friends and of 
whom I have very fond memories of our shared time in Phnom Penh.  
 
I thank all those who generously gave me their time for the interviews. Of these, I 
can name Mrs. Pou-Maline, Mr Yaim Chamreun, Mr Sarath Youn, Mr Taing 
Hum, Mr Lars Olsen, Judge Rowan Downing, Mr Neth Pheaktra, Mr Michael 
Karnavas, Ms. Farina So of DC-CAM, Ven. So Maly, Mr Bou Meng, Mr Chum 
Mei, Mr Sum Rithy, Maître Olivier Bahougne, (and Ms. Ines Chf for her 
translation), Prof. John Quigley, Ms. Rothany Srun, Mr Tim Minea, Mr.Chak 
Sophy, Mr Man Sokkoeun. I also thank all those people whose names I cannot 
give here. 
 









































































    List of Abbreviations  
 
001  Case 001 at the ECCC of Kaing Guek Eav (alias  Comrade Duch)  
002 Case 002 at the ECCC of Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and 
Khieu Samphan 
 
002/01 The first part of Case 002 at the ECCC of Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, 
Ieng Thirith and Khieu Samphan following the ‘severance order’ 
that segmented the indictment 
 
003 and 004 Cases under investigation  (at time of writing) of officially 
undisclosed persons  
 
CPK   Communist Party of Kampuchea 
CPP  Cambodian Peoples Party  
CNRP   Cambodia National Rescue Party  
DC-Cam The Documentation Centre of Cambodia  
DK   Democratic Kampuchea 
ECCC   The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia  
FANK  Forces Armées Nationales Khmères 
FUNCINPEC Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, 
Pacifique,  et Coopératif, (trans: National United Front for an 
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia)  
GLF  Great Leap Forward  
HRP  Human Rights Party 
ICFC  International Centre for Conciliation 
ICTR  International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY  International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia 
KPRP  Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party 
KR   Khmer Rouge  
LANGO      Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organisations Bill 
NUFK  Front Uni National du Kampuchea 
NGO  Non Government Organization  
PRK  Peoples Republic of Kampuchea 
PRT  Peoples Revolutionary Tribunal  
RCAF  Royal Cambodian Armed Forces  
RGC   Royal Government of Cambodia  
S-21   Security Centre 21  
 viii 
TPO   Transcultural Psycho-social Organization  
UN   United Nations 
UNAKRT United Nations Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials  
UNCPPCG  UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide  
US   United States  




   A NOTE ON THE TEXT 
 
There is extensive use of original interview material in this thesis.  It is shown 













Introduction     
 
This thesis is about a court, and about justice, but not necessarily justice in the 
court. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) is a 
unique institution and its operational difficulties are also unique; so too is its 
cultural impact, as much a response to its past absence as to its current presence.  
It was created as a hybrid domestic / international (UN) legal institution to try the 
‘most responsible’ perpetrators of atrocities under Pol Pot’s Democratic 
Kampuchean Regime (DK)  (1974-1979). The first trial (Case 001)   began on  17 
February 2009 - thirty years after the Vietnamese invasion of Phnom Penh ended 
the DK regime. So far only one has been concluded, that of Kaing Guek Eav, aka 
Comrade Duch,  head of Tuol Sleng Prison. Of the four senior leaders whose trial 
has ensued, (Case 002) Ieng Sary has died and his wife Ieng Thirith is declared 
unfit. It is unlikely others will come to trial, although officially two further cases 
are pending (003 and 004). As Anne Heindel observes, by normative standards of 
international law and procedure, ‘The tribunal has - rightly - been heavily 
criticized from the start. It has ended up as the black sheep of war crimes 
tribunals.’1 Meanwhile, ordinary Cambodians grapple with the legacy of mass 
atrocity – be it living in close proximity to a former torturer or securing     
identification of the bones of a relative dying under DK.  They may do so directly 
or indirectly through the court; or they may participate in other processes, evolved 
over those three decades before it convened: grassroots mediation between former 
Khmer Rouge cadres and those who suffered, memorialisations and ceremonies 
originating in Buddhism, Cham Islam, or spirit and ancestor based religion.  
 
Original contribution to the literature 
 
The court (and its predecessors) is a subject of my analysis, but also a point of 
departure for a hermeneutical reading of the multiple, fluid ways justice has been 
considered, discussed and performed in Cambodia since 1979. Rather than 
limiting discussion to how it is represented or instrumentalised in legal 
mechanisms, I am concerned with the many ways justice is told.  
 
                                                
1	  Anne	  Heindel,	  quoting	  Anya	  Palm,	  ‘En	  lærestreg	  i	  retsopgør’	  (‘A	  lesson	  in	  transitional	  justice’),	  	  
Information,	  22	  February	  2014	  	  	  
 2 
The fundamental contention of this thesis is that there can be no justice without 
narrative. I aim to interpret the modern experience of a nation grappling with 
justice, undergoing variously-characterised ‘transitions,’ simultaneously 
attempting to rediscover a philosophical tradition destroyed under Pol Pot, and to 
narrate that experience for posterity. Hence I explore how narratives are situated 
in, emerge from, and create the historical /social/cultural context, and try to 
evaluate whatever meanings of justice they make.  This involves crossing 
disciplinary boundaries.  I draw on political studies, cultural studies, sociology, 
history - including the sociology and history of law - philosophy and theology. I 
use ethnographic, anthropological and discourse analysis methodologies, and 
theory from literary criticism, history, politics and international reIations. 
Although the individual lexicons of these disciplines vary, all are underpinned by 
the notion of narrative.  
 
Thus the thesis forms part of what could be termed the  ‘second wave’ of 
scholarship on the court. It stands in contrast to Ciorciari and Heindel’s Hybrid 
Justice, a more traditional analysis of the normative approach of what is termed 
Transitional Justice. 2 My original contribution lies in a concern with the court’s 
constituents rather than legal, human rights or political science perspectives. This 
involves a new approach to Transitional Justice (TJ).3 While my work is situated 
in some ways within TJ praxis and literatures, it locates itself ‘outside’ the 
Transitional Justice institution (ECCC), examining Transition and Justice from 
the perspective of the society for which the ECCC allegedly exists.  I 
problematize these concepts of ‘transition’ and ‘justice’, taking each separately, 
and analyse how they have been thought about in Cambodia across that thirty-
year gap and beyond.  I have collected and analysed original source material, 
comprising 59 formal in-depth interviews, ethnographic field notes, and personal 




                                                
2 John	  D	  Ciorciari	  and	  Anne	  Heindel,	  	  Hybrid	  Justice:	  The	  Extraordinary	  Chambers	  in	  the	  Courts	  of	  
Cambodia	  	  (Ann	  Arbor:	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Press	  ,	  2014)  
3	  Throughout	  when	  referring	  to	  the	  academic	  praxis	  	  of	  Transitional	  Justice	  	  I	  abbreviate	  it	  to	  TJ	  .	  
If	  I	  am	  referring	  to	  the	  institutionalized	  process	  of	  Transitional	  Justice	  (	  i.e.	  the	  ECCC	  as	  a	  




It is important to define the core terms on which the work is predicated, as both 
are controversial: the word for the crime, Genocide, and the word for the desired 
outcome, Justice.  
 
Genocide is a topic vigorously debated in academic literature. 4 Fawthrop and 
Jarvis entitled their intervention Getting Away with Genocide? but are careful to 
note they use the term ‘in a generic or sociological sense, fully aware of its legal 
constraints.’5 As defined by the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCPPCG), genocide is an attempt to 
destroy ethnic and religious groups and / or a ‘people’, in part or whole. The KR 
did target groups for their ethnicity/religion, such as the Cham and Vietnamese 
ethnic groups. Thus the CPK was carrying out a calculated policy of genocide 
against ethnic minorities within DK, and falls explicitly   within the remit of the 
UNCPPCG.6 Where controversy arises is in applying the term in relation to the 
majority Khmer ethnic group. The CPK never intended to eliminate their own 
ethnic group.  Debate exists   about their exact intentions  - for example whether 
they intended to destroy all Khmers in urban areas: as such they would be 
targeting a minority within their own ethnicity. The UNCPPCG does not address 
such a situation. The guiding event in the minds of those framing it was the 
Holocaust. 7 
 
However, the use of the term is beyond semantics or legal taxonomies.   
‘Genocide’ carries the ‘weight’ of a particular kind of atrocity.  It is a crime apart 
from other international human rights standards and norms. 8 The international 
community has an obligation to prosecute genocide. The official Cambodian 
narrative - in government pronouncements, the school curriculum, the 
presentation of DK in national monuments such as S-21 and the killing fields - 
                                                
4	  Anson	  Rabinbach,	  ‘Raphael	  Lemkin’s	  Concept	  of	  Genocide:	  Fifty	  Years	  Later,	  the	  First	  Conviction	  
Was	  Handed	  Down’	  ,	  IP	  Journal	  Transatlantic	  Edition,	  Spring	  	  2005	  ,70-­‐75	  
5	  Tom	  Fawthrop	  and	  Helen	  Jarvis,	  	  Getting	  Away	  With	  Genocide?:	  Elusive	  Justice	  and	  The	  Khmer	  
Rouge	  Tribunal	  (London:	  Pluto	  Press,2004)	  5	  	  
6	  Jason	  S.	  Abrams	  ,	  James	  L.	  Bischoff	  and	  Steven	  R.	  Ratner,	  Accountability	  For	  Human	  Rights	  
Atrocities	  In	  International	  Law:	  Beyond	  The	  Nuremberg	  Legacy,	  	  Third	  Edition	  (Oxford	  :	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2009)	  320-­‐325	  
7	  ibid.322-­‐323	  
8	  Jack	  Donnelly,	  International	  Human	  Rights,	  Third	  Edition	  (Boulder:	  Westview	  Press	  ,2007)	  
 4 
presents the crimes of the KR as ‘genocide.’ 9 No other word carries the same 
gravitas, nor is there another to convey the crimes of the KR with   appropriate 
impact.  To dispute - even technically correctly - whether all KR policies resulting 
in the death of millions were ‘genocide’ troubles those who wish to stress to 
Cambodia, and the world, the severity of the crimes.  Non-use of the term also 
aids forces wishing to downplay the scale of atrocities. The governments of 
China, the USA, the UK and Thailand, amongst others, supported the KR during 
the 1980s. 10 They maintained that ‘mass murder’ or ‘policide’ was only carried 
out by renegade KR factions. 11  They gain   an obvious advantage   in removing 
the term from international discourse over Cambodia. No nation wishes to appear 
supportive of a regime guilty of ‘genocide.’ That is perhaps the best argument to 
retain the word, and I choose  do so throughout this thesis. 12 Indeed I consider 
what happened in Cambodia a genocide. 
  
The death toll, as Fawthrop and Jarvis note, has been subject to controversy. 
Serious estimates range from the early conservative figure of 740,000 to 3.5 
million.13 Most studies are now converging around 1.6 million-2.2 million, around 
a third of the 1975 population.  In addition to the difficulty over number is the 
question of how many died as a result of killing and torture or as a result of 
starvation and disease wrought by Communist party policy. 14 Several scholars 
have worked on this issue. It is important in face of the troubling historiographies 
of Cambodian holocaust denial currently emerging from ideologically zealous  
‘revisionists’ such as Israel Shamir.15 A precise number is impossible.16  However 
we know that there was a contrived policy of mass killing and wilful ignorance of 
the suffering resulting from other policies.  Witness after witness testifies to 
                                                
9	  Ben	  Kiernan,	  ‘Bringing	  The	  Khmer	  Rouge	  To	  Justice’,	  	  Human	  Rights	  Review:	  Vol	  1	  No	  3,	  2000	  ,	  
92-­‐108,	  	  102-­‐104	  	  	  
10Fawthrop	  and	  Jarvis,	  Getting	  Away	  with	  Genocide?	  53-­‐58	  
11	  Ben	  Kiernan,	  ‘Bringing	  The	  Khmer	  Rouge	  To	  Justice’	  94	  
12 For	  clarity	  ,	  when	  I	  refer	  to	  genocide	  in	  this	  thesis	  I	  use	  the	  word	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  Raphael	  	  
Lemkin	  (	  who	  coined	  the	  term)	  defined	  it	  in	  1944	  in	  his	  book	  Axis	  Rule	  in	  Occupied	  Europe:	  Laws	  
of	  Occupation	  -­‐	  Analysis	  of	  Government	  -­‐	  Proposals	  for	  Redress	  (Washington,	  D.C	  :	  	  Carnegie	  
Endowment	  for	  International	  Peace,	  1944)	  79	  -­‐	  95 
13	  Bruce	  Sharp,	  Counting	  Hell,	  Mekong	  Net,	  2005	  
http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/deaths.htm.<Accessed,	  28	  February,	  2013>	  
14	  Fawthrop	  and	  	  Jarvis,	  Getting	  Away	  with	  Genocide?	  3-­‐5	  
15	  Israel	  Shamir,	  	  ‘	  Dispatch	  From	  Cambodia	  :	  Pol	  Pot	  Revisited’,	  Counter	  Punch	  ,	  September	  18	  ,	  
2012	  
<http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/09/18/pol-­‐pot-­‐revisited/><Accessed	  28	  February,	  2012>	  
16	  Craig	  Etcheson,	  ‘	  "The	  Number"	  Quantifying	  Crimes	  Against	  Humanity	  in	  Cambodia’,	  Mapping	  
Project	  1999:The	  Analysis,	  Phnom	  Penh,	  	  Documentation	  Center	  of	  Cambodia<	  
http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/toll.htm?<Accessed	  28	  February	  2013>	  
 5 
torture (experienced or seen), murder, family breakup and famine; mass graves 
exist all over the country; people live with long-term psychological health 
problems. All confirm the ‘systematic and massive scale’ of the regime’s policies 
of killing and destruction.17 Hence I proceed on the assumption that there was 
indeed genocide in Cambodia resulting from the policies of the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea. I agree with Fawthrop and Jarvis that for many years this 
genocide has been ‘forgotten’.18  The local and global amnesia took some effort to 
contrive, as I go on to show.    
 
A reckoning, in the shape of the ECCC, is now occurring after a perceived thirty-
year gap.  However this should not be understood as the only way the DK era is 
being resolved or as the only agent of justice.  Rather, it is a point from which the 
entire DK story and its aftermath can be hermeneutically read. This thesis is 
chiefly concerned to explore those other discourses and ideas   employed in the 
pursuit of transition and justice in Cambodia since 1979.  This means my working 
definition of the next core term, Justice, is relative rather than definitive:  a fluid, 
complex, ongoing process narrated in multiple ways, without fixed ends. The 
thesis contains a collection of ‘small’ depictions of people and communities from 
across the nation. To organise these and contextualise the thesis I adopt Amartya 
Sen’s concept of a continuum of justice .19 Sen argues that problems arise when 
there is focus on institutions rather than the lives people lead; this bears on how 
political and moral philosophy should be understood. Sen observes the 
concentration of the great moral philosophers (Rawls, Kant, Rousseau) on 
transcendental ideals of ‘perfect justice’. 20  They measure institutions in terms of 
how closely they realize these, rather than making comparisons of justice as 
realisable in human society. Perfect justice is a fiction. What is realisable is 
posing questions of justice in terms of the impact of social institutions on the lives 
people actually live. Sen cites slavery as an example: abolition would make the 
world less unjust.  A society without slavery will not become totally just, but in a 
slave-owning society there cannot be justice. To argue that justice is open, 
without fixed ends, means the thesis cannot reach a neat conclusion. Even if the 
ECCC process ended at the time of writing and I could look on it as a whole, such 
                                                
17	  Craig	  Etcheson,	  "The	  Number"	  	  	  
18	  Fawthrop	  and	  Jarvis,	  Getting	  Away	  with	  Genocide?	  	  53	  




conclusions depend on clear yardsticks, and I do not set out with any illusions that 
this is possible. 
 
Finally, I work on the premise that Justice cannot exist without narrative.    Justice 
is not concerned simply with punishing crime. It is something   told, spoken of, 
articulated, a way to discuss, frame and conceptualize events. The variety of 
voices in the narratives I examine   – including those from that perceived thirty-
year gap  - in which justice is articulated, makes it clear that any claim to possess 
a single way to wrap up the story – Marxism, Liberalism - excludes someone’s 
narrative and denies them justice.  
 
 My approach   
 
Through participant observation, documentary analysis and the collection of oral 
histories I have studied both  ‘formal’ processes such as the ECCC or the 1979 
People’s Revolutionary Tribunal and the  ‘informal’ processes described above.  I 
explore   Cambodia’s experience in dealing with post- atrocity justice within its 
own local intellectual traditions, and how this relates to western-dominated 
narratives of Transitional Justice. My study is focused on ‘living’ and ‘on-going 
events’ and as such needs to be flexible. Theory is part of the process - not its goal 
or starting point , but a response to the empirical data at the centre of my research. 
21 I focus on the themes of Meaning, Process and Narrative. How do processes, 
narratives, and meanings interact? What can these interactions tell us about justice 
in post-KR Cambodia?  What can they tell us about Justice as a concept in the 
wake of mass atrocity?  These broad research questions have been under a 
constant process of refinement as my work progresses.  
 
My theoretical framework is designed to unify my methodological and 
disciplinary diversity, as I make clear in the ‘breakdown of chapters.’ Throughout, 
I illustrate a relationship between macro and micro readings of the same period, 
moving from discussion of institutions to the experience of individuals. However, 
in moving from macro to micro readings I am not ascribing hierarchical positions. 
Both are of equal importance in building the narrative of justice in Cambodia.    
My aims and objectives are listed below:  
                                                
21	  John	  Flood,	  ,	  ‘Socio-­‐Legal	  Ethnography’,	  Theory	  and	  Method	  in	  Socio-­‐	  Legal	  Research,	  eds.	  Reza	  




• To understand the socio-cultural meaning of transition and justice and 
processes undertaken in the development of that meaning 
• To find out how people narrate their stories, to institutions or to one other 
• To ask why they tell these stories as they do  
• To learn what processes–official or unofficial - have been used to deposit 
cultural memories and why  
• To see if there is a Cambodian ‘transitional justice’   beyond the praxis of 
TJ 
Objectives 
• To ask what Cambodians think of justice, in relation to the official 
processes  
• To ask what Cambodians think of justice, in relation to the unofficial 
processes  (those within religion, for instance)  
• To gather oral histories that situate people in their social, cultural and 
political contexts in order to learn from individuals about the larger world 
in which they live  
 
Chapter outlines  
 
Chapter One provides an explanatory historical /political background and 
introduces key figures.  It does so by critically engaging with seminal works about 
modern Cambodian history, particularly   DK and its aftermath. Thus it is not 
simply a chronological outline of events but a backdrop to the historiography of 
modern Cambodia. It highlights core schools of thought and theoretical 
approaches and demonstrates some key debates. It is included chiefly for readers 
unfamiliar with the last sixty years of Cambodian history, but also introduces the 
issue of multiple narratives that figures across the whole thesis.  
 
Chapter Two is both a methodological and theoretical section. I discuss my initial 
methodological concern to undertake a ‘listening methodology’ and a Boltanskian 
en situation methodology, which takes social actors and their critical frames 
seriously in scrutinizing dominant narratives.  I expound the theoretical frame 
emerging from these goals  - that of  ‘narrative’. I introduce Lyotard’s idea of 
‘grand narratives’, his analysis of language games and the organization of the 
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basic units of expression - phrases - into phrase regimes and genres of discourse, 
through which justice is, or fails to be, articulated. 22  I also employ the 
structuralist device of the distinction between fabula and sjuzhet in constructing 
narrative, particularly as used by Todorov.   Together, these approaches provide a 
tool set to identify and analyze the ‘Differend’, the crisis of justice, which 
emerges from multiple tellings of the atrocities in Cambodia’s post-independence 
history. I also discuss how memory studies allow me to understand the meaning 
of my ‘narrators’’ stories in discussing the events of their lives.  
 
Chapter Three is a lengthy and complex section examining the ‘big’ narratives of 
justice, ‘told’ in three different trials of members of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea (CPK) executive: the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal, (PRT) in 
1979; the trial of Pol Pot by his own movement in 1997; and the on-going ECCC. 
Each system of justice has its discourse parameters, and each trial has an 
underlying narrative it performs to various audiences. I attempt to disentangle the 
complex set of narrative threads emergent from these three processes, and explore 
the flaws of each, as well as enquiring about the relevance (if any) of the courts’ 
‘big’ narratives to those ‘outside’ them - especially in relation to their personal 
narratives.  
 
Chapter Four acts as a ‘bridging chapter’ by analysing a restorative justice 
process, neither exclusively religious (its religious elements were elected by the 
participants) nor exclusively secular: the Victim Former Khmer Rouge Dialogue 
Project (VFKRDP),  run by an NGO, the International Centre for Conciliation 
(ICFC).  It raises some fundamental issues around genres of discourse and phrase 
regimes, the expression of small personal narratives, still-existing community 
divisions and the importance of narrative in the functioning of justice. In this 
chapter, not only are the limits of TJ exposed, but, for the first time in this thesis, 
the limitation of Buddhist discourses also.  Buddhism is as much a narrative as 
political narrations. While Buddhist semiotics and discourse entered the ICFC’s 
phrase regime, they did so as part of a non-Buddhist-specific discourse. 
Especially, I indicate where elements of Buddhist teaching (in particular the idea 
of ‘living in the moment’) seem to suppress anger rather than deal with it.  It is 
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also worth noting that the concept of Karma can be used to justify impunity. In 
this chapter I also explore Eugen Ehrlich’s concept of ‘Living Law’ as a social 
process that ‘does’ the work of justice; such social processes have considerably 
more flexible phrase regimes than formal ones.  
 
Chapter Five discusses alternative ways to narrate the DK period in relation to 
justice, through different phrase regimes and genres of discourse. In particular, it 
examines transition and justice through Buddhist discourses and semiotics. It 
begins with the problem of articulating and representing the atrocities of DK and 
examines public articulations of the personal within ceremonies and testimonial 
therapy. It then moves to more activist narratives, such as the Buddhist Peace 
Walks.  The chapter contends that the narratives of (inter) national institutions and 
NGOs appropriate even intimate and religious moments into dominant political 
discourse. Such appropriations have the effect of constraining emergent 
narratives. I explore the relationship between the political context and alternative 
public narratives that must be placed within it.  These are contained by ‘official’ 
discourses, and not in conflict with them  - yet this does not mean that they are 
‘in’ the official narratives.   
 
Chapter Six continues the theme of ‘telling the story’. It also discusses some 
specific Khmer cultural discourses  linked to Cambodian Buddhism. I discuss 
particularly how Phchum Ben (the festival of the dead) and the concept of Neak 
Tas have aided the ‘transitioning’ of communities from the DK period (and 
beyond).  I go on to discuss narratives that are not contained, which conflict with 
the official narrative, and as such are silenced, marginalised or forgotten.  I argue 
that the official vessel for depositing memory (the ECCC) fails to offer a way for 
groups outside its jurisdiction to express their narratives. I discuss   the experience 
of some former KR cadres in one of the movement’s last strongholds, Anlong 
Veng, who remember with some nostalgia being part of the KR, and are thus 
utterly transgressive of the state narrative. I explore David Chandler’s concept of 
‘induced amnesia’ as a way used to control, contain and produce history and 
memory. 23 I also talk about KR cadres who consider themselves victims, yet are 
excluded from being defined as such.  Finally, I look at the narratives of those 
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involved in the construction of one of the case 004 crime sites. I link these 
survivors of KR slave labour to state narratives that render them part of a blanket 
survivor/victim narrative, in which they are unable to express their personal or 
group experience beyond the official telling that categorises them.   
 
Chapter Seven helps to tie up the preceding chapters as it asks why my narrators 
want to tell their stories rather than how. It brings together the previous tellings to 
address themes they raise in the praxes of Time, Imagination and Memory. These 
are particularly significant,  as one of the overriding themes, throughout the thesis 
and in this final chapter, is the desperation of survivors to communicate the 
experience of DK to their (grand) children and the wider world, and to be believed 
when they tell the story.  
 
Reflexivity  
In 2010, I carried out research on Cambodian monks and how they thought about 
the ECCC. Indeed I initially became interested in Cambodia after reading the 
autobiography of Vann Nath, a civil party. 24 The Duch trial had not yet delivered 
a verdict and my work, while critical of the ECCC, was still optimistic about the 
process. Since then I have developed a more cynical attitude towards the ECCC. 
While I do not write off the process as a disaster, I   feel that at this stage (early 
2014) the legacy and impact of the tribunal hangs in the balance. I contend that in 
some ways the ECCC has been detrimental to Cambodia, arguably entrenching a 
culture of impunity and strengthening the executive’s influence over the judiciary. 
This thesis is not about the ECCC alone, and my scope is wider than just one, 
albeit large, institution. However, the ECCC will be the last large institution to 
deal with the DK period and will have a powerful impact in terms of how future 
historians read about it. I do not claim objectivity in this research. It is essentially 
constructivist and qualitative and the reading of the ‘texts’ is subjective. I do not 
claim to know what all Cambodians think about justice; but those of whom I have 
directly asked the question should be heard.  
 
                                                





                  




This chapter attempts two tasks. Firstly, it provides historical context some 
readers may find helpful.  Secondly, my discussion of a living, ongoing event is 
grounded in readings of a regime. Hence it is important to address critically the 
variety of ways major Cambodian political historians narrate its story. My thesis 
is situated ‘at the end’ of their narratives, with the regime   firmly in the past and 
being reckoned with at the ECCC.  Rather than offering another history, my work 
shows how the regime has been and is being addressed. It is about how people 
look back on a time, and in what political, cultural, philosophical and normative 
climate they do it.  I focus extensively on people remembering and reflecting. 
Hence some knowledge of historical developments is vital; but while I draw on 
the historical canon in this chapter, I address different issues.  I am not asking, for 
example, what factors were important in bringing the KR to power, or what White 
House decisions brought about specific outcomes. While this is self-evidently 
important, my concern is with how people convey stories and draw upon them. 
 
No contemporary historian would assume it is possible to narrate a stream of 
‘pure’ fact untouched by ideology, preconception or personal circumstance.  The 
historiography of modern Cambodia, however, is particularly noteworthy in that 
so many of its leading scholars are personally intertwined in its history. They saw 
the rise of DK first hand and/or have been involved in dealing with its legacy. 
David Chandler, Elizabeth Becker and Craig Etcheson, have been trial witnesses. 
Stephen Heder (also a trial witness) worked for Amnesty International on 
Cambodian issues. Helen Jarvis (a government supporter) headed  the Public 
Affairs Section of the ECCC. Craig Etcheson and Michel Vickery   worked for 
some period at the ECCC. Sophal Ear, a Khmer-American scholar, lived through 
the regime - his father was killed and he escaped  with his mother .  Becker  and 
Malcolm Caldwell both visited Phnom Penh during DK : Becker heard the 
gunshot when Caldwell  was murdered a few feet away. A discussion of the often 
ideologically bitter conflicts among historians in the field enhances contextual 
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understanding of the way this story is narrated. In reviewing this literature I seek 
to read it from the perspective of the people that I have interviewed . 
 
‘Can you see the King’s face in the moon?’ 
 
I start with an event that encapsulates the conflicting cultural, political and 
personal layers  in narratives of Cambodia.  It is the end of a personal story, and 
also of the embodiment of a national narrative  still resonating, as I show in 
Chapter Three :  the death of the ‘Father King’ Norodom Sihanouk  on 15 October 
2012.  Ideas of monarchy and nation are crucial to the past and the present I 
examine here . 
 
Fieldwork journal:  23 October 2012  - end of the period of mourning  
 
Everyone has been in white (the Buddhist mourning colour) all week. Two 
major scandals have erupted. One Thai TV journalist has had to publicly 
apologise for the picture of the king on the floor in shot during her report; 
and a Chinese factory overseer has been deported for taking down a 
picture of the King she said was too distracting for workers. This caused a 
near riot; before her deportation the courts made her pay homage to the 
King on national TV.   
 
I have been chatting to a couple of Cambodian intellectuals about   
rumours going around about the King’s face appearing in the moon. This 
is circulating among the mourners around the palace, and on social 
networking sites. You can see people coming out of their homes or leaning 
over their balconies, staring up at the sky in the early evening as the moon 
comes into view.  The rumour is that the king’s face is visible in the moon, 
smiling on his people.  
 
‘Westernized Cambodians feel torn discussing this. When we talk to 
westerners we get embarrassed. You all must think how gullible and 
superstitious our culture is, ha-ha – saying we can see the king’s face in 
the moon!  I can’t see it, but if you were Khmer I would tell you I could.   
Why? Because if I say to a westerner I can see it, you will say we are 
foolish and superstitious. If I say to a Khmer I cannot see it, he will say,  
“It’s because you’ re not a real Khmer.” I think people, especially in the 
village sometimes, think that of us who live in Phnom Penh.  When I go 
back home to my village everyone is a farmer. And my family and friends 
tease me, for I dress like a foreigner, I’m complaining about the 
government, I don’t like the smell of the cows  …You see Sihanouk was the 
last of the god kings – god faces can appear in the moon, I guess.’ 
 
From Independence to the end of the Republic: Cambodia 1953-1975 
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In 1953  Sihanouk’s deft handling of the French secured Cambodia’s 
independence without the bloodshed marking the process in other French 
colonies, including Vietnam. His own flamboyant account terms this a ‘Royal 
Crusade.’1 A national hero, he stepped down as monarch two years later, in favour 
of his father , to stand  successfully for office. On his father’s death he created for 
himself a double role , head of government and head of state ,without the title  
‘King’. Egotistical and sometimes violently repressive, he used his movement, the 
Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Popular Socialist Community) for personal power. 2  
Characteristically, it combined left and right factions, a hallmark of ‘Sihanouk-ist’ 
politics. His guiding domestic ideology was ‘Buddhist Socialism.’ As he informed 
Mao Zedong,  ‘In our country we practice our own brand of socialism …the rich 
give their money to the poor.’ (Mao muttered, ‘Socialism is very complicated’, 
and changed the subject). 3  As Chandler notes, Sihanouk was not well-versed in 
socialism but realised modernisation demanded a modern ideological label.  The 
social structures of Cambodia remained relatively unchanged. ‘Buddhist 
socialism’ upheld the ancient order: the rich provide for the poor, motivated not 
by desire to improve social mobility but for good ‘merit’ and good Karma; the ill-
defined concept rests on the requirement that there must be a rich.4 Sihanouk did 
achieve genuine  improvements, particularly in education.5  However, Cambodian 
socio-political structures were heavily grounded in a patron-client relationship. 
Vickery notes the division between urbanites and peasants aware they would 
never move beyond the social status of their birth.6 This division predated the 
KR’s categorisation of the population into ‘old / base people’ (the peasantry, 
revolutionaries, those who lived in KR-controlled areas during the civil war 
preceding the KR takeover) and ‘new ’/ April 17 people (urban professionals, 
ancien regime, people ‘new’ to the revolution from the areas controlled by the 
Republican Government).7 And, as my journal  indicates , there is still a divide; 
even today a rice farmer may perceive himself, and be perceived, as more 
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‘authentically’ Khmer than one of his countrymen in a western suit talking into a 
smartphone, while the latter winces at his lack of sophistication.  
 
Sihanouk, a feudal King, not a democrat, was genuinely loved by a large majority 
of his people. In the Cambodian Monarchic tradition he was quasi-divine, sui 
generis. Sihanouk envisaged his relationship to his people as that of father, 
protecting an ‘oasis of peace’ for his subjects. 8  Seeing the effects of 
industrialization in Thailand or Malaysia, Sihanouk eschewed their development 
model. His education policies aimed to create an intelligentsia to pursue 
knowledge and the arts (as well as making useful civil servants). However, this 
fostered a disgruntled generation of men and women, with no outlet for their skills 
and critical of the stasis shaped by Sihanouk’s feudal views.  (Many of them were 
executed under DK.) Simultaneously, pro-capitalists were concerned at 
Cambodia’s lack of development as other nations advanced. 9  
 
Pursuing independence through neutrality, Sihanouk played off France, Vietnam, 
China (who, he believed, would become the dominant power of Southeast Asia), 
the USSR and the USA (with whom he severed ties in 1963) , giving and taking a 
little at a time.   Arguably, his objective was to keep Cambodia out of the 
Vietnamese conflicts on his border. For a small, poor, militarily weak nation this 
was  exceptionally difficult  in context of the Sino-Soviet split, détente, and the 
Vietnam War - a convergence of Cold War politics on Cambodia’s border. In  
1965, Sihanouk permitted North Vietnamese bases  near the border, allowing 
military supplies from China to reach Vietnam via Cambodia – much to the 
irritation of the Kennedy/ Johnson administration. By this stage his domestic 
policy was unravelling.   His increasingly repressive line alienated the left.  
Simultaneously his control of the right waned as defence Minister ‘Marshal’ Lon 
Nol,  (appointed Prime Minister by Sihanouk in 1966), gathered credibility among 
conservatives disgruntled by economic failures, the presence of the Vietnamese, 
student uprisings and food shortages after bad harvests. In response Sihanouk 
(bizarrely for a head of government) formed a ‘counter government’ of the left.  
This included Khieu Samphan, who, however, fled after being threatened by 
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Sihanouk for protesting the violent repression of a leftist student uprising in 
Battambong in 1967.   
 
Sihanouk blamed this uprising on local ‘red’ Khmers, Khmers Rouges - a 
nickname that stuck. 10 Indeed this is a good place to note that the term ‘Khmer 
Rouge’ is  slippery, implying a single coherent political party : not an apt 
description of the multifaceted elements of Cambodian Communism.11 When I 
employ the term I copy the way my sources use it, and when   relevant I indicate 
the meaning of the term to a particular individual. I also present the very different 
ways that writers, sources and institutions employ it. ‘Khmer Rouge’ has multiple 
meanings; these meanings pertain to the meanings of justice I also write about.  
 
Sihanouk’s foreign policy of relying on China to keep the Vietnamese   from 
Cambodia’s borders was crumbling. China was absorbed in its own Cultural 
Revolution and cultivating a relationship with the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea (CPK).  The North Vietnamese also supported the CPK. What they 
lacked in terms of popular domestic support was compensated by the support of 
North Vietnamese military forces.  Once the KR became hostile to Vietnamese 
forces, they coerced villages into joining them instead. 12  Sihanouk tried 
rebuilding relations with the USA, hosting a visit from Jacqueline Kennedy, 
which opened the way for a visit by the US ambassador from India, Chester 
Bowles. During their meeting Sihanouk admitted he knew the Vietnamese were 
crossing into Cambodian territory, indicating he would not object if US forces 
crossed the border to pursue the Viet Cong.   This was the basis on which Nixon’s 
administration later justified carpet-bombing. 13  The illegal US bombing of 
Cambodia resulted in a major humanitarian crisis and over 100,000 mostly 
civilian deaths (a conservative estimate). 14  The US dropped 2,756,941 tons of 
bombs over Cambodia over the 1960s and 1970s. (To put this in perspective: the 
Allies dropped just over 2 million tons of bombs during the whole of World War 
II, including those at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 15,000 and 20,000 tons, 
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respectively). 15 During this assault, Sihanouk remained silent. Later Lon Nol 
actively requested ‘assistance’ from President Nixon.16 Despite this new US-
Cambodia relationship, the US gave little of the military aid Sihanouk’s generals 
anticipated; he was unable to keep his domestic and geo-political balancing act 
together.  In March 1970, Lon Nol usurped Sihanouk’s position as head of 
state/government. The  ‘Khmer Republic’ came into being later that year. 
Sihanouk claims the CIA conspired with pro-US players in Cambodia to get rid of 
him.17 There is little evidence of this, although his suspicion is not groundless:  
the CIA funded the right-wing guerilla group Khmer Serei in the late 1950s/early 
1960s.  
 
Sihanouk’s country was in dire economic straits.  Throughout 1969 he spent much 
of his time pursuing his hobby of moviemaking while the Phnom Penh elite lost 
faith in his capacity to govern.  Osborne’s biography comments on the tendency 
to look on the Sihanouk era with a sentimentality prompted by the awful nature of 
what followed, noting that this diminishes the violent, corrupt, exploitative   and 
chaotic nature of Sihanouk’s regime .18 On the other hand, Sihanouk was trying to 
retain his nation’s neutrality and independence in face of massive international 
pressures and an impossibly complex political situation. In his own words, ‘the 
humble people of Cambodia are the most wonderful in the world… their great 
misfortune is that they have always had terrible leaders who make them suffer. I 
am not sure that I was much better myself, but perhaps I was the least bad.’19 
 
The ensuing Lon Nol Regime was violent, corrupt and disastrous.  Famine hit. 
The economy collapsed as Cambodia entered a protracted civil war between the 
Khmer Republican army, the North Vietnamese leftist guerrillas (KR), and 
Sihanouk’s own guerrilla force, Front Uni National du Kampuchea (NUFK) all 
pitted against Lon Nol’s republican army, Forces Armées Nationales Khmères 
(FANK) backed by US money and bombs. Lon Nol ran on an ideological mix of 
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ethnic nationalism and local mysticism (neo-Khmerism).20 His army was ill 
equipped and badly trained. He became erratic, sending his soldiers (many of 
them children) on ‘holy wars’ against the Thmils (infidels) to recapture holy sites 
rather than enemy positions, protected by little more than ‘magic’ scarves. 21  By 
the end of the Republic, millions of refugees were pouring into Phnom Penh (one 
of the few places Lon Nol still controlled) as the KR advanced; indeed while the 
‘official’ start of the regime was the fall of Phnom Penh, the KR had been 
controlling and killing swathes of the nation for months.  American bombing had 
ceased, Watergate destroyed Nixon, Lon Nols’s most powerful supporter, and 
Gerald Ford failed to convince Congress to provide military aid to the Lon Nol 
government.22 
 
On April 17 , 1975, Saloth Sar (Pol Pot) stormed the capital. The earliest accounts  
of the ensuing disasters allot blame in  simplistic binary fashion. Nixon and 
Kissinger contended that the North Vietnamese were to blame for crossing over 
into Cambodia and supporting the communist movement inside the country :   
American military action taken in defence against totalitarian aggressors 
did not cause those aggressors to be totalitarian. If war had anything to do 
with the brutalization of the Khmer Rouge, it was a war instigated and 
relentlessly pursued by the North Vietnamese.23  
 
 The left attributed the rise of the Khmer Rouge to the illicit and extensive US 
bombing. Both views have elements of truth, and at the same time fail to 
encompass a complex picture.  
  
  The closed country:  unfolding awareness and the Standard Total Academic 
View  1975-1979. 
 
 At the start of this chapter I noted the detectable animosity between some  
scholars . It emerges from the politics of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and 
indeed the  1980s. I start with the best-known western academic controversy of 
the DK era .  As with North Korea today, the outside world knew little of DK in 
the 1970s. The country was sealed off  and evidence emerged piecemeal.  The 
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ways in which narratives about the regime  are constructed expose the ideological 
conflicts of the period and the relationship between scholars , their ideology, and 
their  sources.          
 
The earliest document readers may have encountered in this debate is a review 
article by Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman  for the Nation  in 1977. 24 It 
concerns three books: Murder of a Gentle Land: the Untold Story of a Communist 
Genocide in Cambodia;25  Cambodia: Year Zero;26   and Cambodia: Starvation 
and Revolution.27  All three  concerned  the new Communist government of 
‘Democratic Kampuchea’ (DK),  the name  the triumphant group had given their 
country, and Angkar (Khmer for ‘the Organization’), the pseudonym the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) gave itself . By the vast majority of  
accounts,  its own people knew little of their new leaders.28  It is symptomatic of  
the lack of  empirical knowledge in the west that Pol Pot  is never mentioned in 
these three texts as leader of the CPK ; he was  unknown . I begin with these texts,  
and this controversy,  not only because they are rare contemporary accounts of the 
regime , but also to illustrate my approach to narrative in the rest of the thesis .  
Chomsky and Herman conclude, ‘Barron and Paul’s work is a third-rate 
propaganda tract, but its exclusive focus on Communist terror assures it a huge 
audience.’ Ponchaud’s work they consider ‘far more substantial’ despite the ‘anti-
Communist bias and message’, noting dismissively, ‘It has attained stardom only 
via the extreme anti-Khmer Rouge distortions added to it in the article in the New 
York Review of Books.’ Finally, they state that Hildebrand and Porter’s book  
present[s] a carefully documented study of the destructive American 
impact on Cambodia and the success of the Cambodian revolutionaries in 
overcoming it, giving a very favorable picture of their programs and 
policies, based on a wide range of sources.  
 
 They expect it will be ignored by the mass media ‘because the message is 
unpalatable.’ This ‘unpalatable message’ from Hildebrand and Porter was that US 
saturation bombing (‘Operation Menu’) between 8 March 1969 and 26 May 1970 
                                                
24	  Noam	  Chomsky	  and	  Edward	  S	  .Herman,’	  Distortions	  at	  Fourth	  Hand’,	  The	  Nation	  ,	  6	  June	  1977	  	  
25	  John	  Barron	  and	  Anthony	  Paul,	  Murder	  Of	  A	  Gentle	  Land:	  The	  Untold	  Story	  Of	  A	  Communist	  
Genocide	  In	  Cambodia	  	  (New	  York	  :Reader's	  Digest	  Press,1977)	  
26	  François	  Ponchaud	  Cambodia:	  Year	  Zero,	  	  translated	  by	  Nancy	  Amphoux	  	  	  (New	  York:	  Holt,	  
Rinehart	  and	  Winston,	  1978)	  
27	  George	  Hildebrand	  and	  Gareth	  Porter,	  Cambodia:	  Starvation	  and	  Revolution:	  (New	  York:	  
Monthly	  Review	  Press,	  1976)	  97	  
28	  Martin	  Stuart-­‐Fox	  and	  Bunheang	  Ung,	  The	  Murderous	  Revolution:	  Life	  and	  Death	  in	  Pol	  Pot’s	  
Kampuchea	  ,	  (Bangkok:	  Orchid	  Press,	  1998)	  2-­‐4	  
 19 
was a principal source of economic disaster in Cambodia and that the communist 
takeover was a ‘response to real human needs which the existing social and 
economic structure was incapable of meeting’.29 Rather than investigating the 
substantive allegations of genocide made by the authors they criticize, Chomsky 
and Herman use their review to discuss the perceived ideological bias of western 
media against communist/socialist regimes.  Indeed Hildebrand and Porter’s 
conclusion : 
 Cambodia is only the latest victim of the enforcement of an ideology that 
demands that all social revolutions be portrayed as negatively as possible 
rather than as responses to real human needs which the existing social and 
economic structure was incapable of meeting. In Cambodia as in Vietnam 
and Laos the systemic process of mythmaking must be seen as an attempt 
to justify the massive death machine which turned against a defenceless 
population in a vain effort to crush their revolution  
 
chimes with the view Chomsky and Herman reiterate in Manufacturing Consent: 
The Political Economy of the Mass Media - that   anti-communist bias in the 
western media manipulates, distorts and suppresses information to suit capitalist 
interests. 30 To that end, tales of communist atrocities serve to discredit leftist 
ideas. Chomsky and Herman state they do ‘not pretend to know where the truth 
lies amidst these sharply conflicting assessments.’ However, they denigrate 
Barron and Paul without independently verifying the facts, and are critical of the  
‘extreme unreliability of refugee reports’and the interviews with KR survivors by 
Ponchaud, Barron and Paul. 31  The fact that Hildebrand and Porter are entirely 
uncritical of the DK regime appears to escape their notice.  
 
In hindsight it is obvious Ponchaud and Barron and Paul offer a more accurate 
(and morally acceptable) reflection of life in DK than Hildebrand and Porter’s 
apologia for KR policy. Today this at best appears naïve, at worse morally 
obscene. Asked at a hearing of the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on 
International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations on 
Human Rights in Cambodia about the sources for his conclusion that reports of 
mass murder in DK were untrue, Porter cited the following: a letter to the 
Economist by W.J. Simpson (never contacted directly by Hildebrand and Porter) 
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who claimed to have talked to Cambodian refugees and concluded that a few 
thousand people had been killed by the KR; an out-of-context quotation  from Ben 
Kiernan citing  irregularities in refugee testimony ;  and the ‘scholarly debate’ 
surrounding Ponchaud’s work.32 The footnotes to Cambodia: Starvation and 
Revolution cite a number of sources which were DK propaganda sheets. In 1978 
Porter distanced himself from his previous writings.33 34  
 
Hildebrand and  Porter  and Chomsky and Herman were , along with Laura 
Summers,  Malcolm Caldwell  and  Ben Kiernan ( who later changed his mind) , 
part of a group committed ideologically to pro-revolutionary  narratives  focused 
on anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and the superiority of communism/ 
socialism . DK survivor Sophal Ear states,  ‘They were so caught-up in the idea of 
a peasant revolution that they did not  stop and ask the peasants themselves how 
they liked the ride.’35 Developing a term coined by Michael  Vickery , Sophal Ear 
refers to this group’s narrative as the ‘Standard Total Academic View’.  They are  
‘standard’ in the sense of mainstream in their generation of  scholars or journalists 
in reputable left-leaning publications. (More seasoned scholars such as David 
Chandler  were of the previous generation,  not part of STAV.)  Historians are 
rightly critical of the way pre-KR Cambodia was popularly portrayed as ‘ a gentle 
land’ of peaceful Buddhists, 36  ‘paradise,’ 37 ‘a fairy tale kingdom’ of happy 
peasants -  an image Sihanouk deliberately cultivated. 38 Yet the  STAV  scholars 
created an equally simplistic  fiction, constructing the KR in   ‘romantic’39  terms 
as brave 1789-style revolutionaries battling the encroachment of American 
imperialism. 40 
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The works of KR apologists  and their later  perfunctory retractions and/or  
silence over the KR genocide  show how  metanarratives blinker  interpretation, 
and how theory and ideology fill  gaps in empirical knowledge .  A  similar kind 
of theoretical / ideological  literalism arguably allowed an academic theory 
(dependency theory) to cause the deaths of millions via the PhD thesis of Khieu 
Samphan. 41 While I deal with this in a later section,  it is worth noting here that  
Khieu was  an important  intellectual connection point for Caldwell and Summers. 
Summers translated part of his thesis and it was in light  of  his work that they 
wrote in defence of  the regime. 42  To develop my point I  will discuss how the 
three authors reviewed by Chomsky and Herman present the same event :  the 
evacuation of Phnom Penh, the prime focus of the trial in 2012 . (The indictments 
faced by the accused at the ECCC were split into different trials, controversially 
described  as ‘mini-trials’,  covering parts of the indictments. Since November 
2011 the focus has been on  such forced movement of the population from Phnom 
Penh and other urban areas. 43) Barron and Paul utilized the widest sample - over 
300 eyewitness refugees.44 Ponchaud based his book on testimonies of about 56 
refugees. 45 Hildebrand and Porter, like Chomsky and Herman, spoke to none.   
 
Barron and Paul narrate the story of the evacuation after an initially  cheerful 
welcome by the citizens to KR soldiers apparently  coming to end the war. Yet 
within days citizens were told by men with guns that   Angkar would provide, but 
they must evacuate  the city.  No one knew who, what or where Angkar was. On 
the march the elderly, the infirm and young children died and were left at the sides 
of the ‘National Roads’ (motorways) leading out of the city. It lasted days.  
People had only the food and water they had the foresight to bring.  The KR  
(many of them scared teenagers) screamed for people to move on. Those who 
lagged were shot. On this march of three million in a heat of 100°F (38 °C) in dry-
season Cambodia people witnessed atrocities:  ‘counter-revolutionary’ babies’ 
heads were smashed over tree trunks (a practice committed to instil terror and 
                                                
41	  Karl.	  D.	  Jackson,	  ‘The	  Khmer	  Rouge	  in	  Context’,	  Cambodia	  1975-­‐1978:	  Rendezvous	  With	  Death,	  
ed.	  Karl.	  D	  Jackson,	  (Princeton:	  	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1989)	  
42	  Khieu	  Samphan,	  ‘Underdevelopment	  in	  Cambodia’	  (completed	  in	  1959),	  partial	  translation	  by	  
Laura	  Summers	  for	  Indochina	  Chronicle,	  Indochina	  Resource	  Center,	  Berkeley,	  Issue	  No:	  51-­‐52	  
September-­‐	  November	  1976	  
43	  Trial	  Chamber	  -­‐	  15	  March	  2012	  Trial	  Day	  37	  (Case	  002)	  Doc.	  n°	  E1/49.1,	  2-­‐5	  
44	  	  Barron	  and	  Paul,	  Murder	  of	  a	  Gentle	  Land,	  106-­‐127	  
45	  Ponchaud,	  	  	  Cambodia:	  Year	  Zero	  ,	  xv	  
 22 
witnessed in many other places by many others). Many killed themselves.  
Soldiers confiscated items that would be banned throughout the regime (watches, 
western clothes, cigarettes, pens, baby food, medicine and some spectacles). 
Evacuees were told to work in the rice paddies from now on  - contradicting the 
reason they were given to evacuate (air raids) and the promise they could return in 
a few days. This, according to Barron and Paul, was when some of the worst 
trauma set in. People separated from their families now realised even if they 
survived the march, they would not soon be reunited. The  book details what is 
today confirmed as an accurate account. Like Ponchaud,  Barron and Paul’s  
stated desire in publishing was to bring global attention to what they saw as 
genocide,  estimating that by 1977 the KR had killed 1,200,000.46 Their narrative 
is written  (or re-written) in the standardised anti-communist rhetoric of their 
publisher, the Reader’s Digest . They mention no event prior to 17 April 1975, 
other than stating in vague terms that there had been  civil war . There is no 
mention of the US bombings. However, their evidence is meticulously 
documented and confirmed, unlike that contained within Hildebrand and Porter’s 
equally mannered leftist prose .   
 
Ponchaud , a Catholic missionary who lived  in Phnom Penh from 1965  to  May 
1975, states  at the outset his desire to see change  come to Cambodia  and his 
intent to avoid  blind infatuation with the revolution while not  being too critical.47 
His narrative is mediated through the testimonies of 56 refugees . It acknowledges 
the problems of his method and  the difficulty in verifying facts. 48 He clearly 
condemns the damage prior to the KR takeover, especially the US bombings , but 
argues that ‘the self-slaughter taking place at the moment must be denounced no 
less vehemently.’49  This was the first book to draw the world’s attention to what 
in his review of the book Jean Lacouture termed ‘auto-genocide’. 50   In 
Ponchaud’s narrative, the KR announce on entering the city that the Americans 
were preparing to bomb and every person must leave. Ponchaud saw hospitals 
emptied before he was delayed in the French embassy (where almost all 
foreigners were sent). There he witnessed and tried to help Cambodians desperate 
                                                
46	  Barron	  and	  Paul,	  Murder	  of	  a	  Gentle	  Land,	  206	  
47	  Ponchaud,	  Cambodia:	  Year	  Zero,	  x	  
48	  	  Ibid.	  xv	  
49	  	  Ibid	  .	  xvi	  
50 Jean	  Lacouture,	  The	  Bloodiest	  Revolution,	  	  The	  New	  York	  Review	  of	  Books,	  31	  March	  1977 
 
 23 
to seek asylum. He, like the others, saw an exodus of people forced to abandon 
their homes and families to march to some unknown destination; for the sick, old, 
infants, and starving, who were offered no assistance, this was a death sentence  – 
the city of two million was cleared of people in the space of a few days.  
Ponchaud reports utter confusion as to why the KR was doing this. However, he 
quotes an exchange with a KR official: ‘In Phnom Penh you eat rice but you don’t 
grow it…. go to the country and eat the rice you have grown.’51 Ponchaud 
describes his sense of watching an attempt to prove a theory, regardless of the 
human cost. He speculates that the reason for evacuation was because  
everyone knows that cities afford ideal hiding places for opponents of any 
regime, especially for one getting started . Emptying the town was a 
means of shattering traditional frameworks, mixing the entire population 
together indiscriminately and thereby cutting off any possibility of 
structured opposition. 52 
 
(This opinion was confirmed later by others.)  By quoting at length, Ponchaud lets 
the refugees he interviewed  explain the violence of the evacuation , and cites 
witness after witness to the piles of bodies on the roads.   What is now known is 
that the killing of former regime leaders and intellectuals started early. 53  
Ponchaud also recounts the stories of those in other cities such as Battambang 
undergoing a similar experience . 
 
Hildebrand and  Porter’s  narrative of the same event is radically different. They 
depict the KR as justified in their evacuation of Phnom Penh and  do not mention 
that the KR were carrying out evacuations in all cities. It is described as required , 
not forced . refugees who had poured into the city wanted to go back as the war 
was over and  the overpopulation  meant  epidemics and  lack of food. They trust 
Ieng Sary’s claim, ‘By going to the countryside, our peasants have potatoes, 
bananas, and all kinds of foods.’ 54 In this narration the evacuation was justified, 
carried out at a ‘comfortable pace’ with the sick and elderly  assisted in the 
process - at least  according to their source,  ‘a high-ranking Cambodian diplomat’  
interviewed  in  November 1975. 55 In addition, the revolution was attempting to 
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make the unproductive productive : a justifiable and necessary  social reordering 
was taking place. 
 
 STAV  academics were critical of the western  media’s  habitual  narrative   
against communist regimes.  Importantly, they highlighted the atrocity of  the US 
bombing, which  they identified   as the centrepiece of  contemporary Cambodian 
suffering.  Yet, so concerned were they to promote a guilt-based western  
narrative that they now seem blinkered . Critical of the hegemonic capitalist 
narrative through which socialist regimes are portrayed , they impose another 
hegemonic  narrative,  creating an artificial binary to steamroller nuance. Their 
own narrative of mythmaking  by western anti-communism leads them to dismiss  
narratives of refugees they have never met as overblown or unreliable , and to 
disparage reports by urban evacuees  from the comfort of their studies:    
 
 What the urban dwellers consider ‘hard’ labour may not be punishment or 
community service beyond human endurance ... Such associations take 
what is happening in Cambodia out of its historical and cultural context.56 
 
Interpreting  DK after 1979 
 
William Shawcross’s Sideshow (1979)   squarely blamed US policy for the rise of 
the KR , focusing on Nixon’s hatred of Sihanouk  and assistance to the Lon Nol 
government. 57  Shawcross is  mainly concerned with the actions of Nixon and 
Kissinger, their  contempt for US process and law of war, and their lack  of 
understanding about Cambodia, Vietnam and the war on the ground.  In 
Shawcross’s narrative,  ‘Operation Menu’ pursued a strategic goal without regard 
for the human cost ;  as it  hit deeper into Cambodia  killing scores of  civilians, 
the carpet bombing drove people to extremities of political resistance, boosting 
the capacity of  the Khmer Rouge. Shawcross contends  the KR was an almost 
inevitable product of the US action. He shares this narrative not only with the  
STAV  academics but , oddly, with Nixon . Both  sides contend that the rise of the 
KR is attributable  to externals impacting  on Cambodia (American/Vietnamese 
infringement on Cambodia’s independence). Yet as Ponchaud argues, one atrocity 
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does not excuse or explain  another. Most scholars now look on the KR not as a 
popular  communist /nationalist  movement,  but  as a small group getting lucky 
through  extraordinary   circumstances :  Vietnamese desire to destabilize  Lon 
Nol ; the support of Sihanouk as a rallying figure ; the US bombs that turned 
people against the Phnom Penh government; sudden withdrawal of US military 
assistance,  leaving the Lon Nol government defenceless.  
 
 Ben Kiernan  seeks more internal explanations behind one of history’s most 
violent regimes. 58 Kiernan was originally a STAV academic favourable to  the 
KR, who changed his mind after talking with  refugees on the Kampuchean/Thai 
border in the late 1970s. 59 His narrative, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and 
Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79, based on  interviews 
and documentary research,  locates racial  politics at the heart of  the violence.  
Kiernan suggests the regime, which  ‘extend[ed] more power over its citizens than 
any other in history’, was not Maoist ; rather, it  used Maoism as a tool because 
Maoism stresses the capacity of human will over material life. 60 Orthodox 
Marxism, by contrast , is a narrative of progression and thus  had little place  in an 
ideology  regressing society to ‘year Zero’. 61 DK presented itself as ‘leaping’ 
from feudalism to socialism with no  stages between ;  with socialism achieved  
through  societal  restructuring , the question would be how to progress from that  
point .  Kiernan shows this ‘instant socialism’ achieved  by the creation of what 
he  terms ‘the indentured agrarian state’.62 The  KR forced almost the entire  
population  to work in the rice fields;  everything was redirected to creating an 
agricultural society.  Everyone was enslaved ; there was no leisure ;  under 
military discipline  people lived and ate communally in barracks,  separated from 
their families.  
 
In Kiernan’s analysis, this was  done less to create a socialist society  than to 
benefit a conception of ‘real ethnic Khmers’ (a definition made by the small 
ruling clique of the CPK). Central to the label  ‘old person/base person’ was one’s 
                                                
58	  Ben	  Kiernan,	  The	  Pol	  Pot	  Regime:	  Race,	  Power,	  and	  Genocide	  in	  Cambodia	  under	  the	  Khmer	  
Rouge,	  1975-­‐1979,	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1996)	  16	  
59	  Ben	  Kiernan,	  ‘Vietnam	  and	  the	  Governments	  and	  People	  of	  Kampuchea’,	  Bulletin	  of	  Concerned	  
Asian	  Scholars.	  ,	  October-­‐December	  1979	  
60	  	  Kiernan,	  The	  Pol	  Pot	  Regime,	  464	  
61	  ibid.	  26-­‐27	  
62	  ibid.	  159	  
 26 
perceived ‘Khmer-ness.’ The aim of the revolution was to create a self-sufficient , 
ethnically pure Khmer society.   Kiernan’s narrative focuses on the CPK inner-
circle. Through this totally centralized control, the party  could direct policies for   
ethnically cleansing Cambodian society. Kiernan concludes this narrative by 
arguing that, while ethnic nationalism had some success ( particularly the anti-
Vietnamese sentiment), the mass killings resulted in resistance from those living 
inside Cambodia , and eventually persuaded Vietnam to invade in 1979. Kiernan 
presents the killings of other races (Cham, Thai, Laotian, Chinese, Vietnamese) as 
occurring alongside the purges of the increasingly paranoid party - the hunting 
down and killing of the Lon Nol era officials,  their families and friends , the 
murder of intellectuals, and the starvation, overwork,  disease, and day-to-day 
cruelty springing from the disastrous KR rice production policy,  affecting vast 
numbers  . 
 
Kiernan demonstrates  active discrimination and killing of the Cham Muslim 
minority, and  through statistical data shows  that  the  ‘new people’  killed  were 
disproportionately of non-Khmer ethnicity (Chinese, Vietnamese, Thai , Cham). 
Even among those defined by the regime as ‘base people,’ the greatest percentage 
of killings were  of non-Khmer ethnic minorities  (for example Chams).63 Kiernan 
switched his support to Heng Samrin , whose  puppet government was installed 
after the  Vietnamese  seizure of Phnom Penh on  7 January 1979 . He found in his 
race-based theory a way to analyse the actions of the regime, showing it  as a  
movement of ethnic nationalism rather than communism . He rightly  contends 
that there were strong  racist elements  . However, to contend that the KR were 
centred solely on race politics does not adequately explain the KR government’s 
violence. Testimonies of refugees in Barron and Paul, or Ponchaud, or the many 
survivor autobiographies,  demonstrate atrocity at an early stage,  not apparently 
motivated by race-hate but by class-hate.  
 
Kiernan’s work contrasts with Michael Vickery’s 1984 narrative of a ‘peasants’ 
revenge’, Cambodia:1975-1982. Vickery argues that a state calling itself 
‘communist’ or ‘democratic’ is not necessarily either.   While DK’s  degeneration 
into genocide is not an opening for anti-Communists to say ‘I told you so,’ the 
question of communism’s ideological role in extreme violence  cannot be written 
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off by Marxists as ‘fascist’. 64  Vickery’s narrative shows  the regime taking an 
exceptionally violent turn in 1977 , when Pol Pot instigated  party purges and  was 
preparing for war with Vietnam. Before 1977, Vickery argues, there were regional 
differences in terms of  both living conditions and the application of violence and 
killing. Initially city (new) peoples’ complaints about conditions were not 
understood by ‘base’ people ; the peasants had  such awful lives prior to the KR  
that seeing city folk live like the rest  had an element of Schadenfreude. 65 In this 
narrative the central CPK had less control than Kiernan claims. Indeed the 
leadership (‘petit-bourgeois radicals overcome with peasant romanticism’) could 
not control what it had set in  motion: a peasant revolution, with revenge exacted 
in deep-ingrained anger against  urban elites for a history of feudalistic oppression 
against the agrarian poor. 66 CPK leaders were ‘pulled’ along by the peasants.67 
Vickery argues that the chief characteristic of DK was that ‘nationalism, 
populism, and peasantism really won out over communism.’68 Unlike Kiernan, 
Heder and Tittemore69 and Jackson,70 Vickery does not see the KR leadership and 
command capacity  as   heavily centralized .  
 
It is important to note that  both Kiernan and Vickery were writing in the mid 
1980s . NATO was supporting Pol Pot’s KR as the ‘legitimate government’ in 
exile, against the Heng Samrin pro-Soviet People’s Republic of Kampuchea 
(PRK), the puppet government installed by the Vietnamese.  Even the CIA backed 
Pol Pot. Both Kiernan and Vickery describe this hypocrisy and both write in   
relatively supportive terms regarding the PRK - which they certainly see as 
preferable   to the return of Pol Pot.  
 
Theory and Execution: Marxist-Leninism/ Maoism, Dependency Theory and 
the implosion of DK.  
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A contrast to these analyses, which see the regime as failing because it was not 
Marxist enough, is that of David Chandler. Chandler regards the way the KR 
adopted and applied ideology as  ‘standard operating procedure’ for Communist 
states (the USSR, the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea). 71 The difference was that in Cambodia ideology was taken to 
its logical and literal conclusions. This difference between Chandler’s view and 
those of Vickery and Kiernan demonstrates the academic debate around the extent 
of Marxist-Leninism’s influence over the KR’s policies and actions.  
 
However, Chandler identifies a specific strand of KR ideology, one he likens to 
the DPRK’s concept of Juche.72 Khieu Samphan’s PhD thesis offers insight into 
the regime’s chief narrative.  Khieu postulated that the development theory of 
Samir Amin should be applied to Cambodia.  He argues that (neo)colonial 
exploitation integrates the labour and resources of   Third World countries into the 
global economy only to take from them. A small elite in the Third World consume 
the products of the second and first. The exploited of the Third World are not 
consumers, but live on subsistence while their labour and national resources are 
used by richer countries.  Hence there is no domestic consumer market, which 
keeps the worker’s wage minimal. As long as the Third World remains part of the   
global economy it will be exploited. The remedy is withdrawal from the system 
and readjustment of the economy for domestic proletarian/peasant interests. Once 
a country has achieved domestic restructuring and attained a level of wealth, it can 
re-enter the global economy on a more equitable plane. Such withdrawal/ 
restructuring is only achievable through ‘revolutionary means.’ 73 One can see 
how if this thesis were taken to its  logical extreme, it would result in total global 
withdrawal: at its most isolated and withdrawn DK even refused food and medical 
aid from China, its closest ally.74  
 
                                                
71	  David	  Chandler,	  Brother	  Number	  One:	  A	  Political	  Biography	  of	  Pol	  Pot:	  (Boulder:	  Westview	  
Press,	  1992)	  4	  
72	  David	  P.	  Chandler,	  The	  Tragedy	  of	  Cambodian	  History,	  237	  
73	  Khieu	  Samphan	  ,	  ‘Cambodia’s	  Economy	  and	  Problems	  of	  Industrialization:	  Underdevelopment	  
in	  Cambodia,’	  	  translated	  by	  Laura	  Summers,	  Indo-­‐China	  Chronicle	  Sept-­‐Nov	  1976,	  Issue	  51-­‐52,	  
Berkeley,	  Indochina	  Resource	  Center	  	  
74	  Becker,	  When	  the	  War	  Was	  Over,	  	  170	  
 29 
In The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea, Craig Etcheson characterises  
the KR as ideologically mixed, without a consistent party platform. 75In his 
narrative he perceives and labels factions with different ideological orientations 
and reasons for involvement with the KR. For example, Sihanouk had merged his 
guerrilla group with the KR, and thus some KR ‘communists’ joined up to fight 
for King and Buddhism.76 Among other factions were Stalinists/ Pol Pot loyalists, 
Maoists, Internationalists (pro-Hanoi) Pracheachonists (leftists inclined to overt 
and democratic action) and Issarakists (anti-Vietnamese and anti-monarchist). Ta 
Mok was a prominent member of the latter and in light of his later actions, 
Etcheson’s analysis looks prophetic: Ta Mok put Pol Pot on trial in 1997.  Each 
faction brought another element into a complex ideological mix: socialism-in-one-
country, Great Leap Forward, anti-imperialism, ‘stage leaping’, ‘democratic 
centracism.’ 77To this can be added the ultra-nationalism, racism and chauvinism 
almost all Cambodia historians recognize as vital to the KR’s make-up.  In 
Etcheson’s narrative these aspects bleed into each other over each phase of KR 
history, from its origins as a component of the Indochinese communist party in 
the 1930s onwards. He identifies four phases within which parts of the ideological 
mix vied in turn for power:  the ‘Pracheachon’ phase of active participation, until 
the late 1960s,when Sihanouk cracked down on dissent; the guerilla   phase, up to 
1975; the regime phase (DK) - the building of the utopia and war with Vietnam; 
and finally the slow withering of the movement over the years after it lost power.  
In Etcheson’s narrative, DK was the triumph of the Stalinist faction (Pol Pot, Ieng 
Sary, Khieu Samphan, Son Sen) - the most committed to party discipline via 
regular rustications, anti-Vietnamese, vengeful and anti-monarchist. 78 They 
prioritized internal security using purges (KR killing KR) to secure the party line 
of the central committee and purify the party of opposition. This resulted in the 
deaths of hundreds of thousands accused of working for Lon Nol, the CIA, the 
KGB. As the regime wore on and the threat of war with Vietnam heightened, 
purges ranged wider; there was full-scale class extermination by 1978. This 
ironically led to the weakening of the party as more died in internal purges. 79 
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Etcheson highlights issues within Khmer culture formulaic of the way the regime 
emerged and acted, which I discuss below. 
 
Karl Jackson’s edited volume Cambodia, 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Deathhas 
a strong focus on ideological input. 80 Several authors are former US State 
Department employees  - Carney and Quinn, whose troubling reports on the rise 
of the KR and the regime throughout the1970s were ignored, and Twining, who 
was working with DK refugees in Thailand. Jackson and Quinn in particular focus 
on the makeup of the regime as a motivating factor in policy, arguing that KR 
ideology combined elements of Marxist-Leninism, Stalinism, Maoism, 
nationalism and post-colonial theory.81 The KR leadership educated in Paris - 
including Pol Pot, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith - were influenced 
by the Stalinist/democratic centralism promoted by the French Communist Party 
of the 1950s.82 Quinn characterizes the KR as a small group of leftist intellectuals 
enraged by the corruption of their country, seeking to emulate the Maoist 
programme of massive agrarian work to produce a surplus of rice, achieving self-
reliance as discussed in Khieu’s thesis. 83 The collectivization of agriculture 
resulted in nationwide famine. As a group the KR preyed on the poorest, 
especially children and teens, training them on Stalinist lines to bring down 
traditions of Khmer civilization they saw as the source of corruption in 
Cambodian society.84 They operated with total ideological literalism regardless of 
the consequences for the population.85 Jackson identifies four components to KR 
ideology: self-reliance, dictatorship of the proletariat, supremacy of the partyand 
immediate economic and cultural revolution, imitating China’s ‘Great Leap 
Forward’ (GLF). 86  The GLF aimed to skip transitional phases and achieve 
immediate communist society.  
 
Jackson recounts a story from Sihanouk’s book My War with the CIA where  
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai privately counseled Khieu Samphan and  Ieng 
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Thirith not to follow ‘the bad example of our “great leap forward”’ .87 The KR did 
not learn from the Chinese experience, instead believing they had identified two 
reasons for GLF failure (opposition from within the Chinese Communist Party 
and China’s size as an obstacle to policy implementation). 88 The KR killed all 
opposition in the party through a series of purges. Ideological purification of party 
and state was the priority. Minor ‘offenders’ (complaining about lack of food, 
sluggish performance at work, having sex outside marriage) were executed. 89 The 
narrative of both Jackson and Quinn, then, is about a regime where party ideology 
was at once cause and justification for extreme violence. 
 
Stephen Heder offers a different narrative. 90 He documents a detailed history of 
Communism across Indochina, in particular the origins of Indochinese 
Communism through the Indochinese Communist Party of the 1930s, which 
sought to make revolution throughout Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Heder 
argues that the Khmer Workers’ Party (KWP- later the CPK) was influenced and 
stewarded by the communist Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP).  The KWP/CPK 
sought to implement the Vietnamese socialist/revolutionary model in Cambodia. 
Later, however, the CPK obfuscated the role of the VWP.  Heder’s narrative thus 
challenges the notion that the French-educated KR leaders were as influential as 
Jackson, Quinn and the 1970s STAVs imply.   He argues that the KR leadership, 
in particular Pol Pot, wanted a ‘perfected version’of the Vietnamese revolution . 91 
This, he states, made them increasingly  anti-Vietnamese as they sought autonomy 
from a Hanoi insistent that the Cambodian revolution should reflect its socio-
political-economic context, very different from that of Vietnam - which meant 
that Cambodia should adopt a secondary role in Indochinese revolutionary 
politics, following   Hanoi’s instructions and example.  More important, the VWP 
privately took the position that while it supported armed Cambodian revolution, it 
should wait for the defeat of the USA in Vietnam, not least because they did not 
want the Chinese weapons Sihanouk’s government allowed to pass through 
Cambodia to be diverted by local insurrection from reaching Hanoi. Later on the 
KWP/CPK distanced itself from Vietnam. Meanwhile, Hanoi was eager to 
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distance itself from the genocidal regime next door as Cambodian revolutionaries 
stuck to formulaic ideology and its attendant violence despite all the evidence of 
failure. Heder has an important discussion of violence by the Southern 
Vietnamese Communists in 1960. Doctrinally, the rationale was that because the 
enemy was inherently violent, revolutionary violence was justifiable, and political 
and armed movements were on an equal footing. With this idea endorsed by the 
Politburo, Hanoi instigated terror campaigns against local officials and organized 
peasant insurrections against police and army, resulting in the overthrow of the 
anti-communist government of South Vietnam. 92 The KR’s ideological 
justification for violent action emerged from this policy, mutating into the 
‘revolutionary Violence’ they utilized whenever they encountered  disjunction 
between ideology and implementation. 93  Heder’s narrative shows the KWP/CPK 
leadership influenced by theoretical Marxism, versed in its intellectual 
developments and connected to international communism, particularly through 
their allies in Vietnam. As a party the KWP/CPK was welcomed as Marxist by 
communists across the world (witness the STAV scholars). Only later were their 
policies dismissed as Fascist by Marxists eager to divorce the evils of DK from 
Marxist theory. 94  
 
Another illuminating and stylistically different narrative showing how ideology 
was used is the collection of propaganda slogans and songs in Henri Locard’s Pol 
Pot’s Little Red Book: The Sayings of Angkar.95 Its hundreds of slogans denounce 
as counterrevolutionary such features of life as   religion, consumerism, money, 
education, the past, property, the CIA, the KGB, the Vietnamese, ‘April 17 
people’  (New People), the sick, people who complain of hunger, the monarchy, 
sex, selfhood, family, parents, traditional customs, medicine.  They glorify war, 
labour and the party, whilst reminding people of the quasi-supernatural 
omnipresence the party claimed . Locard points out that in a society with such a 
strong oral tradition as  Cambodia, where the internal party newssheet  The 
Revolutionary Flag was only for those in senior roles and  not  mass consumption,  
people’s knowledge of party ideology came from slogans  blared through tannoys 
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or painted on banners. Locard argues that the method fits  traditional   educational 
methods - making people memorize slogans and parrot them back.96 
 
The problem with keeping ideology central to the narrative is that behavior can be 
misinterpreted. It is worth asking the extent ideology actually impacted the day-
to-day killings, tortures and cruelty. It seems possible there is a point where 
paranoia overcomes ideological design as   primary motivator.   Did lower cadres 
have any idea what the revolution was?  Other kinds of analysis  - cultural 
analysis, or psychological investigation such as the Milgram experiment - offer 
insight into the behavior of cadres with minimal knowledge of theoretical 
Marxism. 97 As Hinton points out, complex studies of ideology and policy strip 
the complexity of motivation and agency from the majority of the population .98  
It is to these other kinds of narrative I now turn. 
 
Narratives of Culture   
 
Vickery considers that seeking explanation of the Cambodian holocaust in the  
‘Khmer Personality’ is fruitless, arguing that political /social/economic analysis 
provides more ‘objective’ explanations than  ‘nebulous psychologizing.’99 He is 
scathing about the  ‘arrant nonsense’ of western writers on Southeast Asian 
Buddhism. Heder’s research also suggests Cambodians view the DK period in 
class terms. However, understanding a spectrum of frames of reference, mentality 
and worldview provides insight not only into the regime but how it is interpreted 
after the fact (my main focus in this thesis). One of the most significant 
interventions into the literature about Cambodia was David Chandler’s Songs at 
the Edge of the Forest: Perceptions of Order in Three Cambodian Texts in 1978, 
identified as a seminal text by many academics for its use of ‘thick description’.  
100Chandler analyses the ancient, early modern and colonial periods and uses 
cultural sources such as poems, songs, rituals and stories to contextualise his 
narrative and create a template for his subsequent work on Cambodian history.    
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 His History of Cambodia argues that far from being, as some characterise it, 
unchanging for thousands of years, Cambodia has  been subject to major historical 
shifts . He  explores a pattern in Cambodian history describable as ‘tragedy’ in the 
Aristotelian sense, presenting history in terms of individual leaders with personal 
flaws and tyrannical tendencies; this individualism is however set against a study 
of   insurmountable external geo-political circumstances, which play the role 
allotted to ‘fate’ in classical tragedy in its narrative of the interplay between man 
and circumstance. 101 In The Tragedy of Cambodian History Chandler again 
explicitly adopts the approach of narrative as this  
 
has the virtue of staying close to the way that many people who 
experienced this portion of Cambodian history prefer to remember it and 
close to the unfolding, overlapping narratives of their lives. 102 
 
Chandler defines ‘ tragedy’ as comprising bad leaders (Sihanouk, Lon Nol and 
Pol Pot) within a nation vulnerable to geopolitical pressure  (exacerbated by a 
geography rendering it easily invaded), a culture influenced by perceptions of a 
militaristic Cambodian past and ancient societal power dynamics. He shows 
Cambodia   as a country where the personality of its leaders colours its trajectory. 
This is clear in Chandler’s analysis of Pol Pot as a man asserting national 
sovereignty in the face of Cambodia’s history of patronage and weakness. 
Chandler contends that the irony of the French colonial period is that it was they 
who affirmed Cambodia as a nation state. Throughout the nineteenth century, 
Thailand and Vietnam encroached on Cambodia and hence both  ‘have difficulty 
perceiving Cambodia as a free and sovereign state.’103 In addition, Chandler 
argues, the small country is constantly at the mercy of larger regional and 
international powers.  Between the legacies of the French, the Americans, the 
Vietnamese and the United Nations, many Cambodians favour protection over 
independence; indeed Chandler suggests anti-colonialism is not strong in 
Cambodia, and while the French enjoyed Cambodia in unashamedly orientalist 
fashion the colonial experience of Cambodians was not unpleasant.  
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Chandler’s book narrates a revolution from above, exploiting traditional power 
dynamics dominating domestic politics – a patron-client, student-teacher order. 
This was compounded by the Buddhist notion that power is aligned to merit.   
Reviewing The Tragedy of Cambodian History in 1996, Chandler presented a 
pessimistic vision of the future - Hun Sen, corruption, and foreign domination 
again. He reinforces this by narrating the distant past and the legacy of Angkor. 104    
Angkorian temples   became a focal point of Khmer Nationalism in the nineteenth 
century after French scholars /historians/archaeologists took pains to restore 
them.105Indeed it is symptomatic of the nature of the revolution that, rather than 
the Star or Hammer and Sickle, the symbol on the red flag of DK was a yellow 
silhouette of the Angkor temples. As Chandler argues, Angkor Wat can be read 
not as the accomplishment of a great civilization, but as a symbol of domination 
and power. 106 The structure would have taken thousands of slaves to build for the 
glory of one man. Chandler also points out that the modern image of the 
Angkorian Empire and its decline was a story the French told their colony after 
the 19th century excavations/restorations. Their narrative was of a Cambodia 
falling from domination in the ninth and fourteenth centuries to present weakness 
- highlighting that, without the French, Cambodia would have been absorbed into 
neighbouring countries.  Reaction to this French narrative, Chandler argues, 
awoke nationalism and created the grandiose nostalgic vision of the past and 
future shared by Sihanouk, Lon Nol and Pol Pot.107 
 
Like Chandler, Elizabeth Becker takes a post-colonial approach, preoccupied with 
‘thick description’ and attaching importance to the history of Cambodia’s distant 
past. A journalist from the Washington Post, Becker was one of the few 
westerners to interview Pol Pot during his time in office.  Unlike other writers she 
does not blame the US bombing or Vietnamese interference for the KR rise to 
power and later atrocities, nor does she focus heavily on ideological explanations 
– although she acknowledges that both of these were significant factors. Rather, 
she looks into the cultural and historical elements of Cambodia to argue that the 
KR was a product of their own history, but not an inevitable consequence of it. 
The KR, in Becker’s narrative, were lucky to attain power; they could not do so of 
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their own volition but the combined actions of Cambodia’s Machiavellian leaders, 
the US and the Vietnamese, enabled them to gain control. Becker presents an 
extraordinarily complex and messy history in which Cold War politics, ideology 
and culture mix.   Becker directly links the KR to the ancient culture brought to 
Cambodia by Indian Brahmans in the second century C.E. The Khmers adapted 
Indian cosmologies, gods, institutions and political structures (all powerful god-
kings). The cultural impact of this subsequent Angkor era was so powerful as to 
impact on twentieth century politics, including the communist movement.  Becker 
characterizes DK as akin to life under Jayavarman VII 1181-1218 C.E.). Under 
this God-King  Angkor became the Khmer Empire’s new capital. Becker quotes 
George Coedes’s description of Jayavarman VII  as a  megalomaniac : 
 
…one must visualise the armies of carriers slaving on the slopes, 
of porters dragging those enormous blocks of sandstone, of masons 
filling the stones together… these human ants, not inspired by 
collective faith…but recruited by conscription to erect mausoleums 
for the glory of their princes…108 
 
 Becker sees this is an image  of DK also : slaves living in barracks, minute 
rations,  vast labour- intensive projects such as the Trapeng Tham Dam.  Angkar 
is the successor to the Angkorian  Empire,  the Communist Party taking the place 
of the god-kings;  indeed Cambodians had never known any other form of 
government apart from the sham democracy of Sihanouk and the disaster of Lon 
Nol. Chandler even suggests Pol Pot consciously took the Angkor era as its model 
of government. 109 
 
Becker contends that the KR took their ideological lead from China and, like 
Heder, sees  Vietnam as a major influence ( although not  to the extent  Heder 
does). She argues that when Cambodians  took these foreign ideologies they  
interpreted them in the Khmer political tradition of god-kings. Sovereignty was 
interpreted as authority, independence and self sufficiency seen as synonymous 
and the method of ‘revolutionary violence’ discussed previously reformulated  by 
the KR as violence and murder to eliminate all class enemies. One can see the 
traditional idea of Justice enforced with extreme violence for defiance of the 
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King’s Rule  in the almost universally known story  Tum Teav.110 Here infractions 
against the king’s commands are punished by having an individual’s  entire 
family (seven generations)  boiled alive and the neighbouring townspeople  told 
that they are now hereditary slaves. Becker finally identifies the roles of  
Buddhism and the religious tradition. While the KR sought to destroy Buddhism, 
banning it and forcing monks to disrobe immediately, everyone involved in the 
movement was versed in it . Becker contends that despite the ban,  Buddhism  was 
still one of the foremost ways of conceiving   the world. Buddhism teaches that in 
this world life is suffering .  She also cites  Khmer prophecies   about the coming 
of hell on earth, such as the era that ends the  Kali Yuga ‘age of Vice’ ( a concept 
from Hindu cosmology)  theorising that Cambodians were less inclined to rise 
against DK if they saw the world in terms of  Buddhist fatalism . 111 
 
Intimate Narratives – Torture, the Body and the Psyche 
 
Unlike Becker, Peg LeVine links the response of the people to the DK regime to 
other traditional beliefs such as animism. The KR made little effort to assert the 
validity of their politics via mass propaganda like  other Communist countries.112 
There was no personality cult surrounding Pol Pot; few people even saw a picture 
of the Prime Minister. The CPK used only ‘revolutionary violence’: state 
terrorism with arbitrary killings, tortures, disappearances and marriages. 113 Le 
Vine contends that this convinced Cambodians they existed in a panoptic society. 
‘Angkar has the Eyes of a pineapple.’114 The CPK presented itself in language 
deifying Angkar – tapping into culturally embedded spiritual sentiments as a 
terror tactic to convince people of a massive level of surveillance akin to divine 
omnipresence. Le Vine notes that her interview subjects still conceive Angkar 
metaphysically and are afflicted by a profound angst towards DK even after its 
fall. 115 She argues that unlike, say, Papa Doc in Haiti, the KR did not deliberately   
exploit the cultural propensity for animistic perception, but certainly benefitted 
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from it. 116 Locard suggests that the KR’s rabid anti-religious sentiment springs 
from an idea of God as the Party’s competitor.117  
 
The narratives of Chandler, Becker, Levine and Hinton take pains to discuss 
cultural factors, not in order to explain the KR, but to indicate a range of factors 
characterising the DK period  in a wider cultural, and historical context and to 
understand how the regime is perceived by the population. Chandler’s Voices 
from S-21is a study of DK’s best-known security centre (S-21) where 
approximately 20,000 perceived enemies of the revolution or those with 
‘bourgeois tendencies’ were sent to have confessions taken under torture and 
dispatched to Choeung Ek to be murdered. 118 Chandler discusses how torture 
(‘doing torture’) and Marxism (‘doing politics’) were fused. He argues that ‘total 
institutions’ - places of work/residence where large groups live cut off from wider 
society, where life is governed by rules and formal administration, as if the whole 
of society were a monastery or a boarding school - are a feature of all 
dictatorships, however different their culture. The explanation lies not in culture 
but in aspects of the human condition: the capacity to obey, groups bonding 
against strangers, yearning for approval. Chandler describes how ordinary men 
and women, uneducated peasants (KR made a virtue of ignorance), mostly under 
25 and some as young as 13, were manipulated and seduced by revolution.  Most 
of the S21 staff came from similar backgrounds to the prisoners. They were 
processed through the structured mechanisms of the regime, conditioned into 
accepting extreme violence as a norm of professional life and the prisoners they 
were abusing as sub-human. It is disturbingly easy to make people into monsters,  
as the  Zimbardo prison experiment and the Milgram experiment  suggest.  
Chandler’s narrative is in keeping with these conclusions. 
 
Alexander Hinton  simply asks Why Did They Kill? 119 He spoke to those who did. 
Hinton, an anthropologist, makes a social constructivist argument. People are 
‘meaning-makers who draw on a repertoire of personal and cultural knowledge to 
                                                
116	  ibid.	  161	  
117	  Locard,	  Pol	  Pot’s	  Little	  Red	  Book,175	  
118	  David	  Chandler,	  Voices	  From	  S-­‐21:	  Terror	  and	  History	  in	  Pol	  Pot’s	  Secret	  Prison	  (	  Berkeley:	  
University	  of	  California	  Press,2000)	  
119	  Alexander	  Laban	  Hinton,	  Why	  Did	  They	  Kill?	  Cambodia	  in	  the	  Shadow	  of	  Genocide	  (Berkeley:	  
University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2005)	  
 39 
comprehend and construct meaning out their social lives.’120 Culture, in Hinton’s 
narrative, does have significance and the KR was able to tap into violent aspects 
of Khmer culture – in particular the notion of ‘disproportionate revenge,’ or ‘a 
head for an eye’. 121 Again he cites the extremities of the King’s actions in Tum 
Teav as indicative of this mentality. Like Vickery, Hinton highlights the element 
of ‘getting back’ at the ‘new’ people. However the ‘disproportionate revenge’ 
concept is of greater importance to his argument. Khmer culture is concerned with 
‘face’ and honour. Perceived humiliation legitimises disproportionate revenge.122 
The KR ‘revamped the cultural model of disproportionate revenge in accordance 
with Marxist-Leninist views of class’- allowing the poor to take revenge on the 
rich. 123 Thus in Hinton’s narrative, social divisions were exacerbated or 
manufactured by the KR.  This can explain the massive death toll of the DK 
regime:  hundreds of thousands died in the early 1970s from the bombings and the 
Lon Nol regime  - thus millions died when the KR took power.  
 
This cultural argument is controversial, but should not be dismissed out of hand.  
It is reasonable to describe a violent ideology as exploiting the most violent 
aspects of a specific culture to serve its agenda. (Fascism is not inherently 
Germanic, but the Nazi party is a uniquely German expression of Fascism.) 
Indeed there are some universals that can be drawn on in Hinton’ s argument. The 
KR put the men of S-21 through a process of what he calls ‘genocidal priming.’124 
He argues that all genocidal regimes require some kind of  ‘historical process that   
generates a genocidal context in which orders are given and obeyed’.125 To  ‘heat 
up’ the situation and prepare people to kill, all genocidal regimes ‘manufacture 
difference’ (create scapegoats and sub-humans) to facilitate the extermination of 
those elements of society they want to dispose of (Jews, Tutsis, intellectuals, the 
bourgeoisie ). This process creates a subjective inner dialectic that pumps the 
individual killer with genocidal enthusiasm combined with the moral 
‘legitimisation’ of killing.  
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Perhaps the main flaw of Hinton’s approach is that he has generalised a concept 
(disproportionate revenge) and given it disproportionate weight.  The strength of 
this work lies in individual narratives. He shows how individuals connect at a 
subjective level to a wider narrative - the high modernism of the KR ideology. He 
shows how the men at S-21 were saturated in Khmer Rouge ideology until they 
believed they acted for the revolution - their hatred culturally primed by the 
regime, but their actions motivated by concern to prove they were not ‘the 
enemy.’ In this telling of events, torture and killing are not about mindless 
obedience, personal evil or brainwashing. These men interpreted the orders and 
made sense of DK though a subjective understanding; cultural context, ideological 
understanding and simple fear and paranoia all contributed to the meaning-making 
individual’s subjective response. Genocide is complex, both subjectively and 
culturally understood and enacted. It occurs at the intersection between micro and 
macro, external and internal, in relation to the self and the other.  
 
 Voices of S21 and Why Did They Kill? share a strong sense that the line between 
victim and perpetrator is not clear. Arendt’s book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A 
Report on the Banality of Evil shows evil can become part of the everyday. 126 
Hinton is more postmodern, focusing on  the multiplicity of truths, subjectivities 
and agency interacting with culture and meanings in a complex dialectical 
process. Both contrast to the narrative of Seanglim Bit. As the first Cambodian 
social-psychologist he advances an argument a non-Cambodian  scholar would 
perhaps not dare : that there are elements of Khmer culture  prone to violence,  
and aspects of the ‘national psyche’  needing reformation so the problems that led 
to the KR and post-DK developments can be addressed to save a culture. He 
asserts, ‘Generations have been brutalized and [ are] content to live within their 
traditions without carefully examining their meaning.’ 127  He contends  that 
Angkor’s legacy  permeates the national psyche , with its baggage of  god-kings, 
aggressive  Brahman gods glorifying conquest, politics intertwined with religion 
and the legitimisation of subjection and hierarchy. He complains of a glorification 
of  warrior heritage. The deference to authority and power means deviation is  
severely punished to ensure order, and society is inherently conservative and 
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unwilling to listen to new ideas (for example on gender relations). There is 
excessive reliance on mythical/superstitious explanations, people preferring  
fortune tellers over common sense . The belief system  prohibits expression of 
anger, creating a ‘volcano effect’ when suppressed emotion finally erupts. 
Violence is often collectivized. Seanglim Bit’s book is  wide-ranging,  presenting 
Cambodian culture in  crisis.  He wrote in the early 1990s,  with  liberalism and 
democratization about to enter the Khmer narrative, and  recommended  the 
embrace of such ideas and a reformulation of aspects of Khmer Culture.  
 
After DK - The People’s Republic of Kampuchea 1979-89 
 
The Vietnamese entered Phnom Penh on 7 January 1979, having commenced 
their invasion on 25 December 1978.  This could be seen as the decisive launch of 
the war . Certainly,  DK had been fighting during its entire existence. Ethnic 
cleansing of Vietnamese living in DK had intensified and DK  forces  repeatedly 
crossed the border to attack and raid Vietnamese villages - actions prompted by a 
prevailing view in Phnom Penh that Vietnamese imperialism across   Indochina 
must be pre-empted . Their most significant attack was the Ba Chúc Massacre, in 
which over 3000 civilians were murdered.128 However, the Vietnamese invasion 
arose not from benevolent interventionism but Cold War politics. Ousting  Pol Pot 
damaged the USSR’s rival China .129 
 
 On 3 December 1978 Front d'Union Nationale pour le Salut du Kampuchéa 
(Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation /FUNSK) - also known as the 
Salvation Front  - led by  KR defector  Heng Samrin,  was founded inside a 
‘liberated area’  of Cambodia (backed by and favouring  Hanoi ). Its mandate was 
to ‘overthrow the reactionary Pol Pot- Ieng Sary Clique’ and install a regime 
‘tending towards genuine socialism’. 130 It was largely comprised of KR defectors 
and later served to legitimise the subsequent Vietnamese invasion.131  
 
On liberating the city the Vietnamese were left with the corpse of a country.  
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Collectivization had ruined agriculture . Schools and hospitals were destroyed . Of 
20,000 teachers in 1975, 7,000 remained. Of 450 doctors only 45 were still alive. 
132 Of the 500 pre-1975 legal officials , less than 20% were still alive. 133   90% of 
classical ballet dancers had been murdered as an ‘ideological threat’.134  Of 
approximately 80,00  monks ( traditionally the  keepers of Khmer culture, literacy 
and  the facilitators of  social services) alive  in 1975, approximately 3000 
survived in 1979.135  No academics remained ;  universities could not reopen until 
1988. 136  The country was lobotomized. 137   Infrastructure (electricity, roads, 
sanitation, communications) was irreparable; there was no industry; hundreds of 
thousands of children were orphans. 138The greatest scar was the effect of almost 
four years of famine, mass killing, torture, family breakup, cultural destruction, 
and genocide – the destruction of self-identity. 139 The overwhelming majority of  
Cambodians in their thirties and forties have witnessed such events. 140  




Two books published in 2003 provide contrasting narratives of the regime the  
Vietnamese installed, backed and ran, the ‘People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea’(PRK). Margaret Slocomb, who spent the 1980s as an aid worker, 
takes a  sympathetic (indeed sycophantic)  line towards the PRK, describing it as 
‘although far from liberal, a generally benevolent regime’.142  She describes it as 
governed by ‘three fine prime ministers, Pen Sovann, Chan Si and Hun Sen and  
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[fortunate] to have had Heng Samrin , party leader and head of state,  a practical 
“man of the people” devoid of personal ambition and motivated primarily by the 
needs of the people.’ 143  In Slocomb’s narrative the Vietnamese faced vast 
problems in building a   post-DK state , while the USA, UK, China, and various 
ASEAN member states funded and supplied  KR guerrilla fighters attacking the 
regime.  Slocomb shows Cambodians as distrusting the new ‘Vietnamese backed’ 
regime (for Slocomb, never an ‘occupation’), which proclaimed its revolution to 
be ‘pure’ and  ‘genuine’ and based on  ‘proper Marxist-Leninist priniciples’.144 
This contrasts with Pol Pot’s ‘inherently conservative’ revolution.145 Slocomb 
analyses the DK regime in Marxist terms to identify reasons for the KR failure ; 
she argues, for example, that   because Kampuchea was a pre-capitalist / agrarian 
society, the objective structural conditions (the means of industrialised production 
and hence an industrial proletariat ) did not exist to permit  the development of a 
revolution on properly Marxist lines. 146 Utilizing  Gramscian theory, she  goes on 
to accuse the Pol Pot regime of failing to understand that revolution must spring 
from humankind’s own conscious reality of the world : people must see 
themselves as agents of change before a communist party can establish a new 
hegemony. 147 She   argues that it is within this Gramscian framework we must 
understand the failure of socialism to take hold under the PRK.  
 
One can understand Slocomb’s admiration for the work of the PRK in trying to 
rebuild infrastructure , culture, an economy, healthcare, food, education, with only 
the backing of the ( declining) Soviet states. She argues that it was the PRK who 
rebuilt Cambodia and transitioned it  before the UN intervention in the 1990s.  To 
an extent this is true : the UN  recognised the genocidal Pol Potists as ‘legitimate’ 
while the PRK was trying to re-establish a working society.  While unpopular, the 
PRK to some extent  ‘gave Cambodians back their lives’.148 However, Slocomb’s 
assumption that those lives were ‘not vastly dissimilar from what they had been 
prior to the outbreak of the war in 1970 which preceded the revolution’ is 
contentious. 149 She provides little criticism of  a  regime  abusive of human rights  
and her generalisation about life returning to normal is  overstated. Her overall 
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narrative -  that the PRK did, in its way,  transition Cambodia  out of the darkness 
of DK -  is  a strong stand-alone thesis. However, the overlay of Gramscian theory 
is a distraction.  The failure of socialism to take hold of a population in the post-
DK nightmare does not seem to demand  diagnosis. Socialism’s failure in 
Cambodia is a function of lack of commitment among the populace,  famine 
taking precedence in peoples’  minds over ideology and the  population’s mistrust 
of the entire discourse of communism/Marxism/ socialism after DK. 
 
 Evan Gottesman’s Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of 
Nation Building discusses this transitional phase in very different terms. 150 
Gottesman worked in the American Bar Association’s Cambodia Law and 
Democracy project. He paints a less favourable  but more balanced narrative of 
the period than Slocomb’s, describing a blank slate of a country, with no 
institutions, no legal system, no hospital, no schools, no army, no civil service , no 
religions :   
 
Millions of ragged, malnourished Cambodians wandered around a 
bewildering void, a fragmented landscape  of violence, grief , anger and 
uncertainty … Cambodia’s new leaders, put to work in an empty capital 
overgrown with weeds,  kept calling what they were doing a “revolution.” 
But there was nothing to overturn, just emptiness to fill.151  
   
Although the  PRK did make minimal headway , in Gottesman’s account  they 
came nowhere near  rebuilding a pre1970s level of life, as Slocombe avers . 
Gottesman suggests that  the ‘popularity’ of the  governing occupying force was 
relative,  the  new communist government being  preferable to the previous 
genocidal  one . He presents the regime as ‘more tolerant … relative to 
Democratic Kampuchea in that it freed Cambodians from virtual slavery and 
permitted some internal debate’. 152 However, he   shows the PRK  following the 
Vietnamese model very closely. He demonstrates  that PRK supporters defined 
their  regime –  effectively made a   pariah state by  anti-Soviet global powers like 
the US and China -  in relation to DK, emphasising achievement. Their opponents 
highlight its human rights abuses, corruption and the ‘puppet -mastery’ of Hanoi 
over Cambodia’s new ‘leaders’. 
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  Gottesman concludes that Cambodia lacked  ideological clarity  about socialism 
or communism , to the extent that he questions whether it ever really existed or 
whether it just fizzled out. In sharp contrast to Slocomb’s  policy-based analysis, 
he sees individuals as holding greater sway over grand narratives than philosophy 
ever did, claiming that while the leaders were adept at adjusting to new discourses 
(from Marxist-Leninist to liberal-democratic, for instance),  as time shifted and 
the global  political mood changed, their politics, though becoming more liberal,  
remained fundamentally the same.  He carries this  narrative up to the signing of 
the Paris Peace Agreements in 1991. These resulted in UN Transitional Authority 
for Cambodia (UNTAC) and Cambodia’s democratization under the 
constitutional monarchy. The PRK officially ended in 1989 and was replaced by 
the State of Cambodia (SOC) – although in practice the difference between the 
two was only cosmetic. 
 
Gottesman introduces  a ‘cast of characters’ at the beginning of  his book. 
Notably, one of his ‘cast’ is  Hun Sen,  Cambodia’s current long-serving Prime-
Minister,   initially appointed as Foreign Affairs Minister before becoming Prime 
Minister in 1985. By focusing on individuals in the government,  Gottesman can 
trace the careers of those who were part of  the PRK regime and show  them  
morphing from the  Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP)  to the 
currently ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) : indeed , his  narrative  shows   
that  the same people and politics  exist today despite the change in the party  logo 
and the abandonment of the Marxist lexicon.      
 
UNTAC and beyond – 1992/93 - 
 
At this stage in the literature, historical accounts turn  towards the discipline of  
political science,  concerning issues such as liberalism, democratization, and 
transitional justice mechanisms. The big narrative of the 1990s was about 
liberalism and transitional justice, which I explore in the next chapter  ;  and much 
of the literature concerns the success or failure of this  narrative  in Cambodia.  
The United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC) was the UN protectorate 
state governing Cambodia between 1992 and 1993, the first ever UN body 
charged to run a civilian government, police and armed forces . It was mandated 
to oversee the implementation of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, to implement 
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a new democratic constitutional monarchy, foster a human-rights-positive 
environment, repatriate refugees, carry out mine clearance and disarm the factions  
still fighting (with regard to the KR it failed). UNTAC ended the conflict in 
Cambodia and transitioned it from the ‘State of Cambodia’ (1989-1992) (the same 
government structure of the PR , renamed following the collapse of the USSR) to  
a fully realised pluralist liberal democracy.153 It was a period when liberal 
narrative arrived in Cambodia with the idea that it was bringing about an ‘end of 
history’  in Fukuyama’s sense, giving democracy/pluralism/liberalism/  peace  to 
the people. 154  Or, as Oliver Richmond puts it, bringing a western-led 
epistemology and an institutional set-up to replicate western political/ economic 
systems in a global hegemony that has created a post-cold-war mainstream. 155 
The failure of this model globally is that it has ignored local intellectual traditions  
and discourses.  
In 1993 the first election was won by the Royalist FUNCINPEC, led by  
Sihanouk’s brother-in-law, Norodom Ranariddh. Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s 
Party. (The re-branded PRK, which had governed following the Vietnamese 
takeover came second.) Hun Sen, Prime Minister since 1985, inveigled himself 
into coalition government with FUNCINPEC, with himself as ‘Second Prime 
Minister.’ In  1997, in very unclear circumstances, there was a firefight on 
Norodom Boulevard in central Phnom Penh, between troops supporting 
Ranariddh and those supporting Hun Sen. The United Nations Special 
Representative on Human Rights in Cambodia and Human Rights Watch refers to 
this incident as a military coup.156  Others contend that there was a much more 
complex background. 157 Hun Sen defends his actions, claiming that Ranariddh 
was bringing the Khmer Rouge into Phnom Penh to stage a coup, and that he had 
made a pre-emptive strike. Whatever the truth, the CPP has won every subsequent 
election, after campaigns involving the murder or vicious beating of anti-CPP 
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candidates and activists, and with various opponents being exiled, put on trial or 
imprisoned.158 
Joel Brinkley’s Cambodia’s Curse is an extensive historical account of 
Cambodia’s post-1993 history. In Brinkley’s narrative ‘the curse’ seemingly 
refers, firstly, to the political legacy of the God-Kings of Angkor where ‘hierarchy 
was everything’.159 Brinkley contends that the majority of Cambodians ‘are a 
product of customs and practices set in stone a millennium ago’.160 The second 
aspect of the ‘curse’ he identifies is the cultural impact of Theravada Buddhism 
on the national psyche. He alleges that monks have impressed upon generations 
that they should be ‘pleased with the lives they had and not aspire for more’.161 In 
Brinkley’s view these factors account for centuries of meek acquiescence in bad 
governance, corruption and brutality.  I would dispute both of these charges.   
Brinkley seems to have read little (none of the seminal works on Cambodian or 
Theravada Buddhism are included in his anorexic bibliography). Nor does he 
appear to have interviewed any monks among his 200 interview subjects. This 
thesis is under-researched, given its centrality to his overall narrative. In using the 
term ‘curse’ Brinkley is not skilfully expounding a narrative pattern using ancient 
and indigenous material, as Chandler does, but simply deploys the term as 
rhetorical flourish.  
 It is in Brinkley’s empirical evidence and research that the strength of his work 
lies. Hun Sen emerges as the principal domestic protagonist and fountainhead of 
many national problems, running a ‘murderous kleptocracy.’162 He is shown as 
‘carrying himself as if he is a direct descendant of Cambodia’s great kings. All 
that’s lacking is the elephants’.163 Brinkley hypothesizes Cambodians’ inherent 
deference, fear of change and lack of aspiration ensure acceptance of his appalling 
administration.  Sam Rainsy, leader of today’s main opposition party (the Sam 
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Rainsy Party), is portrayed as a slippery self-publicizer more comfortable abroad, 
even derailing the FBI investigation of a grenade attack, which killed sixteen of 
his own supporters, to score quick political points against Hun Sen. Sam Rainsy 
emerges as a faintly ludicrous figure. The thread running through Brinkley’s 
anecdotes from his interviewees is what the rampant corruption of Hun Sen’s 
Cambodia means to people on the ground: teachers demanding bribes for better 
grades, reducing education to learning ‘how to bribe people’; doctors letting 
people die for lack of $150 bribes; judges releasing paedophiles for cash. In 
Brinkley’s view, the donor community is equally to blame for the plight of 
Cambodia. Year on year, Hun Sen promised international donors to halt 
corruption with effective legislation. Brinkley suggests the CCP’s grip would 
loosen on the nation if its members had less access to the foreign money that 
keeps them loyal to the regime. The effectiveness of this notion is undermined by 
a fact Brinkley himself briefly mentions:  it is China (not primarily concerned 
with the struggle for human rights and development) who is now Cambodia’s 
largest benefactor. This effectively releases Hun Sen from pressure to be more 
liberal.  
When concerned with the ‘curse’ of historical legacies, Brinkley makes a more 
defensible point: that the legacy of the Khmer Rouge underlies the poverty of 
expectation, both domestically and internationally.   If the yardstick is how much 
better things are today than under Pol Pot, then Hun Sen has brought stability and 
some economic growth.  Though implicated in killing, corruption, and human 
rights abuses, he has not presided over genocide and most Cambodians 
understandably believe that the country is on a better track. The international 
community seems to share this ambivalence. To quote Sam Rainsy, ‘The World 
seem[s] to be saying, “If you continue living like you did a thousand years ago 
…you are still better off than you were during the Khmer Rouge.”’ 164 Brinkley’s 
penultimate chapter discusses the trials, including claims of interference and 
corruption widely discussed elsewhere. He describes the culture of impunity 
created by former KR leadership and cadres living in society.  Brinkley also 
denigrates the outreach of the Documentation Centre of Cambodia (DC-CAM)  - 
the principal archiving organization headed by Youk Chhang, which has provided 
the court with a great deal of its evidence, and has for years meticulously engaged 
                                                
164	  ibid.	  268	  
 49 
in preserving Cambodia’s history, advocated justice, and educated the next 
generation. He argues that it is only re-traumatizing victims to show them DVDs 
of court proceedings and  highly distressing testimonies,  ‘like poking a stick in a 
hornets’ nest.’165 Pointing out that they have been living side by side with their 
persecutors for years, Brinkley concludes that most Cambodians are ‘barely 
aware’ of proceedings, a point I dispute throughout the rest of this thesis.166 For 
decades Buddhist monks have engaged in unofficial reconciliatory exercises: 
Brinkley makes   no mention of this.  Nor is the ECCC the only public body to 
have discussed the KR era in 30 years: there are two annual public holidays, the 
Day of Remembrance (20 May) and Victory Day (7 January) to do just that. 
David Roberts’s Political Transition in Cambodia discusses the problems 
encountered with the liberal narrative in Cambodia. Quoting Heder, he argues that 
the main political culture and personalities  - Hun Sen, Sihanouk, and Ranariddh - 
are ‘deeply illiberal, anti-democratic and anti-pluralist’and that  an elite has 
always dominated politics. 167  He states that it is not the fault of Hun Sen’s 
government democracy has failed to be successfully implemented, but rather that 
the discourse of democratization has been thrust on a state by foreigners via 
theories unsuited to the circumstances.  Roberts argues the ruling CPP is acting 
consistently with Cambodian political tradition.  When Hun Sen’s CPP lost the 
1993 election to FUNCINPEC and he manipulated himself into the office of 
‘Second Prime Minister’, he was acting exactly as one would given the elite’s 
assumptions: that with political power come   benefits for one’s ‘clients’, whether 
family or faction. To lack power is to be denied these essential components; what 
is good for the leadership/party is good for the clients. In such a context 
oppositional politics are useless.168 Legitimacy   derives from what patrons offer 
their clients (high-paid jobs for their friends and relatives, hospitals and schools 
for their constituents and good investment conditions/ easy contracts for their 
foreign funders). 169  Roberts concludes that in the Cambodian political tradition 
nobody could expect otherwise; when critics say differently they hold   the 
country to unrealistic standards outside the expectations of the local population.  
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A problem with this idea is that it seems to justify the CPP and Hun Sen’s actions.  
Arguing that there are flaws in the ‘liberal project’s’ assumptions about how it 
will work in Cambodia is reasonable; however, at what point is a line crossed 
between discussing cultural difficulties in the democratization narrative, and 
providing crudely essentialist, culturally relative, explanations for a homicidal 
megalomaniac exercising naked power?   Roberts fails to offer a clear definition 
of such a line.  
 
Increasingly Khmer scholarship in English has entered the most recent narratives. 
The theme of how the ‘Big Bang’ democratization of the early 1990s landed in a 
country not institutionally equipped for it runs throughout Beyond Democracy in 
Cambodia, a series of essays by both western and Khmer scholars. 170  sRather 
than sharing the culturalist assumptions of Brinkley and Roberts, it focuses on the 
difficulty in establishing democracy in conjunction with economic and social 
reconstruction.  The Khmer scholars in this volume are understandably less 
tolerant of the view that some cultural essence inhibits democratization.  Rather, 
they suggest Cambodia’s problem is its ‘on paper’ status as democracy coupled 
with a resource poverty inhibiting its implementation. As they explain, Hun Sen 
may be following an autocratic political tradition, but people do not follow him 
because they acquiesce in that tradition. They do so because they are too 
frightened to fight in the face of his demonstrable readiness to secure his will with 
extreme violence.171 Cambodia lacks the resources required to build democratic 
capacity.  Kheang Un describes a judiciary filled with legal officials inadequately 
educated to run a properly independent organisation; as he points out, what fills 
this resource vacuum is Hun Sen’s executive.172 Mona Lilja points out that 
globalization and liberalism have been accepted where the chance for such ideas 
has been allowed - notably in the area of gender relations, where traditional 
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gender roles are being challenged. 173 The overall narrative of this book of essays 
is that liberalism and democracy are desired in Cambodia and that they are 
discourses that can be brought into the Cambodian worldview on its own cultural 
terms; the problem with implementation lies in the autocratic government and in a 
poverty that disempowers, making it difficult for such notions to advance.  
 
Recent studies have also pushed out from the post-colonial studies of Chandler 
and Becker to connect post-1993 Cambodia to its deep past via a discussion of 
Buddhism.   I will discuss these in more detail later; here I seek only to give the 
reader some sense of the existing thematic literatures.  The important feature of 
these works is the central place they give to religion.   One historical monograph 
on Buddhism in Cambodia discusses how Buddhism has adapted and 
developed.174  So do two volumes of essays mostly by anthropologists . People of 
Virtue  focuses explicitly on how moral order has been reconstructed in Cambodia 
following the DK atrocities, and how myth, symbol, and ritual facilitate the 
recovery of culture and a cosmological sense. 175 The essays in History, Buddhism 
and New Religious Movements in Cambodia  explore power relations and focus 
on how contemporary Cambodian identity and Khmer nationhood are constructed 
through religion as a means to connect to a mythico-historical past, particularly in 
light of the catastrophic events of the DK period, civil wars and Vietnamese 
occupation. 176  Both these texts point to a period of liberalization as vital to the 
development of religion; for it was only after the end of SOC that the 
constitutional bars on religious institutions ended  (for example the Vietnamese 
armed forces tried to stop young men from ordination). Liberalization released a 
wave of religious revival currently shaping moral discourse, national identity, 
society and politics in a way impossible in the 1980s. Both books examine how 
this liberalization has affected the regime's development in Cambodia.  
 
Towards the ECCC 
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The only historical narrative to explore the establishment of the ECCC is 
Fawthrop and Jarvis’s Getting Away with Genocide?177  This explicitly focuses on 
efforts to obtain justice throughout the intrigues of post-1979 politics.   Stressing 
the total lack of domestic resources such as lawyers, intellectuals and teachers 
(targeted by the CPK) it deals in some detail with the 1979 People’s 
Revolutionary Tribunal and portrays it in a positive way, suggesting that it 
deserves attention rather than being dismissed as a show trial. Fawthrop and Jarvis 
argue that an international trial, decades after the end of the regime, is not the 
desire of the international community pushing an institution onto the country, but 
expresses an aching need for justice in the nation, and that a proper tribunal is 
important. Indeed they make the case that it is the powerful international actors 
with their embarrassing history of assisting the KR (the Chinese, the USA, the 
Thais) who have thrown up obstacles to the idea of a trial.  
 
It is important to note that Jarvis works for the Cambodian government.  She does 
not misrepresent herself as an impartial analyst. She defends the tribunal set-up.  
However, she leaves Hun Sen and the ruling CPP criticism-free while the UN is 
heavily criticized.  Fawthrop and Jarvis explain how the realpolitik of the NATO 
powers led to the grotesque position of the UN recognising Pol Pot’s CPK as the 
legitimate government of Cambodia throughout the 1980s  - thus cutting off the 
nation from aid and much-needed developmental assistance. However their 
concern to provide a favourable portrayal of the Cambodian government means a 
one-sided discussion of the very protracted negotiations to establish a court. The 
UN pull-out from negotiations in 2002 is shown as a ‘bombshell’, a stab in the 
back causing  substantial loss of faith in the UN among the population.  Serious 
concerns raised by the UN and NGOs regarding the Cambodian judiciary, 
impartiality, the roles of currently serving government ministers who may have 
been involved with KR atrocities (and thus have an interest in leaning on the 
ECCC) are not seriously analysed. Indeed in this narrative Hun Sen, the man who 
argues that Cambodia should ‘dig a hole and bury the past’ comes across as the 
man who not only secured peace, but also fights for justice. 178  The narrative 
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legitimises a fiction he promotes - that wider prosecutions would be destabilizing 
to the nation (begging the question ‘Who, other than Hun Sen, is capable   of 
starting a civil war?’). 179 Sam Rainsy is portrayed as a lackey of Washington 
rightists. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and scholars with differing 
opinions are portrayed as ill informed, ignorant or flaky:  for example, the authors 
acerbically dismiss (and misrepresent) Heder’s suggestion that prosecutions 
should encompass more than the highest echelons of the CPK.180 Heder did not, as 
they claim, suggest that there should be thousands of investigations, but rather 
that the structure of the ECCC is too limited, largely because the RGC and the 
CPP have senior members who may themselves be guilty of atrocities; these 
‘small fish’ may warrant some investigation into their roles.  181Read in 2013, as 
the process enters its seventh troubled year of operations, with so many concerns 
raised by the UN and NGOs during the negotiations apparently justified, 
Fawthrop and Jarvis’s account reads like an elegantly argued piece of government 
publicity, or at best a defence of the mixed system far too strong in light of such 
statements from the Cambodian government as ‘If they want to go into cases 003 




The primary source material in the subsequent chapters was assembled as the 
ECCC was in session. Much of the available literature around the ECCC is legal 
in nature; it discusses jurisprudential issues, procedure, TJ mechanism design, 
legal history, or the contributions the ECCC makes to law domestically and 
internationally.  This thesis takes a different approach.  It juxtaposes what takes 
place in the court with stories told by Cambodians who may never enter it, 
although   affected by the issues that it raises.  It is about meanings assigned via 
narrative (and vice-versa) through processes – macro- micro- and meta- 
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narratives. Hence it takes the ECCC, not as a subject for legal analysis, but as a 
social artefact, viewed through a particular ‘interpretive community.’183 The 
proceedings of the Extraordinary Chambers are not the centre of interest here and 
there is no detailed analysis of cases. Nor am I focusing on ‘peace building’; due 
to the narrative nature of my study I am problematizing the concepts of transition 
and justice.  Rather my concern is with how the court is seen as a social-cultural-
historical subject, what narrative it produces and how others feel incorporated or 
excluded from its narrative structures.  But before I can present the legal macro-
narratives or the small stories against which I contend those narratives must be 
read, it is necessary to explain how and why these particular stories were 
gathered, and how various theories concerning narrative offer a framework 
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Some core themes emerge from the foregoing chapter.  The first is the 
unimaginable injustice inflicted on the Cambodian people. Second is the process 
of rebuilding culture in the face of  near-total annihilation, a process presenting a 
unique set of circumstances  for observation. Third is the rapid succession of 
changes in regime types (monarchy, republic, two strands of Communism, 
‘democracy’) resulting in what can be described as nothing short of paradigm 
shifts.  The result is that the dominant theme in speaking of  post-DK Cambodia is 
that of transition.  
 
It is obligatory for a thesis to contain a chapter on ‘theory and method,’ and the 
convention is that research questions are shown to emerge out of the theoretical 
literature before methodological issues are discussed.  I think this would be an 
oversimplification in a thesis  grounding itself in ‘subaltern’ epistemologies.1 
There is a risk that paradigms conceived in the Western academy may be brought 
prematurely to the field site and marginalize local voices .  How one comes to the 
field informs the theoretical approach.2  The risk is compounded by the thirty- 
year gap between DK and the ECCC . For example, in his conclusion Kjetil 
Grødum’s PhD thesis on Ricœur and Cambodia asks,  ‘Suppose a former Khmer 
Rouge cadre is not welcomed in the village by a family living there who suffered 
great losses due to his actions in the past. This form of sanction or punishment 
would be legitimate. But would this punishment qualify as justice?’ 3   But this  
question can be addressed empirically . Those three decades did not suspend 
history or justice in aspic.  Cambodians have found their own ways to discuss and 
deal with their situation , including issues like this, and I seek to give  priority to 
their voices.  My aim is to explore the dialectic between the big narratives of 
states, institutions and global actors and the small narratives of individuals. I hope 
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to create a platform of intellectual equality  on which dialogue and argument is 
possible between  theories, concepts and processes derived from both Eastern and 
Western epistemological and ontological traditions. I seek to listen to the voices 
of the country and   then to theorise through them.  
 
Hence at times I intertwine theoretical and methodological material. On the 
whole, however, I progress from method through methodology finally to develop 
a theoretical  frame that enables this prioritizing of local voices .  I begin with 
method, with my need as an ethnographic researcher to achieve ‘best practice’ in 
hearing and framing the experiences of my ‘narrators.’ First I discuss  Clifford 
Geertz’sapproach to ethnography.4  Then I situate my own approach through   
post-colonial  method, using vocabulary  developed by Linda Tuhiwai Smith, 
Kathy Absolon and Cam Willett .5 6  I then turn to the sociologist Luc  Boltanski   
to articulate an overall methodological framework .7 Boltanski stresses the need to 
take social actors seriously rather than imposing metatheories 
/metacritiques/metanarratives . I introduce his  ‘pragmatic’ sociology, focused  
upon social actors  in their world , and their own sense of justice and morality  ‘at 
the expense of a cartographic description of the world already there’.8  I then 
move to the complex relationship between my thesis and the (sub) discipline and 
praxis of Transitional Justice. At this point I proceed to set out the theoretical 
framework through which I organise my material.   
 
Essentially this is a framework grounded in narrative.  Narrative is the means by 
which what Berger and Luckmann call ‘ the social stock of knowledge’ is passed 
through the generations. It is one of Boltanski’s ‘core institutions’ through which 
social reality is constructed. Given my resistance to the imposition of 
metatheories, I could hardly confine myself to a single theoretical approach  to 
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marshal the variety of voices I explore.  Rather, I use a number of theories about 
narrative, which complement one another and at times overlap; each, however, 
has greater relevance to certain parts of my material. Hence I turn briefly to 
literary theory, particularly the work of Tzvetan Todorov, to explore how stories 
are told.  I look at Lyotard’s theory concerning what stories are told: the ‘grand 
narratives’ which underpin the approaches of the UN and CPP to the present court 
and its predecessors, and the ‘small stories’ against which these grand narratives 
must be read and judged.  Finally, I look at the work of Paul Ricœur on memory 
to show why those ‘small stories’ are told , and who is listening.  
 
Method and My Approach to Ethnography 
 
John Flood argues that in inductive research, based upon ‘grounded theory’, 
theorization emerges from ethnographic data in a rolling process.  I follow this 
model. The function of small-scale ethnographic interaction is to generate 
understanding of the low-level realities of large/macro issues.  Such research is 
not concerned with theory, ideology and law in their idealized form, but their 
lived form.9  I went to the field with the intention of using what Sriram calls a 
‘listening’ methodology, one that seeks to listen to subaltern voices and then 
relate them to theory. 10 This prioritizes a difference-centered approach, which 
seeks out those who do not conform to the standard praxes offered in western- 
derived theories of society. 11 This is particularly important when I consider issues 
of reflexivity.12 I am a western, Caucasian, male, in many cases at least twenty 
years younger than my interviewees.  This means I have to come to the field site 
open to knowledge, culture and understandings not my own. The core of 
ethnography requires that one be sensitive to context, and above all to how 
members of the group studied look at their world, not to build theories about the 
world to present as ‘superior’ to the everyday knowledge of a community. 13It 
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also means that people interact with me as a foreigner and that I should be aware 
of this . One example of this occurs in Chapter Seven , when my interpreter tells 
me that talking to high school students about the KR would not be a good idea as 
they would be trying perhaps to impress me with their knowledge rather  than 
expressing their actual indifference.14 
 
Thick description   
 
By situating myself with Cambodian social actors I place myself    as the primary 
tool of data gathering - the ‘I am a camera’ perspective.15  Geertz discusses how 
symbolic meaning is communicated via artefacts and symbols, cultural concepts 
and texts; it is through ‘thick description’  - an understanding of the layers of 
meaning making up what can be immediately observed - that scholars penetrate 
the highly interactive dimensions of a symbol in context of a wider set of ideas. 16 
‘Thick description’ juxtaposes the specific with the general ‘to find the little that 
eludes us in the large’.17 Geertz describes a process of seeing the whole through 
its parts, hopping back and forth from small scale to larger context.18 This usefully 
allows, firstly, for putting the smaller stories and events into context of the wider 
process of justice at the ongoing ECCC, and secondly, for hermeneutic analysis 
over a long period (1979-2013). Context is vital in the Cambodian case. This is 
partly owing to the time scale of political and social change, but also the complex 
webs of meaning people establish. One of the premises of ethnographic research 
is that it seeks to understand the ‘ethos’ or ‘world view’ in a culture, to grasp 
cultural and social meanings of events and objects.19 I will be using  Geertzian 
method  linked to interpretivism and phenomenology, asking,  How do people see 
themselves? What meaning do they attribute to events? Why do they do what they 
do? How do they interpret their own behaviours and attitudes? Geertz’s principal 
point in The Interpretation of Cultures   is that symbols/ signs  indicate, express 
and  formulate the construction of social meaning. To ‘read’  the ‘acted document’ 
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of  a culture is to understand it.  ‘Doing ethnography’ is attempting to read the 
‘manuscript’  of culture. 20 
 
The Geertzian approach precludes generalizable statements . Thick description 
only allows the ethnographer to write about a group  representing the culture: a 
representation of a representation.21 This is not to assume that ethnographers 
‘blend in’. One goes to the field to understand a society, not as, in Geertz’s 
trenchant phrase,  ‘a walking miracle  of empathy’. 22 An ethnographer can claim 
to make an account of other peoples’ subjectivities through understanding the 
‘rules of their game.’ In Geertz’s analogy one can manage  ‘grasping a proverb or 
…seeing a joke’ , rather than ‘achieving communion’. 23  
 
Post-colonial developments in ethnographic research -  the ‘Re- s’. 
 
Ethnographic research is inevitably ‘third order’. Only someone native to a culture 
could claim first order knowledge.24 However , the ethnographer should attempt 
Verstehen - an empathetic approach to produce a more authentic understanding of 
how a society thinks than survey data could reveal.25 I aim to provide  ‘thick 
description’- layers of cultural concepts  and their meanings - from which 
understanding can be reasonably drawn. 26 Specifically, I wanted a research 
method that treated the values  and behaviors of the people I talked to as 
integral.27 Hence I  draw on post-colonial scholars , especially the ‘Re-s’ research 
agenda originally devised by Linda Tuhiwai Smith and developed by Kathy 
Absolon and Cam Willett .28  That is, to ‘re-do’ or ‘re-visit’ events and ideas  the 
‘west’ (especially its academy and policy-making  bodies ) has conceptualized   
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categorized,  and  operationalized  on its own terms. Absolon and Willett  expect 
research to ‘re-visit’ these from the perspective of  the subjects .  Their vocabulary 
informs my approach :  
 
Respectful Representation is central. 29   I cannot make broad generalizations but I 
can  represent those I listen to and provide  an emancipatory space for their 
voices. I must avoid ‘extracting’ knowledge from people . It is  theirs and they 
retain ownership.   This approach confirmed a decision I had already made  not to 
carry out quantitative data surveys.  I felt that gathering statistical data would not 
convey the experience discussed here. (Though studies of this kind have been 
done previously.)30 A particular issue I faced was that of ‘Coding’. Initially I 
looked into data software packages (Atlas.ti, NVivo). Immediately I disliked the 
way the software   highlighted and grouped key words  to create categorizations. 
This is particularly problematic when discussing something as complex   as mass 
atrocity. Categorizing, labeling and finding trends felt  as if I was  pushing my 
work into  predetermined  frames rather than reflecting adequately what I was  
told . Arranging  life stories in categories  felt less like  narrating  than mimicking 
the quantitative methodological style I had rejected.   I resolved this by deciding 
not to code  but to bring people in and out of my narrative  of the field. I am self-
consciously engaged in creating a narrative myself ,  simultaneously representing 
something through my own eyes, and trying to understand  other peoples’ view  of 
one of  the most violent  times of  the last century. 
 
Re-Visiting demands that histories be deconstructed  to expose their political 
biases. 31  It insists on the recontextualization of experience , conscious of the 
legacy of cultural aggression from colonial ideologies  .  
 
 Re-claiming  involves reclamation of  local intellectual traditions to place  them 
on a par with  (neo)colonialist  ideologies. 32  (In the case of Cambodia : 
Vietnamese/ Soviet Communism and  Western liberal democracy) . In this context 
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Tuhiwai Smith  argues for a broader definition of  testimony. Testimony is 
important not only for use in court, but  as a conduit through which a younger 
generation access the culture of their ancestors after attack. She discusses how 
narratives  tap into a culture’s literary and oral traditions .  It is through such 
testimonial acts that heritage is reclaimed. 
 
Remembrance   situates research within recollection and reconnection with the 
past. 33 Following genocide and mass cultural extermination, there is a need to 
forge  such links . It is through  research   focused on local voices and intellectual 
traditions  that recovery is best explored.  Tuhiwai Smith argues  that  scholarly 
presentation of remembrance after trauma , cultural destruction  and oppression 
must emerge directly from those who  suffered.34 I aim to use peoples’ own 
stories  as the core knowledge on which I proceed  . 
 
Articulating methodology: Boltanski and social actors.  
 
Boltanski  offers a broader methodological frame in which to locate the practices  
I describe. He  attempts to reconcile ‘critical sociology’ (which exposes the  
mechanisms of power passively endured and not always recognized by the 
oppressed ) with the idea of a  ‘pragmatic sociology’ ( sociology based on the 
perspectives of social actors). He envisions an interdependent relationship 
between critical sociology and a more interpretivist  perspective grounded in  
social actors. Boltanski  notes that, ‘Critical theory has to grasp the discontents of 
actors and explicitly consider them in the labour of theorization’ - that is,  the 
theorist should theorize through social actors , not make them subjects of theory.35  
It is important to explore power relations in terms of the experience and 
judgement of the oppressed, to  ‘enable the disclosure of aspects of reality in the 
immediate relationship with the preoccupations of actors- that is also with 
ordinary critiques.’ 36  ‘Progressive’ theoreticians  in pursuit of their research 
agenda effectively  ventriloquize their subjects,  for example by arguing that they 
are caught up in ‘false consciousness’  and  speaking on their behalf .  Boltanski 
focuses on the abilities of  social actors to  critique in their own way  and in 
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response to their own situations,  and stresses the need for social researchers to 
recognize this,  not  treat actors as passively acquiescent to  hegemonic 
domination. An example of this is the Herman and Chomsky/ Hildebrand and 
Porter debacle discussed the previous chapter . These scholars prioritized their 
own metacritiques  , then claimed to speak for the oppressed by ‘exposing’ what 
they perceived as the underlying  cause of that oppression . This illustrates 
Boltanski’s point about failure to take seriously social  actors in their context  , or, 
to re-iterate Sophal Ear’s trenchant phrase, ‘to stop and ask the peasants 
themselves how they liked the ride.’37 
 
Indeed Boltanski seems sceptical  of a sociology of critique that undertakes to 
‘describe the world as the scene of a trial’. 38   He notes a concomitant nihilistic 
‘dizzily exciting’ suspicion of everything’.39 He  contends that  people do not 
need an ‘emancipatory theoretical enlightenment’  conceived ‘above’ them but 
rather a ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’, which takes the lived experience of 
actors to its heart  and works ‘on the ground’. 40 This refocuses ‘the sociologist’s 
attention on actors en situation as the main agencies of performance of the social’ 
and  brings to bear a variety of disciplines ‘ to account for the capacity of actors to 
produce acceptable critiques and/or justifications  en situation’ -  in contrast to 
those theorists and philosophers who only create metacritiques/metatheories about 
society. 41 
 
I will revisit Boltanski later on in discussing theory. However , Boltanski’s project 
to take social actors seriously underpins the platform between my interviewees 
and those macro-institutions that have the ‘loudest voices’ in narrativising the DK 
era. His approach heavily stresses difference, which is key to my project.In a 
difference-oriented approach the method must account for the ‘difference’ within 
the stories of the participants. This  study  includes former members of the Khmer 
Rouge, anti-communists, democrats, pro- and anti- government voices , civil 
parties,  defence attorneys, monks, Imams, old people, young people, and 
international judges. Inevitably there is   contention over the ‘facts’.   I bring my 
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methodology to this discussion. I do not seek to question the facts of the stories 
told to me ; my purpose is not to establish historical fact about places and events, 
or seek a purely  photographic kind of  truth through the accounts of eye 
witnesses, but rather to discuss the ‘meaning’ of what is told to me. 42  
 
Practical questions : a  summary of the field work 
 
With method and methodology outlined , it may be useful to provide a description 
of what I did during the field work portion of my research . The original material 
in this thesis was acquired through interviews, observations and oral histories, 
applying the ethnographic method to both the ECCC and the more intimate sites 
outside it. I spent eleven months in Cambodia in 2012. Five were spent as an 
intern at the ECCC in the Public Affairs Section (PAS). This gave me the 
opportunity to observe the workings the institution at very close quarters and 
follow proceedings at court daily . ( The contract for that internship precludes my 
disclosing some confidential information.  In this work I have disclosed nothing 
about the ECCC not already in the public domain , publicly observable or 
specifically permitted.) The remainder  of my fieldwork was spent interviewing  
and observing.   I   stayed  in ten provinces in the country, spending several weeks 
in each and had in-depth interviews with 49 people .  When invited I  stayed with 
families, at other times in Wats or  guesthouses.I have gathered observational 
material  in the form of videos, photos, logbooks, field diaries, and notes  from 
ceremonies, procedures and places of historical significance as well as day-to-day 
life in Phnom Penh and villages in the provinces.   This is further supplemented 
by material collected while writing my Master’s thesis on Cambodian Buddhism 
and the Khmer Rouge in 2010 (eleven interviews and more observations).43  In 
2013 I made a return visit  for six  months and watched the closing arguments of 
Case 002/01. 
 
Language and Limitations  
 
I worked with my  interpreter, Sina Thor, for interviews that could not  be 
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conducted in English. (My  Khmer is  ‘small talk’ standard.) French , although 
used by the ECCC,  is effectively  redundant in Cambodia .  The majority of those 
I spoke to with a second language knew English. It is obvious that language 
fluency has considerable advantages. Yet it should be noted that Geertzs’s 
warning that anthropological knowledge obtained by  outsiders  is ‘third order’  
nevertheless applies. Fluency does not grant  the ‘chameleon-like’ status 
mythologised by anthropologists prior to a more reflective turn in the 1980s.44 
The  notion of  ‘blending in’  was then challenged to the point of  crisis and there 
was a felt need for reform.45 Axel Borchgrevink argues  that many engaged with 
anthropological  research make use of interpreters. This  is seldom discussed -  
perhaps because of  this myth that ‘true’  research can only be obtained by those 
with near-native fluency.  He also asserts  that many anthropologists actively 
obscure  interpreters behind words such as ‘field assistant’,  wary of accusations 
of not doing the anthropological method properly.     
 
An honest way to deal with the issue of the interpreter’s role within my 
understanding of  the relationship between  narrators and stories  is to analyse the 
role of  my own interpreter. 46  I worked closely with Sina Thor, discussing each 
project and its purpose in detail. I clarified the importance of informed consent 
and at the start of every interview he read out my participant information sheet in 
Khmer and provided  written copy if desired. We transcribed  together so I could 
ask for clarification, and he  could check the accuracy of my perception about 
what I thought I was being told. The principal problems of translation concern lost 
nuance and we tried to counter this : Sina would  explain the subtleties of the 
language as spoken and always read  my subsequent transcription. During 
interviews he would  translate ‘blocks’ of text, enabling me to react to what had 
just been said, sometimes giving the gist for speed , but  returning to recordings to 
produce more nuanced translation .   
 
The Interviewees  
 
Participants were sought using ‘snowball’ sampling. 47  This was the easiest 
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method for me to gain access, but it also underlines the idea of ‘ownership’ by 
giving them a clear context, as being ‘passed on’ by someone already interviewed 
offered a basis of knowledge on which to opt to participate.  It was important to 
give those directly approached a chance to refuse without embarrassment  (or 
meeting me), despite the difficulty of contacting rural people in their 50s and 60s 
with only cell phones, or none. In the event, only one person refused an interview. 
Most were one-to-one, although there were some group interviews. A few, 
including long sessions, were ‘entirely private’, carried out at the participant’s 
home. Some interviewees asked for privacy- generally at a location they chose, or 
in one case in my apartment.    
 
Oral History and interviews 
 
I tried to allow the telling of life stories to be only semi structured, with thematic 
guidelines. My aim was for storytellers to have power over their own stories. Oral 
histories allow a researcher to learn about a way of life by focusing on people and 
their experience, stripping away agendas to afford the subjects space to express 
what they feel is important. 48 Most interviewees were contacted because they had 
a special or unique knowledge of an event, place or institution, or on the advice of 
DC-CAM ;  so while the sample was snowballing, it was not entirely random. It is 
important to note here a matter I later discuss in detail: the victim /perpetrator line 
is difficult to distinguish. However, I did not seek out victims of the regime 
specifically to address their victimization and /or personally traumatic events. I 
sought out people with knowledge of Buddhism, people who had published 
historical accounts of the regime, monks, achars, NGO workers, heritage site 
curators, and witnesses to events of historical significance who had given their 
names to DC-CAM indicating their willingness to be interviewed or directed to 
me through the networks of other interviewees.  
 
Ethical issues and the act of naming  
 
The formulation of a code of ethics for this kind of work is complex. Inevitably 
difficulties arise when a project meets a code developed by an institution for 
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general use, a ‘one-size-fits-all’ formulation.49 Here issues clustered around the 
issue of protection for participants. Underlying the spirit of research ethics is a 
concern for the protection of the confidence, physical, mental and social 
wellbeing of the people who participate. My ‘default’ practice was to keep my 
informants anonymous. Some - not all - made this a condition.  I have used titles – 
‘Cadre’, ‘Imam’, ‘Ven.’ (for Buddhist monks) with a number relating the date of 
the relevant interview and the order in which I met them.  Those for whom 
anonymity is pointless I name - for example an international judge at the ECCC 
who gave me an interview did so in full knowledge that his identity would be 
evident from what he said.   However there are also instances where to keep 
names out of the stories would be unethical in that the respondents have a 
profound desire to bear witness.  Tuhiwai Smith considers   stripping people of 
their names to be a hallmark of colonial oppression. 50 As  Absolon and Willett 
argue, to  treat them as data fodder is tantamount to  cultural plundering.  The  Pol 
Pot regime stole identities.  Under DK one was part of a class – the often-quoted 
KR slogan ‘To keep you is no gain, to lose you is no loss’ expresses this attitude . 
The notion of anonymising people once dehumanised as merely a ‘class’ by yet 
again making them a number, a statistic or a pseudonym is stealing part of them.  
Those who lent me their stories and chose to keep their names did so for a reason 
– that of voice.  Sum Rithy, Bou Meng and Chum Mei and others find   
anonymisation offensive, although they have had to accept it as academic practice 
in some institutions. 
 
 Qwul’shi’yah’maht and Robina Anne Thomas  discuss naming alongside   
researchers’ dangerous power to make stories into the ‘shape’ they want. It is the 
duty of the researcher to represent as honestly as possible the stories they have 
                                                
49	  Although	  I	  sought	  	  and	  obtained	  ethical	  approval	  for	  this	  study	  from	  	  the	  University	  of	  Westminster’s	  	  	  
own	  code	  and	  committee,	  	  I	  found	  	  the	  process	  deeply	  	  flawed.	  	  For	  example,	  I	  was	  asked	  by	  a	  university	  
official	  to	  ensure	  that	  I	  always	  asked	  the	  ‘line	  manager’	  of	  my	  subject	  to	  sign	  off	  on	  an	  interview	  	  .	  This	  
would	  be	  a	  bizarre	  request	  to	  most	  of	  my	  	  subjects	  .	  In	  some	  cases	  it	  would	  have	  been	  	  actively	  unethical	  if	  I	  
had	  interpreted	  it	  literally.	  Asked	  who	  might	  be	  the	  ‘line	  manager’	  of	  ,	  say,	  	  	  a	  Buddhist	  monk	  in	  a	  rural	  
location,	  the	  official	  	  	  suggested	  	  	  ‘the	  equivalent	  of	  a	  Bishop.’	  But	  	  given	  the	  	  seriousness	  with	  which	  
hierarchy	  and	  deference	  to	  age	  is	  regarded,	  this	  would	  create	  serious	  problems.	  To	  ask	  a	  senior	  abbot	  or	  
senior	  monk	  to	  provide	  me	  with	  a	  signature	  would	  undeniably	  give	  me	  	  much	  stronger	  access	  to	  many	  
monks.	  With	  a	  signed	  bit	  of	  paper	  bearing	  such	  a	  person’s	  name	  on	  it,	  	  I	  would	  effectively	  be	  able	  to	  cajole	  
junior	  monks	  into	  participating	  -­‐	  	  even	  if	  they	  did	  not	  want	  to.	  	  I	  did	  not	  do	  this.	  	  Although	  bureaucratically	  
acceptable	  ,	  I	  contend	  it	  would	  be	  deeply	  unethical	  .	  This	  illustrates	  	  	  the	  	  complex	  	  dilemmas	  that	  research	  
can	  pose	  	  ,	  especially	  	  when	  the	  code	  that	  determines	  its	  ethics	  is	  drawn	  up	  by	  a	  culture	  unaware	  of	  the	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been lent, and to indicate clearly the places where the researcher’s analysis starts 
from the story provided. In writing up, a problem emerged in editing and cutting 
material so that it still represents what my interviewees say. In some cases I could 
do this directly with the subjects, but   once I left the site it was difficult. I employ 
extensive quotation to preserve as much original content as possible.  I believe 
that in doing this there is a basic honesty. A précis would not give readers the 
chance to scrutinize the original source and would effectively mean that they 
would have to ‘take my word for it’.51  I want the reader to see each story I was 




 My questions were crafted as abstract and generalized, so the respondents need 
make no personal reference   - for example, ‘What is your view of the ECCC? 
Can you tell me about the history of the country in the 1970s?’ However, many 
people did draw on their own experience to illustrate their points. Some of this 
information is harrowing but it was given unprompted. Indeed I found that people 
would volunteer information I would never enquire about  (torture, the loss of 
family). Similarly some people did discuss their personal violent behavior. Again 
I did not ask. The information was volunteered.  
 
It is impossible to find any person alive between 1970 and the mid 1980s not 
affected by the DK era. While no one I interviewed for the thesis falls under the 
court’s jurisdiction, readers may well ask how  I know the narrators are telling the 
truth, a particular issue when talking to former cadres. I analyse what   I am told, 
necessarily working on the principle that interviews are the best way to ask. 
Fetterman describes this   as ‘cognitive theory’ - the ethnographer can understand 
what people think by what they say they think. Generally speaking one has to 
work on the premise that they believe what they are saying.52  However, to 
address this concern  I situate the  individual  within the ‘meta data’.  I  can put a  
narrative in  context  of other research and local knowledge  - also in the context 
of  silences, denial and the points at which  people  choose to set  their own 
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boundaries. At times too  I was observing public events (religious ritual, law 
courts), and was able to see narratives unfolding within them. Such observations 
enable context to be further established. What matters is  to understand   meaning.  
As a researcher  it is incumbent on me to  understand  why the narrator  framed 
their story in such a way - not to dispute the information given. I am not cross-
examining my narrators or asking  questions  that would require them to reveal  
criminal acts.53 
 
 E. Valentine Daniel discusses a phenomenon he faced as a anthropologist in Sri 
Lanka : an eagerness on the part of victims or participants in grotesque crimes to 
talk to the outside world - and western journalists /academics/ aid workers offer 
this outlet. 54 It places on the researcher a particular responsibility: to understand  
why someone would open up their story to a stranger. Valentine Daniel argues  - 
and I  have also found  - that one reason  is  a wish to see their story disseminated 
to wider audiences.  This means it is vital to preserve the integrity of the story.  
Daniel feels theory ‘flattens’ down narratives, for the ease of the academic;  
squeezing narratives of violence is easy in the study, but betrays the narrators.55 
Their willingness to talk does not spring from a desire to impact upon western 
critical theory or  to bolster  alien  political agendas . 
 
A final (sobering) point : part of ethnography is highlighting modes of expression 
that do not fall into standardized academic and/ theoretical discourses. 56  
Cavellsays that it has proven an impossible task for the social sciences  to find a 
language in which  to discuss pain.57   
 
‘Transitional Justice’ and its limits.  
 
Before moving from methodology and practice to ‘pure’ theory, it is important to 
address a concept which bridges them and with which my thesis has a complex 
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relationship - which indeed was originally intended to form its theoretical spine : 
Transitional Justice. The central theme of Transitional Justice (TJ) is ‘How do 
societies deal with horrific histories?’ 58   It is a subfield of  legal studies  
combining the disciplines of political science and theory with jurisprudence. The 
academic literature on the topic is still theoretically underdeveloped – the phrase 
itself was only coined in 1995 by Neil Kritz. 59  In the introduction to his three-
volume collection contributors engage with the question of how new democracies 
contend with the authoritarian former regimes   preceding them. Ruti Teitel 
expounds the concept in her seminal work, defining the term ‘Transitional Justice’ 
as applicable to countries undergoing paradigm shift political change, whereby the 
understanding of ‘justice’ at the time of transition is seen as contextual to its 
location and always relative to the character of the previous regime.60 The term 
applies to a series of judicial and non-judicial measures - trials, truth 
commissions, reparations, institutional reforms, and memorization initiatives – 
which address massive human rights abuses. 61Olick and Coughlin, I think 
correctly, situate the notions of Universal Human Rights and TJ in the Liberal 
paradigm, as taking a linear view of time, which sees progress from atrocity to 
humanity’s self-realization. 62 They argue that accounts of history are a product of 
the meeting of the diachronic and synchronic axes of history to ‘create a 
framework for further historical understanding.’63 As though to illustrate how 
squarely TJ is situated in a Liberal narrative Teitel   specifically describes 
transition’s place in bridging society from authoritarianism to liberalism (i.e. 
Liberal Democracy). 64 
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In short, Transitional Justice is a narrative, one which tells ‘the story’ of events 
within the parameters of democratization. 65 The institutional bodies 
operationalizing it are mandated for many tasks: restoring dignity to victims, 
promoting psychological healing, creating collective memory, forging a new 
liberal democratic order, identifying and making perpetrators of mass atrocity 
account for their crimes and punishing them, legitimizing the new regime, 
promoting reconciliation, educating the population about the past, deterring 
potential future atrocities. 66 Internationalized judicial institutions construct 
historiographies of atrocity, editing, prioritizing and presenting histories within 
the limits of the methods of the TJ institution, such as tribunals. The kind of 
history which TJ mechanisms present as their final ‘product’ depends on how 
information is ‘extracted’, and under what conditions.67 Trials and the records 
they produce make narratives foundational to historical national political identity.   
Past and present are linked in a narrative format.68 Its shape is ‘how far we have 
come since the bad old days.’ 69Teitel discusses TJ in direct relation to western 
narrative frames shaped by the Abrahamic narrative. Redemption and 
reconciliation narratives (Moses’s journey to the Promised Land, Jacob and Esau, 
the life of Christ) are structurally replicated in western literary texts (Teitel uses 
Shakespeare’s Tempest as her example) all of which follow a linear format.  
Stories of redemption contain ‘transitional’ events (Moses crossing the desert, the 
Crucifixion) and suffering progresses via self-knowledge to transformation. This 
pattern emerges in the way modern official reports are constructed by drawing on 
history   as the means by which self-knowledge can be obtained:  the ‘lessons’ of 
history are learned and through this knowledge, society is able to progress to a 
liberal future. 70   Kjetil Grødum sums up the ECCC’s own reading of TJ: ‘By 
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accepting the followability of the transitional justice narrative, the victims are 
empowered to re-interpret memories of the conflicting past and orient themselves 
towards a better future.’71 
 
Given that I have laid out ethnographic, post-colonial and sociological reasons for 
a situational analysis taking Cambodians outside the ECCC as serious social 
actors, it is inevitable that I cannot work wholly within a paradigm which brings 
to the field concepts prioritised over the narratives of the people who live in the 
country. TJ is a potentially oppressive research agenda. When most TJ political 
scientists /researchers approach research on justice in post-atrocity countries, they 
seek empirical data to measure how far the normative standards set by 
international law/ democratization/ constitutionalism have been achieved – or to 
what extent TJ mechanisms have worked to facilitate such ends, thus proving their 
impact. Hence they validate their premises - if not always the mechanism. To put 
it more crudely, the narrative has been written before the research is done and the 
research aims to measure transition and justice by its own normative standards. 
 
Another problem of TJ in this specific context is the thirty-year gap between DK 
and the ECCC; it is vital to address this. My contention is that transition, and 
ways of seeing and understanding justice, have developed over these decades but 
have been largely ignored by TJ institutions. For example, I attended a conference 
run in Cambodia by an international NGO, Impunity Watch, entitled ‘Breaking 
the Silence’. It sought to address questions of memorialisation, TJ, and ways of 
discussing the past. While the conference was interesting, its title unquestioningly 
assumed the existence of a ‘silence’ to ‘break’. While I discuss this in greater 
detail later, I would here argue that this assumption is common among NGOs 
working in the normative TJ paradigm.  The premise of the conference about  
‘silence’ arose from an inability to conceive any other mode of discussing DK 
before a normative TJ mechanism arrived in the country with the ECCC. Yet both 
transition and justice exist outside the TJ paradigm. Cambodian social actors, 
including those I interviewed, have their own methods and group-specific 
discourses; they establish collective memories, away from institutional 
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restrictions, official discourse and political control. 72  
 
My decision not to ground the thesis in Transitional Justice crystallised when I 
began to think of the people with whom I had discussed the nature of justice and 
the atrocities of DK as my ‘Narrators’. At first this title simply seemed to be more 
respectful to people with difficult and personal stories than  ‘informants,’ 
’interviewees’ or  ‘subjects’.  But as their stories often diverged from what was 
articulated in the ECCC, from what TJ acknowledges as being a narrative,  the 
term acquired a central importance. I wanted to develop a theoretical frame which 
would recognise the importance of TJ  - given that the ECCC is a TJ mechanism it 
could do no other - while clearly identifying it as a single narrative running 
alongside others. This would allow me at different points to employ TJ 
scholarship and the way it traverses disciplines to be a social, political, legal, 
historical, philosophical and even theological discourse, without always referring 
back to social/political/ legal narrative origins which leave it stuck in a 
redemption narrative alien to my ‘Narrators.’73  There is a wider scope for 
transition and justice analysis outside official institutions, and a need to explore 
all the above-mentioned dynamics working in relation to the official mechanisms 
and/or autonomously.  It is part of the project of this thesis, then, to clarify the 
need for transition and justice; and to place TJ itself within broader theories of 
narrative equally capable of encompassing the stories I have been told.   
 
A Narrative Framework  
 
The word narrative derives from the Sanskrit word gna, a root term that means 
‘know’.  It comes into the western world through the Latin  for  ‘knowing.’74 Thus 
at an epistemological level the word for narrative is the same as knowledge. 
Indeed Lyotard calls narrative ‘the quintessential form of customary 
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Knowledge.’75  Virtually all contemporary investigations of narrative theory start 
from Roland Barthes’s assertion that narrative is ubiquitous  - ‘the narratives of 
the world are numberless’ - and mediated by an enormous variety of sign systems 
– ‘articulated language, spoken or written, fixed or moving images, gestures and 
the  ordered mixture of all these substances.’76  This leads me at times to place as 
much importance on a laugh, a badge worn by a lawyer, or the condition of a 
house occupied by a Khmer Rouge official as on the words of an interview or the 
transcript of a trial. Narrative is a permanent feature of what societies do ; there 
are different means of doing it, but storytelling is a permanent feature of social 
interaction.77 Narrative is the means by which the generations are linked.78 79 80 81 
Through it society’s knowledge is stored, transmitted and legitimized.82  We tell 
stories. Stories also tell us. 83  Narrative is how people know what they know and 
how to teach it. Lyotard cites the example of an Amazonian tribe (the Cashinahua) 
to illustrate the use of narratives in communication. 84 He describes how each time 
a story is narrated a specific phrase is used: ‘Here ends the Story of (whoever the 
story was about) and the name of the man who told it to you was (whoever just 
told you the story).’ 85 The narrator links himself to the story, just as Trin Min-Ha 
describes herself listening to the stories of ‘grandmothers’ in her own community. 
‘In this chain…. I am but one link.’86 
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 Berger and Luckmann famously described the  ‘social stock of knowledge’ as   
‘“what everybody knows” about a social world, an assemblage of maxims, 
morals, proverbial nuggets of wisdom, values and beliefs, myths, and so forth’.87 
This is in large part transmitted through narratives and with this in mind I would 
like to develop Berger and Luckmann’s theory throughout my own thesis in terms 
of Cambodia’s unique situation. The processes through which knowledge is 
created, preserved, institutionalized and transmitted were rendered impossible 
during DK.  Social interaction could only occur within the language and forms 
approved by the KR. One could therefore characterize the entire DK period as an 
inversion of the process of cultural transmission, in which all these elements were 
closed down by KR policy. Knowledge itself was their target. Human carriers of 
knowledge  - teachers, academics, and religious leaders - were murdered. One 
could also describe the KR period as a perverted attempt at a new social 
construction of reality.  In this process, Wats and Mosques became torture 
chambers, prisons, pigsties, transforming these sites into places of misery and 
fear, 88  and changing the meaning of the institutions from which people 
individually and communally drew the narratives of their own social reality. Peg 
LeVine coined the term Ritualcideto describe this policy of cutting off the Khmer 
majority from their perception of personal connection to the cosmic order, in turn 
forcing people to disengage from, and thus betray, their connection with the 
spirits and ancestors.89 Children were separated from their parents on a massive 
scale, removing them from the transmission of history and indoctrinating them 
with the new reality and narrative of Angkar, so they were not ‘tainted’ with too 
much knowledge of what came before the revolution. Ysa Osman points out that, 
as these children grew up, a new generation would be brought in to kill them, 
further  ‘purifying’ the regime’s social stock of knowledge from any pre-Year 
Zero influence. 90  The ‘symbolic Universe’which legitimizes social intuitions 
through  ‘conceptual machineries’ such as religion, myth, folklore and 
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philosophy, underwent the process known as smashing. 91  This policy was 
described by the head of the S-21 prison as ‘not just a physical smashing but also 
a psychological smashing, dehumanization and debasement of the individual 
psyche  ... Smash means something more than merely kill.’ 92 It is no coincidence 
that as I spoke to people working to help the traumatized they told me, again and 
again, the same traditional stories.  These narratives, as I outline in Chapter Five, 
are gradually being woven back into the social fabric to counter the effects of 
ritualcide.  
 
Through narratives,  ideas, histories and cultures are transmitted. And a principal 
feature of narrative is that it is informative of events rather than simply 
descriptive. (Abbott succinctly differentiates:  ‘My dog has fleas’ is a description 
of a dog. ‘My dog was bitten by a flea’ is a description of an event and thus a 
narrative.93)  Events involve interaction, which almost invariably means some 
kind of shift, however slight, in the power between the actors.  Hence narrative 
too is bound up with power.  Transmission, and the nature of what is transmitted, 
both become problematic when stories claim universality – particularly when, as 
the example of the Communist Party of Kampuchea demonstrates, one narrative is 
allowed and all others excluded. 
 
  Grand Narratives and their Collapse   
Hence one of the major axes on which this thesis turns is Lyotard’s theory of the 
collapse of the Grand Narratives of Modernity- the modern, western narratives of 
human progress. 94 He argues that the Cashinahua style of linking stories of the 
past to the present via the articulation of the narrative has been replaced, in the 
West at least, by narratives that point towards a future when the problems of 
‘humanity’ will be solved.  For the post-Enlightenment West the Grand Narrative 
is primarily a story of emancipation from superstition and dogma; for Marxist 
societies it is one of workers’ emancipation from alienation and control over their 
lives.  Changes in knowledge and its circulation since the Second World War 
have thrown these narratives into doubt.  For instance, the market-led global 
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economy values knowledge in terms of its market value and utility, not its role in 
‘progress’.  It is also clear that these  ‘grand narratives’ fail to contain or represent 
the narratives all people - they are the polar opposite of Buddhist narratives, 
which are cyclic rather than linear, for example.   
 
The Transitional Justice institution in Cambodia works on grand narrative 
assumptions. The UN component of the ECCC seems to situate itself in a Liberal 
narrative of international law with a linear view of time , charting a progress from 
atrocity to humanity’s self-realization.95 It is also worth noting that the thirty-year 
gap between DK and the ECCC saw the collapse of the Soviet Union.  However , 
as I show in the next chapter, the ruling CPP still clings to Soviet-style politics, 
manifest in the domestic component of the ECCC.  Thus the courts are effectively 
trying to shore up two collapsing narratives, often in the interests of masking their 
own shortcomings. Sometimes the narratives clash, leading to disputes about 
procedure; sometimes they co-operate to produce a result; both of them, however, 
shape the macro-narrative of the trials. The situation in the ECCC mirrors the 
nation’s suffering over the last thirty years. As the previous chapter has shown, 
Cambodia has been subject to externally imposed grand narratives with disastrous 
effect. Indeed I would contend that Cambodia is a site on which the grand 
narratives of the later half of the twentieth century collapse. Sophal Ear’s critique 
of the consistent failure of outsiders to ‘ask the peasants themselves how they 




 To find a language to discuss the impact of the collapse upon the lives of my 
narrators, whose stories relate in many different ways to the narratives of the 
court, I return to Boltanski,  He draws a distinction between ‘reality’ and ‘the 
world’.97  ‘The world’ is ‘an unknown portion of uncertainty … the flux of life’.98 
There is an inevitable disparity  between this  and  ‘reality’ -  Boltanski’s term for  
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the work of institutions in  ‘saying and confirming what matters. This operation 
assumes the establishment of types which must be fixed and memorized in one 
way or another (memory of elders, written legal codes, narratives, tales, examples, 
images, rituals, etc)’ to which  institutions ascribe names and definitions. 99 Thus 
they construct ‘social reality’, order , coordinate , control and justify behaviour. 
This constructed ‘reality’ exists despite ‘the world’. Institutions survive through  
discourse  and sign systems . Actors adhere to institutional codes and narratives , 
speaking them and being spoken by them , and  thereby create the boundaries of  
that ‘reality’, what Boltanski calls the  ‘whatness of what is’. 100  ‘Reality’ appears 
coherent   because  it  ‘succeeds in getting actors to believe in its solidity and 
internalize their powerlessness to change test formats.’ 101 Institutions  ‘succeed in 
providing descriptions of what happens and …what might occur.’102 (An example 
of this latter is the government’s  increasingly weak insistence that only the 
current regime can prevent the return of the KR). 
 
Institutions  provide ‘confirmation’ of what reality is, and attempt to justify and 
legitimize themselves  through ‘truth tests’ - visible demonstrations of  the 
standards they wish to show as norms.103 This is achieved through ceremonies 
embodying and demonstrating ‘the relationship between the order of symbolic 
propositions and the order  of the state of affairs’.  As Boltanski shows, such 
‘tests’ are often tautological , existing to assert that ‘ the king is the monarch’ . As 
such they do not hold up well to critique;  but their role is crucial , because of 
their power when they succeed.  Then ‘their effect is not only to make “reality” 
accepted. It is to make it loved.’104 
 
On the other hand ‘existential tests’ open up the constructed social order to ‘the 
world’ through critiques. By ‘existential tests’ Boltanski means tests  not 
emanating from institutions. He locates  radical critique in the creative processes , 
‘whose aesthetic orientation makes it possible to bypass the constraints of 
consistence and legal or moral justification imposed by argumentative 
discourse’.105  In the case of the social actors with whom I situate myself, such 
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tests might involve ceremonies, poems, dreams and stories,  conveyed in 
variously chosen media, as I  show in the following chapters . Even where they 
are less ‘creative’, my narrators demonstrate‘the capacity of actors to produce 
acceptable critiques and/or justifications  en situation… their sense of justice or 
their moral sense.’ 106  Although  multiple Cambodian  regimes have constructed 
‘realities’, and ensured that, if not always  ‘loved’ , they are accepted , my 
narrators are not blithely unaware of their own social realities and do not inhabit  
institutions as if they were fish unaware of the water in which they swim.  This is 
notably evident in the case of former KR cadres in their current dealings with the 
government , as I will show in Chapter Six.  I attempt throughout  to answer 
Boltanski’s methodological call to ‘ grasp the discontents of actors and explicitly 
consider them in the labour of theorization’ by asking those watching the grand 
narratives unfolding in their nation about what they think. 107 
  
The narrator’s toolkit -   how a story is told  
 
Early work on the theory of narrative began with Structuralism, that is, an attempt 
to find the underlying common features of, for example ,  variants of the Oedipus 
myth , to uncover a ‘structural law’ which makes sense of them.108 The Russian 
Formalists developed a key distinction between the  fabula –  the constituent 
events in a story - and the sjuzhet, the arrangement of that story in terms of time 
sequence, point of view, duration  etc.  The possibility of doing this, however,  
has always been highly contestable and it is the complexity of the relationship 
between the two that is the focus of most post-modern narrative theory. Barbara 
Herrnstein Smith, for instance,  arguesthat the construct of the fabula and the 
sjuzhet  is dualistic and uncontextualized. 109 If a reader is able to provide a 
summary of the ‘story’ (fabula) this is not indicative of his ability to draw out an 
essentialized  narrative, but demonstrative of one reader’s reading of that story, 
which will be different from another’s. What the reading will demonstrate is a 
particular reader’s priorities, culture and  biases. There is no basic story , but 
rather an unlimited multiplicity, constructed, responded to and perceived by each 
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reader differently. This as is true for non-fictional stories as for folk tales or 
novels; it is never possible to say  everything  about ‘what really happened. ’ It is 
possible to  piece together an account that offers a basis on which to administer 
justice, just as it is possible to  betray justice by irresponsible narrative 
arrangement. A court could not exist without the assumption that what will 
emerge from the telling of different narratives across a trial will yield some sort of 
baseline narrative of ‘what really happened.’ However, this is never without 
problems. I  illustrate these by borrowing the work  of the literary theorist and 
historian Tzvetan Todorov  on detective fiction as a  tool to dissect  by analogy 
the trial process.  I believe this to be helpful for two reasons. Firstly,  the  format 
of detective fiction  is , to use Todorov’s phrase, a ‘narrative of narratives.’ 110    
The working assumption of the   ECCC and the CPP is that the trial will yield a 
yet untold history of the DK era ,  created out of the evidentiary narrative streams 
that compete and collide during the process, to arrive at coherent conclusion and 
attribution of responsibility, conforming to the international norm on justice, 
accountability, procedure and trial rights.  
 
Secondly, although there is no conscious attempt to create a fiction on the part of 
the UN or  domestic judges, the Grand Narratives have a role  similar to that of 
the author of the detective story. Todorov argues that although in a tale of 
detection the fabula  -  ‘what really happened’  is uncovered through the  sjuzhet  -  
how it is told  -  the Author already knows the fabula and uncovers it through the 
sjuzhet. 111  Grand Narratives , never  themselves articulated in court, nevertheless 
shape the stories that emerge like a detective novelist’s fabula. A resultant 
problem lies in the individual stories of  people who fail to fit the grand 
narratives. Their  experience  may fall outside the relevant time frame, or the 
specific locations of atrocities under investigation ;  it may involve information 
which undermines the credibility of one or more institutions conducting the trial . 
How do those outside the scope of the discourses employed by institutions 
situated in progressive/linear narratives - whether PRT /Marxist or ECCC /Liberal 
- deal with  their encounter with those overpowering grand narratives ? Lyotard 
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outlines their situation in his arguments about the nature of injustice and the 
Differend. 
 
Just Gaming  and the Differend 
 
In Just Gaming Lyotard considers what  constitutes ‘justice’ , given his earlier 
contention that grand narratives have collapsed.112 He concludes  that an ethical 
justice must be based on the principle that people must be able to employ their 
own discourses and language .113  Language games set a ‘contract’ , which frames  
the particular dialectic  between interlocutors , that is, what sort of utterances  the 
interlocutors acknowledge as  legitimate or not in a particular frame of knowledge 
or understanding.  Every utterance in the ‘game’ is a ‘move’- the analogy here 
being a chess game – each move subject to a set of rules.  Lyotard argues that the 
rules of the ‘game’ are agreed  in the ‘contract’ between the players ( though this 
is not to say that the players devised the contract). Without the rules, there is no 
game. Despite the terminology of games and rules, this is not to say that games 
are entered into so that someone can ‘win’ , or that the ‘rules’ are oppressive 
impositions ; nor is it to say that the game is not subject to other games , or cannot 
be changed.114  Language games  make up wider social bonds. Society is made up 
of statements setting up the rules of the language games . As with the  multiplicity 
of language games, there is also a multiplicity of societies, with different forms of 
legitimizing the language games and setting their rules . 
 
 
Lyotard argues that there are significant differences in language games . Hence 
universalising systems (grand narratives) as the sole means for framing 
communication should be resisted. This is a call for the recognition of  multiple 
language games and  narrative ways to organize  discourse. An ethical form of 
justice   requires  a recognition of the rights of others to use their own language 
games and  modes of thought, without being silenced and/or marginalised by a 
hegemonic discourse. An additional  injustice occurs when this is not allowed to 
happen. Indeed, exclusion from the discourse of the just is a further  act of 
injustice. The postmodern condition is one where, in face of the collapse of the 
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grand narratives, we are left with a massive multiplicity of language games, which 
a just and ethical world must recognise and listen to on the terms in which they 
are articulated. Justice in this sense is not based on consensus (unified narration or 
conceptualization of the idea) alone, but the practice of justice must be one that 
enables the small narratives to have their space.115 
 
 
Lyotard moves on to explore this in The Differend. 116 This concept hinges on 
what he terms ‘phrase regimes and genres of discourse’. ‘Phrases’ are 
communicative acts, words, and gestures, images that carry information to the 
addressee.  These can be categorized into ‘regimes’, that is, into whatever the 
‘phrase’ attempts to ‘perform’ (ordering, questioning, threatening, describing). 
Phrases can be non-verbal (silence is a phrase), or incoherent (a scream performs 
the communicator’s intention).117 Phrases exist in phrase ‘universes’. 118 These are 
constructed when four elements of language come together: the person presenting 
the phrase (the addressor), the person it is communicated to (the addressee), the 
thing to which the person communicating is referring (the referent) and the way 
(the sense) in which the referent is being referred to.119 
 
‘Genres of discourse’ are ways discourse can be categorized (e.g. legal, scientific, 
political, artistic, religious, Marxist). They determine the utility of phrases 
towards the particular end the genre is seeking. They organize the phrase regimes, 
‘fix the rules of linkage…determine the stakes, [and] submit phrases from 
different regimens to a single finality.’120  Hence if a genre’s framework does not 
permit the entry of certain phrase regimes, regime and genre become 
incompatible. The genre shuts out phrases that it will not permit to link. To 
illustrate this point I will employ a specific discussion at the ECCC. Saloth Ban is 
Saloth Sar’s (Pol Pot’s) nephew. Called as witness to the ECCC, he was 
questioned by one of the prosecutors, Vincent de Wilde d’Estmael: 
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  d’Estmael:  Witness, let me put the same question to you again. 
Yesterday, you said that you went to K-1, from time to time, to see your 
wife. How many times did you go there? And how frequently? 
 
  Saloth Ban: I came to testify before this Court and I took an oath before 
I testified. I took an oath before the Iron God - [lokta dambong daek, in 
Khmer] -- and yesterday I was told by the Iron God that I should not … I 
should speak very carefully, I should choose the word Khmer carefully, I 
should consider the word "happiness"; and if the questions put to me do 
not make me happy, then I should not respond to the questions. These are 
the words told to me by the Iron God last night…. The Iron God also told 
me that this Court is unjust; it is not a hundred per cent just. … The God 
told me last night. And when I asked him why he said that this Court is 
unjust, the response was that… because this Court does not prosecute the 
Case 000. 
 
  President: Mr. Witness, can you show clearly your position? Are you 
refusing to respond to the questions from now on? What is your position?  
In the oath that you took and the laws that require you to do so, you have 
to testify to the truth that you have known, have heard, and have 
remembered. Did you use all these words yesterday during your oath? 
 
  Saloth Ban: Yes, I took an oath. However, as I just stated, in my… what 
I stated earlier was what I was told by the God. 
 
President: Your dream is a superstition and it cannot be used in law. We 
have heard your statement regarding your dream. This is purely a dream of 
yours, and the Court cannot use that.121 
 
Regardless of what one may think about Saloth Ban’s dream, the example 
demonstrates the working of genres of discourse on phrase regimes. Saloth Ban 
describes a dream visitation from a god and says  the Iron God believes that the 
ECCC is unjust. The president of the court explains that the ECCC genre of 
discourse does not admit a dream discourse. Even though the phrase concerned a 
point about the nature of justice (and could be said to have a degree of overlap 
with the work of the ECCC) it did not fit the genre of the court’s discourse, and 
was not permitted to link. 
 
The Differend is that point where the addressor is unable to phrase their grievance 
in a way acceptable to the addressee , who may be working within a totally 
different genre of discourse, one unable/unwilling to allow phrases to link. If 
injustice is to be avoided, it must be possible for the addressor’s grievance to be 
presented to an addressee confident that they will understand the phrase regime in 
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which it is spoken. Lyotard is concerned with the point where  the genre disallows 
the link that would enable someone to present their grievance in their own choice 
of phrasing. The Differend occurs in a case where at least two interlocutors cannot 
resolve their issue in a way that satisfies both,  as there is no mutually agreed rule  
by which judgment can be rendered .122 One party is thus excluded. ‘The victim is 
deprived of life, the freedom to make his or her ideas or opinions public’.123  A 
person with a grievance is powerless  to present it  through the only  channel 
available if their ability to phrase the referent  (injustice)  is excluded from the 
genre of discourse . The victim of the injustice is silenced by inability to convey 
their story in the discourse   prescribed for their use, or the discourse parameters 
laid out in the ‘rule of judgment’. 124 There is no  ‘meta-language’ through which 
all persons can relate their stories  and in which all are  equal.125 This picks up on 
Herrnstein Smith’s challenge to the fabula/ sjuzhet dichotomy when she refers to 
the necessity of dealing with the unlimited multiplicity of narratives, which are 




 For Lyotard, the Holocaust is a rock upon which the grand narratives crash and 
founder. ‘With Auschwitz, something new has happened in history’ - the 
systematic imposition of a Differend upon a whole people, killing not only the 
Jews but the possibility of their bearing witness to what was happening to them.127   
When we contemplate the Holocaust we contemplate the unthinkable, the thing 
that lies beyond the rules of knowledge.   The Differend of Auschwitz is an ethical 
obligation upon us to analyse and consider. In rejecting  the  narrative of progress 
Lyotard also  rejects the idea that  there should be some kind of modernist re-
working of history as outlined by Jameson or Habermas. For Jameson this is  an 
explicitly  Marxist project, undoing the fragmentation of events and resituating 
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them as ‘vital episodes in a single vast unfinished plot.’128 Rather, Lyotard 
contends that  we cannot return to the disrupted narratives of modernism , but 
must  reconfigure history and justice in terms of seeking a new historiographical 
project based on the ’universality of cultural differences,’ utilizing the whole 
range of genres of discourse and phrases to interrogate one other. 129  People have 
to  ‘know-how-to-speak’ and ‘know-how-to hear’.130   
 
In face of the collapse of the grand narratives , historiography has become so 
fragmented, discourse so infinitely plural, that the only way in justice to hear this 
plurality  is to free our understanding  from the contested genres of discourse and 
abandon the pretence of a final end to the story. Reading  history must be open to 
the fact that the potential to achieve finality has ended.131 This is not a smug post-
modern irony which forgets the past and inhabits an eternal now in which there is 
no such thing as society. Lyotard is clear that  ‘it is  not exactly advisable to resist 
the plenum of instituted narratives by taking a stand on the void of a universal 
principle of discourse.’ 132 Rather, he has a more optimistic project. He envisages 
our obligation to attend to those points on which the Grand Narratives crash and 
to hear the voices of those silenced and crushed by the Differend.  ‘Little stories’ 
are vital currency precisely because they do not fit into great histories. 133 As he 
points out with reference to Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago,  collections of  
‘uncomfortable little stories’ not only offer eye-witness accounts of injustice, but 
‘breathe new life’ into the stories of those  ignored in the past,  as well as 
interrogating the present. Rather than contending that  grand narratives forcibly 
speak us,  Lyotard  takes a more optimistic stance which reflects the vitality of 
Boltanski’s conscious ‘ social actors’.  He suggests  that actions are also stories, a 
way for small acts of resistance can be articulated: 
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 ‘Are you saying that a runner in the ten thousand metres, or a resistance 
fighter who slips under the arch of a bridge with a packet of explosives – 
that these bodies in action are recounting something?’ 
 
‘I would say they are acting out scenarios that are running through their 
heads…they become bullets, or events, and they adopt positions by 
referring to what is being said, has been said, or will be said. And they 
become witnesses to the fact that the stories they are acting out are the best 
stories, simply because they testify to their accuracy.’ 134 
 
In other words a ritual of healing, a ceremony at a grave, a peace walk, can be a 
narrative, a telling of a story that will never be spoken in a court. 
 
Narrative and time 
 
 This leads me to another axis on which this thesis turns. Paul Ricœur articulates 
Lyotard’s project as achievable by abandoning  sweeping histories , inevitably 
written by the most powerful ,  to write   alongside them  the story of the 
powerless, the dispossessed , the  history of the vanquished - the small people 
omitted in top-heavy accounts (for example those provided by courts). This 
counterweight of small narratives drives my thesis . Those whose voices are 
powerless, marginalized, vanquished, cry out in history for justice through 
recognition. A theory of justice must  account for these  voices. Ricœur, 
discussing Arendt, considered how one meaning of being human is to be 
remembered and recollected in narrative discourse – ‘to be memorable’.135 What 
is deemed   important to be preserved? The implications of this are considerable 
for narrativity, as it is in ‘the determination of whose voices are preserved and  
how they are narrated, that justice, culture and identity are established .’136 137 
There is a potential critique that would contend  the terms of narrative theory are  
‘inextricably linked’ to structuralist discourse. 138  Structuralist terminology 
dominates what narrative theory does. This perhaps is due to the timebound nature 
of narration and how humanity structures narrations within constructed ‘realities’. 
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 Ricœur  argues that narrative constructs a sense of temporality, that it is a 
mechanism for the organization of time. 139 He postulates the present  as  the point 
where understandings are rearranged, in context of what has been, and what is 
expected to come.  Historical time becomes  ‘human time’.140   That is, as human 
beings we are bound by our ability to express in the means available to us – we 
are stuck with constructions, frameworks, and to some extent the structuralist 
discourse, which order our stories in relation to time.  I use his work to expound  
in my final chapter what is happening in Cambodia between generations .  My 
principal aim there differs from the previous chapters, in that I am  not concerned 
to address how people express their stories, but why.  
 
Ricœur lays out the relationship between time and narrative in his Mimesis model. 
Mimesis 1 (M1) is the stage of ‘prefiguration’ /pre –understanding - a preliminary 
notion of what  comprises human action.  The reader has a practical understanding 
of this. Personal experience develops a semantic, symbolic and temporal 
understanding of persons and events. 141  M2 is the ‘emplotment stage’  - how 
events are ordered and their relationship  to one other. Emplotment arranges 
narrative into an ‘intelligible whole,’ showing how  events, actors, and agencies 
relate to one other and to the end point. 142 M3 is the ‘configuration, 
reconfiguration and reading’ stage.143  This is done through the act of reading, 
whereby the reader can grasp the whole,  see what sense it makes of the text,  and  
consider the possible implications .This is the point at which the reader establishes 
a hermeneutic understanding. Meaning can then be ascribed to the entire 
narrative. Without M3, M1 and M2 would be purposeless, as only the reader can 
provide M3.  
 
In his discussion of the temporality of narratives, Ricœur  argues that there must 
be an end to narratives  to facilitate hermeneutic understanding.  ‘Narrative time’ 
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must lead to a place when it can be read in its hermeneutic circle.   It attains  
significance and meaning because it emanates from temporality. The timebound 
nature of human existence is what allows us to read it hermeneutically and 
interpret ourselves in temporality. 144 Emplotment sequences a story  by 
establishing  networks of causality. 145 Time is not a linear series of events, but a 
subjective concept, whereby events are highlighted according to the significance a 
particular narrator gives them – hence  networks may operate differently for 
different narrators.  
 
  The present, in which stories are told, is the space of reconfiguration of 
‘readings,’ which  change according to the ‘present’ we occupy.146 Narration is an 
action of reading phenomena/history hermeneutically through semiotic 
infrastructure and discourse, enabling  meaning to be   deposited and negotiated 
through  religion, art, language. Narrative establishes human actions in what is 
subjectively understood as time, within memory and in contrast to histories.147  It 
is performed through its telling in time, through the unfolding and speaking of 
words, and at the same time creates a structural framework.148 Narratives relate to 
the past, the present and the expected future. 149  An example from recent 
Cambodian experience may  clarify this rather abstract discussion . On August 10 
2012, the Phnom Penh Post printed a story about a DK era mass grave  excavated 
that week :  
 
 Lat Ngi struggled to explain to her daughter the significance of what she 
was holding. ‘This is your grandfather,’ she told the little girl , holding a 
15-centimetre jawbone segment out to the incredulous child.  ‘I know it is 
my father’s bone because he had platinum covering his three teeth here,’  
the 40-year-old said,  pointing to three decaying teeth pockets along the 
jaw. ‘I knew he was brought here but never imagined I would actually find 
him- I can’t find words to say.’ 150 
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The story goes on to cover the ceremonies and the plans for the building of a 
stupa  taking place  since the excavation, at the instigation of the people who had 
come up to see the site . It ends with the words of an 83-year-old woman: ‘ “ I try 
to tell my grandchildren the stories, but they don’t believe” she said,  struggling to 
smile. “ How can you believe what happened?”’ 
 
 In assembling a narrative for her child, Lat Ngi understood herself to be in 
possession of all the aspects of the mimesis model. She knew about the DK era,  
as she was a child at the time ;  she knew how people acted and the context of that 
action; she  knew that millions died, and were buried in mass graves (M1).  She 
knew what happened and the order in which it happened ; she knew her father had 
those teeth implants, that he was brought here, and  that all these years later they 
had unearthed a set of bones that fitted with her knowledge.  She then was able to 
complete the order of events by reading the bones in light of M2 and M2. The 
young daughter, struggling to believe, is not in possession of the pre-configurative 
stage. Like the woman who explained that her grandchildren do not believe her 
stories, Lat Ngi’s child can’t perform the hermeneutic understanding required for 
the story to make sense.  As I discuss throughout,  especially in the final chapter, 
this lack of belief on the part   of younger people comes from lack of context.   
They cannot believe their country ever resembled the accounts given them by the 
old. Their understanding of what  comprises human action (such as  Khmer killing 
Khmer in vast numbers) makes it impossible for them to understand the stories, so 
they dismiss them as exaggerated, or invented.  A problem here is that narrative, 
intergenerational communication, and memory require imagination.  I go on to 
explore the links between memory and imagination below.  
 
Collective/ Collected Memory?  
 
Benedict Anderson describes how people are socialized into ‘imagined 
communities’ by constructing   narratives of collective identity  - the ‘biography’ 
of the community. 151  In this process of socialization two kinds of memory are at 
work, distinguished by Jan Assmann: ‘communicative memory’, operating 
between generations in daily discourse, and ‘cultural memory’,linking generations 
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long dead to the present. 152  As the eldest of a society die away, there comes a 
turning point at which communicative memory becomes cultural memory.  Once 
this has  happened, those memories have to be deliberately maintained within the 
culture by generations of people who were not themselves alive to witness the 
events and do not know anyone who was. As these memories become ever more 
distant until no one is around to contest them, later generations interpret the 
distant past in the light of the present context. The distant past is constructed as 
the foundation of contemporary identity. The three years, eight months and twenty 
days of DK were the period of rupture in the nation’s capacity to construct reality, 
carry out ‘communicative memory’ between generations and interpret ‘cultural 
memory’ of a fixed point in light of the present. While they were not  ‘long dead’, 
the sheer number of dead, coupled with the physical destruction of artefacts and 
literature and the regime’s total immobilization of the process of the social 
construction of knowledge,  meant that the ‘communicative’ and ‘cultural’ 
processes were forced to overlap and occur at a greatly accelerated pace. 
Both Anderson and Assmann presume, firstly, that socialization can occur and 
secondly, that the binding chronological sequence of events making up a 
community’s history/biography can be ‘emplotted’ into a linear narrative 
nourished by personal and public memories with sources – writings, buildings, 
photographs, letters and all kinds of meaningful texts and artefacts that contribute 
to the narrative - which provide meaning to that sequence and make it into a 
coherent story to be told. While hegemonizing mechanisms supposedly enable 
those who have suffered to come to a sanctioned site and project their subjective 
experience into the official narrative, they do not necessarily deal adequately with 
the specificity of that experience. Individuals have to find the context into which 
their story fits, sharing and owning the narrative the official mnemonic device 
promotes. ‘Collective memory’ offer individuals a ‘touchpoint’ in the wider 
canon, a conduit through which to contribute to the wider process of national 
narrative making and transmission of experience to the next generation. Collective 
memories are the core of group identity. 153 Young asserts that several individual 
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memories together form 'collected memory’ rather than ‘collective memory’.154 
Like Lyotard’s ‘uncomfortable little stories’, they form the ‘ghost of a civil 
society’, an entity which does not set up a battle to the death with the 
institutionalized state apparatus, but nevertheless questions it, and achieves small 
victories. 155  The historian’s approach of ‘micro-history’ could be used to seek 
understanding of broad historical/cultural phenomena by intense scrutiny of an 
individual/event/location - particularly if used in conjunction with the 
methodology of oral history.156 This is a process actively engaged in at the 
Documentary Centre of Cambodia; their archive is the principal store of memories 
in Cambodia and offers researchers a way to study the collected memories.  
 
Physical sites (such as museums or memorials) and artefacts shape memory, 
narrative identity and national canon. 157  The ways sites and artefacts of genocide 
are preserved and presented demonstrate political, historical and religious 
messages. There is a major divergence of views as to what to do with them. 
Tribunals see them as evidence; victims, educators and religious leaders all have 
different ideas about how to curate the artefacts of genocide - if they wish to at all.  
Such disputes expose how historical identity is made in a post-genocidal society. 
158 For example, the use of bodily remains for forensic evidence at the ECCC (a 
highly politicized institution with a top-heavy focus on historical narrative), the 
display of bones in stupas and the treatment of mass graves constitute a point of 
contention where the requirements of law, religion, culture, and personal feelings 
collide. 159   All these constitute the ‘technologies of heritage.’ 160  These are 
sanctioned narratives with political agendas that shape them.  Individual memory 
is too disconnected from collective memory – an individual’s experiences are 
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always unique and there are as many collective memories as groups in a society. 
For instance, the group memory of the Chams will be different from the 
experiences of other sections of the population. However, when what Young 
defines as ‘the national canon’ finally evolves, these disparate memories need to 
find their place there. 161 
 
Conclusion –Framing the thesis.  
 
‘There’s always an element of piety in a concern for theory, even critical 
theory.’ (Lyotard, Lessons in Paganism)162 
 
This study’s relationship with the idea of Transitional Justice is a complex and not 
uncritical one.  The literature in this field emerges out of the liberal grand 
narrative; however when extricated from its liberal origins TJ spills out 
conceptual notions that can be fruitfully explored. My concern is to explore the 
narrative threads entwined in Cambodia, an entangled aporia in and between 
narrativesconcerning the telling of the DK period, what process in justice deals 
with it, and what meaning such processes have for the telling of the story.163 
Disentangling the narratives, and especially looking into the grand (meta) 
narratives and discourse, is relatively straightforward.   Indeed I contend that the 
more  ‘official’ (state bound) the processes, the more embedded they are into the 
grand narratives, and the more they can be analyzed in old-fashioned structuralist 
terms. The notions of  fabula, and sjuzhet have applicability in the process of 
creating a narrative of DK to impose a just response to it in Law, within these 
grand narrative formulations. The complexity of the task arises in identifying the 
Differend.  As more narrators come forth to tell about the same people and events,  
the more difficult  it becomes to extract any narratological frame.   My task here is 
not to attempt to create a grand frame, but to identify how the grand narratives 
collapse in the face of mass killing and the fragmentation into an unmanageable 
plurality, to discover some of the phrases that crash against the meta-languages.164 
 
On encountering Differend-rooted problems of dealing with justice deficits 
through narrative, we encounter the question : why narrate? (Or,  sometimes, why 
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narrate when the meta-language has articulated an overarching schema?) The 
answer to this is to look into  narration as both a mechanism of knowledge and an 
act of  memory transmission.165 166 167 This is particularly pertinent in a nation 
where the regime pursued a policy of deliberate inversion/ perversion of the 
process of the socialization and construction of social reality.  
 
Given the plurality of narratives, and the rejection of metalanguage as an 
appropriate frame,  it is difficult to find a means  to explore how people narrate 
without contradicting the premises on which the study is resting (infinite plurality 
and re-interpretation of story). This is not to say that there is a singular structure, 
but rather a singular restriction (time) into which narrative is spoken, interpreted 
and absorbed.  This sequencing allows for hermeneutic reading in the frame world 
of the three mimeses . Put differently, history, self, identity, memory and narrative 
over the past 40 years and the perceived future are made into a intelligible 
whole.168 From that intelligible whole some kind of meaning of justice can be 
posited, not out of Assmann’s collective memory, but rather from Young’s  
‘collected memory’, described above. 169 170 Young contends that any public 
memorialization initiatives or memory-making objects  depend on the viewer’s 
subjective readings rather than the object/event ‘broadcasting’ a singular memory.  
Viewers themselves come to the memorial and from them, through their ‘reading’, 
meanings are derived from the object . Put simply, ‘viewers make meaning.’ In 
themselves memorializations  are   inert. The memories they ‘make’ are  viewer-
dependent  . The  memorial site creates the  illusion of a collective memory. In 
practice however , a multiplicity and diversity of memories  collect around  such 
sites.  Memories develop and readings of events change over  time. The object or 
memorial site becomes a sign of history which  instigates a dialectic in the minds 
of the viewer /groups of viewers. Memories collect together at such sites , but are 
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not   inscribed for eternity. Viewers will read in the context  they themselves 
inhabit, with their own interpretation, their own (in)ability to project themselves 
into the narrative. Young is specifically  discussing  memorial sites.  However,  I  
contend that his notion is applicable to a court room, a ritual, or  even an 
unmarked place. Young’s approach of collecting rather than collectivizing 
memories has two functions ;  first, it addresses the history of the vanquished, the 
small voices;  second, it  answers Arendt’s point that one meaning of being human 
is the need to be remembered and recollected in narrative discourse –‘to be 
memorable’.171 172 Throughout the thesis I will be shifting between micro-and 
macro-history,  between the grand narratives of international institutions and 
regimes  and the voices of the small,  quiet and  orderly drowned in comparison; 





 Sen argues that institutions can be compared in terms of how they dispense 
justice without the need to refer to a transcendental ideal of justice, but rather  by 
placing institutions on a comparative continuum. 174   By situating itself outside 
TJ, this thesis is asserting that justice is not a process with fixed ends,  but  a fluid 
idea which can only be discussed relative to what is available to those who have 
endured injustice. Sen is specifically discussing John Rawls’s  idea of justice as 
fairness and social justice.175 I adapt this to discuss the narrative of Cambodians 
who lived under DK, and their ability to narrate or have narrated their stories 
within the means available to them. 
 
Placed within a narrative framework,  this means that justice  acquires its meaning 
not from transcendental ideals an institution has/has not fulfilled,  but from the 
extent those who have suffered feel  able to express their stories, and how those 
stories are represented in the modes established to deal with  suffering and 
injustice. To take a small example from the following chapter, I spoke to people 
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about the 1997 trial of Pol Pot and the ECCC. They believed the ECCC was 
comparatively better than the trial of Pol Pot. However,  this did not mean that the 
ECCC was seen as a perfect institution -  simply that it was better  in evolving a 
narrative of events and developing a narration of history to be shared by a wider 
community. None of my narrators see justice as  a question of sending  
individuals to prison, but rather as a  process of finding out the truth, conveying a 
story, trying to make sense of the past, trying to explain it to their (grand) 
children. These are far more complex demands than the TJ focus on 
democratization, accountability, and procedure can cope with alone. TJ’s 
normative standards are unobtainable(transition from atrocity to peace, 
democracy, reconciliation). A better way to work with transitional justice is to 




Chapter Three: Trials and Narratives: Performing Ideologies? 
 
The elephant in the room 
 
Andrew Ianuzzi: - I'm only trying, in my own boorish way, to suggest 
that if the Trial Chamber continues to work from a script, with cues and 
stage directions, these proceedings take on all the dignity of a very bad  
‘Gilbert and Sullivan’1 
 
Michiel Pestman: I think this court needs a jester. Maybe that is why I am 
still here.2 
 
What underlies these comments is the concern voiced by Pestman in his response 
to the opening statement by the Prosecutor in 2011, a concern he labelled the 
‘elephant in the room’ : that the ECCC might  ‘[turn] into a mere re-run of the 
1979 show trial’.  In which case, Pestman added, ‘I will take off my gown and 
join Nuon Chea in his holding cell, where I will follow and probably intensely 
enjoy this drama on “telly”.’ 3 Both Pestman and Ianuzzi eventually resigned in 
December 2012, stating the whole institution was a ‘farce’. 4 Theatricality has 
been something of a theme in the ECCC as these comments from Nuon Chea’s 
legal team indicate.   Over 2012 Ianuzzi played several ‘stunts’ apparently 
designed to satirise the trial process from within. For example, he came into court 
wearing an  ‘I Love Dada’ badge on his robe, commenting: 
  For the record... ‘Dada’ refers to Dadaism, and that, of course, is the 
early twentieth century movement that rejected logic and reason in favour 
of nonsense, irrationality, and chaos. It is not, as was suggested to me over 
the break …. it does not refer to  “don't ask, don't answer,” although I 
would say that that seems to encapsulate this Chamber's approach to our 
defence team quite well. 5 
 
Ianuzzi also quoted the rapper Dr. Dre with reference to what he saw as one of the 
international judge’s offensive ‘gesticulations’. 6 This strategy was designed to 
evoke a question, which would in turn permit him to get into the court record his 
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allegation that when his colleague, Michiel Pestman, was discussing possible 
political interference at the ECCC, she shook her head and silently mouthed the 
words ‘blah, blah, blah, blah’.  
 
 The ECCC is the third  ‘trial’ process concerning the Khmer Rouge executive.  
All three processes have at some point been subject to the same ‘show’ analogy.  
When I interviewed witnesses and/or participants in the People’s Revolutionary 
Tribunal or the ‘trial of Pol Pot,’ they described the proceedings as ‘like a show’,7 
‘not a proper court’,8  ‘scripted’ or 9 ‘a drama’.10   The term is now being 
employed for a third time in a process that will undoubtedly be the last trial of the 
leadership, a trial Michael Karnavas, lead international co-lawyer for Ieng Sary, 
identifies as the final curtain: ‘the exquisite moment for Cambodia ...the first time 
in its history to see how an independent tribunal functions… I would say this is 
“IT,” at least for those alive today in Cambodia.’11 If the trial fails to provide a 
process seen as legitimate, there will be no fourth chance to deal with the DK 
period in a judicial institution.    
 
It is important to clarify the role of ‘show’ in trials. Ever since Stalin, the term 
‘show trial’ has been synonymous with an illegitimate process. Yet, as De Nike 
argues, all trials are in one sense ‘shows’. 12 They are -  must be -  events with 
their own Lyotardian language games.   As with stage plays, ‘phrases’ used in a 
court  –  including the furniture and the clothing – are organised into  regimes . 
Some indicate the roles of the participants – the accused, the judge, the public; 
utterances such as ‘he is guilty’ or ‘I sentence you’ are, in the court’s phrase 
regime, explicitly performative, rather than simply descriptive as they might be in 
conversation.  Trials are expected to take place before an audience - often several 
audiences:  those responsible for reaching a verdict, the members of the public 
who may be attending, and in the case of a high profile trial, the world at large.   
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 All trials involve narratives within narratives like a Russian doll.   The   over-
arching narrative is always ‘Here is a process, and its outcome is justice.’  
Shaping the structure through which that narrative is organised are the ‘grand 
narratives’ of Liberalism and Marxism; both claim that their ideologies alone 
facilitate justice. These in turn generate specific related metanarratives - 
nationalism, TJ, legal liberalism - which protect, support or modify the grand 
narrative. The narrative of the actual events these metanarratives shape may then 
emerge as a clear account on which to base a just verdict; alternatively it may be 
actively orchestrated in order to obscure the process or mask information. As 
Awoi Allo contends, ‘What counts is not that a trial is labeled a 'show trial'; it is, 
rather, the end that the 'show' serves.’ 13 My objective to understand the socio-
cultural meaning of the three processes discussed here and how they are 
understood.   Hence I lay them side by side  - to the best of my knowledge, for the 
first time – asking very basic questions in order to identify the large number of 
competing narrative strands often entangling to the point of aporia : 
 
• How does this court present itself?  What narrative is imparted through the 
venue, the people present, and the clothes they wear? Who is watching? 
Who is absent? 
 
• What kinds of (grand?) narratives frame the trial? 
 
• What narratives are unspoken?  Who selects what is told and what is not?  
How are they authorized to do so? 
 
• Who is able to tell their story within this framework? Who is not? 
 
• Is it possible for stories to find a way to be told despite the framework?  
 
I follow this chapter with an ‘interquel’, or bridging chapter, analyzing what I 
define as an ‘alternative’ mechanism: a small-scale Mediation Process between a 
family who lost a relative during DK and the former KR cadre involved in that 
person’s arrest. In juxtaposing this small-scale narrative with the  ‘hegemonic 
mechanisms’ discussed below, I hope to interrogate those mechanisms by 
                                                
13	  Awol	  K.	  Allo,	  ‘The	  “Show”	  In	  the	  Show	  Trial	  	  :	  Contextualizing	  the	  Politicization	  of	  the	  
Courtroom',	  Barry	  Law	  Review,	  Fall	  2010	  
 98 
indicating significant gaps in their operation.  Hegemonic mechanisms create and 
implement a hegemony in discourse and an understanding of history through 
large-scale presentation of narrative, backed by powerful actors marshalling 
considerable resources with the intention of presenting  ‘the truth’/ ‘the official 
narrative’ .The (meta/grand) narratives demand that individuals situate themselves 
in relation to them and aid the creation of a politically appropriate ‘hegemonic 
social memory’.14 However, ‘vernacular narratives’ - memories at individual 
level15  - too often encounter the Differend,  and voices that fail to resonate with 
the official interpretation of events are silenced, a process I show occurring in 
different ways in all three of the processes described below.16 
 




Following the invasion that ended DK, the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal 
(PRT) was convened by the new government to try Pol Pot and Ieng Sary in 
absentia for genocide. Located in Chaktomouk Hall, Phnom Penh (still a 
performance space) this five-day trial was the first in the world to use the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.17  Thus 
it marked itself as an event with significance for the wider world. Lawyers were 
present from Algeria, Cuba, Japan, Syria, the USSR, the USA, India, Vietnam and 
Laos, addressing the court in their own languages.   Their presence implicitly 
declared the crimes on trial to be an affront to global human values and endorsed 
the justice and fairness of the process.  (Indeed Hun Sen is quoted by John 
Quigley as saying ‘We had international lawyers join the trial in 1979. You 
cannot do better than that.’18)  
 
 Some trouble was taken to secure a Cambodian audience. Few of my own 
narrators, scattered across the nation, knew the trial was happening.  One former 
cadre told me that after he had fled with other KR:  
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I used to hear in 1979 they were doing a trial of the KR leaders, but I 
don’t know about it very well. We heard on the radio. In the whole country 
it was broadcast over the radio.  I heard it was small stuff, I only heard it 
from the radio.19  
 
There were in fact very few people left in Phnom Penh available to watch the trial. 
However, a Cambodian audience was specially bussed into the empty city to fill 
the seats.  John Quigley, a legal scholar enlisted in 1979 to determine whether 
what had occurred qualified as genocide, and one of the few to have seen Phnom 
Penh just months after the end of the regime, describes it as a ghost town:  
 
… empty, there was no population in the city. I’d never been in a city like 
that … you know this beautiful major city, … and there just wasn’t any 
population, no shops, nothing going on. They put us in what I think had 
been a hotel, that was not functioning as a hotel, but they fixed it up so 
that those of us who were coming in for the trial could stay there. It was 
only the people coming in for the trial that could stay there. They didn’t 




Bogdan Szajkowski has pithily summed up the key dynamic to keep in mind 
when analyzing the PRT:  Cambodia is the only country where the Marxist regime 
was overthrown by another Marxist government with the help of a Marxist 
neighbor(Vietnam). 21   This is the clue to the complex meta-narrative shaping the 
trial’s idiosyncratic genre of discourse. Essentially it was a Vietnamese-run 
operation with a Cambodian face. It had a Cambodian (PRK) and international 
staff,  selected by the  pro-Vietnamese Heng Samrin government, comprising 
Cambodian defectors from DK backed by a Vietnamese military presence and 
with Vietnamese officials .  The choice to use the Convention devised in the wake 
of the Holocaust showed the new regime  presenting a narrative about its concern 
with ‘universal’ humanitarian issues,  on which justice would  be done. However, 
this narrative had to interact with another  - the story of how a small group under 
the influence of Peking betrayed Marxism.    
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On the domestic front three strategic goals were linked to this latter narrative. 
Firstly, to detoxify the Marxist ‘brand’ of the genocidal connotations accrued 
under the KR.  Communism originally had little intellectual foothold in the 
Cambodian population .22  However, Angkar used terms like ‘great leap forward’ 
during its time in government, identifying itself as a communist party in 1977.23  
However, the use of the term ‘communist’ and its associated lexicon by both the 
former Maoist and the new Marxist regimes was obviously problematic for the 
government. For most people the term(inology) connoted a hated regime.  The 
policy of the PRK was to enable a (limited and controlled) degree of cultural 
revival in order to distinguish itself from KR hostility to traditional culture. 24  
 
Secondly, the focus on only two individuals dealt with the problem of figures 
from the old regime that had taken up arms and relocated to the jungle. Chandler 
cites a figure of around 30,000 KR cadres (along with 100,000 villagers) active 
throughout 1979.25 The tribunal’s limited narrative placed the weight of genocide 
squarely on the shoulders of a ‘Pol Pot - Ieng Sary clique’, implicitly inviting 
other ex-KR  - even senior figures such as Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan - to 
come in from the cold.  This would also help to end divisions impeding 
reconstruction. Not only was the KR   running rampant in places, but also people 
angry in the wake of the regime’s fall were taking revenge on KR. Judge 
Downing of the ECCC noted: 
I suspect, but don’t know, there may have been some KR cadres who lost 
their lives in some unsavoury manner. If there is no formal legal structure 
and someone has behaved in the most aberrant manner, they are probably 
going to be dealt with by those who have suffered under them; and I think 
that the realization of that sort of thing maybe demonstrated that… People 
like Duch and others fled to areas where they were not otherwise known; 
they took on assumed names; there must have been some fear that they 
were going to be dealt with in a summary manner.26 
 
This anxiety was experienced by a KR cadre I interviewed:  
I didn’t want villagers to know me as Khmer Rouge. Later on I confess 
everything to one villager and he was very kind and took me to stay in his 
homeland in Kompong Thom Province. And later on I go to the commune 
chief and I confess everything, and he give me a right to stay as a local 
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people in his village, and let me stay as a normal villager same as the 
other villagers, and informed me of my right to come back to my homeland 
as well. And to tell me that no one arrest me if I go back to my homeland.27 
 
Thirdly, the Vietnamese invading Cambodia needed to deal with the baggage in 
their relationship  - both the recent past and the ancient enmity between the two 
nations. As Stuart-Fox and Ung note: 
 
Considering that almost every Kampuchean had learned to see the 
Vietnamese as the nation’s historic enemy, the warmth with which the 
Vietnamese forces were welcomed came as something of a surprise, even 
to the Vietnamese. The risk was, of course, that there had been no genuine 
shift in the relationship between the two countries. Rather, it was a product 
of the depth of hatred felt for the Khmer Rouge…so long as there was 
even the remotest possibility that Pol Pot and his minions might reimpose 
their rule on Kampuchea the Vietnamese would be welcome. Longer than 
that and they would not be seen as liberators, but would become an 
occupying army. .28 
 
 
  On the international front, the Convention was central to the PRT’s self-
presentation to the world.   The government seized the chance to demonstrate the 
legitimacy of the Vietnamese invasion. Vietnam never overtly cited humanitarian 
reasons for it, claiming self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. 29  
However, mounting evidence about mass graves and torture centres, and lines of 
people attesting to horrific atrocities, dramatized the need for their presence when 
China and the USA were still condemning it as Soviet imperialism.   The Sino-
Vietnamese war (third Indo-China War) lasted until March 1979, with skirmishes 
between Vietnam and China occurring as late as the 1990s.   The chance to show 
China supporting mass murder was of great propaganda value to Moscow and 
Hanoi, giving both the excuse to occupy a nation till the end of the Cold War.  
 
Using the Convention to try the two absent defendants was also a direct and 
timely challenge to one section of the global audience: the 71 nations, including 
the USA, China, and the UK, who recognized the Pol Pot government as the 
rightful government of Cambodia and the KR as having a rightful place in 
Cambodia’s seat at the UN. The 71 would now have to justify supporting the 
leadership of a pair on trial for genocide. Ieng Sary’s absence from the ‘cast’ of 
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the show was thus a phrase of considerable eloquence:  rather than confronting his 
accusers at the PRT, he was heading the delegation to maintain the government-
in-exile’s place at the UN, the vote scheduled to take place in just one month’s 
time.  
 
Phrases in dispute? 
 
The 71 dismissed the PRT as a ‘show trial’- a remark   inevitable in the 
circumstances. 30  Nevertheless, they might have supported their case by calling 
attention to the presence of an undeniable ‘script’. 31 The entire procedure was 
scheduled for only five days.  Before anyone entered the court they knew from the 
printed agenda how it would play out: on the fifth day the closing statements of 
the lawyers would be made in the morning; the judges would ‘deliberate’; they   
would read their judgment and pronounce sentence (death) in the afternoon; the 
court would be dismissed in time for a ‘cocktail party in honour of foreign guests’  
at 7pm that evening. 32 
 
The PRT lexicon also befitted a Soviet-backed country using the tribunal to align 
itself on the USSR side of the Sino-Soviet split.33 The closing statement of the 
chief prosecutorcrucially identifies Pol Pot and Ieng Sary as  ‘men loyal to 
Peking’.34 Defence attorney Yuos Por argued that ‘the hegemonist expansionists 
of Peking’ should have appeared alongside the defendants.35 The narrative is 
framed to foreground the ‘Maoist’ nature of DK and its association with ‘Peking 
reactionaries’ 36  subverting the genuinely revolutionary /Marxist communist 
movement stretching across Indochina. Gottesman argues that the decision to drop 
charges of  ‘betraying the revolution and fatherland’ and  ‘creating war by 
invading Vietnam’ was an attempt to avoid drawing attention to the government’s 
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struggle for legitimacy and the visible occupation by the Vietnamese.37 The 
PRT’s genre of discourse involved the exclusion of any phrases critical of 
Marxism, or of Vietnamese involvement in the history of Pol Pot’s party beyond a 
few elements of the CPK; it was also deeply infused with phrase regimes geared 
to praising the Marxists. 
 
A lawyer speaks – 1. 
 
One of the most striking performances in the court was the closing statement of 
the American Lawyer and Defence Counsel Hope Stevens.  Stevens discusses his 
own status as a member of an ethnic minority and the responsibility to ensure a 
defence, placing him within the international Convention-driven narrative. Within 
the same speech he employs a completely different phrase regime supporting the 
anti-Maoist narrative linking Pol Pot to China in the crudest of terms. With 
reference to his clients, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, he states that it was not his duty as 
defence: 
 
…to give approval to monstrous crime or to ask mercy for the criminals. 
No! A thousand times No! Not at all!....It is clear to all that Pol Pot and 
Ieng Sary were criminally insane monsters carrying out a program the 
script of which was written elsewhere for them. So that if it were left to 
me and the other lawyers of the world who are present here you would not 
only have Pol Pot and Ieng Sary and their agents and willing vassals 
standing judgment here, in fairness to them we would have beside them as 
fellow accused the manipulators of world imperialism, the profiteers of 
neo-colonialism, the fascist philosophers, the hegemonists who are 
supporting Zionism, racism, apartheid and the reactionary regimes of the 
world, all of these would be standing here with the false socialist leaders 
of fascist China...in the mean time I hope that soon, very soon, a wind of 
change will blow across the Gobi desert to where once a land were a 
thousand flowers once invited to bloom, that land where the flowers have 
dried up ,where only one ugly, spindly cactus has survived to be nurtured 
not only by a gang of four  but also it seems by a group of despots of the 
kind  of the former celestial emperors who have for the moment grasped 
and hold unscrupulous power for their own selfish ambition  to extend 
regional and global hegemony by violence and force , ready to sacrifice 
hundreds and millions of their own and other people to achieve their goals, 
to use the accused with success as their willing agents in perpetrating this 
awful crime of genocide against their own people of Cambodia and who 
used this poisoned cactus of fascism masquerading under the false cover 
of socialism… 38 
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I am not arguing that Stevens should have argued for the innocence of his clients 
or dissociated himself from the judgement to be read out later that day. Rather I 
am looking at the consequences of that disjunction between phrase regimes. 
Stevens’s rhetorical excesses link him so closely to the government narrative that 
he is effectively undermining his role as international lawyer, reducing himself to 
a handy visual symbol of the humanist/ universalist grand narrative while keeping 
the dialectic relentlessly on the anti-Maoist track.   
 
Witnesses speak  
 
The prevailing phrase regime of the PRT anti-Maoist narrative was in perpetual 
tension with the sheer weight of the evidence.  The field reports making up its 
investigative phase are notably less infused with rhetorical flourishes.39 In most 
parts the phrase regime is purely denotative:  numbers of bodies found in mass 
graves, locations of such sites, identities of victims (if possible), descriptions of 
the physical conditions of buildings, census data placed in comparison with 1979 
and excerpts from documents captured at the sites and witness statements giving 
accounts of what they saw there. Written witness statements, however, conformed 
to party phrase regimes, often expressing gratitude to the new government and 
pledging loyalty. Former KR cadres end like this:  
After acknowledging my misdeeds and after gaining understanding of the 
just political position of the United Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea I 
promise to respect the National United Front for the Salvation of 
Kampuchea.40  
 
Testimonies of victims also conclude with sentiments such as:  
 
Having seen the flagrant violations of human rights, I was filled with 
hatred against the inhumane regime of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary that is guilty 
of these bloodthirsty crimes as they were subservient to Peking’s 
expansionism. I joined and served those who liberated us. Long live the 
liberation of January 7, 1979 which gave us a new life under a new sun! 
Long live the Peoples Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea! Long Live 
the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea!41  
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These expressions sit uncomfortably in their context. Few people   describing the 
deaths of their own children are naturally inclined to punctuate their testimony 
with ideological slogans. Throughout the written witness statements there is 
liberal use of such phrases as ‘Pol Pot Ieng Sary Clique’.  Their sometimes odd 
position in an otherwise simple syntax describing traumatic and violent personal 
experience, and the way slogans frequently round off a testimony, may well 
indicate they were prompted or added. Quigley suggests it was the secretaries 
taking down the statements who added such phrases; producing numerous 
statements, they would have turned to standardized phrases rather than producing 
verbatim transcripts. 42 In some cases one could argue that permission to add such 
phrases might have been willingly given out of hatred for the previous regime.  
 
Arguably the Tribunal’s overall genre of discourse permitted the phrase regimes 
of witnesses to link, albeit awkwardly, with its own. Grievance was expressed, as 
shown by photographs of the Cambodian audience, shock and sorrow written on 
their faces. But it is all too evident that carefully researched evidence denoting 
mass graves, torture centres, evidence of people subjected to torture, the 
destruction of the intelligentsia, the persecution of religions and the criminal acts 
of DK, was forcibly linked to phrase regimes denouncing China. The blatant 
propaganda grafted on the facts played into the hands of the 71. They could 
employ their term ‘show trial’with enough conviction to evade embarrassing 
questions about their own moral position and their endorsement of the KR as the 
legitimate government in exile. 43 
 
A lawyer speaks – 2 
 
Even the tightly sewn up ideological narrative, however, occasionally opened up 
space for other voices.  Surprisingly, one of these was American.  Like Hope 
Stevens, John Quigley, as international law expert to the court, provided in his 
own person a tangible image of an international presence at the trial, giving it 
credibility. 44  However, in his closing statement Quigley became one of the few 
to mention the US bombing and its significance.  Within the PRT narrative this 
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had almost disappeared in the anxiety to blame the Chinese. As he states, Quigley 
had little knowledge of Chinese involvement. 45  He speaks of the bombing to 
contextualise the KR’s eviction of the cities. In unadorned and simple language he 
also describes personal shame at his nation’s aiding of the KR.  His voice stands 
out sharply from the anti-Chinese narrative to imply that there are other ways of 
telling this complex story.   As Otto Kirchheimer notes, as long as it is possible to 
speak at all within the framework of a virtually pre-scripted ‘show’, it is possible 
to take the ‘stage’ and present a narrative of resistance. 46  Although not excluded, 
however, Quigley’s phrase regime never links to the point of achieving discussion 
or development.  
 
Outside the courtroom 
 
  I now move outside the Chaktomouk Hall to quote my interview with John 
Quigley on his interactions with Cambodians not in the audience:  
 
 There were other people who would just, you know, come up, and would 
want to talk about what happened to their families, um, just outside the 
building when I’d be coming in or going out ... They were people that were 
very anxious to talk to a foreigner, to let a foreigner know what had 
happened in their village or to their family. So people would say 
something like, ‘My brother or my sister were killed’ and that sort of 
thing.47 
 
No particular attitude is expressed here toward the Tribunal process.  But this 
small anecdote shows a clear desire to narrate, to testify to someone from the 
outside world (a foreigner) to get a story heard, and I use it to transition to the 




 I begin with two survivors of S-21 prison: Bou Meng and Chum Mei. 
 
Bou Meng .. Under communism there was no law, only the most powerful 
had the most say. So there is no justice, accusations could be made 
without proof … 
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I heard a little about the tribunal at the time… I didn’t know if anyone 
supported it; but at the time I didn’t believe the court, because the country 
was in chaos. The court meant nothing to me at the time. The PRT was the 
same as the example I just mentioned [about the unjust legal system]. For 
example, in my life at the time someone - a soldier - said I owed him or 
her money. They had no proof.  But I didn’t owe any money.  So they went 
to the commune chief to be ‘the judge,’ who was chosen by the high-
ranking soldier or important family, and he decided to fine me.  And this 
was not fair on me. And you know the PRT worked in the same way: so it 
didn’t make any sense for me.48  
 
Chum Mei: In the 1980s Cambodia’s situation was that there were many 
Vietnamese troops to help fight against Pol Pot’s troops, but the KR was 
still very much in control in many places in Cambodia. At the time the 
Government was talking to the Vietnamese also about when they would 
leave the country. There was still a lot of fighting along the Thai border 
and other places in the north. We cannot compare the 1980s to today. At 
the time nearly all the schools, the temples, were broken from years of 
fighting. Everywhere was broken - houses and schools, dirt roads, and the 
country in some places was very quiet –especially in Phnom Penh.  
 
 I don’t remember much about the PRT.  I know they sentenced Pol Pot 
and Ieng Sary to death. I know it wasn’t an international court. 49 
 
 
  Sum Rithy – a life story. 
 
At this stage I   introduce a figure who reappears several times in   this thesis:  
Sum Rithy, who has given his own story in a variety of different contexts and 
media. He provided a witness statementfor the field report into the investigation 
team for the PRT, and is currently a civil party at the ECCC. 50  Here I cite his 
interview with me, his statements to the PRT and DC-Cam, and the life story he 
gave to another scholar.51 52 53 He believes himself to be one of only two 
surviving former prisoners to present testimony to the PRT.  His experience 
illustrates the suffering of many designated as ‘new people,’ though, as he says, as 
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one of the few prison survivors he has a greater knowledge of what underlay the 
whole experience. 
 
I was arrested at the end of 1976 and stayed in the prison at Siem Reap 
until January 7 1979. The Khmer Rouge tried to kill each other many 
times( village and commune chief etc.) [during  the internal purges]. It was 
a trick of the KR leaders; they wanted to eliminate each other, as they 
were always paranoid. I still remember when the new leaders were 
appointed in 1977.  At the time they killed each other and lots of prisoners 
and citizens. The monks were mostly charged with being ‘17 April People’ 
[New people]. I guess it was a good trick of the leaders to exercise total 
control: one kills one, then another comes to replace him, before he is 
killed and replaced too…. You know they regard me as a victim, but I am a 
direct victim, different from the normal victim.  You know when you were 
sent to the prisons, mostly they would die of starvation or be taken to be 
killed. If you are a normal victim, you worked in the fields. But those of us 
who stayed in the prisons know more than most of the normal victims.  We 
know how torture was used, how people were forced. And actually I was 
one of the first people to be seen as an enemy of the KR.  I was seen as a 
‘17 April Person’ – a ‘new person’. Other victims of the KR were not seen 
as this, not regarded as automatically an enemy like me.  You know the 
people taken to the prison were decided by the KR to be enemies. They 
singled us out – but we were normal citizens of the ‘April 17 People’ 
category .We didn’t know anything about politics at all. As for me, I was a 
moto fixer [motorbike mechanic] and knew nothing. You know, at the time 
they arrested me – if I didn’t have skill as a moto fixer, and if I didn’t use 
this skill I would not have stayed alive. But I used my skill to work for 
them. 
 
I once witnessed a guard beating a boy. ‘Why did you run?’ he asked. ‘I 
miss my parents so much,’ answered the boy. The guard savagely hit him 
on his back and said, ‘Your mother was killed, you son of traitor!’ The 
boy, too, was murdered the following night. 
 
…  In addition to repairing motorbikes, I carried pots, distributed helmets 
the prisoners used as food containers, collected human waste for making 
fertilizer, and buried dead prisoners. Because I worked near the detention 
center, I saw the trucks bringing new prisoners and taking the old ones 
out. On average, 200-300 new prisoners came in every day, and about the 
same number were taken away. Sometimes the Khmer Rouge took the 
prisoners out twice a day. They were beaten by the guards each time they 
were interrogated. 
  
 Some prisoners died in their bad-smelling cells, and others committed 
suicide by biting off their tongues, suffocating themselves, plunging into 
deep wells, and cutting their veins. Not a single day passed without 
prisoners committing suicide.54 
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Sum Rithy describes his motivation to tell the story to anyone who will listen, 
either publicly or on a one-to-one level, as with me. 
 
The most important [thing is] telling this story to the world. It is a 
significant story: Khmer killed Khmer. This is very strange. What I want to 
tell the world is that this should never happen again. It’s a savage and 
brutal story. You know, you see, Gunnar Bergstrom came to Cambodia in 
1978 to talk about Pol Pot, and wanted to take this regime as a model for 
his own country ... 55 At the beginning he was talking good things about 
the KR regime. In 2009 he came back and saw the evidences of the DK 
atrocities and apologised. But when he was there in 1970s he praised the 
regime.   56 
 
In the act of telling the story Sum Rithy believes there is a way to enact justice by 
offering a warning to history.  But when he told his story to the PRT he was 
cynical about the process:  
 
The tribunal in 1979 was just a fixture of the government. It was a way for 
the government to let the international countries understand the former 
government is on trial, so no need for another court again. But it was a 
show trial, a drama.  
 
They were prosecuted, but the defendants were not there - just only the 
name [i.e.in absentia].  I had never heard of a process of a tribunal like 
this in the world. There is always the defendant, the criminal, the lawyers- 
you need all of this to have a proper prosecution.  
 
 At the time I did not join the court. But I did file a complaint; because of 
the trial of Ieng Sary they wanted someone with a long background with 
the Pol Pot. My friend went to the courtroom, but I did not.   
 
But it was still part of the drama of the Vietnam government that they 
wanted the international community to see the Vietnamese government as 
having a legal system.   You know, last time in the ECCC I wanted to be a 
civil party.57 
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I have quoted this interview at length so that it can be laid alongside Sum Rithy’s 
witness report and his other published tellings. 58 Notably absent from all of them, 
even his PRT statement, is the Marxist phraseology that peppers some of the 
others.  His language does not transgress the PRT phrase regime, but does not 
endorse it. For Sum Rithy, the vessel through which the story is to be transmitted 
is less important than the act of telling – even if it risks painting a favourable 
/legitimising view of the PRK.  However, he did not trust the process any more 
than Bou Meng and Chum Mei did. Like them he was well able to read signals 
including the absence of the defendants even as he offered testimony.  He 
expresses that afterwards he felt hopeless, that no one really wanted to hear it.59   
 
If we theorise through these three social actors, it is clear that they are asserting 
the existence of a Differend, considering themselves ‘divested of the means to 
argue’ by the primacy of a narrative Sum Rithy explicitly calls the ‘drama of the 
Vietnam government,’ to the point where they did not choose to appear. 60 Sum 
Rithy’s sense that no-one wanted to hear his story may reflect the feelings of 
others who came to testify. I have suggested on the basis of written texts that on 
the one hand, the testimonies show grievance articulated and the audience visibly 
affected, but on the other hand, phrases of victims in uneasy relationship with the 
hegemonic discourse.  However, only those still available to speak, like Sum 
Rithy, can say exactly how far they felt undermined by the clash. Sum Rithy is a 
special case in his determination to find ways of telling his story in the new 
century so it can be heard, be understood on its terms and be represented in a 
history where it can educate.  
  
It is important not to underestimate the PRT. Jarvis and Fawthrop rightly note that 
its characterisation   as a ‘show trial’ by the west and the 71 chose to ignore the 
power and value of the evidence and testimonies it collected. 61   The experience 
of people like Sum Rithy, however, leads me to conclude that the PRT   missed an 
opportunity.The goodwill which welcomed the Vietnamese forces as liberators, 
the powerful evidence and the willingness of people to testify, even, I would 
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argue, the chance to seize the moral high ground over those nations condemning 
the invasion for geo-political reasons, were all sacrificed to protecting the primacy 
of the PRT’s pro-Soviet narrative. Its refusal to let the evidence stand alone 
without linking to phrase regimes praising the government was a callous 
usurpation of memory; the ‘small stories’ looking for justice did not really find it. 
 




Pol Pot, ill and old, was apprehended and placed on trial on July 25 1997. His 
presence was captured on news footage.62  However, the news of his arrest was 
received with doubt and the West was puzzled as to what this image of a frail old 
man might mean. 63  The KR was notoriously unreliable at communicating 
accurate information about them to the outside world. The trial was brought to 
western attention by journalist Nate Thayer.64 He claims to have persuaded the 
KR that   some independent presence at the trial was necessary for the world to 
believe it. 65  I would speculate that the KR needed less persuasion than Thayer 
suggests. 66 In particular, the architect of the trial, Chhit Choeun, better known as 
Ta Mok, was well aware that an  (inter)national TV audience for a spectacle in 
which he fully intended to emerge as   victor would advance his interests.   
 
 The only available footageof the trial shows the ‘courtroom’ as a kind of barn 
with open walls in an L-shape, along which the audience is grouped; it suggests a 
space communal and informal, familiar to the audience. 67  One side consists 
mostly of women in brightly coloured clothes, like women in the Cambodian 
countryside wear today, many holding babies.  There are some men on the other 
side of the ‘L’; they wear uniforms, but informally; some wear caps, kramas and 
combat trousers with colourful polo neck t-shirts. This presents a careful visual 
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contrast to footage of DK showing everyone in black pyjamas, with the same 
haircut - a uniform society with everyone in uniform. 68 The austere communist 
society now visibly permits   choices. The gender imbalance in the film is a clue 
that fighting still continues; as some of the cadres I interviewed attest, men were 
away for long periods leaving the women and children behind.   In the middle of 
the ‘room’ sit Pol Pot and two other men, his co-accused; opposite them is a 
folding table with a microphone.  The meeting goes on for around two hours; the 
‘chairman’ continually shouts accusations into the microphone. The audience 
occasionally chant in unison phrases such as ‘Crush the Pol Pot-ists,’ pumping 
their fists in the air. Most look bored. My eyewitness narrators confirm this view; 
my field notes about meetings with attendees record 
  These people understand that the event I am discussing is of interest to 
foreigners, but I am not so sure it is of much interest to them.  While they 
are doing their best to remember what they can of the event, it strikes me 
that to them it is not all that important. 
 
 Indeed it was not in any real sense about them, as I hope to show.  
 
The author of the narrative                          
 
The charges against Pol Pot did not relate to ‘genocide’ events between 1975 and 
1979. They were a mixed bag of crimes:  the murder of Son Sen, property damage 
and prolonging a war. 69  This selection was the product of complex political 
shifts out of which Ta Mok rose to power.  I will examine his rise in some detail. 
This is partly to clarify how he staged the trial and orchestrated a narrative, which 
skirted the true horrors of DK but structured his own bid to consolidate his power 
as the face of the new KR.  However, it will also provide a context for the 
‘transgressive’ narratives from Anlong Veng in Chapter Six.  
 
 The Communist Party of Kampuchea   dissolved itself in 1981 in favour of a 
‘movement of Nationalists’. 70 This was Pol Pot’s  strategy to make the movement   
more appealing.  Out of power, the KR needed not only to divorce itself from the 
horrors of DK but also to attract people not previously associated with it. So Pol 
Pot’s  ‘new KR’ relaxed some rules: personal property was permitted; 
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collectivised meals were abolished; people could live in their own homes; they 
could marry partners of their choosing, not the party’s. 71  Mass killing all but 
disappeared.72 The propaganda radio station broadcast traditional music. 73  At 
this point China, Thailand and the USA all opposed the Vietnamese puppet state. 
The Thai government gave shelter to KR; the Chinese sent weapons/ supplies. 
The West offered active  support. 74  Throughout the 1980s the KR could 
realistically aim to be a viable alternative government. Many who had survived 
DK feared just that. However, after the departure of the Vietnamese, the Paris 
Peace Accords and UNTAC (described in Chapter One) the KR was shut out of 
the national discourse, partly of its own volition.  Sihanouk returned with fanfares, 
embracing Hun Sen as ‘his son’.75 Although the KR still controlled large areas 
and continued to fight with the Kingdom’s army, the mid 1990s marked a 
terminal decline. The   uneasy Prime Ministers’ coalition of Hun Sen’s CPP and 
Norodom Ranariddh’s FUNCINPEC attempted to demobilize the KR. Each party 
vied to attract defectors as the KR haemorrhaged members. Ieng Sary’s defection 
was especially   damaging; in exchange for a full royal pardon and retaining a 
demesne in Palin he brought with him 4000 KR troops (almost half of them) who 
swapped their uniforms for those of the Royal Cambodian Army.  76 Ieng went on 
a charm offensive to rewrite his role in the DK era. Nuon Chea and Khieu 
Samphan were pushed aside for younger men. As the KR movement 
disintegrated, Pol Pot became paranoid about his closest comrade’s relationship 
with the coalition. Son Sen had been a key player in Pol Pot’s movement since 
they met as students in Paris; he became DK Defence Minister and head of the 
Santebal.77 Now, suspecting him of colluding with Hun Sen, Pol Pot ordered his 
death and those of his wife and small children.  Khieu Samphan was arrested.    
 
This greatly alarmed Ta Mok, who had been a leading CPK figure in the 70s, 80s 
and 90s with the nickname  ‘Grandfather Mok.’ During DK he was head of the 
Southwest zone, a vital figure in orchestrating internal party purges and mass 
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killings, earning his other nickname, ‘the butcher.’ 78 Assuming that if Son Sen 
could be killed anyone could be next, Ta Mok moved his forces against Pol Pot in 
Anlong Veng, aided by FUNCINPEC, with whom he was negotiating.79 As his 
interviews with Thayer show, these negotiations with FUNCINPEC were 
informed by Ta Mok’s ultra-nationalism, undermining Vietnamese influence in 
Cambodia by further re-branding the KR. In Ta Mok’s nationalist narrative, the 
CPP was synonymous with Vietnam. His argument essentially goes: anything bad 
in the nation is Vietnamese: communism is Vietnamese: thus Ta Mok is not a 
communist.  Rather than denying personal responsibility for mass murder outright 
to Thayer, he adopts different stances, adamantly denying involvement in sending 
Cambodians to die at S-21, but taking a more nonchalant attitude to the killing of 
Vietnamese in the Southwest during DK. 80 In many ways Ta Mok was well 
placed to show himself fit for high office in a new democratic Cambodia. Anlong 
Veng (the area under his control) was not a bad advertisement for life under the 
‘new KR’. Conditions were no worse than other poor countries. He had improved 
the infrastructure and those former KR who lived in the area under his control 
have fond memories of him:  
 
People who stayed with him, who worked with him, do not regard him as a 
bad person. They see him as a good and a kind person. He may have 
blamed and cursed a lot but always gave back good feedback.  If he got 
angry with us, five minutes later he would bring us something to make up 
for it. Many people around here love and trust him… Ta Mok has left an 
infrastructure legacy - streets, hospitals, roads for Cambodia’s future and 
the younger generation.81 
 
If Ta Mok’s ally Norodom Ranariddh was to market himself and FUNCINPEC 
domestically and internationally as preferable to Hun Sen and the CPP, he had to 
bring the new KR into the fold clean of its past. With the departure of UNTAC 
only a   few years earlier and the ‘end of history’ /liberal democratic statebuilding 
experiment of the new democratic Cambodia an apparent failure after the coup, it 
is unlikely the international community would want Pol Pot   involved with the 
new Cambodia. Getting rid of Pol Pot was good for the image of a movement 
whose new slogans included ‘Long Live the Emerging Democracy’,  
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‘Cambodians Don't Kill Cambodians’ and ‘Long Live the New Strategy’. 82  83  
Hence Ta Mok’s   trial narrative offered an excellent way for the new KR to 
dramatize their rejection of their past by condemning its personification, Pol Pot. 
Killing him in the jungle would not have yielded such helpful footage to press this 
point.  
 
The subject of the narrative – local readings 
Nate Thayer’ s understanding of his footage and its significance is interesting in 
that it is very different from that of my Cambodian narrators. For Thayer it was 
the scoop of his career; he had provided the world with an iconic image, the 
hitherto unknown face of Pol Pot, which his footage could construct as the very 
face of genocide.  But Ta Mok’s narrative had been tightly organised to exclude 
such meanings. It was important the trial did not relate to DK events between 
1975 and 1979, crimes in which Ta Mok and others around Anlong Veng were 
implicated.   So although Thayer’s footage might be understood in the West as a 
‘genocide’ trial, it was no such thing.  For the local people who watched it, it had 
a different significance. It was the first time they had seen Pol Pot, the man they 
considered responsible for very specific grievances under one of the charges  - 
prolonging the war. They hoped these grievances would be addressed at the trial.  
I spoke to two eyewitnesses, a former cadre and the wife of a cadre then living in 
Anlong Veng, about what they felt the trial meant. Both read it as a power 
demonstration by Ta Mok over Pol Pot   : 
I didn’t know the specific name of that mass meeting, only that it was 
referred to as the Pol Pot Trial.   At the time I was in charge of the 
military families, like the soldiers’ families.  I led the people to go to listen 
to the ‘court’. At the time Ta Mok collected all the KR families, like the 
wife and kids of the KR soldiers, to go to hear the court. All the Khmer 
Rouge villagers went to participate in that mass meeting. It was orders 
from Ta Mok. My role was to gather people and to hear the result of the 
court. 
 
At the time in this area it was divided into two groups. One was the Pol 
Pot group; the second was the Ta Mok group. They had a conflict with 
each other and then they fought with each other, but Pol Pot lost the 
fighting to Ta Mok’s force .So the reason they prosecuted Pol Pot at the 
time was because he was the enemy of Ta Mok. Ta Mok wanted to show 
the power of his group. Ta Mok arrested Pol Pot as a high enemy – 
wanting to show that he was the man who won the conflict. At the 
beginning they were friendly and worked together, they stayed with each 
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other for a while.  No one really knew why there was a conflict between 
them.84 
 
None of the spectators was under any illusion that the trial was more than a 
spectacle to demonstrate Ta Mok’s superiority locally .  They were unaware of 
any kind of international dimension. They were clear, however, what they felt 
about the prolongation of the war and Pol Pot’s role in it.  I asked the wife of one 
cadre what people talked about among themselves before the meeting: 
 
The citizens were chatting with each other about Pol Pot and they cursed 
him and talked badly of him, and were cursing him, like saying,   ‘Fucking 
guy,’ and things like that, because it was him that made the regime. It was 
because the regime lost the war with Vietnam [meaning Hun Sen].  
 
One of my narrators described what she had hoped the trial would achieve 
and how it failed to do so:  
 
I was just in the audience to hear the court.  Many villagers volunteered to 
go, because most of them thought Pol Pot was guilty because he was the 
biggest leader in the regime, and they blamed him for the war [over the 
1980s], the separation of families, and loss of their relatives, so they 
volunteered to go. I was thinking about when my family was separated 
from each other because of the Pol Pot regime.  I was still very angry with 
this, and with Pol Pot, because he led the regime and made everything like 
the war, and he forced us to do all of the things he wanted and would not 
let us reject his idea. He was the powerful man of that regime. After we 
heard that he was going to be taken to be prosecuted, we wanted the court 
to take him or kill him. We were powerless in that court, we could not 
make any requests of it…The court process was not the same as the one 
now. There were no witnesses, no judge – just Ta Mok’s staff announcing 
over the microphone that Pol Pot was a traitor and that the KR had lost 
fighting with the Hun Sen government because of him [Pol Pot]. It was a 
court like the one in the Pol Pot regime.  
 
I lost two of my sisters and two brothers between 1975-1979.  In the KR 
regime [she refers here not to DK but rather to the KR-controlled areas of 
the country in the 1980s and 1990s] I lost my husband and my son in the 
wars [i.e. civil wars of the 1980s/1990s]. 
 
We were all citizens under a communist regime and all communist party 
people, but only because Ta Mok took our husbands to be his military 
soldiers. But Ta Mok did give food to the wives. But we did not eat and 
live together. We lived separately, not collectively like under the KR.   In 
1990s up to nearly two hundred people here lived individually [had their 
own houses] but our husbands were collected by Ta Mok to be his 
soldiers, and only came back maybe one or two times in the space of three 
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or four years.  And the wives and children lived in individual houses but 
we had to collect rice, salt, sugar or clothes from the centre of Anlong 
Veng town, to get everything from Ta Mok’s donations. This regime ran 
for a couple of years.  So no-one could dare reject the order of Ta Mok in 
the 1990s.  I have never heard of anyone making a rejection of his orders, 
because that family would create a problem. And I delivered two babies in 
this time; my husband couldn’t come to look after me at all for the first 
child I had.  I delivered the baby in my house with help from my 
neighbour, and by the time my husband saw it, it could walk and sit. It’s so 
sad he only saw his children one time. But no one ever said ‘No’ to Ta 
Mok. 85 
 
This lady is expressing a grievance that has never been addressed in any of the 
courts and probably will never be.  After DK thousands of people devoted their 
lives to Pol Pot’s movement. She, like thousands of others, lived in the KR 
controlled zones. The male members of her family were sent to fight and die - 
against other Cambodians, and for nothing. Hun Sen was winning. Thayer refers 
to the cadres at the meeting as those who wasted their lives and lost limbs for Pol 
Pot’s cause, which had achieved nothing but the prolongation of a war. 
Justice is fairness, I saw Pol Pot being carried to the truck with his hands 
tied. This is justice, and all the people who saw this meeting think it’s 
justice. Karma is in a Buddhist proverb,  ‘Do good you get good, do bad 
you get bad.’ So that was Pol Pot’s Karma; this is why this court 
happened in 1997, the year before his death -because he was bad and 
killed many people, killed his staff, used his power badly. This is his 
Karma.86  
 
The trial of Pol Pot was a show trial, all a drama - no judges, no lawyers, 
no witnesses, no questions, and no answers. Only one or two people 
talking - so it’s still communist. So I don’t know if that is justice or not 
justice. As for the victims and the families, hmm.... Maybe this is justice for 
Pol Pot himself? As for Karma, Pol Pot is the guy who was the leader of 
the regime. So it’s fair, it should be to prosecute him because he was the 
leader of the regime. But the problem is that the court was not 
legitimate.87 
 
These two statements are revealing. Both the former cadre and the wife of a 
former cadre read the trial of Pol Pot in terms of Karma. However, such a reading 
does not demonstrate a competing idea of justice that for them negates the 
principle of a trial. The wife of the former cadre expressed her frustration with the 
Pol Pot trial as marginalizing her grievances in pursuit of its narrative. The two 
narrators are not saying that because Pol Pot’s Karma returns to him they consider 
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the court a just institution. Indeed the former cadre refers to the trial as 
illegitimate because it lacked all those elements that constitute what he regards as 
a legitimate court: lawyers and judges, not party apparatchiks.  
 
The subject of the narrative – (inter)national readings 
 
A single image was all that mattered to  Ta Mok .  He wanted everyone around his 
power base Anlong Veng to see Pol Pot in captivity. This is the sole image  he 
wanted to project to the nation and the world.  There was no need for a coherent 
narrative  about the experience of people like my narrators  related to the activities 
of Pol Pot. What mattered was a few seconds of newsfilm establishing him as 
fallen : old, weak, ill and surrounded by people denouncing him. Thayer and ABC 
News both compared this process  and its ‘robotic’ chanting by the audience to  
images of Chinese mass meetings during the Cultural Revolution. 88   
Patronisingly,  they suggest  that  while the KR were attempting to show 
themselves breaking with the past,  the style in which  they chose to do so 
undermined their aim.  But while their Cultural Revolution analogy allows the 
western media to trot out the usual  phrase ‘show trial’, their judgement here 
misses an important  point. I would contend that Ta Mok never cared about the   
procedural character or visual impression of the trial. The point was to show a few 
seconds of Pol Pot looking miserable and under Ta Mok’s control . Ta Mok 
needed to demonstrate the KR had changed, to make him an acceptable partner for 
FUNCINPEC.89 He needed to demonstrate to cadres and their families that he was 
the new person to lead them. These political points were successfully  established 
in seconds.  Meanwhile, the victims of one of the crimes being tried - the  
prolongation of the war -  sat in the same space as Pol Pot with no chance to bear 
witness .  They did not even have the opportunities available to the PRT 
witnesses,  whose stories could at least find a place in the pro-Vietnam grand 
narrative. My narrator identifies a clear  Differend  when she says, We  were 
powerless in that court.90   
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3.3 THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF 
CAMBODIA 2006-  
 
The trial in the jungle was the only one Pol Pot would ever receive ; he died in 
1998 . Ta Mok commented , ‘ Now he’s finished . He has no power, he has no 
rights, he is no more than cow shit.’91 Ta Mok was arrested a year later and in 
February 2002  charged with crimes against humanity;  he  died before he could 
face the ECCC.   As  the ECCC proceedings carry  on, narrative strands entangle 
and impede each other and there is an increasing awareness that  the deaths of  the 
remaining elderly defendants could forestall any final outcome at all . Karnavas’s 
‘IT’ moment will be stillborn. 
 
Staging  a moment in the life of the ECCC.    
 
 February 3 2012  saw the conclusion of the appeal arising from the first case 
(001) – that of Kaing Guek Eav , Comrade Duch . Duch was chairman of Tuol 
Sleng prison, Security Center 21 (S-21) where at least 12,000 ‘enemies of the 
revolution’ were sent to be ‘smashed’.  His  appeal  was rejected; the  sentence 
was extended from 35 years - with 19 left to serve -  to full life imprisonment (the 
maximum sentence).92As the final process of Case 001 this moment marks the 
first real outcome since operations began six years before. The occasion is 
carefully orchestrated as an ECCC showcase. While journalists are generally 
present, this is one day the global media will be offering coverage of the ECCC to 
the world . Diplomats and VIPs are escorted into the trial chamber , greeted by  
women in traditional  Khmer costumes . The American and Japanese ambassadors 
have prime  seats for the reading of an inevitably  long verdict. Outside, elderly 
women who lived through DK sit on plastic chairs or the floor.  As the verdict 
booms out through tannoys  it prompts the immediate question:  ‘For whom, 
exactly, is this day?’ Arguably, the ‘show’ is staged for a particular audience : for 
VIPs ensuring their donor money  was well spent ;  for the international 
community , who will  report that  the ECCC (as a TJ institution) delivers ‘justice’ 
- just as the PRT participants could go to their cocktail party with the sense that 
justice had been served .   
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The physical structure of the ECCC speaks of tensions which this performance 
glosses over.  It is easily missed.  Several kilometres out of Phnom Penh on 
‘National Road 4’ - a major motorway -   and  about ten minutes’ drive past the 
airport, it is sited in the  Army HQ. The symbolism of locating a court towards 
which the government has expressed such hostility  in the  heart of its power 
source has not escaped  ECCC staff. A  rusting sign points visitors up a dirt road 
behind tall trees, a further indication of the government’s lack of enthusiasm for  
one of the most significant trials in legal history,  and their desire to  obscure it . 
The court makes great play of the  thousands of people it busses in to watch.93 
However,  it does not pay for the civil parties to attend.  
 
I go to court many many times and I  lose  business. I have to spend for my 
own transportation , and the court does not pay.94 
 
This is not a trivial complaint. Even for Phnom Penh locals, the cheapest rate for a 
moto-taxi (there is no public transport)  is  $3-4. Cambodia’s average per capita 
income is $944 a year. 95   
 
The courtroom itself is behind a curved glass wall; before this  is a curtain , which 
opens when  proceedings begin.  The TV cameras’ angle can only catch the front  
rows. Today these are occupied by a bank of monks in their orange robes. While 
this  position might suggest respect for their status and vocation, the best  view is 
from the back. The monks present today are mostly students , too young to have 
lived through DK. The Public Affairs Section, though, is  well aware of the power 
of the monks .  
It’s important we contact monks, because monks in Cambodian society are 
superior to all other people and normal villagers will listen to them.  This 
is why when we do work, we try to work with the monks. 96 
 
Use of the orange robe assists the ECCC in its presentations ; the homepage of  
the UNAKRT website includes  a picture of a monk  between two UN jeeps. 97 
Robes  provide a cultural signifier to the TV cameras for  both international and 
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local audiences .  For the international community and international donors the 
figure of the monk conveys local legitimacy combined with the exotic and 
unfamiliar, a classic Orientalist image . The presence of robed men  in the 
auditorium taps into the national motto which heads  all legal and state documents 
( including my own tenancy agreement): Nation, Religion, King.  It implies the 
ECCC has a kind of moral authority within Buddhism. The Buddhist community 
does not wholeheartedly assent to this, any more than it would have done  to  the 
PRT’s public use of   Tep Vong, ( who eventually became Supreme Patriarch).  
Some are hostile: 
 
We have had a Buddhist  abbot who turned up once and said,  ‘Look all of this 
is useless, these  people[the accused]  are going to rot in Hell for all eternity . 
It’s  all a big waste of money,  go and spend it on something else.’ 98 
 
Grand Narrative 1 – Liberalism ?  
 
Like  the angry  theatrical interventions by Ianuzzi and Piestman cited earlier , 
such comments undercut the smooth impression created by  the VIPs, the monks 
and the energy generated by such a significant event . The BBC News quoted 
Andrew Caley in June 2011  : ‘There hasn't been a case as large and complex as 
this since Nuremberg.' 99  In fact the hybrid status of the ECCC makes it far more 
complex than Nuremberg , so complex that  at the time of writing it is bordering 
on  impasse. The  ECCC  is  not a  Huntingtonesque binary ‘clash of civilizations’  
but a tangled battle for  primacy between  narratives . 100  Here I  attempt to pull 
out the competing narrative strands and examine the direct conflicts between 
them.  I then go on to  identify  those points where ‘grand narratives,’ and the 
meta-narratives they generate to protect themselves, collapse and contaminate one 
another.  
 
The first strand  is produced by Lyotard’s Grand Narrative of human progress 
through the acquisition of knowledge.101  It may be termed Legal Liberalism.  
Legal Liberalism is based on a constitutionalist view that there should be a 
separation of powers - executive, legislative and judiciary. It holds that there is a 
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body of law to be drawn on , and  a right and a  wrong interpretation of that body .  
If one comes before a court,  its role in the liberal legal system is to determine 
whether the law as codified  has been transgressed or not. Thus decisions are 
made on the basis  that there is a right interpretation of a law; that law is mostly 
comprised of  interpretative decisions made ‘within’ what is already codified. 
Uncertain cases where courts must ‘make’ law are supposed to be rare. Judges and 
courts make their decisions on the basis of the  law alone.  
 
Without such separation of power or interpretative  frames within  law,  legal 
liberalists contend, interpretation and  application of rules would emerge from 
another source . For example,  the executive branch might push for an outcome it 
finds  politically expedient. In a system where rule of law is supreme the 
executive is unable to influence the courts ( and is indeed subject to them ),  and 
the courts are constrained to act only within law. 102 103This concept infuses the TJ 
narrative. As Teitel  says ,‘The justice-seeking phenomena discussed here are 
intimately tied to the fashioning of a liberal political identity…the turn to 
legalism…is emblematic of the liberal state, with transitional justice 
reconstructing the political identity on a judicial basis by deploying the discourse 
of rights and responsibilities.’104  Thus legal liberalism  is both the means and the 
ends of transitional justice.  In the ECCC’s self-proclaimed ‘new role model for 
court operations’ the TJ narrative , and the means by which that narrative is told, 
are both component stories within the grand narrative of liberal democracy. 105 
 
  Conforming to the international norm on justice, accountability,  procedure and 
trial rights, both the government and the UN parties involved in the  ECCC have 
signed up to this narrative:106 and hence to the assumption that the trial will yield  
as Karnavas puts it, a yet untold  ‘historical truth’. 107 To use Todorov’s term for 
the legal liberal trial’s literary cousin, the detective story, they will create a 
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‘narrative of narratives’  from the stories told by witnesses on all sides,  arriving 
at a conclusion which attributes responsibility.  I find this analogy helpful not 
simply because it is a tool for the imagination to order  and remember complex 
narratives, but because it is a reminder that caution is needed.  As Todorov notes, 
in a detective story  the  fabula  -  ‘what really happened’ - is uncovered through 
the   sjuzhet -  the presentation of events  in a particular order , style, and set of 
viewpoints.108   In a detective story the fabula  is also the author’s creation – it  
only exists for the sake of the sjuzhet.  It is important to bear in mind that the 
‘historical truth’ which emerges will be the product of certain political 
assumptions and priorities. A true  fabula is impossible . As Barbara Herrnstein 
Smith notes, ‘ For any given narrative there are always multiple basic stories that 
can be  constructed in response to it, because basic-ness  is always arrived at by 
some set of operations, in accord with some set of principles, that reflect some set 
of interests.’109   Nor could any court , archive, or art form ever show ‘what really 
happened’ in Cambodia ; but as bodies continue to be uncovered and identified it 
is worth measuring what the court achieves by the standards  it has set itself. The 
ECCC has to work on the assumption that enough of a fabula, enough evidence of 
‘what really happened’ can be made to emerge through a narrative process 
allowing for a charge to be proven or not proven, and that this cannot be pre-
scripted. It is an act of faith in the Liberal narrative, even when its imperfections 
are clear.   At the political level the trial structure articulates the classic TJ 
narrative arc of redemption , moving the state towards a more liberal political  
order by a demarked shift via the criminal  trial  to a  point where the illiberal past 
is rejected ; this end point is  liberal democracy .110 
 
It would be a mistake to see this as a purely Western narrative.  All my 
Cambodian narrators, while not blind to its imperfections,  regard the ECCC as 
having greater legitimacy than the domestic legal system.  Many Cambodians at 
the ECCC are reasonably content to work within this trial narrative because  it fits 
the framework of the Cambodian Constitution established under UNTAC in the 
1990s,  rooted in Enlightenment ideals,  the democratic peace thesis and the ‘good 
governance’ paradigm they wish to see successfully applied throughout 
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Cambodia. 111  Their faith in the Liberal narrative is fully aware, however,  that it 
has to negotiate with another . One of my Cambodian  narrators from a Human 
Rights and Good Governance NGO  described the institution as  being ‘ like a 
three legged race .  Both have to work together .  One fails,  the other fails.’ 112  
 
Grand Narrative 2 – Marxism ?  
  
Judge Rowan Downing QC International Judge at the ECCC’s ‘Pre-Trial 
Chamber  told me  : 
 
[Cambodia is a ]country with French-based laws. So they have adopted 
those and they have chosen to continue to adopt them.  Post-  
independence , post-shattered state , they have still got those laws,  but 
with a Soviet overlay. Because all of the upper echelons of their legal 
sector here are Soviet-trained  -  Moscow, East Germany or one of the  
Soviet satellites. That presents a challenge . Now, in the thirty year period 
and the legal vacuum there was an initial 10-12 year period where there 
was a complete collapse in the legal system. The judiciary was not 
functional.  The judiciary,  insofar  as it was there at all, was a direct arm 
of the government . There was  no pretence that it was separate from 
government;  it was a Soviet system.113    
 
 
Ieng Sary’s International Lawyer Michael Karnavas describes the post-DK 
Vietnamese-installed judiciary as ‘party members...I can only assume they were 
there to watch the judges.’ 114  He says that his experience of Legal Capacity 
Building in Cambodia  showed  that this new judiciary had no experience of 
courts abroad with which to compare itself.   Despite signing up to the ECCC’s 
legal liberal narrative, Cambodia remains a country in which the judiciary is 
basically an arm of the executive .   
 
Marxist or Democrat or Sdech ? Hun Sen as controller of the narrative 
 
However, while the RGC may currently express commitment to the liberal 
democratic principles of the constitution, it maintains a Soviet structure.  It is 
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extremely difficult to disentangle  Government or Party from  the figure who  
heads both, Hun Sen.  This is as much a mystical story about a prince and his 
power as it is about  ideology. I turn now to the author and self-appointed hero of 
that narrative, a complex  product of a hybrid political culture.   A former guerrilla 
fighter and Khmer Rouge cadre who claims to have joined to fight for the King, 
Hun Sen served for over a decade (first as Foreign Minister and then Prime 
Minister) in the Soviet-style government backed by the Vietnamese. 115 Post-
UNTAC, he and his Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) emerged 
into the 1990s with a change of party name to the Cambodian People’s Party 
(CPP), a redesigned logo and quick abandonment of the lexicon of Marxist-
Leninism.  The one man and party that governed the People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea became the dominant person and party of the Royal Government of 
Cambodia , to dominate Cambodian politics through the 1990s to the present. My 
contention here is that the narrative in relation to the DK era   did not significantly 
change character with the change of lexicon and look - the party narrative stayed 
the same. The CPP is a party of Soviet-style government with a self-devised 
lexicon. It is not appropriate to call this strain of narrative ‘Marxist’, in that the 
KPRP/CPP was always primarily concerned with the preservation of itself over  
ideology  . Nevertheless, phrase regimes were carefully re-calibrated to  fit their 
respective eras. With the Vietnamese pullout in 1989 the KPRP became the more 
pro-democratic CPP, and as the UN pulled out, Hun Sen’s CPP and its 
commitment to  Liberal democracy also waned. Both grand narratives of human 
progress (Marxism / Liberal Democracy) collapse in the  face of  a superficial 
commitment where power is the end and  ideology the  means .   
 
As the  traditional Cambodian monarchical governance  of the autocratic kind 
practiced by Norodom Sihanouk in the 1960s grew  steadily weaker,  space 
opened up for a different kind of narrative and the power that went with it.   As 
Astrid Noren Nilsson points out, Hun Sen actively links himself to  Sdech Kân, 
the sixteenth-century monarch of powerful cultural legend. 116  By awarding 
himself the title Sdech  (prince)  he taps into concepts of authority by linking 
himself  to traditional Buddhist cosmological notions of moral order. The 
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authority of the monarch  in the Khmer tradition emerges from the notion  that he 
has accrued enough merit over previous existences to permit his birth  into such 
an exalted position. (The King rules because of his accumulated good deeds.) Hun 
Sen wraps himself in Khmer mysticism to exhibit himself as a strong ruler who 
can create a  new ‘tiger economy’ - one , moreover, engaged in prolonged struggle 
for peace in the face of American and UN intransigence. 117   
 
America, along with the others ... once gave support to the Khmer Rouge. 
It's not me who has changed, but those who supported the Khmer Rouge 
10 or 20 years ago. It took me 20 years to destroy the political and military 
organization of the Khmer Rouge.  118 
 
When considering Hun Sen’s impact on the court it is important to note that  
many Cambodians who lived under the KR would share this evaluation -  
although many of those born in the 1980s are baffled by it, as one of my narrators 
commented: 
They [the older generation]  say,  ‘I vote this guy because I don’t want to 
see the war.’ And I say,  ‘No, no this guy is bad’ . And they say , ‘Ah,  you 
never lived or had past experience like me, and I was in the Pol Pot 
regime.  It was very difficult’.   So now it  is enough for them, even if  there 
is no... they are not rich,  but they have food to eat , something like that. 
They may have no rights but they can vote. So they say it’s better than Pol 
Pot regime .  So they say, ‘ I like this guy.’ They trust this guy because 
there is the absence of war and now there is  food. They are scared to 
change, because they are afraid the war is coming back. They know this 
guy is very bad , but he is better than Pol Pot. So that’s why it is difficult 
for the Cambodians to vote or select the good,  because they feel it is 
better than Pol Pot already. So they just compare like that. They don’t 
compare to other countries and say, ’No, we are poor, we need to change 
a bit,  to find a good leader.’  They don’t care;  they just keep ...because 
they are afraid of the war and killing again . 
 
So they don’t want to say… they never talk , they keep silent,  just very 
short …If you ask why they vote for this guy,  they will give you short 
answer,  like say, ‘ You  never experienced  Pol Pot. I have. So I don’t 
want to change.’ 119 
 
Closing the narrative 
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Hun Sen has already stated that  ‘ the accused are guilty.’ 120   For him the court’s  
legacy and scope have been decided .  In place of the liberal project of bringing 
evidence to bear in order to (re)construct a fabula, the approach is one of reverse 
engineering . The  completed narrative is  taken apart through the process and the 
sum of its parts are examined using a liberal legal format, but there is a 
preconstructed narrative serving as both sjuzhet  and fabula  - one in  many ways  
similar to that of  the PRT . Hun Sen makes frequent references to the PRT, and 
other Government officials have stated that  no further trial was needed. 121 122 123    
There will be no attempt to revise the sjuzhet to produce a different narrative - 
despite the fact that the PRT investigations were only the start of the process of 
amassing evidence of genocide ; with the best will in the world  the PRT could 
not have been aware of the magnitude of the impossible fabula . The most 
obvious feature of the CPP’s present-day sjuzhet is its small number of characters. 
Only a few of the most senior figures will ever appear as defendants. Along with 
Case 001, now  resolved,  and  Case 002, still  being tried  , two further cases  are 
supposedly under investigation (003 and 004). Hun Sen has explicitly stated that  
he will not allow these to proceed. 124  His information minister declared, ‘If they 
[the ECCC] want to go into Case 003 and 004, they should just pack their bags 
and leave.’125  Despite officially ‘inviting’ the UN to help the state prosecute the 
atrocities, the trial narrative is closed . It runs, ‘ We have faced evil times, here are 
those who are responsible, we condemn them, and afterwards we move on.’ The 
story pushes with all possible speed towards the point Hun Sen envisages when 
Cambodia can  ‘dig a hole and bury the past’.126  
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A sovereign state is of course allowed to say that it no longer wants to have an 
independent international court . However, the ECCC was officially invited to 
pursue independently all that falls under its jurisdiction and  to withdraw that 
invitation would immediately raise questions.    But the reason for Hun Sen’s 
reluctance  is clear. Many serving government officials and senior CPP members 
had close ties and/or direct involvement with the KR. 127 His position is not 
without support. Low-level  former KR  are responsive to such a narrative because 
whatever they may have done as KR they did not do willingly:   
 
I joined the Khmer Rouge in 1973….  Soldiers just came to the village and 
took the men. We couldn’t say no as they would kill us. So they forced us 
to be soldiers. Everywhere in this country when soldiers [of whatever 
group] came to the village to ‘recruit,’ no one ever had a choice.  They 
just had to join.  Every time soldiers came, they came as a large group, 
carrying guns, and they picked up the men of the right age.128 
 
 But it is senior figures in the ruling party who have most to fear from revelations 
that may emerge if matters are pursued beyond Case 002 - because they are 
connected with defendants or would themselves become defendants. If Cases 003 
and 004 do proceed, it will theoretically open the way for the ECCC to prosecute 
similar crimes involving, perhaps, the 15-20 individuals apparently envisaged by 
David Scheffer and Stephen Heder during the negotiations phase. 129 Heder has 
remarked that the extremely limited jurisdiction of the ECCCworks to exclude 
Hun Sen himself. 130 131    
  
This tightly restricted selection of cases is reinforced with an underlying threat to 
the public who might want further prosecutions. As discussed previously, the 
PRK and the RGC were concerned not to alienate lower cadres as they 
demobilized.  Hun Sen still warns that prosecutions beyond Case 002 could lead 
to civil war - despite the fact most cadres are beyond the age where they could 
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take to the jungles again.132 One of my Cambodian narrators in the Human Rights 
field considers that only the government now has the power to stir up this kind of 
conflict, but that it exploits a fear of civil war inherent in a society that has 
endured so much: 
  
One: the government do not want to lose power.  My thinking is that the 
government knows the people want peace, and say that the court is not 
important: the peace is important. Second: if we call for 003/004 etc., then 
they [the RGC/CPP] threaten  [the possibility of] war. So people will be 
frightened if they think Case 003 and 004 will cause war. All the time the 
government says to the people, ‘ Peace is most important, and court is not 
as important as peace.’133  
 
This threat of a war is an illusion.  There is no threat of a KR return to power, or 
civil war. As the speaker is aware, what drives this view is not a concern to keep 
the peace but to keep the CPP in power.  In Chapter Five I discuss how the CPP 
used the threat of a KR ideology returning civil war and an interstate war with 




It is necessary for the Hun Sen narrative to retain at least some of the outward 
forms of legal liberalism.  Adapting   Homi Bhabha’s concept of ‘mimicry,’ I 
would argue that the RGC mimics the liberal system to ‘look’ legitimate in global 
society, quashing discussions in the international community about the ‘culture of 
impunity’ and consigning the legacy of the KR to history. 136 A court system like 
the ECCC provides the means to this. However, the RGC has shown no political 
will for the process. 137  My modified version of Bhabha’s term ‘Mimicry’ 
denotes ‘ a performance that outwardly copies the lexicon and style of the liberal 
democratic ideal, but only for the benefit of the international community’. 138 By 
having the process at all, the RGC is   demonstrates its fluency in the discourse of 
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legal liberalism and  ‘normalises’ itself for the global community, showing that 
the once war-torn state can now be a fully engaged political and economic player 
under the rule of law. 139  
 
It is clear, however, that there are grounds for pessimism both within the trial and 
the associated reportage.  For example, Khmer Language versions of newspapers 
available in both English and Khmer contain different ‘facts’ about the same 
stories, while the English language versions read by the NGO/UN/ international 
workers appear to enjoy the right of a free press. 140  Within the ECCC itself co-
investigating judges have discovered that even the physical processes through 
which they present evidence are impeded.  Judge Laurent Kasper-Ansermet 
resigned in 2012, claiming the Office of the Co-investigating Judges was 
dysfunctional and rife with irregularities.141 His domestic counterpart, Judge You 
Bunleng, was sabotaging his ability to investigate Case 003 by: not allowing him 
to place documents in the case files; withdrawing the official seal; refusing to 
acknowledge his legal validity to investigate; denying access to basic services, 
such as interpreters and drivers to go out on investigation missions.   The 
relationship between the two judges visibly degenerated, as evidenced by hot- 
tempered press releases (especially Judge You’s).142 
 
This weakness of the legal liberal narrative of the court is precisely that it is in the 
process of being assembled. A fabula that has been fully pre-written like a 
detective novel does not need the way to be smoothed for it, especially when one 
has allies working from within to steward the sjuzhet as it advances through the 
dialectical process of the trial. The ‘liberal side’ has to battle against those inside 
the institutions  ‘pulling the strings’ to block any component of the narrative they 
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do not desire to be incorporated. 143 The experiences of the investigative offices 
have shown that, when combatting defensive techniques ranging from the petty to 
the ‘possibly even criminal,’ it is the liberals who lose.  144 
 
  Almost all my Cambodian narrators (unless they have a particular criticism of 
the ECCC), express the assumption that the task of the ECCC is to exhume some 
kind of historical account, a fabula of sorts with lasting value.  As one of them put 
it: 
I think that the tribunal itself provides tools. With all the questions from 
the judge is finally some truth out of this tribunal.  If they take [what they 
found] and they publish a report at the end, this can be placed in a 
museum.  This can be an official book about the KR regime, and this can 
be soothing related to facts.145 
  
 
Mingled narratives: holes in the stories  
 
However, it is important not to over-simplify the complex relationship between 
the narratives.  For instance, another way to think about the behaviour of   the 
RGC is to ask, as Alexandra Kent does, ‘Why should the RGC trust the 
international community?’146  The USA saturation-bombed their nation, arguably 
allowing Pol Pot to ascend to power; western Marxist academics provided the KR 
with intellectual ‘cover’ as the regime slaughtered millions; the UN recognised 
DK as the legitimate government throughout the 1980s, setting back national 
reconstruction for years; then the UN came with peacekeepers and NGOs, 
creating a boom in the sex industry.147  It is wholly inadequate to characterize the 
struggle for narrative primacy as a binary between east/west, domestic 
/international, ‘Asian Values’ / ‘Western values’. This would imply that all the 
Cambodian elements of the court   collude with the RGC-approved narrative, 
while all the international elements remain ‘pure.’ I would argue that within both 
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‘sides’ there are degrees of both compliancy and subversion, emerging from the 
‘egregious dysfunctions’  produced by this very struggle. 148 
 
The selective sjuzhet is by no means a monopoly of Cambodian politicians.    
International actors also have an interest in the obliteration of nuance, which leads 
to significant gaps in the story.  Their legal model   is designed to place on public 
record what happened, within the framework of a constitution enshrining the 
concept that someone must be held responsible for an outcome. 149  Steven Heder, 
however, argues that this ‘Nuremberg’ model encourages a ‘top down’ view of 
history, which concentrates the narrative on a few individuals to exclude context 
and episodes vital to understanding the whole situation. 150  Michael Karnavas 
echoed this, with particular reference to the way the timeframe of the ECCC 
sjuzhet has obliterated the American bombing from the fabula, or as he terms it, 
the ‘historical truth’:    
 
In this particular place [ECCC] they have plucked two magical dates – the 
fall of Phnom Penh [1975] and the fall of Phnom Penh [1979]- as if 
nothing happened before and nothing happened after. So the biggies -
China, the United States, and the UN - are not in the scope. 151 
 
  The sjuzhet of ‘magical dates’ (Ta Mok’s sjuzhet also used these) had 
particularly poignant application on the day I interviewed Michael Karnavas. A 
former cadre had testified about his experience of fleeing from the American 
bombing at Mondul Kiri and how he was forced to evacuate.  Karnavas observed 
that his testimony received little attention:  
 
Like, today you had a witness. He was talking about the   bombing, and 
people evacuating [from Mondul Kiri]. Of course, he and everyone else 
had to leave of their own accord. It may not be what the Prosecution want 
to hear.  But it’s part of the narrative. Because we are not searching for 
the historical truth we are discarding that.  I think the court is going to 
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allow a certain amount of contextual facts to come in, but it is not going to 
be the historical truth. When a civil party comes in they want to know the 
historical truth, but the court doesn’t have time for that. You know, one 
piece of information is all they need to assist them to fill in a blank.152 
 
The limited narrative and jurisdiction of the ECCC not only exempts currently 
serving government officials from scrutiny but also all those in the international 
community who helped the Khmer Rouge to power and supported their terrorist 
guerrilla movement of the 1980s. The official position of China, announced by the 
Ambassador in Phnom Penh, Zhang Jin Feng, is:  ‘The Chinese government never 
took part in or intervened into the politics of Democratic Kampuchea…the 
Chinese did not support the wrongful policies of the regime, but instead tried to 
provide assistance through food, hoes and scythes.’153 This is an outright lie. 
China had thousands of ‘advisors ’ in Phnom Penh at the time.154  Along with the 
US, UK and the rest of the 71, China stood shoulder- to-shoulder with their ‘KR’ 
allies throughout the 1980s.  The Chinese actively tried to block the creation of a 
court in the negotiation phase.155 This is in stark contrast to 1979, when the 
President Heng Samrin (former head of the government in PRK and current 
chairman of the National Assembly of Cambodia) implored the world to help the 
new government to  ‘stay the criminal hands of the Peking reactionaries and other 
reactionary forces who are strenuously trying to sabotage the Kampuchean 
people’s just cause and to undermine peace and stability in Southeast Asia.’156 As 
the CPP has strengthened its power through brute force and western donors 
become squeamish, it is to China that Hun Sen has turned to bankroll his 
increasingly authoritarian state. Hun Sen in 2006 declared that China is 
Cambodia’s ‘most trustworthy friend’.157 The Chinese do not attach ‘human 
rights’ issues, political or judicial reform to aid, of which they are now providing 
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vast sums. The Chinese denial that they assisted the KR means that the RGC 
sjuzhet is narrowed to exclude yet another part of the story158.  
 
Speaking (?) silences in the narrative 
 
There are subtle varieties  of  international complicity with  the RGC narrative .  
Karnavas suggests that the Internationals have  painted themselves into a corner 
by too much acquiescence.  From the outset there were systemic failures , which  
become more apparent as time goes on : 
 
The UN, very early on, for whatever reason,  was willing to give and give 
and give and give,  and they out-negotiated themselves and put themselves  
in a position where they had very little leverage. And now when there’s  
massive political interference , very little can be said from the court,  
because well,  you know,  the local judges were appointed by Hun Sen  
and the international judges are not coming out saying, ‘This is 
reprehensible behaviour, the Prime Minister should stop doing that’ . 
Because  the minute they do,  their colleagues on the bench are going to 
get upset.  I think the International Judges have been... in a sense been co-
opted  by not taking on a lot of the issues  at the very beginning. You  
know,  when it became known that the national staff had to give  kick-
backs – massive corruption- here you have an entire institution , a judicial 
institution , where you have these  very corrupt practices . The UN does 
not investigate. The UN says it cannot come out with a report because the 
Cambodian government requested it.  
 
I think some take a very pragmatic view and say something like , ‘Well,  
you know , something is better than nothing. There may be flaws,  but at 
least it’s  not nothing. But why spend  $150, 000,0000 on something to 
prosecute a bunch of octogenarians?’ It has been a very rough trial . 159 
 
Co-Investigating  Judge Marcel Lemonde resigned from  the ECCC in 2010. In 
2013 he published a book describing his experiences.160 He mentioned discussions 
with another Cambodian judge  in which he was told directly that all Cambodian 
judges are so fearful of,  or so intertwined with,  the Party that there is not a single 
Cambodian magistrate who could be trusted. The same judge told Lemonde that 
the international judges on the investigative  team would never be trusted by their 
Cambodian counterparts . Lemonde concludes that the entire Cambodian side is 
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prepared to obstruct any potential proceeding that would prove politically  
embarrassing. He considers that the Party was not so much conspiring  to destroy 
the ECCC as assuming that  Judges exist only to carry out the executive’s orders. 
161 Lemonde’s replacement, Siegfried Blunk, resigned in 2011 , mired in scandal.  
Members of his own office  alleged that , along with You Bunleng , he had closed 
down investigations into 003 and 004 with barely any  inquiry . International 
NGOs Human Rights Watch and Amnesty called for his resignation  ( implying as 
they did so that Blunk was being leaned on).  He was replaced by Kasper-
Ansermet. 162  The Blunk fiasco was a particular humiliation for the UN; the 
stories surrounding the investigative offices were farcical. Open Society Justice 
Initiative reported that the staff of the Office of Co-Investigating Judges had 
stuffed Case File 003 with random papers to give the impression of a genuine 
investigation.163 There have also been criticisms of other staff members, for 
example Helen Jarvis, former head of the Victims Unit, due to her close long-term 
relationship with the Hun Sen government. 164  
 
Michiel Pestman put it bluntly when he asked the Trial Chamber Judges 
Cartwright and Lavergne whether they believe the Trial Chamber will ever take a 
decision against the wishes of the Cambodian Government.165 This is a significant 
question. While a trial of the CPK leaders is symbolically important, at what point 
does a process of a standard unacceptable at The Hague imply a UN seal of 
approval on corruption and political molestation of the judiciary?  Given the 
serious nature of the allegations, particularly those from Kasper-Ansermet, the 
absence of an official international investigation is surprising.  The question 
hovering over the internationals, in particular the two international judges in the 
Trial Chamber, Cartwright and Lavergne, is whether their silence is complicit 
with interference.    
 
Hybridisations 
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In 2008 a story appeared in a Khmer newspaper  about the Neak Ta statue outside 
the ECCC. 166 Such statues exist outside every Cambodian court, on which 
witnesses swear to tell the truth.  This one represents Ta Dombong Dek, a 
representative of justice from the Angkorian Era; it was specifically designed by 
the sculptor to symbolise the hybrid nature of the court, with  a ‘curved moustache 
and silver eyes like those of Europeans’.  Soon after the statue was established, a 
live-in guard at the ECCC described a disturbing dream, in which the Ta 
Dombong Dek spirit threatened him and complained about its western moustache.  
A ceremony was held in which it was   explained to Ta Dombong Dek ,  ‘You are 
not an ordinary Ta Dombong Dek, but a Cambodian UN hybrid.’ This vividly 
encapsulates local  anxieties circulating around the notion of hybridity and the 
investment many people have in the court. Like Ianuzzi’s Dada badge and 
Pestman’s jokes , the dream  is a piece of political performance art . It is a graphic 
warning to the internationals of the danger in becoming the western face of an 
RGC narrative. This is no small issue in a nation where,  for Cambodians with  
little faith in their own judiciary, like Sum Rithy,  the presence of foreigners gives 
the court  legitimacy :  
 
Currently we have many foreigners( judges, prosecutors etc. ) from 
overseas.  So I am hopeful.  Also I had wished for their [the internationals] 
presence here, as these from overseas have more knowledge, more 
expertise, more skill and ability to act independently than Khmer 
Judges.167 
 
This contrasts with the view of the PRT he and two of my other narrators 
expressed earlier , in which the presence of foreigners made no difference and  the 
Vietnamese  presence at its head probably diminished its credibility.  As Chum 
Mei  comments : 
 
 The citizens couldn’t accept the PRT’s legitimacy. At this time there was 
nothing.  Mostly now people believe in ECCC,  because it’s an 
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international court. The judges are wise people, from USA, Korea Japan 
etc. 168 
  
However, those Cambodians who desire liberal democracy  to work in their 
country are despondent at the possibility  of the ECCC   compromising its legacy 
by the way the liberal legal narrative has hybridised with that of the RGC as one 
monk argues : 
 
If this ECCC is a success it would be a good model of best practice for the 
government, to learn as a case study. But it is not a success. It’s a bad 
experience.  It’s corruption again, it’s international corruption, because 
they use a lot of money and the result is bad.  The International side has 
joined with the corruption here in Cambodia.169 
 
It is more encouraging to  look at the hybridization of domestic and international 
ideas in the actions of local NGOs, and even in the Sangha,  through monks such 
as Ven. Sovath Loun : 
 
In my interpretation of Buddhist rules and the life of Buddha,  I see him as 
a human rights defender . But also a natural rights defender. Whenever 
the Buddha preached,  he taught respect for one another, respect life, 
don’t kill, respect each other.  The  precepts of the Buddha -  do not steal 
( same as property rights) , do not killing (same as the human rights) -  
this is the first law of the human rights and democracy. The Buddha is not 
a communist! The Buddha is a democrat! 170 
 
Ven. Sovath Loun is very much a product of the post-1989 liberalisation. He was 
born after DK and became politically aware in the 1990s as the country was 
undergoing liberalisation. He,  like many engaged monks of this time,  regards the 
Hun Sen government as  a continuation of the communism of the 1980s and views 
the UNTAC legacy as vital to advance. 171  For him Karnavas's ‘IT’ moment rings 
true. Ven.Sovath was  arrested for campaigning for land rights a few weeks before  
we spoke ;  the failure of the liberal discourse to take hold and the triumph of Hun 
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Sen’s Soviet style government became personal experience for him as he was 
manhandled into government trucks.  172 
 
Keeping the liberal narrative afloat 
 
Perhaps the  strongest expression of faith in  liberal international justice at the 
ECCC is that of Michael Karnavas. Unlike the Pestman/Ianuzzi ‘court jesters’ 
who use parody to foreground the court’s failure to adhere to international 
standards , Karnavas engages in  his work in the court on the basis of its own rules 
while insisting that its narrative is emergent, not scripted. One of his major 
complaints is that the court keeps shifting the rules of its own proceedings mid-
trial.  
 
I’m an advocate. And if you make the rules I adjust to the rules. The rules 
don’t adjust to me. You may not like the rules - well, tough. These are the 
rules, and if it is to your advantage to stall or whatever, OK.  Because that 
is my role, I’m playing my role. Now I’m pretty aggressive in my 
representations of the client, because I’m not here to pass judgment on 
what he did, who he is.  I work for him the same way I work for any of my 
other clients.  But we insist that we have a transparent process, and in that 
this court is in a unique position to.... this entire ECCC experiment is in a 
unique situation. This is perhaps the first time that Cambodian people 
have been able to see an adversarial procedure where the defence lawyers 
are actually sitting at the same level as the prosecutor, and have an equal 
voice in court and challenge the judge openly. So the ECCC is in a unique 
situation to demonstrate to the Cambodian people that this is what a court 
looks like.173 
 
Karnavas is extremely aware of his capacity building role in the court (probably 
because he has been involved with it since 1994) and considers that the ECCC 
should be showing a country with a corrupt and dysfunctional legal system how a 
fair court in context of a liberal democratic and legal liberal system is supposed to 
work: 
 
These are the roles of the parties, and we each play our role. If you are 
represented by somebody, that person will not just be there as a ‘potted 
plant’ but actually has power to make arguments. The Judge should not 
always be ruling for the prosecution, but is supposed to rule on behalf of 
the defence. In other words they are seeing the application of the rule of 
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law – ruling by the law and the law applying to everyone equally, 
irrespective of race, region, position in society. It applies equality every 
day of the week. And to some extent they [the Cambodian people] are 
seeing that here [the ECCC]. The fact that they have an outreach 
programme is.... even though it sometimes gives the appearance of it being 
sort of a show trial, that they are bussing people in.... you have to keep in 
mind that effectively the entire country was a crime scene. Based on the 
indictment, which means that the events that are covered in the closing 
order touched upon everyone in Cambodia.  So seeing people over there 
sometimes seem surreal - that you have monks, or nuns or what have you. 
On the other hand it is exposing them to due process. They are not 
watching it on the telly; they are actually there in the room. Much of it 
they may not understand, like when we get into hyper–technical arguments 




Ianuzzi’s elephant is still in the room.   The liberal legal narrative is controlled as 
tightly as possible  by the RGC’s  exclusion of all foreign participants in it, 
especially those who currently bankroll the state , and  through the exclusion  of 
any other characters in the cast outside the top CPK leadership  of the 1970s 
(especially those  in the present government)  in aid of ‘ensuring public safety’ 
and preventing civil war.   Hence the case of Duch  (001) will probably be the 
only one in the ‘most responsible’ (as opposed to ‘senior leader’) category to be 
tried, giving him a unique status as lone defendant in his category ( unless Cases 
003 and 004 ever make any headway).  Duch is a  ‘necessary scapegoat’.175   His   
prosecution is heavily symbolic. Since the Vietnamese invasion, S-21 has served 
as a symbol of the criminality and sadism of the CPK. The site of Duch’s crimes 
(S-21) is now the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum; as such it is part of the 
established KR history in the heart of the capital, and part of the tourist trail . This 
makes his sentence look like the end of a narrative. But there are ‘other Duchs’ : 
men and women who ran prisons, torture chambers , supervised mass murder and 
used slave labour. The narrative is no more complete than a history of the  
Holocaust  presented solely through an account of  Auschwitz . There are crime 
scenes  far less visible, with  no memorial, no plaque, and no acknowledgement 
that they are as much part of the story as S-21.  What remains unsaid, what fails to 
make it into  the official narrative,  is not given a forum ;  the multiple narrations 
the country contains live within individuals, who must find ( if they are inclined to 
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do so) a place in which to deposit them, another institution and frame. This is 
especially important as documentation of these other centres is missing or simply 
does not exist. Not all the KR  were as apt at record keeping as Duch.  
 
The Civil Party Mechanism  -  opening up the narrative? 
 
The ECCC is the first internationalized process of its kind to include a ‘civil 
party’ element ; this facilitates victim participation in the proceedings. People 
who believe that they have been subject to physical, psychological or material 
harm as a result of crimes under investigation by the court can apply to be a civil 
party and be represented by one of the lead co-lawyers at the court. 176  Civil 
parties provide testimonies to be used in court , incorporate individual narratives 
and experience into the court’s considerations and allow a forum for the 
expression of grievance at a procedural level. Civil parties offer victims the 
chance of ‘moral and collective reparations’. 177  These are defined as measures 
which: 
a) acknowledge the harm suffered by Civil Parties as a result of the commission 
of the crimes for which an Accused is convicted and 
b) provide benefits to the Civil Parties which address this harm. These benefits 
shall not take the form of monetary payments to Civil Parties. 178 
 
However, given that the accused persons are indigent, what can be offered is 
minimal.  In Case 001 the Trial Chamber included in the judgment the names of 
all Civil Parties and the names of their deceased relatives and compiled a booklet 
containing all of Duch’s statements of apology or acknowledgement of 
responsibility; this was also   placed on the ECCC website. 179 
 
Reparations commissions would have been impossible here, because by 
their very nature shattered states don’t have any resources. And where 
you have no external combatants against whom you can claim reparations  
- this was internal - you have to look to the state for the reparations. Well, 
what sort of reparations can you give? Well, the answer is nil. And the 
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reason the answer is nil is because everyone is a victim. You can’t give 
monetary compensation when everyone is a victim in one way or the other. 
Everyone, perhaps a small group of people.... The system has an 
additional internal problem. We have 4000 people who have been clever 
enough or well connected enough – that is, that they have been 
approached by an NGO and have been able to make application to be a 
victim, and were admitted in first instance or on appeal. But there were 
4000 out of a potential 6,000000 victims.  Is it just or fair?180 
 
As Judge Rowan Downing notes here, the civil party mechanism is deeply flawed 
and only represents a few persons.  There is not even a pretence that a whole 
fabula can ever emerge. However, of the civil parties I have spoken to most (not 
all) do not seek individual reparations: they take on a role as  ‘representative’ of a 
group and their stories stand for a mass of unspoken narratives. Ven. 9 for 
instance, who lost his uncle, is young and educated enough to feel that as a civil 
party he can represent a wider community within himself. Someone with 
education and energy is important in this regard. The Civil Party process has been 
criticised for making complex bureaucratic demands on applicants and these 
alienate many.181 
 
This is why I became a civil party – I want justice for all people.  I do not 
want compensation for myself. If I receive any I will distribute it to all the 
victims. I do not expect it though, in financial terms. My place as a civil 
party is symbolic.  I see that through me as an individual I can be a 
representative of many. 182 
 
Sum Rithy too sees his role as representing thousands who died at the Siem Reap 
prison. The dead are on his shoulders as he personifies their story: 
 
It’s good the court was supported by the UN. Even though the process is 
bad I still have confidence in the UN. It was the NGOs that pushed me to 
be a civil party. My daughter said to me before,  ‘No need to file a 
complaint, father, it may be more trouble for you.’ But because of the 
NGO’s involvement and then the UN I felt confident to do this.  
 
You know, I think that if I did not become a civil party then the Siem Reap 
prison would have been vanished [i.e. from the historical record- the site 
of the prison, which he showed me on a map, has literally been obliterated 
from the landscape; a series of hotels and spa resorts have been built on 
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top of the mass graves]. I wanted people to know the Siem Reap. I should 
show it to the world.  The Siem Reap prison is a very big story, the most 
important in telling this story to the world.  It is a significant story: Khmer 
killed Khmer.183 
 
One of the International Co-Lawyers for the Cham civil parties in court, Maître 
Olivier Bahougne, states: 
 
This definition [of ‘moral and collective’] is made by the court for me. It is 
new to me. From my point of view ‘ moral reparations’ means the most 
important thing is to show that the active participation as civil parties in 
the court is moral reparations. And that the participants will know that we 
explain to the court their lives, their way of life during this period [DK]. 
This is the moral participation for them. 184 
 
Acknowledgement of their experience, getting it recorded, is significant to civil 
parties. However, expectation often fails to match reality. Karnavas goes on to 
explain:  
 
You know like all these civil parties, when they come here, leave very 
disappointed. They have very very high expectations. A lot of them come 
and they want their story to be heard; but the point is, it’s not a forum to 
establish historical truth, OK ? …You had victims coming in to give 
evidence, and you see very often they get very frustrated when they are 
told,  ‘Well, we don’t want to hear this part of your story’. But they have 
been waiting 10 or 15 years to actually come into court and be heard.185 
 
Karnavas here discusses the problem with legal mechanisms where phrase 
regimes from a vernacular narrative meet those of the institutional framework and 
the narrative comes out differently from the teller’s true desire.  All of my 
respondents who are civil parties have expressed exasperation at not having their 
stories told in court. Civil parties of Case 001 said they felt that too much time 
was given to Duch’s statements at the expense of theirs. The problem at the heart 
of this is that the two interlocutors (the court process and the civil party) do not 
share a knowledge base, and have divergent views of what is and is not relevant.  
 
Chum Mei was one of the very few survivors of S-21; he was kept alive by 
Comrade Duch when he found out Chum Mei was able to repair typewriters- a 
required skill as many ‘confessions’ following the torture sessions were typed.  
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Chum Mei acknowledges the limitations of the mechanism but argues that the 
moral reparation he seeks is the process itself: 
 
At the ECCC, it cannot bring 100%, justice.  But its results, and the 
background, and the very action of prosecuting the KR, is moral and 
collective reparations.  If we didn’t have this court, the story would still be 
secret and no one would know about it. So it’s a good thing.  
 
The most important is to tell everybody about the Khmer Rouge story. I am 
82 years old now. If I don’t tell people, it will be finished, lost. That’s why, 
if people are interested, if they want to know, I’m not stingy to tell them. 
Chinese people, Japanese people, any people if they have a translator, I 
will tell them, because I want to tell everybody.  I want everybody to know 
this story and I don’t want to see it again. This is important to me and I’m 
trying to write a book.186 
 
As it is for many, the act of telling the story is the most significant aspect. Chum 
Mei sits almost every day inside S-21. The guides there introduce tourists to him:  
he will tell his story to anyone who will listen.  
 
 As Karnavas argues, no legal /court /transitional justice mechanism facilitates 
this. However, for groups  desperate to tell their story by whatever means , the 
ECCC , for all its  flaws , is a repository for stories and a conduit from which 
future generations will  access part of the narrative of their history.   Despite all 
the controls exerted by Grand Narratives as they intertwine and collapse, and the 
regimentation of the stories on all sides, for some a degree of justice is achieved 
not as a result of the telling, but in the telling itself.  
 
Legal liberalism is the globally legitimate narrative generator. However the 
limiting of a jurisdiction is in the interests of the CPP and those in the 
international community with a sullied history of engagement with Cambodia. 
Meanwhile the process of legal liberalism is struggling, as many of those at work 
in the court are pushing a predetermined account, which is top-heavy and focused 
on only a few individuals.  The primacy of the Party is a tool of power legal 
liberalism is structurally incapable of combating at the ECCC.  The experiences of 
Lemonde and Ansermet exemplify the struggle between the RGC’s pre-
constructed narrative and the liberal desire to uncover the (impossible) fabula of 
Cambodia. The ECCC is in many ways a useful conduit, but in others it is highly 
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restrictive. As with the PRT and the trial of Pol Pot, there is a disconnect between 
interlocutors. 187 All are engaged with processes with no shared ground rules 
between the narrative they wish to provide and the institutional restrictions of the 
process.   All three trials have battened on individuals like these to nourish the 




Throughout this chapter I have demonstrated that in each case there has been a 
highly political narrative that has to some extent prioritized itself over the story of 
the DK era - and what came before and after. Each trial is a genre of discourse in 
which some victims failed to find linkage. Each trial was ‘showing’ something to 
different audiences:  that the CPK were not a ‘real’ communist party; or that Pol 
Pot was a failed nationalist leader; or the values of liberal legalism.  
 
My contention here is that the prominence of Marxist/Liberal grand     narratives 
and metanarratives such as those adopted by Cambodian politicians Ta Mok and 
Hun Sen exclude the possibility of participation by smaller narrators on their own 
terms. In addition, the trials have all been constructed to exclude specific foreign 
and domestic actors. All these systems of ‘justice’ have been imposed from 
above. This has meant that the interlocutors have only been able to tell some (if 
any) of their story.  
 
It may be useful here to return to Sen’s   idea of a continuum of justice: a 
comparative assessment on the basis of the available options. 188 If I combine this 
with Lyotard’s argument that an ethical justice system is one that provides space 
for people to present their narrative, I can ask whether these bodies facilitate for 
such a space. It should then be possible to place them in relative comparison.   It 
is not for me to prescribe where these institutions fit on the continuum of justice 
for Cambodians. And I am clearly not arguing that all the processes laid out here 
are ‘all the same’. However, I can hypothesize on the basis of the narratives I have 
curated that the institutions discussed in this chapter allow for the voices of DK 
survivors in varying degrees and use these narratives to place the processes along 
Sen’s continuum. From my own perspective I would suggest, for example, that in 
                                                
187	  Charlotte	  Linde,	  ‘	  Narrative	  in	  Institutions’	  ,	  The	  Handbook	  of	  Discourse	  Analysis,	  eds.	  Deborah	  
Schiffrin	  and	  Heidi	  E.	  Hamilton,(Oxford:	  Blackwell	  2001)	  518-­‐537	  
188	  	  Amartya	  Sen,	  	  The	  Idea	  of	  Justice,(London:	  Penguin	  Books	  2010)	  409	  
 145 
comparison with the trial of Pol Pot, an occasion on which no-one other than its 
organisers had a chance to bear witness, the PRT at least collected and heard the 
testimonies of some survivors and exercised the more ethical justice discussed by 
Lyotard. Then again I would suggest that the ECCC, allowing a greater number of 
persons to speak - albeit in a limited way – might be more ethical than the PRT, in 
that it does not add rhetorical appendages to witness statements as the PRT did.  
 
Each process, however, has its own genre of discourse to which people have 
brought their narratives and found that their phrase regime is disallowed. The 
story of a dream, of the experience of the US bombing, cannot find a place.   Sum 
Rithy at the PRT and the ECCC, Chum Mei and Bou Meng at the ECCC, the 
woman angry at her lack of voice at the trial of Pol Pot, the people outside 
Chaktomouk Hall, are all anxious to tell their stories; all have found themselves in 
an uneasy relationship with the process; some have found gaps in the narrative 
edifices that allow a limited space for expression; some can only attest to the 
Differend. 
 
One theme that emerges out of this study of trials to carry through the thesis is 
that ‘viewers make meaning.’189 That is to say, meaning is drawn from an event or 
object by those viewing the spectacle and drawing from it a meaning that those 
who set it up did not necessarily intend to be read from it. These institutions are 
active in creating a subaltern group   whose narrative is not allowed in the 
hegemonic narrative. As Todorov points out, the trials are not simply about ‘old 
men no longer a threat to anyone’ but about what they  ‘inscrib[e] in collective 
memory’.190  I turn now from the large-scale processes and hegemonic narratives 
to look at the ‘small voices’ and the way they construct other kinds of narrative, 
their own part of the impossible fabula. 
 
First I will examine a different kind of process:  the next section is a bridging 
chapter in which I examine a small-scale, participant-driven narrative process 
with a more accommodating phrase regime. It is not concerned with making, 
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advocating or protecting a hegemonic grand narrative, but with prioritising and 











This is a bridging chapter.  The event I discuss   occupies a space between the 
legal and trial genres of the previous chapter and the religious ceremonies of the 
next. It offers a link between the discourse of the trials and the other discourses in 
which narratives of DK are articulated and acted upon.  
 
The ‘knowledges’ gap between the justice-administering institutions and their 
supposed constituents (Differend) were articulated early in the last century by 
Ehrlich as a tension between law, justice and society.  Confining the ‘science of 
law’ to  ‘black-letter’ institutions such as courts and tribunals ignores what 
Ehrlich calls the ‘life of law’   outside the legal institutions of the state.  The PRT 
and the ECCC can both be seen as adopting too narrow a focus in terms of the 
scope of their discourses, procedures and jurisdiction, and in their ‘knowledge’ 
base. As Ehrlich argues, there is a set of social norms and structures with ‘life’ 
outside statutes and trials, to which people ascribe meanings and authority. 1 Such 
‘laws’ determine social relationships and sometimes ‘govern’ individuals in a 
society more than the codified laws of the state. Transgressions against such laws 
have consequences, equally well known to transgressor, transgressed-against and 
witnesses to that transgression.  
 
Because of the enormity of the Cambodian genocide and the complexity of its 
narrative threads, there have been, and are, on-going mechanisms to deal with it 
outside formal legal mechanisms.  This idea takes on particular resonance in a 
society in which there was a long-term legal vacuum, in which the judiciary is 
generally regarded with suspicion, and where there is already a system of   
alternative mechanisms for grievance redress. 2 3 For example, people will ask the 
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village chief, community leader, or a monk to preside over property and family 
issues at a local level rather than using the court system.  
 
I here describe a mediation process, a Victim/Former Khmer Rouge Dialogue 
Project (VFKRDP) run by the peacebuilding NGO, the International Centre for 
Conciliation  (ICFC). 4 This works in collaboration with a group of psychiatrists 
focusing on post-traumatic stress disorder, the Transcultural Psycho-social 
Organization (TPO).5  
 
It is a restorative justice project, whose stated aim is to enable dialogue between 
those who lived under DK, and to achieve reconciliation between former lower 
cadres and those targeted by CPK policy in DK. It also aims to develop 
community cohesion and defuse intergenerational resentments consequent on the 
present fragmentation of the community. It encourages the full telling of a story; 
out of this comes acknowledgement of wrongdoing and the pain caused by the 
actions of KR cadres, followed by an apology between former cadres and victims.   
The project necessarily assumes a more sophisticated understanding of the 
ambiguity of the Victim/Perpetrator Binarythan the ECCC. 6 
 
Indeed one former cadre who had been a witness at the ECCC told me: 
 
We are all living in a suffering situation in the Pol Pot time. It’s good to 
have the court in Cambodia, but I am a KR survivor as well. Whenever I 
go to any Wat, I dedicate food or money to those spirits and confess to the 
Buddha statue,   ‘Forgive me because I was ordered to by someone else.  I 
did this but I have no willingness to do.’ But even so I still did wrong.  I hit 
the people, I kick the people.  I still have a mistake.  I was forced to work 
[as a KR]. They found out I had ninth grade education. On my first day I 
followed the others … to watch how to do the torture and ask the 
questions. The first day I was very fearful in [the place where I worked].7 
 
 
A major objective of the project is to aid the development of a full and nuanced 
narrative at grassroots level, one that encompasses the forced nature of what many 
cadres did in deeply fearful circumstances. This is particularly important since the 
                                                
4	  A	  video	  of	  this	  event	  is	  available	  at	  	  	  
<http://www.kdei-­‐	  karuna.org/VFKR/vfkracad.html><Accessed	  	  21	  April	  2013>	  
5	  Rothany	  Srun	  ,	  Tim	  Minea,	  Judith	  Stasser,	  Muny	  Sothara,	  Chhay	  Marideth,	  Yourn	  Sarath,	  Victim-­‐
Former	  Khmer	  Rouge	  Dialogue	  Project:	  Lessons	  Learned	  	  (Phnom	  Penh	  :	  International	  Centre	  for	  
Conciliation	  and	  Transcultural	  Psychosocial	  Organization)	  December	  2011	  
6	  Srun	  ,	  Tim,	  Stasser,	  Muny,	  Chhay	  ,	  Sarath,	  Victim-­‐Former	  Khmer	  Rouge	  Dialogue	  Project.,	  
7	  	  Former	  KR	  1,	  Interview	  with	  Tallyn	  Gray	  27	  July	  2012	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ECCC focuses only on ‘top leaders’.  It ignores those who have committed 
violence   without addressing its effect on the society in which the perpetrators 
still live. Many  former cadres returned to their villages in the 1980s but were 
never re-integrated. With no system in place to deal with the anger and 
resentments felt by victims, hatred has persisted through the decades. For 
example, during my interviews I  heard alarming stories from more than one 
source about  two ‘Khmer Rouge families’  seeing their children in conflict with 
other students.8 
 
There was conflict in school between the former KRs’  children and the 
victims’ children, fights breaking out,  because the parents told them of the 
bad things the KR parents did to their family.9 
 
The  Structure of the Process  
 
After initial  assessment the project is explained and offered to those involved. 
The first phase involves video rather than face-to-face confrontation. Typically, 
one video  is shown to the other party, and then their reaction to watching that 
video is filmed to show to the first party . Victim and former KR cadre are  both 
filmed in  the presence of counsellors,  giving testimony about what they hope to 
achieve through their dialogue, about  their personal recollection of the event 
under discussion , and about its impact on their  own lives.  These initial  videos 
are shown to each party and video exchanges go back and forth  until   a face-to -
face mediation, in which the parties would be able to accept each other,  seems 
possible. There follows a process  whereby the community can work together 
performing some action to help the reconciliation and peace building process. 
Facilitators are trained in conflict mediation to deal with future issues and 
conflicts arising from the process. 10 I interviewed the mediator of  one such 
process ( put on video) and the local facilitator  left to carry out follow-up work.11 
 
In this process the three  parties have pseudonyms : the former KR Cadre is 
referred to as  ‘Grandpa’;  one survivor is a woman referred to as ‘Grandma’, 
whose husband was arrested by ‘Grandpa’ and taken to  be killed ; there is another 
                                                
8	  Ven.	  10,	  Phnom	  Penh,	  Interview	  with	  Tallyn	  Gray,	  	  16	  August	  2012	  
9	  	  Tim	  Mine,	  ICFC,	  Interview	  with	  Tallyn	  Gray	  	  8	  	  August	  	  2012,	  
10	  Srun	  ,	  Tim,	  Stasser,	  Muny,	  Chhay	  ,	  Sarath,	  Victim-­‐Former	  Khmer	  Rouge	  Dialogue	  Project.3	  
11 http://www.kdei-­‐karuna.org/VFKR/vfkrcad.html	  Accessed	  21	  April	  2013 
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woman, referred to as ‘Aunt’ (very young during DK), whose father was also  
taken away by ‘Grandpa’. 
 
There were four video exchanges .  
 
EXCHANGE ONE. Grandpa states he doesn’t want the two victims to be angry 
with him. He says he has difficulty remembering the night that he arrested the two 
men the women have lost .  
 
 Grandma and Aunt want Grandpa  to acknowledge what he did  and apologise.  
 
Grandpa says that he is now  isolated from the rest of the community as a result of 
his past, and that he feels great regret for what  happened : ‘They forced me to do 
that work. I didn't want to do it, I only did it because they pushed me to do it. 
They used me.’ 
 
 
EXCHANGE TWO. Grandma and Aunt are not happy with this reply and feel 
that Grandpa has not properly expressed his  sorrow for what he had done.  
Grandma states , ‘I worked hard to build up my Buddhist merit, so in the next life, 
I will not experience separation again.’ She adds, ‘I'm a person who has good 
Buddhist merit. I do not have any bad feelings towards him.’ However,  as she 
expresses this her manner is  angry. ‘He could not even say sorry. Just one word, 
and we did not see it.’ Aunt in particular is upset at this video exchange as 
Grandpa   said he cannot remember arresting her father.  
 
The ICFC team carried out some investigations and took other witness testimonies 
to establish Grandpa’s involvement .  
 
EXCHANGE THREE  Grandpa takes responsibility and apologises. 
In his video reply he says he can understand the women’s concerns: ‘I feel a lot of 
regret over what happened to Grandma. And I am sorry for what happened to her. 
I am not educated. It was easy for the Khmer Rouge leaders to use me.’ 
 
Aunt and Grandma decide after hearing the apology  that they want to forgive 
Grandpa. They  understand that he was a low-ranking official, and  that he too has 
suffered because of the KR. Grandpa expresses a desire to carry out a Buddhist 
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ritual for those who died. Grandma and Aunt agree. They elect to meet face to 
face at the Wat, which  was turned into a torture centre under the KR .  
 
EXCHANGE FOUR : In the final face-to-face meeting the participants meet in 
the Wat in a structured event. The videos are watched and reflected upon. What 
has been learned is affirmed. A future course of action is decided. All those 
involved decide that,  since the dead are so significant  in their story,  there must 
be a response inclusive of the spirits of the dead.  They decide this can be best 
done by building a stupa . The monk blesses the end of the event.  Later a village 




The outcome of this process was a community was much more at ease with itself.  
The achar (Buddhist  lay minister),  trained as a facilitator by ICFC, says : 
 
Before, in the villages, mostly the Khmer Rouge victims and the cadres 
didn’t have good …communication,  because their mind still have 
rancour,  and then they were unhappy with each other . Especially the 
Cadre family :  they did not go to the other community because they 
worried [for]  their children , or that the victim’s family would do 
something bad to them .  But after the mediation process, the victims 
understand more. They told their story, and the cadres as well confessed 
what they did in the past. They [both the Cadres and the victims] 
understood the reason that they should not hide these stories or feelings. 
The mediation helped them deal with these issues.12 
 
 
Discourse and narrative blocks 
 
In the process described,  the role and discourse of Buddhism are not emphasised  
by  the ICFC, but by the community itself . They have elected to employ Buddhist 
discourse and phrases to facilitate the aim of this particular project, just as they 
have chosen the site on which the exchanges take place,  rather than having a 
‘staging’ imposed on them. The  genre of discourse was chosen by the 
participants and it has clearly provided them with a way to articulate a narrative 
beyond the remit of the ECCC.  
 
                                                
12	  Achar	  1,	  ICFC	  facilitator,	  	  	  Interview	  with	  Tallyn	  Gray	  17	  August	  	  2012	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It is important not see this as replacing the Liberal Grand Narrative with a 
Buddhist Grand Narrative invariably better equipped to deal with the aftermath of 
DK.  Some at the ICFC identify Buddhism as an obstacle to discussion. 13 The 
problem is that Karma is supposed to deal with justice deficits. Buddhism  
demands that one let go of anger. However, within Buddhism’s  transcendental 
philosophical  ideal  no actual process is prescribed which might make  this 
letting-go possible in a political context like the one outlined here.  Meditation 
and prayer are meant to lead the individual internally to let negative feelings go.  
However, viewing the video responses,  it is obvious that while  ‘Grandma’ voices 
her lack of anger,  she is clearly  angry. Acceptance of the past, reconciliation and 
letting go require a process to transition the subject from A to point B. The 
VFKRDP offers this kind of  linking point . It  fills in some of the gaps left open 
by the ECCC narrative while at the same time  facilitating for the notion that the 
victim must let go and leave things to Karma.  
 
However, the VFKRDP has another function, in that it contributes to the 
development of Buddhist discourse and practice in post-KR Cambodia. As stated 
previously, and as I show in Chapter  Seven, Cambodia  has had to draw heavily 
on external influences in the wake of the cultural destruction of the KR . This in 
turn means that the development of a culture to deal with the KR legacy is often 
hybridised. NGOs and foreign money use their resources to  develop frameworks  
which respond to the historical context  by  hybridising with the local . In short, 
various modes of phrase regime and genres of discourse are being created in 
parallel in response to an event ( the DK period).   The VFKRDP is part of that 
process ; as such, like all these new and intertwining discourses, it has to negotiate 
with what I term a ‘triple lock’ on speech concerning the KR period.  
 
The first part of this lock is the  PRK  government’s utter domination of the 
discourse surrounding the Dk period in the 1980s. While discussion did occur, it 
was heavily restricted by KPRP discourse parameters and lexicon. For example, 
the Day of Anger  was a state /communist party endorsed commemoration event ,   
obligatory  for state employees and focused principally on the justification of the 
Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia. The PRK state was 
encouraging defectors from the KR throughout the 1980s. As such, KPRP policy 
                                                
13	  	  Rothany	  Srun,	  ICFC,	  Interview	  with	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  Gray	  8	  	  August	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effectively quashed  discussion around DK . 14 The pursuit of this policy 
effectively cut off all non-sanctioned  dialogue about DK. 15  The CPP continued 
with this attitude as Cambodia ‘transitioned’  in the 1990s. 
 
The second part is the way the Buddhist command to ‘let go’ of anger and leave 
justice to Karma operates  in concert with the political suppression of  discussion.   
Since the Vietnamese occupation, Cambodian religion has remained under the 
control of the Minister of Cults and Religious Affairs. The government  has 
considerable control over religious discourse in the nation and often funnels its 
interests through monks  supportive of the CPP’s interests, such as Tep Vong, the  
Great Supreme Patriarch .  
 
The third lock is the presence of the ECCC. Cadres who might make use of the 
VFKRDP process are reportedly scared that the videos will be taken to the ECCC 
and used as evidence against them.16 
  
Discourse and emerging narratives 
 
The combination of these forces has served to shut down discussions that might 
ease the co-existence of victims and former KR. However, if we examine the 
outcome of the specific VFKRDP process described earlier, it is clear that some 
space is nevertheless opened up for participants to articulate and accommodate 
their situation. The stupa represents a means by which to round off a narrative of 
the events that emerged out of the VFKRDP. It serves both the function of 
commemoration, and also of the integration of the former KR cadre back into the 
community. All are involved in a project, all work on it together, and even the 
dead are included; it is hoped that the spirits of those who died will come to 
inhabit the Stupa.17 
 
Here we have one Stupa, but it is not finished yet, it is under construction. 
It comes from the request of  the victim and cadre. They requested to build 
this Stupa because they wanted a good memory with each other. The 
problem of rancour with each other was already solved, so they want to 
                                                
14	  Impunity	  Watch,’	  Pacifying	  Vindictiveness	  By	  Not	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  Vindictive’:	  Do	  Memory	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  In	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  Have	  a	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  Utrecht,	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  (2012)	  27-­‐28	  
15 Rothany	  Srun,	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16	  Achar	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focus on good memory. Before the focus was on rancour or mental 
problems or unhappy problems of this time [the past]. So this is that they 
want to have a good memory together. This is why they chose to build the 
stupa. Mostly the cadre and the victim when they come together they 
always pray, or they invite the monk for blessing, or pray in order to 
dedicate good things for those who die in Pol Pot time. Also it’s important 
they can do good things together, the victim and the cadre. They can do it 
here.18 
 
The Achar trained by the ICFC defines the space created by the process as one 
where personal narratives intersect with the national:   
 
They will produce their own story if we make them understand clearly in 
their mind. 
 
Also, fate, destiny - sometimes I explain that it’s our national destiny.  We 
live in the country, and if the country has this event we will all suffer, the 
victim and the cadre. If the country has a problem like this  [the Khmer 
Rouge legacy] we will all have problems. 19  
 
In this process a culture is being produced:  a frame is being constructed in which 
to tell the story of the KR legacy and a collective audience is being constructed to 
hear it. It is a version of the tradition of narrative pragmatics outlined by Lyotard: 




Out of processes such as this something is created to fill the space between law 
and normative social values. It is useful here to turn back to Ehrlich’s work on 
living law. Although he never envisaged the complex   intersubjective dynamics 
of post-genocide international law in a predominantly Buddhist nation, the 
concept usefully describes the situation occurring in this small example. 21 ‘Living 
law’ can govern social life more than the codified law of courts, or the statutes of 
the state. Ehrlich contends that people do not act in a particular way or perceive 
transgression of norms purely because of the codified law. ‘Living law’ frames 
social relations between actors, and places social pressures on them even when the 
state law does not.   ‘Grandpa’ may not fall under the jurisdiction of the ECCC, 
                                                
18	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but his ostracization from the community is because of his actions during DK.  
Within   ‘living law’, ‘social norms’ are differentiated from morals or customs by 
the feelings of repulsion generated if they are transgressed, because the wider 
society sees these ‘laws’ as universal and primary.  22 23 
 
 The VFKRDP process is filling a gap in justice the ECCC does not address, that 
of the lower cadres. Their violent acts remain unremarked by the law, yet as is 
clear from the situation described in this chapter, there is a definite sense that a 
norm has been transgressed and that there has to be a way of dealing with the 
transgression. Hence the VFKRDP is not simply about memorialisation. The 
decision here to construct a stupa was made by the participants; it was a chosen 
outcome, not the aim of the project. They could have chosen some other activity, 
but decided themselves to place the dialogue within a Buddhist ceremonial genre 
of discourse.  By doing so they also created the phrase regime themselves. The 
aim of the project is to answer a justice deficit within a structured process, 
drawing on social norms with this local relevance.  As Engel and Engel point out, 
in Buddhist countries, Buddhism is the formative ontology of most people’s ‘legal 
consciousness’. 24  In the instance narrated here Buddhism is at the heart of the 
participants’ concept of justice, the basis of this society’s ‘living law’.  
 
Faced with widespread distrust of the state judiciaryand the failure at the ECCC of 
both legal liberalism and the CPP-sanctioned narrative to address the concerns of 
social actors like Grandpa, Aunt and Grandma, it is to Buddhism, the formative 
ontology of many, that they are likely to turn. 25  Increasingly visible in Cambodia 
through events such as the VFKRDP process is what could be described as a 
Buddhist way to deal with questions of Justice after mass atrocity, in institutions 
and discourses recognised locally as having authority, which assume many of the 
roles of a court system in resolving conflict and dispute.   An emerging body of 
literature addresses what can be labelled ‘Buddhist Jurisprudence’. Rebecca 
French, Andrew Huxleyand David and Jaruwan Engelall discuss how systems 
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rooted in Buddhist philosophy, discourse and semiotics answer questions of 
justice that would be seen as ‘legal issues’ in European societies. 26  27 28 
 
This is particularly apt given that the ‘facilitator’ left by the ICFC takes on the 
role of solving civil disputes on non-KR related legal issues: 
 
The NGO taught us two kinds of lesson. The first is the conflict inside 
human beings; the second is the outer conflict. Mostly they focused on the 
Khmer Rouge, but now they focus on the people who have the problem in 
their heart, are unhappy in their mind, or keep the spirit of anger.  
 
The second, outer conflict is like a normal conflict happening outside the 
body, like a property conflict or something like that, and we take the good 
way or technique to solve it. 
 
 I use this strategy to solve conflicts between two families. For example, in 
my community they had a land dispute. But justice’s real meaning is it is 
right and acceptable, and people understand it this way: acceptable 
agreement between two parties. Acceptable between the two parties who 
have conflict with each other, and if we work as facilitator both sides 
accept what we explain to them why.  
 
 One family wanted the other family’s land; so I explained to them how to 
stop their conflict.  It took a long time, even as a normal conflict 
facilitator. Mostly when working on Khmer Rouge Victim and Cadre, we 
focus on mind with each other.  But in normal conflict we won’t use this 
technique all the time.  For example, we have used it with domestic 
violence and fighting.   But with some criminal acts … such as stealing or 
destroying another’s property, we may try to use the facilitation, but 
mostly we will use the National Law .We will use the normal law in 
criminal cases, but using the facilitation as well.  For example, in 
domestic violence, those peoples’ minds are still cruel, and I will take the 
Buddhist strategies to stop them; but for the actual crime I will call on the 
law, to warn that person not to do the crime again. 29 
 
 
This is an example of the central point of ‘Buddhist jurisprudence’:  that a case is 
never resolved until both parties are at peace with its decision. French argues that 
ultimately the departure of both parties in a calm state of mind is the true ‘end 
point’ of the process  - not shutting down the case to the point where there is no 
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further avenue of appeal (such as a supreme court). 30 Rather, the process sees 
itself as part of a Karmic cycle: letting go of anger releases the plaintiff from the 
cycle of revenge, which would otherwise continue.  
 
 
The notion of a local means of dealing with such issues can make jurists at the 
ECCC uncomfortable: 
 
Karma presents a challenge of total impunity for any form of criminal act 
that may be carried out. Now that is abhorrent to us involved in 
international law; it is inconsistent with the interest of the international 
community as a whole, and it’s also abhorrent to the interest of Human 
Rights and the assertion of human rights, and the rights and protection of 
the Geneva Conventions. Whilst this may be a Buddhist country, it has 
entered into numerous treaties, which may or may not be consistent with 
Buddhist concepts, but they [politicians] have determined to be bound by 
them. 
 
I have worked in customary law with ‘elders.’ It will often be an accepted 
manner of resolution, if you have got a chiefly system. They know their 
community, they know what’s going on, and if they can resolve the matter 
in a suitable way then it’s a recognised way, in formalistic legal systems, 
in respect to civil disputes. In respect of criminal matters it is not. This is 
about the justice that you can afford. If you are going to apply 
humanitarian law to humanity, then it must be done in an equal manner. It 
is not appropriate to say, ‘We in the west are more civilised so we will 
deal with it this way, but sorry, you’re in Asia or Africa, we are not going 
to assist you, so we have a western standard which we apply to ourselves 
and then we have a standard which we apply to everyone else.’  Although 
here there is nothing stopping the state in dealing with matters … yet in 
the wake of mass atrocity crimes, the states are shattered or failed states.  
If it is an internal conflict it’s going to be worse, as animosities will 
continue to exist  - so they can’t do it themselves. There may be lack of 
political will or just no funding and no ability.31 
 
Judge Downing is correct in saying the ECCC was a compromise.  The 
widespread impunity it permits is a compromise, dictated by lack of both funds 
and political will. It is ‘the justice that you can afford’.  But the VFKRDP 
process, while it can deal with some of the justice deficits created, is not suitable 
for cases of mass killings (Cases 003 and 004 for example). It is also important 
not to romanticise legal liberalism or Buddhist jurisprudence.  The ECCC’s gaps 
are vast and problematic. Buddhist discourse is also inadequate by itself to deal 
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with mass killing; the moral demands it makes on its subjects can result in the 
repression of anger, rather than calming the mind. 
 
The VFKRDP process does address these problems: it fills the ECCC gaps, 
answers Lyotard’s concerns and provides an ethical system of justice whereby 
those silenced / excluded by the dominant discourses and processes (ECCC) find 
a language to narrate their story and have their concerns addressed in a discourse 
of their choosing. 32  It also provides a secular framework within which individual 
participants can relate the transcendental imperative of Buddhism to let go of 
anger to negotiation with former enemies in a specific context.  
 
This process is much more ‘of’ the society, than ‘of’ an institutional imposition 
from international actors.  This small chapter has shown one example of  ‘justice’ 
radically differently viewed and enacted.  While clearly an inappropriate forum to 
deal with figures such as Nuon Chea, the VFKRDP highlights a discursive need 
among survivors of the regime to discuss it in a genre of discourse /phrase regime 
that the legal institutions cannot (or perhaps do not care to) offer. I move in the 
next chapter from ‘living law’ narratives to representation and ceremonial 
discourse – different genres of discourse and different phrase regimes, in which 
justice is nevertheless narrated.  
                                                





Chapter Five: Contained narrations  
 
Introduction  
The previous chapter focused on one process through which the KR past can be 
discussed in a genre of discourse less restricting than formal legal mechanisms. 
However, the issues in the VFKRDP were   specific to one community and one 
group of people. In the next two chapters I examine streams of narration  
‘alternative’ to those generated in the legal process, and how they express the 
experience and history of DK in the broader context of the Cambodian intellectual 
tradition. 
 
The structure of this chapter could be described as moving from internal to 
external experience, or from private to public.  It begins with the problem 
survivors have in finding language to articulate the experience of DK and goes on 
to explore both populist and academic readings of Cambodian Buddhism (which 
contains some highly localized elements, not found in other Buddhist nations. I 
indicate when this is relevant).  Its phrases, lexicon and mythos offer a context in 
which both victims and KR can situate their narratives to achieve a measure of 
healing and reconciliation. The chapter moves on to more publicly articulated 
narratives of justice and transition – testimonial therapy, ceremonies of 
remembrance. This progresses to a study of activist and socially engaged 
narratives, such as the Buddhist Peace walks. These interact with others - 
narratives of NGOs and funding, and, ultimately, with the dominant political 
discourse. I show Buddhist processes and discourse appropriated by the narrative 
frames of political and economic actors, both domestic and foreign. 
  
Appropriations have the effect of constraining the narratives, as distinct from 
cultural interaction, in which multiple cultures, ideas, philosophies fluidly 
encounter in dynamic dialectic. In appropriations, one culture has power over 
another. For example, an international organisation can utilize a local Buddhist 
discourse while still maintaining a framework whereby the local voice is subject 
to constraints.   These constraints, more obvious in these public narratives, must 
be read against a wider backdrop.  For while this chapter begins with internal 
convictions about representation and narratives which site the individual in 
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relation to the sacred, every narrative here has a political dimension.   What 
distinguishes those in this chapter from those in the next is that they are contained 
within the ‘official’ discourses of the court and the RGC, rather than being in 
direct conflict with them.  
 
Expressing the inexpressible 
 
The work of Holocaust scholar Lawrence Langer is marked by deep pessimism. 
After studying hours of archived footage of Jewish Holocaust survivor testimony, 
he concludes that, despite what comes after  (family, children and ‘normal life’) 
victims are forever bound to the ‘deep, anguished, humiliated, tainted, unheroic 
memory’ of that period of their lives. Langer identifies a major problem in 
survivors’ capacity to recount their stories, one I see in Cambodia today. How can 
a person ultimately express what they saw? How do words encapsulate watching 
one’s entire family killed?  Langer discusses the struggles of one woman to 
verbalise her experience:  
 
 ‘My entire family were killed’, was totally inadequate because “killed” … 
was a word for ordinary forms of dying. ‘ My mother and brother, and two 
sisters were gassed’, seemed equally unsatisfactory, because the plain 
faculty could not convey the enormity of the event. She was reluctant to 
reduce her family’s disappearance to a mere statistic because she was sure 
that was how her audience wanted to hear about it.1  
 
The experience is unshareable; the individual’s capacity to testify is exasperated 
to the point of silence; because words fail, the teller gives up.2  
 
A   parallel problem is the concern that the person(s) to whom the testimony is 
recounted will not believe or understand.   Indeed survivors of atrocity themselves 
say they would find it hard to believe such stories.  ‘The seeds of anguished 
memory are sown in the barren belief that the very story you try to tell drives off 
the audience you seek to capture.’3 In the words of one survivor:   
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‘If somebody would tell me this story, I would say,“She's lying.” Because 
this can't be true . . .. Because to understand us, somebody has to go 
through with it. Because nobody, but nobody fully understands us.’4 
 
One senior Cambodian monk/ academic I interviewed described  encounters with 
foreigners  curious about DK:  
 
Cambodia is a very special case;  foreigners find  it very hard to 
understand. However much you hear , how much you read, it’s still not 
like you ever experienced the situation. It was completely different, and 
there has never been perhaps anything like this in the history of humanity.  
To foreigners now  it [the situation of stability in the country] seems  
normal , but ten years back , when foreigners come and meet , they always 
have questions to us, and they will never understand, no matter how much 
we try to explain. I have come across this  situation quite a lot in my stays 
abroad for  my studies . They ask, ‘ Who are the Khmer Rouge?’ We say, 
‘They were Cambodians.’  ‘But how can Buddhists kill Cambodian people 
and destroy Buddhism?’ 
 
You see , you can’t explain. One thing… it was so shameful in a sense, it’s 
shameful for Cambodian people themselves, and at the same time it has 
much intricacy and mysterious things , so it is difficult for foreigners to 
understand ,  and these aspects that are unique , that have never really 
existed in the history of humanity.   
 
 Cambodian Buddhists suffered so much . In the words of Preah Maha 
Ghosananda [Peace Walks Monk], ‘The suffering of the Cambodian 
people  is deep, very deep  and deep. And  from this deep suffering springs 
their compassion and from  compassion springs the reconciliation and 
peace.’ 5 
  
Langer and the narrator  quoted above  identify a Differend  in the sense of ‘the 
unstable state of language wherein something which must be able to be put into 
phrases cannot yet be’ - a point at which Lyotard considers it politically vital to 
search for ways of shaping and linking phrases. 6  In exploring  how the  challenge 
is  addressed,  I start with the concept of anthroposemiosis outlined in  E. 
Valentine Daniel’s essay ‘Mood, Moment and Mind’. 7 Daniel defines 
anthroposemiosis as an entirely selfconscious  process of communication through 
signs - as distinct   from the way  beasts communicate, unaware of a process at 
work  (zooosemiosis).  We do not simply know that we are communicating, we 
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are conscious and aware of being communicative . This  defines us as human.  
Participation in any language event ( spoken, physical or performed action) means 
one enters into a discursive community.  
 
Lyotard notes that silence is a ‘negative phrase’.8 But I suggest that in an  
anthroposemiotic context,  silence is flexible and expressive, performing several 
possible meanings .  It can be a means of withholding knowledge ; however , it 
can also call attention to an inadequacy in language and  assert the Differend;  or 
enact a drastic withdrawal from the anthroposemiotic process , a refusal to be 
human or  acknowledge the humanity of others. There are a series of ways by 
which people can engage in anthroposemiotic communication and I would push 
Lyotard’s analysis further to  contend that anthroposemiosis  is in itself a genre of 
discourse,  in which the chief criterion for the linkage of phrases is the 
empowerment of a performative assertion of the speaker’s humanity. This is 
especially  important when confronting  Langer’s challenge , the difficulty people 
have  expressing horrific memories. If words fail to express what the 
communicator desires to say, other forms of language become vital. Taking his 
cue from C.S. Peirce’s key work on semiotics distinguishing icon ,index and 
symbol, Daniel devises the following categories through which anthroposemiotic 
communication occurs. 9 I would  argue that all of these are phrase regimes, 
falling within Lyotard’s model .  They  offer  useful subdivisions that provide me 
with a method of  framing some of the ways  DK is   narrated.  
 
Representational language - language literally re-presenting what it describes - is 
the denotative  phrase regime courts require :  descriptive testimony supposed to 
account verbally for what was said/seen . At the other end of Valentine Daniel’s 
scale   is Genealogical communication, which  recognizes other forms of verbal 
and non- verbal expression( for example, ritual, storytelling, song, prayer, 
metaphor).  Such discourses are often quashed  by institutions if they do not fit 
their genres of discourse , in favour of written/spoken accounts that fit more easily 
within their parameters.  Representational  language relegates  ‘subaltern’ 
narratives to the margin because their phrases do not link into the genres of law,  
academia, or  politics.   But those discursive parameters are inadequate for 
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discussing issues  beyond the realms of normal comprehension  exemplified by 
Langer’s  witness, the territory of the Differend. 10 Genealogical language permits 
a ‘choice of voice’ by the individual: 11 a voice which facilitates the speaker’s 
agency rather than being infused by meta-narratives, a voice which might perform 
a task such as addressing a dead relative  even if it does not fit the dominant 
paradigm. 12 
 
Between these forms at either end of the scale lie two others: one Daniel labels 
Constitutive language, which acknowledges that language can represent, but not 
entirely, and that meaning must be tacitly negotiated within a specific genre of 
discourse. The other, Expressive language, attempts to harmonize representational 
and constitutive language to convey both ontological reality and epistemological 
thought. This admits cultural nuance and acknowledges that to express one’s story 
is to recall and transmit from ‘the ruins of memory’. 
 
 
Realism and representation 
 
The importance of care in negotiating such borderlines is shown through the 
paintings of Vann Nath and the narratives of Sum Rithy. Like Bou Meng, Vann 
Nath was a professional artist imprisoned at S-21.13 He survived because of his 
skill. Duch needed artists to produce giant pictures of Pol Pot. In S-21 Vann Nath 
worked at replicating hundreds of times the photograph of this man, whose 
identity was then unknown to him.  Upon leaving S-21 years later, Vann Nath 
produced graphically realistic pictures of the tortures he had witnessed at first 
hand. 
 
Sum Rithy, like Vann Nath, feels a need and desire to tell the story to the world. 
He views documentation as vital, so those who hear his story can believe it really 
happened; he has commissioned pictures to augment his verbal narrative.  Sum 
Rithy and Vann Nath have both discussed the purpose of the pictures showing 
their experience. 14  It is not  ‘Art’:  they are not designed to act as an expression 
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of a mood, or an impression of an event; indeed I feel that they would be insulted 
if these works were described as ‘artistic’.  Vann Nath does produce pictures 
intended as art; but his paintings of torture and murder, like those commissioned 
by Sum Rithy, are iconic, not symbolic, representations. They take the place of 
photos or live footage of the events. Sum Rithy says the point of the pictures he 
commissioned is to document the crime for posterity. In some ways there is a 
disjunction between the desire to represent as literally as possible (a photograph 
or film would be ideal) and a form like painting.15 Both men would prefer to show 
their addressee a photograph, to say, ‘Look, see, here is the proof of what I tell 
you.’  A photo would be in this sense more ‘real’. 
 
 
The stupa in the village had a painted mural, which the Achar, trained by the 
ICFC as a facilitator, discussed with me (see plates: 1-5): 
 
Tallyn Gray: Who decided on the design and mural on the back? 
 
Achar 1: The community.  The picture is the real activity of the people in 
the Khmer Rouge time and is happening in this location. The place they 
killed the people was in the temple [Points to the temple behind us] in the 
middle of the picture.  After Pol Pot the temple still had many scars and 
bruises inside, but now they fix everything so you can’t see [bullet holes 
shown on the depiction of the temple on the mural]. Everything [in the 
mural] is a hundred per cent the same to the Pol Pot time. Many location, 
like grave, like monastery, the activity, the trees and everything, is exactly 
the same. 
 
TG: Is this picture then what people have remembered and asked to be put 
on the mural?  
 
A1: Yes. People from the community, they remembered it.16 
 
 In a country without mass circulation of photographs and videos, painted forms 
have to traverse representational and genealogical forms of communication - 
sometimes to the frustration of survivors who would prefer to show a movie or a 
photo. There is a very evident desire to express in literal, representational phrases 
– even, as here, on a site of memorialization. Many of my narrators were 
concerned with the need for representational ‘proof’, in particular those engaged 
in discussing the DK period with the generation born after 1979, who do not 
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believe it was as bad as their elders say. (I discuss this  more fully in Chapter 
Seven. ) The stress they place  on ‘exactness’ or ‘one-hundred per cent’ accuracy 
emphasizes that the pictures  have a function analogous to that of a photofit (E-
fit), where the concern is for accuracy in the  service of criminal evidence. 
 
This is by no means to discount the genealogical . A poem/ picture/ ceremony is 
useful. It is clear that  images conveying an impressionistic, poetic or creative 
reading  of the time are  not unwelcome.  Their  absence would  be a huge gap . 
But the desire  is for a double discourse whereby literal, representational phrases 
can act and link  with  genealogical ones – a  fluid dialectic somewhere within 
Daniel’s phrase regimes. Thus there is a desire for a complex variety of means by 
which to convey the unspeakable - including  means that are inadequate to the 
task by themselves. For example, to  return  briefly to the structuralist view of 
narrative,  one can define a paradox in how people wish to narrate their own 
stories. From the VFKDP it can be seen that between Grandma and Grandpa   a 
negotiation was in process over events during DK, which established a baseline 
(fabula) of events on which they could  both agree.  Engaging  in a process of 
fabula (re)construction, they were also engaging in a process of re-telling - a 
sjuzhet - in  genealogical and representational phrases helpful to them both : 
Buddhist ritual and the construction of a stupa.      
 
Thus it would be false to dismiss the literalist/ representational  phrases   favoured 
by the ECCC and NGOs as ‘western’ and unable to link with those of  Cambodia 
at any point . Over numerous interviews it was an  emergent theme  that it  is  the  
‘officialness’ of the ECCC process that makes it more legitimate. It would be 
false (and patronizing) to argue that the Cambodian mode of communication is 
rooted solely in one tradition and that they are unable to comprehend or work 
within another (or have no desire to do so). The  representational  language sought 
by Cambodians , the desire to show pictures ‘a hundred per cent the same’ ,makes 
this plain. 
 
The need for  representational forms is perhaps a product of the thirty-year gap 
before any institution with the scope, capacity, (inter)national visibility and 
money of the ECCC. Langer’s source,who stated that she could not express what 
happened, spoke despite the vast quantity of documentation about the 
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Holocaust.17 After the Holocaust many Jews had reserves to evidence their 
suffering which Cambodians lacked, and perhaps feel they lack still . While there 
are  detailed and complex records at S-21, it was only one of hundreds of killing 
sites  considerably less well documented, some no longer even visible. Sum 
Rithy’s prison in Siem Reap is now a site of shopping centres, malls and spas in a 
tourist town. 18  The Nuremberg trials ensued soon after the end of the Nazi 
regime.  Following  this  memories of the Shoah could be deposited in cultural 
institutions - especially after the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. 
Cambodia’s ongoing war, the Soviet-backed Vietnamese government, and  
genuine fear of a KR return to power, afforded no space to deposit memory or 
cultural and historical knowledge. Alternative narration was shut down if it failed 
to fit the narrative restrictions of the Soviet/Vietnamese state version of events,  
and has subsequently been restricted by the CPP’s desire to limit the story. The 
attempt of survivors to represent what they endured is an attempt to reinscribe 
themselves and their experience on their nation’s history,  especially as younger 
people forget, and the physicality of it literally decays or is built over.  I now turn 
to those modes by which the story of this era is narrated and interpreted  
specifically informed by the Cambodian intellectual tradition.  
 
Buddhist narratives : subjectivity and justice  
 
Most of my monk-narrators say they employ  Buddhist stories with people with 
concerns about KR issues, making direct links between experiences under DK and  
these ‘geneaological’ Buddhist stories.  Three were mentioned as frequently told 
to link the personal narratives of lay people who come to them to a Buddhist 
ideal. I will look at each in turn.  
 
Ven. 14 explains how stories are used : 
 
The young monks we ordained in the late 1980s and early 1990s have 
contributed quite a lot to the rebuilding process and the reconciliation in 
many ways. Buddhist temples were still  centres for the widows and 
orphans of the war, especially the children whose parents were killed 
during the Khmer Rouge and the civil war.  
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These bereft women found solace in the temples, and shelter in the 
temples,  and asked for guidance from the monks. If you are a grieving 
widow or suffering, if you can speak out, that’s one way to find relief. 
These women found the most sympathetic ears at the monasteries . So they 
expressed their suffering and their deprivation of their loved ones and 
parents and their husbands, children, brothers and sisters. So we are ... 
the monks were lending them sympathetic ears and provided consultation, 
guidance, counselling (not in the western sense though). But in general, 
we take the example from the Buddhist texts, epics and teachings to 
comfort them. Mostly we take the story of Patacara.19 
 
 
The story of Princess Patacara;  
 
Patacara eloped with a servant in the household and bore his children.  
She wanted to return to her parents to show them her children. She and 
her husband and children journeyed through a forest back to Patacara’s 
parents' house. On the journey her husband was bitten by a snake and 
died. 
 
Thus with the new baby and her older child she carried on, wanting to 
reach her parents. She had to cross a river and could not in her weakened 
state carry the children across; she put the oldest on one bank and carried 
the new one across. As she was coming back over to get the other (leaving 
the one on the other side) an eagle came and took the baby. The older son, 
thinking his mother was calling him, fell in the river and drowned. She 
carried on to her parents’ house desperately, but on her arrival 
discovered that her parents and siblings had died in a storm during her 
absence. 
 
After the loss of her husband and children she went mad with grief, 
running from village to village, naked and deranged.   She was brought to 
the Buddha. Buddha explained to her the nature of impermanence. She 
became a nun and attained Arhat (enlightenment and Nirvana) She 
became free. This was her last life. 
 
Ven.14 continues:   
 
We used to cite this story, the point being that so much suffering like 
Patacara’s could still find relief and freedom in the noble teaching of the 
Buddha. So we use these stories to comfort the Cambodian women, to 
assist them to gain the strength to move on.  Some women here in 
Cambodia also lost everything, and had no family. Almost every family 
lost a member but some lost everyone  - no husband, children, relative, 
just alone. Patacara was mad – so we tried to comfort them, gave them 
shelter in temple.  So reconciliation is not just about dealing with armed 
conflicts. 
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The armed conflicts finished in 1998. In 1993 there was a UN sponsored 
election, but even at that time the war was not ended. Some KR factions 
didn’t join; then there was fighting in 1997 in Phnom Penh and some 
factions went to the forest again to take up arms. And there was fighting 
for some months, and they joined forces with the KR again.   And finally 
and thankfully the armed conflicts came to a complete end in 1998. But 
still the consequences of the KR and the civil war were blatant 
everywhere. Now you travel in Cambodia and you hardly see this, but it’s 
there in the memory of the people, and deep in the society there still. 
Institutions and traditions were destroyed- so when we re-established 
these things, they still feel the effect; and the biggest felt impact is what 
happened with Buddhism and the institutions. 20 
 
 
The use of such stories can be compared to the practice of Bruno Bettelheimin 
using European folk stories to assist disturbed children. 21 Bettelheim argued that 
traditional stories allowed his subjects to project into the role of protagonist; they 
helped them come to terms with subconscious drives concerning their place in the 
family or their emerging sexuality, within the grotesque and violent frames of 
stories that nevertheless turn out well for the central figure. By contrast the use of 
Buddhist stories of the kind Ven. 14 tells helps victims make sense of individual 
and collective trauma by applying their own experiences to the Buddhist 
cosmological ordering of the universe and the Dharma cycle.  Stories of violence 
transform into order and peace of mind. The act of listening is anthroposemiotic, a 
participation in meaningful dialogue between moral ideals and moral order in face 
of moral collapse and widespread violence; it reclaims and reasserts the humanity 
of the victim. In these narratives one relates not to an idealized world where 
things turn out well for the vulnerable, but to the world as it is.  This feature 
Chandler identifies in Khmer folk stories in general. 22  Here, with Buddhist 
worldviews at their ontological heart, the juxtaposition of the stories with the 
reality of victims’ experience constitutes a linkage between Daniel’s ‘expressive’ 
phrase regime and the discourse of Buddhism. The link is possible because there 
is no attempt by the larger genre of discourse to prescribe a course of action that 
burdens the sufferer.  Patacara  has a miserable life but nevertheless finds the 
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means to escape the cycle of misery; her story reflects the catastrophic loss most 
of the population have encountered; in the realm of the expressive they find a link. 
 
In  terms of justice this story says little . Patacara’s catastrophes were not a result 
of something  done to her , or the result of her doing something . Ven 14’s telling 
even plays down any causal link between   defying her parents and her fate. The 
snake, eagles, river, and storm are not manifestations of Karma or divine design, 
but show that life is suffering.  In placing experience into a narratological frame, 
the story lays a foundation to deal with the effects of injustice.  However, it does 
not address the question of responsibility.  As many of my narrators stated, there 
were persons who made a conscious decision to kill, to torture, to inflict suffering. 
To deal with that dynamic monks tell other stories, about justice and the desire for 
revenge  - frequently this: 
 
The Lady and the Ogress23 
 
A man greatly desired a baby, but his wife was barren. Fearing that he 
would leave her, the wife decided that her husband should have a child by 
another woman. However, she again grew fearful of the consequence of 
this. So each time the husband’s mistress became pregnant the wife would 
drug her food, so that the mistress would miscarry. After several times the 
mistress figured out what was happening; but by this point the wife had 
administered so much poison to her that the mistress died. On her 
deathbed, the mistress swore vengeance on the wife in another life. 
Throughout many incarnations as animals (a cat and a hen, a tiger and a 
deer etc.) the women perpetually sought out the other so as to kill each 
other’s children. Eventually they were reborn, one as an aristocratic lady, 
the other as an ogress. The ogress went to eat the lady’s baby. The lady 
ran to the Buddha and begged him to protect her child.  The Buddha 
explained to both the lady and the ogress that they had been chasing each 
other for centuries, doing the same thing again and again. The suffering 
they inflicted on each other would continue unless they renounced this 
now, and forgave each other, thus breaking the cycle of perpetual 
vengeance and killing. 
 
This story relates to the past and the future, as one monk explained:  
 
Prisoners such as those at Tuol Sleng, even though they have done nothing 
bad in this life, still received torture and bad things in this life. When 
discussing justice for those people, we should explain to them that these 
actions could be due to actions in the previous life done to those 
wrongdoers [who recently tortured them]. And also we have to look at our 
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families:  maybe our fathers and mother have done wrong things to those 
wrongdoers, and those wrongdoers do bad back. So if we keep thinking, ’I 
have done nothing wrong, but you hit me, you torture me’, we will have 
anger with the person torturing us, and if we stay thinking like this we 
need to forgive and forget about the wrongdoer doing a wrong thing to 
us.24 
This appears on the surface to blame individuals for abuses against them  - grim, 
but not without  ‘meaning,’ in that suffering is placed in a context which makes it 
comprehensible; this is an inference opposite to that drawn from Langer’s 
‘unheroic memory.’ 25 He argues that those who never experienced it inscribe the 
Holocaust with meanings; no happy endings or ‘closure’ can or should be drawn. 
Doing so makes the Holocaust a ‘feel-good’ Hollywood story of  ‘the triumph of 
the human spirit’, de-emphasising the mindlessness of its violence, the 
hopelessness of its victims and the sadism of its perpetrators. There is no heroism 
in the stories of mass violence, simply an exposure of the failure of humanity and 
the human condition.  Buddhism’s narrative of Karma is not a source of 
therapeutic notions of  ‘comfort’ but a frame in which to articulate a story to 
configure one’s identity and locate oneself in a cosmological order. It does not 
attribute a phoney ‘meaning’ to suffering but enables one to avoid being trapped 
/disabled by the past. Langer points out that survivors will never be truly freed 
from their experience (or wish to be - this would risk forgetting it). However, he 
too distinguishes between forgetting experience and being permanently disabled 
by it; dealing with the latter is both feasible and necessary.26 
 
Ven. 6, who lived in Paris at the time of DK, explains the concept of living in the 
moment and not being bound into the past:  
 
The past is past; looking to the future, we must learn, but we do not 
need revenge, to add more and more suffering. We cannot do well 
with hatred and anger; we need to do better… why attach to one, 
to possess something? Attachment is a cause of suffering. Craving 
and attachment, clinging, we should liberate from these things. 
Anger, if it presents itself in the mind, we take only mental notice, 
only arising and then falling away without participation or 
attachment.  We just observe and notice, stop and let go. This is the 
method to finish with everything in the mind - just make mental 
notice of each instance where this feeling arises, and falls away- 
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usually immediately.  When we are a neutral observer, we can 
notice and see impartially as a neutral observer of these emotions 
– to live in the present moment, live here, now, this: in the present 
moment/action. To cope with their suffering they should know what 
is suffering. What’s its cause? When Buddha reached 
enlightenment he discovered four noble truths: suffering, cause of 
suffering, the cessation of suffering, the way leading to the 




Karma is a narratological device by which people situate themselves in time – 
unreality and impermanence, and the eventual attainment of Nirvana; in this frame 
they can develop the ability to see the past as past and not to dwell in it. In this 
context Nirvana can be seen as providing ‘closure’ in both forms of mental/textual 
process and as an ‘end’ of the Buddhist master ‘text’. Unlike Abrahamic religions, 
Buddhist thought does not provide mythic explanations for existence.   There are 
no creation myths or prophecies of end times.  The ‘universe’, time and Karma are 
narratological constructs through which timelessness is made accessible. Nirvana 
does not depend on the existence of the universe: the universe, time, existence, are 
narrative frameworks which contain the idea of Nirvana. Stories such as The Lady 
and the Ogress are not literal descriptions of reality, but simple ways to grasp 
Buddhist concepts through the use of chronological and classificatory systems to 
emplot existence in a sequential narrative. 28 The Lady and the Ogress is not 
readable as a heroic tale about the redemption of the human spirit. It can be seen 
as story of Karma manifesting itself in an extremely violent way. However there 
is another way to read it: that by taking revenge, you become like the one 
inflicting it on you, and that by breaking the cycle of violence the individual 
releases both self and enemy from a perpetual cycle of destruction.  
 
This returns to the ‘Buddhist jurisprudence’ discussed in the previous chapter.29 
Its ‘end point’ of ‘justice’ is   a calmed mind – not retribution or exoneration – 
and a past no longer   plaguing the present. Attachment to that pain is over for the 
individual, who aims to be liberated from all attachments that hinder 
enlightenment. Buddhist jurisprudence in this sense creates a metaphorical 
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narrative framework and a process to understand non-temporal concepts of a 
higher order. 
 
Conceptions of Karma 
 
To understand reconciliation in Cambodia awareness of Karma is vital.  The 
concept of Karma has kept the aspiration of justice alive in many people’s minds, 
especially those who have found the ‘legal’ processes alien, aloof, politicised, 
failed, farcical or unsatisfactory. Sophal Ear, who is critical of the ECCC , 
describes its meaning for his mother: 
 
As an observant Buddhist,  my mother probably had the last word. She 
always said that, no matter what happened to the Khmer Rouge leadership 
in their current lifetime, Karmic justice would prevail in the next.  They 
would be reborn as cockroaches. I am certain that this belief has helped 
millions of survivors cope … after more than three decades since the fall 
of the Khmer Rouge.30 
 
Despite the failings of earthly justice, many Cambodians trust there will not be 
eternal impunity for the crimes committed against them. This is not to say that the 
Buddhist answer to impunity is ‘eye for an eye’ retribution . Rather, it recognises 
that  experience does not happen in a  vacuum . In Khmer folk stories , villains 
often end up enjoying the profits of their crimes, while their victims remain  
miserable ; this  highlights the point that while present existence may be fraught 
with injustice and unfairness, in the wider context of Karma and merit both parties 
harvest the fruits of their actions ; immediate punishment is less important.31 This 
idea is particularly resonant for people seeing former cadres lead affluent, 
successful lives -  even occupying senior posts in the current government - while 
their victims cannot discuss this situation for fear  of repercussions .  As TPO 
therapist Taing Hum says, ‘The victim cannot say something, but is kept silent’.  32 
 
Again, I  stress I am discussing popular ideas within the framework of Khmer 
Buddhist thought, not making theological arguments.  Rather, I am exploring the  
deep roots  of a religious orientation in the cultural life of the community I study, 
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and how some of my narrators  understand the concepts in light of their lived 
reality. Some Buddhist scholars  may feel this analysis is  more social and cultural 
than theological or philosophical – yet  this thesis explicitly sets out to theorize 
through social actors  not religious texts. I look at Buddhism here  to understand 
how people come to the notion of justice in their own critical, cultural and 
imaginative frameworks. It is also important to note that though philosophy may 
state something to be the case, human beings are not singleminded in their 
outlook.  Other factors and ideas (such as a belief in legal liberalism) impact 
equally on the critical frames they employ to analyse their situation: 
 
Of course the Monks and Buddhism helped to educate the people and the 
families of the victims of the Pol Pot time . But for me, whenever I go to 
the temple or the ceremony,  I will make a contribution to the beggars to 
relieve their suffering, I will give them food. I am a painter at the Buddhist 
Monastery .  I paint the  murals of the Buddha stories – so I know all the 
stories.  Buddhist religion is believed by many of the Khmer people . But 
for me,  I believe in what I do more than the Buddhist teachings . But I will 
always go to the ceremonies and rituals . I believe that when you die you 
die. I don’t believe you can come back or will be born again – the natural 
law , but …People will not be the same spirit again . For example I do not 
think people will be reborn. I only believe in one life,   not past or future 
lives.  
 
But I’m Khmer.  Buddhism is part of my culture , as my mother and father 
were Buddhist,  like a Khmer . But I don’t believe in  rebirth.  
 
…I gave all to the ECCC.  I was  a witness in front of Judge Nil Nonn 
[President of the ECCC trial chamber] and my expectation was there 
would be justice. The court should put them … for their whole life in the 
jail. 33 
 
This statement is revealing.  For Bou Meng Karma is not a reality,  although he 
still values the tradition of Buddhism. Conversely he feels the framework of the 
ECCC offers potential for justice ; his expectations lie within  the operations of 
earthly justice and legal liberalism .  
 
A more nuanced story about  crime , punishment and a violent killer , Angulimala,  
is cited again and again by the monks .     
 
Angulimala’s Story  
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Angulimala had killed 999 people; he was told that if he killed 1,000 
people he would be the most prolific killer in history. Angulimala decided 
to kill his mother as his thousandth victim, but upon coming across 
Buddha changed his mind and decided to kill Buddha instead. Angulimala 
frantically ran after Buddha. Yet despite Angulimala running as fast as he 
could,  he was unable to catch up with Buddha, who was walking at 
normal speed. Buddha had willed a mental power over Angulimala. 
Angulimala called after Buddha, demanding that he stop. Buddha 
explained that he had already stopped and told Angulimala to do the 
same. This statement confused Angulimala. Buddha explained that by 
renouncing the killing of all living things he had stopped, unlike 
Angulimala who was obsessed with killing and thus  would never be able 
to stop. 
 
Angulimala became a monk and a good man, yet people were still afraid 
of him. Part of a monk’s life is the collection of alms - in this way they get 
the food they need. Yet when Angulimala went out to collect alms people 
fled in fear  when they saw him approach, knowing his reputation as a 
killer. Angulimala acknowledged to Buddha that this was inevitable given 
his past actions. Buddha told Angulimala that he had created so much 
suffering,  and that people shunning him was part of the fruits of his karma 
he was now reaping for his past actions. 
 
Every day , Angulimala went out to collect alms . Every day he was 
shunned and not given food and people attacked him, as in his present 
position as a monk they realized he would not retaliate.The King came to 
Buddha to seek his blessing to kill Angulimala. Buddha asked the king,  
‘Would you kill him if he were dressed as a monk?’  The King said 
yes.’But’, reasoned the Buddha, ‘if someone is a monk they are a peaceful 
person. Would you kill a peaceful person?’ The king said no. Buddha 
explained that the king had to see Angulimala in the present moment. 
Buddhism is a way of changing and improving from moment to moment.34 
 
This story is applicable to former cadres, some of whom are deeply concerned 
about their own Karma, like the cadre quoted earlier : 
 
  Before I feel very, very fear [about his Karma], but I also do good things. 
Whenever I go to any Wat, I dedicate food or money to those spirits and 
confess to the Buddha statue, ‘Forgive me because I was ordered to by 
someone else.’  I do this because I have no willingness to do- but even so I 
still do wrong - I hit the people, I kick the people . I still have a mistake, 
but for now I’m not so much afraid of this. I was forced to work  [doing 
human rights abuses]. 35 
 
The Angulimala story places former KR into a cosmological and narratological 
framework which allows them to construe their own behaviour  : that while they 
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will face punishment for their crimes, punishment is not the end of their personal 
narrative.  
 
The concept of Karma, in populist or more developed form, can raise highly 
problematic issues for universalist notions of justice and human rights. Not only, 
as Judge Downing notes, does the possibility of resolution later in the Karmic 
cycle imply ‘total impunity for any form of criminal act that may be carried 
out’on earth, but it could also be seen as a reason for victims not pressing for 
justice in the secular legal system as they see their sufferings as Karma.36 There is 
no word for ‘rights’ in the Khmer Theravada Buddhist lexicon. 37  Karma as the 
source of personal suffering is stressed over any external source, such as the 
failure of government policy. 38 
 
Ceremony as Performed Narrative 
 
Ceremony and ritual provide a means by which testimonies can be recounted, 
ECCC gaps filled and memorialization initiatives enabled. The previous chapter 
bridged the section on ‘trials/legal processes’ and   the participants’ chosen way to 
involve religious discourse into the Victim-Former Khmer Rouge Dialogue 
Project.  The VKRDP’s achievement placed itself within gaps, not only in the 
legal and political processes of the ECCC, but also gaps at an ontological level  – 
the failings of any legal system in addressing the abominations of mass atrocity 
events. The VFKRDP attempts something more complex than a formal court can 
achieve, in that, aside from the truth-telling function it shares with the trial 
process, it must, as part of its restorative function, go beyond blame and 
punishment. What was unique about the VFKRDP, as discussed previously, was 
its inclusion of former cadres. While I have met former KR willing to engage with 
younger people, or even appear in documentary films to discuss their roles in the 
regime, it is still unusual to see such direct face-to-face communication between 
two parties (former KR and non-KR) in a structured process aiming at 
reconciliation.  
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As the Achar facilitator trained by the NGO running the VFKRDP says: 
 
Of course it takes a long time to get victim and cadre together in the 
programme. For victim it’s OK, it doesn’t take a long time. The cadres 
take a longer time than the victims. Before we get them involved in the 
programme, we take a long time. We use many of the techniques to talk to 
them, to tell them the advantage or the result of the programme, or the 
future meaning of the programme. Takes long time, because the cadre 
does not want to get nervous, because he feels nervous or want to keep his 
dignity. At the beginning, he thought if he get involved talking about the 
story, it will break his dignity.39 
 
While the victim-cadre encounter described earlier clearly fills a gap   in the 
ECCC process, there are ceremonies entirely without the involvement of KR. 
Indeed most events do not include KR; as the Achar argues, and other 
organisations have found, former cadres are uncomfortable with such events .40  
 
Field Journal 3 May 2012  
 
Choeung Ek (approximately 15 KM outside Phnom Penh) is the best-
known ‘killing field,’ in that it is the one that tour groups most frequently 
visit. It is where most of the victims of S-21 were sent to be killed.  It is 
however one of approximately 309 killing fields/mass gravesites around 
the country (more than 1.3 million  victims of execution have been thus far 
found.) 41 
 
At the centre of the site is a very large stupa, which contains several 
thousands of the skulls found at the site. Parts of the walls of the stupa are 
made of glass so people can look through and see the skulls inside.  On 
this day some civil parties have been brought to the site; some of their 
legal team and members of the Victim Support Section (VSS) of the ECCC 
are here.  All the civil parties (10 of them) are women, dressed in 
mourning clothes (white). Also there are the monks who lead the blessing 
ceremony, one of whom (Ven 9) I interviewed later. He is also a civil 
party, although at this event he did not speak about his experience but 
carried out the ritual. In addition to these people are some staff from the 
Transcultural Psychosocial Organization (TPO). TPO is a Netherlands-
based mental health NGO utilizing the ‘testimonial therapy’ method 
brought into Cambodia by Inger Agger of the Research Department, 
Rehabilitation and Research Centre for Torture Victims, Copenhagen. The 
technique, which has also been utilized in different cultural contexts (the 
Philippines, Chile), uses local spiritual ceremonies within the process of 
testimonial therapy for survivors in countries where mental health services 
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are chronically under- resourced.42 Personal participation, in the sense of 
giving testimony, is a personal investment, as the preparation time for 
those who testify requires them to spend time over this project rather than 
just attending a one-day-only event to which they are bussed in. 
 
At the ceremony, all the participants (including myself) sit in front of the 
large stupa. The participants hold flowers and incense as we listen. Two of 
the women told their stories, while their friends supported them.  The 
monk is handed their testimony and ties a red string bracelet to each 
victim’s wrist, gives them a blessing, and hands back the testimony. (A 
version of this ceremony has been committed to DVD. Sum Rithy appears 
in this as one of the ceremony participants.43) The Monks then bless the 
crowd, sprinkling water over them, and throw flower petals and sweets 
over us. They chant and pray.  
 
Two things stand out from what was said. One woman states that she does 
not know the people behind her (i.e. the skulls in the stupa) and is not 
related to them. She wishes them blessings, but separates her story and the 
atrocities her family suffered from them.  
 
The monk thanks the UN/ECCC officials at the site today; the UN staff 
wear their blue badges (court security/ID cards). The Monks spoke 
directly about the ECCC as offering justice. The fact that the UN was here 
gave this ceremony an international audience, something that the women 
and the monks at the ceremony desired. There is a desire that the story be 
heard.  
 
The group then was driven to a nearby Wat where there were more 
testimonies and blessing following this pattern inside. During the 
testimonies the ECCC is mentioned multiple times, often at the end of 
harrowing testimonies. The ECCC is viewed as a symbol of truthtelling 
and justice. An outstanding factor of this is that the women providing the 
testimonies say they are happy their testimony (told to the civil party legal 
teams) is aiding in the prosecution. Finally the Monks again acknowledge 
and thank the ECCC for its presence, before the civil parties offer them 
food.  
 
Such a ceremony fills several gaps the legal process cannot. Firstly, it is explicitly 
therapeutic. The ceremony offers a place to testify less clinical than the ECCC. 
Given that the mental health services in Cambodia are wholly inadequate to deal 
with the estimated 2 million people suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder, events such as this offer means to deal with abuse, torture, rape and 
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witnessing the murder of friends, family, strangers and children. 44 Even if the 
ECCC was functioning as it should, with none of the political, legal and narrative 
problems, as a legal institution it operates a genre of discourse alien to the lived 
experience of those who suffered, providing no way of linking to more 
‘genealogical’ phrases. 
 
We cannot forget this whole story. Everyone in their 30s, 40s, 50s, 60s, 
70s knows this time [DK]. The next generation also need to know. In the 
TPO ceremony we use Buddhism to help people let go of their anger and 
help them deal with it.  This anger can then go to the court and it can deal 
with the anger. By telling your story to ECCC you can give your anger a 
place to be where it can do good and become used as court evidence. The 
people can let their story go to the court and Buddhism can look after the 
victims and help them to let go.45  
 
In Buddhist terms Ven. 9 is describing the ECCC as a funnel though which people 
can pour their rage and pain in the process of ‘letting go of anger’. However, the 
women at this particular ceremony have also managed to become civil parties.  
Thousands have not.  They can only turn to private religion to express their 
stories. This is painful if they are alone with their thoughts, memories and dreams/ 
nightmares/ flashbacks. By engaging in a discursive community, /interpretive 
community46 - in this case Buddhism - individuals also engage in a process of 
reclaiming their own stories and knowledges .47 These have not only been stolen 
from them by the KR, but may also have been narrowed to fit the discursive 
frames of legal liberalism. 
 
The woman who related her own experiences to that of the skulls behind her 
brings in a means by which the living and the dead are connected within the same 
narrative. Her own genealogical phrases link to Buddhist discourse via an artefact 
(the stupa, the remains of those in it) -  a linkage that not only permits her 
grievance to be spoken but also brings her into a discursive community. 48This 
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directly addresses the ‘ritualcide’described by Peg LeVine, the KR policy of 
severing people from their perceived place in a cosmic order and thus from their 
ancestors. 49 Indeed Buddhist regeneration through ritual has enabled people to 
formulate and relate their collective stories of DK via symbolism that recalls a 
shared culture.50  Cultural identify is affirmed through narratives into which the 
individual can project personal experience, but also identify with the cultural 
history from which his or her story emerges. Buddhist stories taken from the Pali 
canons are deeply engrained into Cambodian culture. The following section 
provides an example of how individuals connect to Buddhist stories to air their 
own narratives and find wider cultural connection.   
 
Containing Narratives through Hybridisations: Transnational/hybrid/ mixed 
priorities 
 
The Dhammayatra Peace Walks. 
 
Here I briefly discuss one of the most famous Buddhist acted narratives of 
reconciliation in Cambodia. In the early 1990s, as religious restrictions imposed 
by the PRK were lifting,  Ven. Maha Ghosananda (former Supreme Patriarch in 
Cambodia and Nobel Peace Prize nominee) led the Dhammayatra Peace Walks. 
These were initially a symbolic act of escorting Cambodian refugees back home 
from the Thai border. They were   dangerous. Neither the Thai nor Cambodian 
governments approved. 51 The civil war was ongoing. Dhammayatra required  
walkers to pass though KR-controlled zones and minefields. Monks were attacked 
and even killed. The Walks were a form of meditation: part of the purpose was to 
meet with the KR and ‘walk until our enemies became our friends.’52 Linked to 
this was the Buddhist concept of Metta (Loving Kindness).  
 
I do not question that loving one's oppressors … Cambodians loving the 
Khmer Rouge… may be the most difficult attitude to achieve…but it is the 
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law of the universe that retaliation, hatred, and revenge only continue the 
cycle and never stop it. Reconciliation does not mean that we surrender 
rights and conditions, but rather that we use love in all our negotiations.  53 
 
The  narrative  enacted in the walk  is of  taking the country back from war and 
division ‘one step at a  time’.  The idea arises from the concept of ‘ socio-centric 
engaged Buddhism’ - using Buddhist philosophy in the pursuit of social (and even 
political) goals, such as peace activism or environmental activism. 54  It is 
characterised by transnational networks  which it both draws on  and promulgates.  
Poethig argues that Ghosananda imported this concept from other parts of 
Southeast Asia ( for example the environmentalist monks in Thailand)  and 
integrated it  into the Cambodian setting. 55  His project was to ‘glocalize’ 
‘engaged Buddhism’ ( i.e. articulating its global ideas/concepts through localized 
discourse) so it could take root in the nation after undergoing  ‘Khmer-isation’, 
focussing initially on Cambodia-specific issues: peacebuilding, repatriation of 
refugees,  landmines.56 The accomplishments of the Dhammayatra were, firstly,   
an activism formula  unique to one nation but philosophically rooted in 
transnational ideas, and secondly, a concept that has spawned other ‘engaged’ 
movements. Poethig  identifies this as a major strength. 57  Such flexibility 
contrasts with processes of ‘deculturalisation’ within Cham Islam explored in 
Chapter Seven .  
 
The early walks were financed by Japanese and German backers. As the 
movement progressed year on year,  it expanded and linked with multifaith groups 
across the world , in context of more generalised walks for peace.  Eventually the 
peace walks struggled to carry on as donor funds dwindled. 58 This transnational 
movement  incorporating old KR into a wider nationbuilding narrative was cut 
short.  
 
Placing Memorial ceremonies     
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I was trying to find some prayer events around the festival of the dead to 
see if there were any ceremonies.  Sina called up S21 and Choeung Ek 
victims’ associations to see if there were any prayer ceremonies during the 
Phchum Ben festival or any other time we may be able to attend. We found 
out that the people who had family die in those places are not planning on 
visiting unless ‘the NGOs are willing to pay for their expenses-otherwise 
people will probably stay at home.’  
 
This raises a host of questions. Do these memorial ceremonies matter to 
their participants? Are they just being laid on by NGOs who have 
misjudged the mood of the people they are hosting them for? Would 
people prefer to forget?  Are people attending to be polite, but with no real 
interest?  
 
Most DK-specific ceremonial events exist only through the foreign money which 
arrived once the ECCC came.   NGOs work in a highly politicized environment; 
though less rigid than in the 1980s and early 1990s, it  still restrains them from 
carrying out much work beyond  supporting survivors.59  NGOs and donors are 
constrained domestically by what the government permits. It is also noteworthy 
that the  passage of the Law on Associations and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (LANGO) Bill (requiring NGOs to register with the government) 
will impinge even further upon potential to explore alternative narratives with 
which  the RGC/CPP might feel uncomfortable. 60 
 
NGOs have built new memorial sites; however, the ceremonies  clustering around 
them are incorporated into pre-existing ritual  events (Banskol ceremonies prior to 
Khmer New Year and during Phchum Ben.) Local  memorialization initiatives 
have also been in place since the 1980s.  
Monks were involved in gathering bones and taking them to temples at 
mass killing sites. And many also did fundraising to build Stupas to keep 
bones in.61    
  
Caroline Bennett, a forensic anthropologist specializing in mass graves in 
Cambodia, argues that there is an integration and normalization process around 
the sites of mass graves in rural Cambodia. She suggests  people living around 
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these graves ( which is common, given their sheer number)  are less concerned 
with  memorial processes , and   take a  pragmatic view of the presence of bodies. 
Indeed mass graves are good for soil : blood and bone are good for fertilizer.  
 
They mostly comment that they need to live, and the grave was so big, 
plus, most of the dead are now believed to have been reborn by now, so it's 
not a problem anyway.  This includes monks. I’ve spoken to various monks 
around Cambodia who tell me most people are reborn now.62  
 
In some places bones were excavated a year or more before  being housed in bone 
houses or stupas ; generally no Buddhist ceremonies have yet been undertaken.   
 
Justice, narrative and money 
 
 Youth For Peace (YFP) is one of the NGOs using Buddhist ritual to discuss the 
past. Funded by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(German Society for International Cooperation) (GIZ), it declares the explicit aim: 
 
Healing through Buddhism Project was designed to train the monks about 
the Khmer Rouge history, transitional justice, monks in peace building 
movements in different Asian countries, roles of monks in peace building 
in Cambodia and other facilitation skills. 63  
 
This programme  had former KR cadres on radio  (providing them with some 
degree of anonymity) to discuss their experiences as child soldiers. The 
conclusion of the YFP report states: 
 
during the training workshop conducted by monks less perpetrators 
appeared. Most of the participants were youth and villagers who claimed 
themselves as victims. We can conclude that the former Khmer Rouge try 
to hide their story because of security reasons.64 
 
In an interview the project leader stated :  
 
We encourage the monastic community to work at reconciliation, as we 
see Buddhism as having a key social role in the Cambodian context. So we 
train monks and operated the programme in 4 provinces. Funding for this 
project dried up.65 
 
                                                
62	  Caroline	  Bennett,	  e-­‐mail	  to	  author,	  	  18	  May	  ,	  2013.	  
63	  Youth	  For	  Peace,	  Healing	  through	  Buddhism	  Project,	  3	  
64	  ibid.	  
65	  NGO	  worker	  1,	  Phnom	  Penh,	  Interview	  with	  Tallyn	  Gray,	  	  25	  October	  	  	  2012	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Almost every NGO worker I speak to   is mindful of  ‘ the donors’,  those 
governments or charities that give money to projects and on which the 
lifeblood of NGOs, development charities and many other things depend. 
The problem with donors is that NGOs constantly have to spend their time 
appealing to these bodies in grant applications.  The ideal one of these is a 
page of A4 with pithy bullet points, and the incorporation of whatever 
buzzword is in vogue at this time amongst the middle management set 
(‘donor liaison,’ ‘ interfacing with stakeholders,’ ‘ inclusivity,’ etc.) 
 
  The effect of this is to reduce complex situations to the point of 
misrepresentation and simplistic distinction. The line between victim and 
perpetrator is very fine when one thinks that most of the KR in the 1970s 
were scared, family-less, young teenage boys with guns at their backs. 
Were these boys victims or perpetrators?  
 
An NGO worker at Youth for Peace is clear about the danger of binary 
distinctions when discussing the KR legacy in Pailin:  
 
People say, ‘ Oh, this is “former KR,”  this one is “survivor.”’  No.  In 
this kind of situation you cannot do that.  If we did that we would be 
classifying the people :  how many survivors in Cambodia, how many 
former Khmer Rouge. My parents are also former Khmer Rouge;  they 
didn’t kill anyone at that time,  but they are the Khmer Rouge . But how do 
people know they don’t kill? In Cambodia we define three parts: a)under 
Khmer b)middle Khmer c) over Khmer  (centre, semi-periphery and 
periphery). In the 1990s people from Battambong would be scared of the 
people from Pailin because Pailin was  a KR zone… 
 
We do not classify who is a survivor and who is Khmer Rouge; we also 
know who is the former. We know that most of the former KR does not 
want to say or to speak out about that. So just let the monk motivate them 
to say something that maybe they do in the past. I think the KR leaders will 
feel able to say because the monk can help them to tell. 
 
We explain to the monks the difference between the survivor and the 
former Khmer Rouge  and  tell them that the KR can  be seen as victims 
also. We explain the concept of high responsibility (e.g. most responsible 
category at the ECCC and Khmer Rouge leaders.) But we explain to the 
Monks to see that all [both former KR and non-KR]   people in the forums 
are both victim. So that the Monk does not say, ‘This one is the former 
Khmer Rouge.’ If the Monk say like that,  then the former KR will not say 
anything, but if the monk say,  ‘OK,  you are a survivor….’ Most of the 
former KR at that time were ordered and forced to kill.  
 
The children of former KR in Palin feel angry, if it is asked them,  ‘What 
do you think if they call you a child of a former Khmer Rouge?’ They feel  
anger, because this classification is still existing. ‘Even though my parents 
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may have been in the Khmer Rouge I am not.’ It’s a way to alienate and 
exclude.66  
 
This difficult and nuanced narrative acknowledges that one can forget, speaking  
to a middle-aged man about his time as a KR, that he was  a child . The way the 
story above is narrated, with careful discussion of  labels,  is almost opposite to 
the narrative of  GIZ .  This  is highly structured: as the project ends in 2014, it is 
also  time-bound,  people allocated  roles  to a specific end:  
The country has not adequately confronted and come to terms with its 
past…. The ECCC has created opportunities to advance the rule of law 
and promote human rights in Cambodian society. Thanks to the tribunal, 
the people are now closer to coming to terms with the horrors of the civil 
war and genocide. …. Outreach activities are conducted to inform the 
population about the Khmer Rouge regime and about the tribunal and its 
role in rebuilding society. These activities help to bring the message of 
justice and reconciliation. Through dialogue between victims and 
perpetrators, survivors of the regime are involved in the process of coming 
to terms with the past. Former members of the Khmer Rouge, along with 
people who resisted the regime or helped victims, are now speaking 
publicly about their experiences. Memorial committees have been set up at 
places where crimes were carried out. They raise awareness of the past 
through the arts, visual representations and specially constructed 
libraries.67 
In this narration GIZ work to complement/ compliment the ECCC (indeed GIZ 
spend money in areas of the ECCC such as the victims’ unit). The narrative 
creates the ‘victims and perpetrators’ binary, even though those on the ground say 
that this is  unhelpful and divisive.  With the binary laid out from the  start, NGOs 
must acquiesce in it -  and its consequent narrative -  on  funding  application 
forms.  
The format of all  GIZ’s Cambodia project reports follows the same narrative 
pattern, be it  ‘Social Health Protection’, ‘Justice and Reconciliation in the 
Context of the ECCC’, or ‘Stone Conservation in Angkor’. 68 This pattern, a 
lived-out version of Lyotard’s Grand Liberal Narrative of Progress, runs from  
‘Context’, in which some socio- cultural information is laid out like the exposition 
of a play, to  ‘Objective’, or climax, the point one can identify the narratological 
end of the project, when a tangible goal will have been achieved – for example,  
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Cambodian experts  conserving and restoring the Angkor temples, or state and 
civil society acknowledging shared responsibility for maintaining national and 
international peace and stability.  The ‘Approach’  section then attempts to answer 
the issues laid out under ‘Context’ and ‘Objective.’  The  format concludes with 
‘Results achieved so far’ , listing a set of ‘tangible results’ - points on the way to 
full closure of the objectives.  The narrative is prescribed ; solutions  exist only to 
fit  its framework. Results are, if not quantifiable, at least listable under bullet 
points. 69 
Simplifying the Narrative – quantitative academia and the ‘reconciliation 
industry'. 
 
Lawyers and academic studies simplify narrative. Lawyers tend to doctrinal/black 
letter approaches, which provide normative standards for justice. Some political 
‘scientists’ attempt to measure the ‘success’ of these, substantiating the 
foundational claims of transitional justice. Such approaches represent a desire for 
a fixed yardstick of justice, producing reductive statistics such as: ‘7 out of 10 
genocide survivors feel transitional justice mechanism X is satisfactory in dealing 
with their justice concerns.’ 70 This is the kind of research undertaken by large 
institutions embedded in what Claire Moon calls ‘the reconciliation industry’ 
whose theory and praxis dominate post-conflict/atrocity societies.71  Statistical 
results legitimize them. The Public Affairs section of the ECCC lists such 
research on its ‘blog’ as proof of the civil parties’ ‘largely favorable impression of 
the ECCC’. 72 
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Complex situations reduced to statistics for the benefit of middle management is a 
favourite narrative structure of donors/governments /corporations. It is powerful, 
because of the money associated with their genres of discourse, despite drowning 
alternative stories which use the phrase regimes described by Daniel, less driven 
by measurable results. The narrative seeks a value-for-money climax to the 
project: X % of genocide survivors expressing satisfaction with justice. A high 
poll number here is a success, without the need to delve into deeper questions. 
Similarly narrative-building projects designed around   grant/funding application 
forms preclude locally pertinent material – for example, Sum Rithy’s project 
described earlier, combining personal experience and commissioned paintings to 
narrate the story of Siem Reap prison.73 The problem in the ‘donor-focused’ 
frames is that there is no clearly defined ‘end point’ /statistic/ ‘result’. No lawyer 
could see it in terms of doctrinal law and a qualitative researcher would struggle 




Christian Oesterheld refers to an ‘elite’ of victims whose suffering is publicly 
acknowledged by the ECCC  (civil parties), in contrast to an   amorphous ‘mass’ 
of traumatised others, their stories untold, who must be content with a more 
generalised justice. 74 The ‘elite’ comprises victims and concomitant victims of 
the 158 prisons of Pol Pot, including S21, and the 309 mass graves, including 
Choeung Ek.75  Both S21 and Choeung Ek have the status of metonyms of the 
regime. A further complication in the case of S-21 – or possibly the reason for 
that status - is that many of those sent to die there were themselves perpetrators of 
atrocity, sent to be tortured and killed during the height of the regime’s paranoia. 
(However, again one must be mindful of the victim/predator binary.)  Upon 
entering Phnom Penh in 1979, the Vietnamese force discovered S-21, and 
immediately employed it as a tool for propaganda and self-legitimisation to the 
local and international communities, a ‘Museum of the Cambodian Nightmare’. In 
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1979it was a showpiece for the PRK regime.76 Such places were always state-run 
until their recent privatization. 77   New memorial sites have emerged recently (in 
the mid 2000s), such as the Krang Tachann memorial site, a killing field where 
approximately 15,000 people were executed.78 It was funded by GIZ, via YFP. At 
Krang Tachann there is a library, a dialogue room where old people   tell their 
story to the younger generation, and a museum. Unlike many other sites this has 
become a learning and education centre.  
 
There have always been privileged points of the narrative, determined by the 
money NGOs can access and the political uses of those points.  While other sites 
of atrocity have faded into obscurity, S-21 and Choueng Ek will always have a 
significant place, in terms of what is preserved, who is prosecuted, and what is 
written about. I do not dispute their huge significance, but note that other 
significant sites of atrocity   get nowhere near the attention.  There is a process of 
choice involved in discussing atrocities committed in Cambodia. DC-Cam’s 
mapping of mass graves excludes those made before 1975, though there are 
several sites where the Khmer Rouge killed their ‘enemies’ in their strongholds 
before that date.79 80 DC-Cam does not consider gravesites of Vietnamese victims 
of the KR in Vietnam relevant.  When one asks why these choices are made, the 
answer will be, in some cases, political and financial support. 
 
Buddhism, remembering genocide and Election 2013 
 
Field Journal Spring 2013 
 
It is general election season, and the Khmer Rouge genocide is an election 
issue.   Sam Rainsy, leader of the Opposition Cambodian National Rescue 
Party  (CNRP) (an alliance between the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) and the 
Human Rights party (HRP) is in self-imposed exile, campaigning via video 
link. This leaves the CNRP ‘acting president’ Kem Sokha to head up the 
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campaign. On the 18th of May Kem Sokha allegedly made a speech in 
which he called into question the history of S-21; he was ‘recorded’ 
saying, ‘The Vietnamese created this place with pictures [of the victims]. 
If this place is truly Khmer Rouge, they would have knocked it down 
before they left.’81 The Council of Ministers’ ‘press and quick reaction 
unit’ also released a ‘recording’ of him saying, ‘Why would the Khmer 
Rouge be so stupid as to keep Tuol Sleng after killing many people, and 
keep it as a museum to show tourists? This is just staged. I believe it is 
staged, isn’t it?’82 Sokha alleges that the recording has been doctored and 
taken out of context by the CPP. 83 The comments prompted reaction. 
Chum Mei called for a mass demonstration against Sokha to demand a 
public apology: approximately 10,000 attended. 84 Hun Sen has slammed 
the comments and demanded a hastily drawn up ‘Law on the Denial of 
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea,’ rushed 
through the National Assembly.85 ‘Anyone who says there was no Khmer 
Rouge genocidal regime in Cambodia has to be punished,’ Hun Sen said, 
and explained that similar laws have been implemented in Europe with 
regard to discussion over the Nazi holocaust. 86  
 
An individual falling foul of this law could face two years in prison. The 
politically charged context in which it was passed and the extreme speed it was 
written and voted on in the National Assembly (less than three weeks from 
conception to legislation) raise concern. It is not seemingly directed at negations 
and illegitimate Irvingesque historical revision 87 such as the work of Israel 
Shamir, who claims ‘Cambodians have no bad memories of that period’, 
describing ‘the dreadful stories of Communist Holocaust as a western 
invention’.88 Few question the historical veracity of the Khmer Rouge genocide; 
not even former cadres deny it. Human rights organizations and DC Cam are 
vocal in their opposition to the new law, afraid it will be a bar to reconciliation.89 
It appears to be solely a reaction to an alleged statement by a CPP opponent, not 
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an attempt to address a genuine problem. In a broader perspective, it ringfences 
the narrative. A question arises as to whether any interpretation/telling of the 
Cambodian genocide not approved by the official government line is now closed 
for discussion.  
 
 Rwanda’s ruling party introduced anti-genocide denial legislation effectively 
criminalizing discussion of   atrocity inconsistent with the ruling party’s version 
of the story. (Such non-authorized accounts may challenge the legitimacy of the 
governing Rwandan Patriotic Front.) It has been used against Human Rights 
Watch, members of the opposition party such as Dr Leonard Hitimana, and 
government critic Paul Rusesabagina who challenges the ‘official’ history 
promoted by the RPF.90 The Law on the Denial of Crimes Committed During the 
Period of Democratic Kampuchea risks doing the same.   
 
This chapter has so far argued that there are multiple modes of expressing 
narratives of DK, alternative readings contained in the big meta-narratives, but 
subject to constraints on how they are told. The following discussion deals with 
explicitly political tellings of the story. As to be expected, both political parties 
are creating their own narratives. But what is interesting in the Cambodian case is 
how the history of DK   is currently playing a role in party discussion. In election 
year there have been two important ‘memorial ceremonies:’ one convened by the 
CNRP on the April  17 Anniversary 2013, another on 20 May 2013, National 
Remembrance Day, by the CPP at Choeung Ek.  
 
At the first, Sam Rainsy addressed a crowd of his CNRP members at a rally at the 
mass grave, via a video link. He vowed to prosecute more cases at the ECCC and 
punish those who have interfered with its operations.91 At the second, at Choueng 
Ek, the CPP was visibly present. Students re-enacted scenes from DK.92 There 
were statements such as, ‘We want to thank the CPP for saving our people’ from a 
Cham representative. An Achar repeatedly mentioned the CPP and reminded 
                                                
90	  Lars	  Waldorf,	  ‘Revisiting	  Hotel	  Rwanda:	  Genocide	  Ideology,	  Reconciliation,	  and	  Rescuers,’	  
Journal	  of	  Genocide	  Research,	  Vol	  11,	  Issue	  1,	  2009,	  112-­‐117	  
91	  Meas	  Sokchea	  ‘CNRP	  Urges	  More	  KR	  cases,’	  	  Phnom	  Penh	  Post	  ,	  18	  April	  2013	  
92	  Asia	  Report,	  ‘Cambodian	  "Day	  of	  Anger"	  Ceremony	  Honours	  Victims	  of	  Khmer	  Rouge’	  	  Straits	  
Times,	  20	  May	  2013	  
 190 
people not to forget to vote.93 Hun Sen has been warning that an opposition win 
would result in civil war and interstate war with Vietnam.94 He states that the 
CNRP share an ideology with the Khmer Rouge.95 Similar displays across the 
nation have been going on over the course of the election period, many at   
memorials paid for directly by the deputy PMs.  
 
The sites become eloquent phrases in the political narratives of the election.  The 
CPP stand on a mass grave and tell voters this is their future if the CPP fail to 
win; alternatively, the CNRP stand on gravesites and call for justice, the cessation 
of political interference at the ECCC and the extension of prosecution. Buddhist 
elements serve the function of signifying moral and cultural legitimacy for rallies 
on both sides, like the orange robes at the ECCC.  For a nation where religion was 
almost obliterated by the KR, using monks at CPP rallies shows attendees it is the 
CPP they must thank for the re-establishment of their religion. 96  It is also the 
case that many of the Cham Muslim minority feel Hun Sen and the CPP are 
directly responsible for the re-establishment of their religion.  One leading Imam 
told me: 
 
The Muslim religion has a four hundred year year history in Cambodia, 
but it was very affected by the Pol Pot regime, as were all the religions 
from thirty years ago.  But on behalf of the Muslim community, I want to 
thank Hun Sen who has stopped discrimination .Hun Sen has allowed us 
freedom. We owe a lot to Hun Sen….. Pol Pot threatened and abused 
everyone, every day people were worried they may die. If we compare the 
prison [he uses this word as a metaphor for the whole nation] of the Pol 
Pot regime, all are happy now all have freedom. Pol Pot killed people just 
by accusing them of being a spy. … Today the Prime Minister always tries 
to look after us. Hun Sen leads the country well; but under the Pol Pot 
regime they would not help us. That’s why the current government is 
better than the past. So again we can behave as Muslims, we can have 
freedom to practice our religion, to do business, and also I would like to 
bless Hun Sen and his family.97 
 
 My interviews reveal markedly greater respect for the CPP on the part of those 
who lived under DK.  Visual reminders in their rallies of religions subject to 
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destruction under DK signify that the CPP has restored religion to Cambodia. This 
reinforces the point made in Chapter Three, noting that Hun Sen can gain votes on 
a platform of ‘not being Pol Pot’. The CPP emphasize that they saved the nation 
from the KR.  
 
The context of the Sangha 
 
The fact that both parties draw on religious officials demonstrates that even 
private, intimate moments of prayer have a political framework. The presence of 
monks between both crowds demonstrates a clear division in the Sangha and 
different modes by which the parties are using Buddhist frames to legitimize and 
promote their narrations. 
 
It is useful here to use Berger’s concept of the ‘sacred canopy’.98 Berger argues 
that individuals seek order and meaning (nomos) to avoid a sense of anomie. 
Theodicy is used to counter those elements of the world (pain, destruction, death) 
that generate a sense of meaninglessness. Nomos and theodicy are the moral and 
spiritual order of human society, the ‘sacred canopy’. Into this   other themes and 
concepts are injected. When religion was re-established under the auspices of the 
KPRP, pictures of Marx were placed alongside Buddha statues in Wats.99 The 
state has injected the Marxist-Leninist narrative into that of Buddhist cosmology. 
It has created, institutionalised and placed itself under the sacred canopy.  
Buddhism was explicitly identified as the state religion in the 1993 constitution. 
Religious belief is protected under the constitution with the caveat that it does not 
impinge on ‘public order, other people’s right to religious belief and the security 
of the state’ - an echo of the PRK era’s desire to control and define the sacred 
canopy. 
 
There are two broad groups in Cambodian Buddhism: ‘Traditionalists’ who 
favour subjective spirituality - spiritual development within the self – as opposed 
to the socio-centric engaged Buddhismof the  ‘Modernizers’, favouring engaged 
spirituality active outside the Wats. 100  101The traditionalist approach, whilst 
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claiming lack of ‘engagement’, is deeply political and intertwined with the CPP.  
In the minds of traditionalists, the post-1993 ‘sacred canopy’ is defined by the 
sangha. Politicians seek approval by associating with the monks who have 
defined this moral and religious order.  An important factor in the success of the 
traditionalist wings in securing the patronage of the political elite and 
advancement of their cause in society has been the commodification of merit 
making, and of the ritual and supernatural powers attributed to monks at some 
traditionalist Wats. 102 103 Yet whilst claiming to be above the political fray, 
traditionalists are intensely politicized, if not ‘engaged’. 104  The ruling CPP 
administration blatantly favours the traditionalist wing of the Sangha, while 
traditionalists openly disparage the modernists. 105  Perhaps the most famous 
traditionalist is Ven.Tep Vong, who described HIV/AIDS as ‘overhyped’ by the 
CPP’s political opponents to destabilize the government; he also stated that AIDS 
was a Karmic punishment monks have no obligation to prevent.  Modernists, 
however, conceive their monastic duty to engage, among other issues, with 
HIV/AIDS, its prevention (safe sex education) and the people it afflicts.106 Ven. 
Tep Vong's position can also be read in party political terms. Sam Rainsy has 
frequently appealed to voters to stop putting faith in Karma. The ‘traditionalist’ 
interpretation of the Karma doctrine identifies personal suffering as the 
consequences of one’s own actions. Such thinking conveniently obscures the 
failure of CPP policy to deal with social problems.   Thus the government has 
contrived to institutionalize religion in a way favourable to the CPP, without 
needing to outline a framework of the spiritual order as explicitly as the PRK. 107 
 
 
In contrast to the financial patronage received by the domestic political/business 
elite in the traditionalist wing, the modernist wing of the Sangha relies on funds 
from the Khmer diaspora and from NGOs supportive of their activities in 
environmental issues, human rights and development.108 Reliance on international 
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funding makes them vulnerable to the charge that they serve the international 
community rather than devoting themselves to the revival of Khmer Buddhism.  
Traditionalists emphasize their ‘patriotism’ and Khmer-centrism. (Monks’ 
supernatural powers are seen as   emanating from their ‘Khmer-ness’.)  The 
patriotism argument has also been applied to criticise modernist practices, which 
traditionalists claim have been imported from other Theravada traditions, rather 
than the ‘ancient’ meditation practice devised in Cambodia, emphasizing its 
indigenous rather than its global character. 109 
 
The universal suffrage proclaimed in the 1993 constitution included monks, and 
hence drew them directly into party politics. The 1993 election exposed the 
division between traditionalist and modernist approaches to political action.  
Traditionalists urged monks not to vote, or to use their influence to persuade 
others to favour political parties.110 However, twenty years later, the presence of 
monks at rallies emphasizes this political division. One pro-CPP monk 
commented to me: 
 
In Cambodia we have two sectors - that is, Buddhism and the state; the 
nation cannot act without both. It is like two wheels of a cart.111 
 
However other monks are less inclined to this attitude, and look back:  
 
Before the Pol Pot Regime there was no ‘Ministry of Cults and Religions.’ 
But after the Pol Pot regime the government, even though they allowed 
religion in the country, they still controlled it [i.e. through the Ministry]. 
They still have the power to control it now. Now they engage Buddhism or 
religion to be part of their political game.112 
 
Ven. Sovath Loun was very publicly arrested after speaking up for the interests of 
thirteen women imprisoned for protesting land seizures. 113 He is   closely linked 
with international human rights groups:  
 
Now the court has accused me of incitement, and the Sangha has accused 
me of breaking the national law. We know the law –the national law- it’s 
like this but they [the authorities] say no law is like this.  HAHA. And me 
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  League	  for	  the	  Promotion	  and	  Defense	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (LICADHO)	  website	  24	  May	  
2012.	  Accessed	  11	  June	  2013.	  <	  http://licadho-­‐cambodia.org/video.php?perm=32>	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talking with the monks, they also say different. Why is it different? 
Because the politics control it… 
 
In Buddhism law is peaceful, non-violent, educates for peace and justice 
and stopping fighting, campaigning for justice and ending suffering.  
Buddhism can help end the suffering. This is the reality of the Buddhism 
rules. But right now new laws around Buddhism control the Buddhist 
monks and Buddhism in Cambodia. They write a new law to work with the 
authorities - to solve a problem like me!114 
 
 The accusation here is that not only are the authorities manipulating or even 
effectively rewriting the law to fit with political agendas, but that the Sangha 
authorities are complicit.  
 
Contained in all of these are elements of truth recovery. All my respondents tell 
me they want to know the ‘truth’ of the story as well as to be given an outlet to 
express their experiences - ‘truth’ is an element of ‘Transitional Justice’ 




This Chapter has dealt with a different set of phrase regimes and genres of 
discourse, which while dealing with issues of concern to TJ scholars (justice, 
reconciliation) express stories and experiences outside the scope of legal 
processes. Such modes of articulation and comprehension are perhaps able to 
connect to people better than legalistic discourse. They are more flexible, 
culturally relevant, less alien. However they are, as I stated at the outset, 
contained. Buddhism is contained in the Ministry of Cults; activities run by NGOs 
are contained in ‘results driven’ narrative frameworks, which expect value for 
money. 
 
The pattern emerging from this chapter is that while there are alternative means, 
specifically   Buddhism, by which the experiences/narratives of DK era can be 
placed in a ‘justice narrative’, it is clear that when government, international 
donors and political parties highjack Buddhism as a genre of discourse, they 
impose their own phrase regimes. The discourse is not only manipulated to suit 
                                                
114	  Ven	  Sovath	  Loun,	  Phnom	  Penh	  ,	  Interview	  with	  Tallyn	  Gray,	  	  14	  July	  2012	  
115	  Daniel	  Philpott,	  ‘When	  Faith	  Meets	  History:	  The	  Influence	  of	  Religion	  on	  Transitional	  Justice’	  ,	  
The	  Religious	  in	  Responses	  to	  Mass	  Atrocity:	  Interdisciplinary	  Perspectives,	  eds.	  	  Thomas	  
Brudholm	  and	  Thomas	  Cushman	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,2009)	  199	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the official story but can go as far as the party political. The official narrative, 
promoted in the ECCC, and the alternative streams of narrative offered by religion 
and the NGOs, are pushed closer to that of the CPP’s own history. At best, the 
alternative streams are contained; at worst they are actively constrained.    
 
The effect of a constrained narrative is that if a person cannot speak of their 
experience within the permitted frames of the legal and the sanctioned they are 
constantly at risk of becoming marginalised, silenced or frustrated:  explicitly, in 
case of the ECCC, in terms of the highly specific parameters of the court; 
financially, by the agendas of NGOs; or in more subtle ways by the prioritisation 
of particular kinds of Buddhism in using the Buddhist genre of discourse.  
 
The next chapter deals with another, more ‘messy’, series of alternative narratives. 
These stories transgress, or fail to fit, the powerful official narratives, histories 
and social and political understandings and norms surrounding the DK era and the 
KR. Unless such narratives are able to find expression, the silence that surrounds 






Chapter Six: The Transgressive/ Forgotten / Silenced /Marginalized  .  
 
Introduction  
 I begin this Chapter with gestures, not words - a tap on the arm, a whisper and a 
nervous laugh.  My contact was a former KR cadre who was telling me their 
story. During the interview the former cadre (I will not provide any identifying 
information) was tapped on the arm by their spouse.  There was some hushed 
discussion between the two.  I re-stated I would not name names, would even 
destroy the tape of the interview if they wanted, and that we could stop at any 
time. Despite this it was good humoured:  
 
‘Ah don’t worry about that. We will just talk of something else.’1 
 
My informant had let slip something that contradicts the lie perpetrated by the 
Chinese government: that ‘the Chinese government never took part in or 
intervened into the politics of Democratic Kampuchea…the Chinese did not 
support the wrongful policies of the regime, but instead tried to provide assistance 
through food, hoes and scythes.’2  3 They had been discussing at length a Chinese 
official they claimed had some role over them. However, the Chinese advisors of 
whom they spoke never officially existed. Even in this remote location, my 
narrators knew what was not to be spoken of. This incident encapsulates the 
subject of this chapter:  narratives that cannot be spoken, or which are silenced 
(often through self- rather than explicitly state- imposed silence).  
 
What differentiates these narratives from those in the previous chapter is that they 
cannot be contained within the dominant discourses but are actively marginalised, 
forgotten or silenced. While not all transgressive in the sense of running counter 
to the state-sanctioned narrative, none fit well with the official narrative pursued 
at the PRT and ECCC: that there are very few people responsible for DK, and that 
                                                
1	  Former	  KR	  Cadre	  ,	  	  Interview	  with	  Tallyn	  Gray	  2012	  
2	  Kong	  Sothanarith,	  ‘China	  Played	  No	  Role	  in	  Khmer	  Rouge	  Politics:	  Ambassador,’CAAI,	  News	  
Media,23	  	  January	  2010,	  <http://khmernz.blogspot.co.uk/2010/01/china-­‐played-­‐no-­‐role-­‐in-­‐
khmer-­‐rouge.html>	  <Accessed	  11	  April	  2013>	  
3	  Andrew	  Mertha,	  ‘Surrealpolitik:	  The	  Experience	  of	  Chinese	  Experts	  in	  Democratic	  
Kampuchea,1975–1979’,	  East	  Asian	  History	  and	  Culture	  Review,	  No.	  4	  ,	  September	  2012,	  65-­‐88	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only atrocities between 17 April 1975 and 7 January 1979 can be discussed.  
While the previous section discussed alternative genres of discourse and phrase 
regimes available to discuss DK outside the court, this section opens the question 
of those whose stories will not fit the confines these structures offer. 
 
It is useful to start with Chandler’s characterisation of the policies that have 
contained the discussion of DK since its demise.  Chandler identifies three distinct 
policies, reflecting whatever ‘ism’ the state employed to frame its discourse at the 
time.4  The first, under the PRK, was one of outright hostility towards the KR, 
exemplified by the Day of Anger in the 1980s. The second was that of ‘induced 
amnesia’ in the 1990s. Hun Sen attempted KR demobilisation and integration and 
was not eager to foreground memories of atrocity and trauma. Discussion of that 
time had to be ‘forgotten’ for the policy to work.  The third involved renewed 
popular interest in DK in the 2000s, as the ECCC began operations, although the 
‘policy of “induced amnesia”…remain[ed] partially in force.’5 Chandler was 
writing in 2008.  I argue that now we have seen the operations of the ECCC, some 
reassessment is necessary. I suggest the policy of ‘induced amnesia’ has not only 
remained ‘partially in force’, but has been strengthened.  The ECCC allows 
expansion on a top-heavy narrative while driving further back into obscurity 
memories that are ‘non - canonical’. It is boxing memories, then sealing them, so 
that nothing additional may enter.  
 
The narratives in this chapter are mediated through words, through gestures, 
through private ceremonies and through silences. Some are grounded in religion, 
some in culture, some in politics; some are specific to place, some to events; they 
reflect different experiences and operate within different discourses.  Hence it is 
necessarily fragmented; these narratives cannot be shaped into a coherent 
structure or perceived as an account of organised resistance.   However, all of 
them interrogate the grand narratives at the epistemological centre of the court or 
the government by their inability to fit into their discourses. Like small grains of 
sand in a machine, they challenge the smooth running of the ideological process. 
These readings of culture and society emerge from the critical frames of the social 
actors en situation as the main agents of and producers of critiques about their 
                                                
4	  David	  Chandler,	  ‘Cambodia	  Deals	  with	  its	  Past:	  Collective	  Memory,	  Demonisation	  and	  Induced	  
Amnesia’	  ,Totalitarian	  Movements	  and	  Political	  Religions	  Vol	  9,	  	  Issue	  :2-­‐3.	  2008,	  357	  
5	  	  ibid	  .357	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own society, culture, history and politics.6  
 
Narratives of the dead : Phchum Ben and Neak Ta 
 
I begin with my fieldwork over the Phchum Ben festival in 2012.  I will first 
provide some context. Phchum Ben is a 15-day long festival (forbidden under 
DK) in which people pay ritual attention to the dead of the past seven generations, 
in particular to the recently dead.  Those performing the rituals hope to transfer 
their merit and positive Karma to their dead relatives, to ease their suffering in the 
dukkha cycle.7 It is one of the most significant festivals in the Khmer calendar, 
which Clifford Holt compares to Christmas in the west in religious and cultural 
significance. In the aftermath of DK, Phchum Ben was quickly reestablished; it 
generated family cohesion after years of separation, allowing the Karma transfer 
process between survivors and the millions who perished. 8  Anne Yvonne 
Guillouand Holt both discuss  how Phchum Ben and beliefs about the dead relate 
to the atrocities. 9  10  Their emphases are different, Guillou attaching greater 
importance to ‘Neak Tas’  (examined in Chapter Two in relation to Saloth Ban’s 
dream).  However, rather than tracking two lines of argument I find it more useful 
to explore the intertwining of concepts around Phchum Ben and some Neak Ta- 
esque spirits.  
 
Guillou notes that Phchum Ben and other spirit festivals are used for 
commemoration, healing and memory-making for all the dead of DK. She argues 
that they fall in different ways outside the prevailing   discourses about the dead.  
As Chapter Five noted, the CPP utilize the dead to convey a political narrative of 
national salvation from the KR, while the legal discourse of the ECCC presents 
                                                
6	  Boltanski,	  On	  Critique,	  26	  
7	  John	  Clifford	  Holt,	  ‘Caring	  for	  the	  Dead	  Ritually	  in	  Cambodia’,	  	  Southeast	  Asian	  Studies,	  Vol	  1.	  
No.1.	  April	  2012,	  4	  
8	  ibid.29	  
9	  Anne	  Yvonne	  Guillou,	  ‘An	  Alternative	  Memory	  of	  the	  Khmer	  Rouge	  Genocide:	  the	  Dead	  of	  the	  
Mass	  Graves	  and	  the	  Land	  Guardian	  Spirits	  [Neak	  Ta]’,	  South	  East	  Asia	  Research,	  Vol	  .20,No.	  	  2	  
2012,	  207–226	  	  
10	  Irritatingly	  	  Holt’s	  and	  Guillou’s	  accounts	  of	  dates	  	  do	  not	  seem	  match	  up;	  Guillou	  states,“When	  
the	  annual	  festival	  of	  the	  dead	  was	  re-­‐established	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  it	  became	  easier	  to	  pay	  
tribute	  to	  them	  .	  I	  myself	  witnessed	  a	  huge	  relief	  among	  the	  population	  in	  the	  days	  following	  the	  
first	  festival,	  as	  if	  the	  atmosphere	  was	  suddenly	  lighter	  and	  quieter.”(218)	  	  This	  omits	  what	  
meaning	  Phchum	  Ben	  would	  have	  had	  in	  the	  1980s	  even	  under	  strict	  state	  restrictions	  .	  	  Holt	  
does	  provide	  that	  analysis	  (28).	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  determine	  whether	  Guillou	  has	  omitted	  
information	  or	  is	  working	  from	  different	  assumptions	  .	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itself as the sole institution  ‘breaking the silence’ to address DK; in the words of 
Lars Olson of the Public Affairs Department: 
 
 This was a taboo for 30 years. Even only last year was the history of the 
KR introduced into the school curriculum. This has not been a topic of 
discussion. People would just not talk about it, would try to forget it. 11 
 
Or Judge Downing:  
 
You’re assuming that they [Cambodians] talk about it. I don’t know if that 
is a valid assumption, I would have to be convinced of that assumption. I 
think a lot of people form the opinion of outreach that they have only since 
the tribunal started ...been talking about the past.12 
 
Guillou, by contrast, asserts that the dead are thought about and incorporated into 
pre-existing local Khmer religious frameworks. The DK era is not unaddressed, 
taboo or not talked about, but dealt with in a discursive framework far removed 
from the discourse parameters of the ECCC.  Holt argues a similar point: that the 
strength of Phchum Ben’s revival is due to the atrocities and the wars of the 1980s 
and the consequent many ‘Bad Deaths’ in Cambodia. In the Buddhist narrative, 
those undergoing Bad Deaths (by murder, accidents or violence) find transition 
between lives difficult.  The conditions of one’s death should be filled with metta 
(Loving Kindness) In addition, because of the CPK’s banning of religion and 
ritual engagement, not only were people unable to engage with their ancestors and 
recent dead at a ritual level, they were prevented from burying their dead in 
accordance with customs. People were forced to betray their spiritual duties. 13 
Hence within the Pali imaginaire, defined by Collins 14 as ‘the imaginative world 
created by texts, art, literature - not identical to the material world but not 
‘imaginary’ in the sense of false’, those who have suffered bad deaths are likely to 
exist between incarnations in spirit form.  Often people encounter such entities in 
dreams.  Bou Meng has reported being visited by such spirits, including his wife, 
with other prisoners at S-21 telling him, ‘Only you, Bou Meng, can find justice 
                                                
11	  Lars	  Olsen,	  Legal	  Affairs	  Spokesman	  at	  the	  ECCC,	  	  	  Interview	  with	  Tallyn	  Gray	  18	  March	  	  	  2010	  
12	  Judge	  Rowan	  Downing	  QC,	  International	  Judge	  at	  the	  PreTrial	  Chamber	  in	  the	  ECCC,	  interview	  
with	  Tallyn	  Gray,	  29	  July	  2012	  
13	  	  Peg	  LeVine,	  Love	  and	  Dread	  in	  Cambodia:	  Weddings,	  Births	  and	  Ritual	  Harm	  under	  the	  Khmer	  
Rouge	  (Singapore:	  NIS	  Press,	  2010)	  14-­‐50	  






Guillou describes how mass grave sites and mass bereavement become integrated 
into the land guardian  (Neak Ta) cults. Neak Tas are spirits protecting areas of 
land ; they can have a positive, neutral or negative effect - depending on the 
individual spirit’s temperament and power  - on those who live on / enter their 
territory.The  discourse of the Neak Ta is present in the ECCC in the form of the 
Ta Dombong Dek statue, described by Karnavas: 
 
 It’s no lady justice! It’s frightening as an object, it’s standing with a club, 
a  “Tell the truth or I’m going to smash you” kind of pose .  16  
 
There are a set of beliefs and interactions around this Neak Ta to which most  
international staff are oblivious; some are confused about the meanings drawn  by 
Cambodians. 17 Guillou describes how Neak Ta spirits and  people in their 
vicinity enter a dialectic, via a medium or dreams.   There are two reported 
incidents at the ECCC of communication between a Neak Ta and  people entering 
his domain (the court), including the dream discussed in Chapter Two. 18 19In 
narratives concerning Neak Tas, the spirits of  DK victims in mass grave sites 
become manifest.  Those killed by Pol Pot’s regime are expressed as spirits with 
associated legends, stories and backgrounds   conveying the history of the era . 
Those who died ‘bad deaths’ can become ‘elected’ Neak Ta. It is important to 
note that  Neak Tas are not necessarily persons of  virtue.  They can be the spirits 
of angry, violent, and dangerous individuals. The relationship between  
interlocutors - spirits and human beings -  can be one-sided;  mortals placate the 
Neak Ta rather than hoping to attain any particular blessing . Nor is the manner of 
death necessarily preserved with historical accuracy. It involves a process  
described  as a ‘vernacular’ mode of remembering.20 Vernacular memories  situate 
                                                
15Bou	  Meng	  quoted	  Seth	  Mydans,	  ‘Survivors	  Shed	  Light	  on	  Dark	  Days	  of	  Khmer	  Rouge’,	  New	  York	  
Times,	  16	  May	  2009	  	  
16	  Michael	  Karnavas,	  interview	  with	  Tallyn	  Gray	  6	  June	  2012.	  	  
17	  Trial	  Chamber	  -­‐	  30	  May	  2012)	  Trial	  Day	  66	  (Case	  002)	  Doc.	  n°	  E1/78.1	  pp26-­‐32	  
18	  Rasmei	  Kampuchea	  ‘UN	  styled	  Moustache	  and	  Eyes,	  but	  Cambodian	  Body:	  “Neak	  Ta	  Dombong	  
Dek”	  Statue	  at	  ECCC’,	  Rasmei	  Kampuchea,	  16	  January	  2008	  
http://khmernews.wordpress.com/2008/02/01/un-­‐styled-­‐moustache-­‐and-­‐eyes-­‐but-­‐cambodian-­‐
body-­‐“neak-­‐ta-­‐dombong-­‐dek”-­‐statue-­‐at-­‐eccc/<,	  Accessed	  2	  	  	  July	  2013	  >	  
19	  Trial	  Chamber	  -­‐	  (24	  April	  2012)	  Trial	  Day	  55	  (Case	  002)	  Doc.	  n°	  E1/67.1	  5-­‐9	  
20	  	  This	  was	  the	  case	  in	  one	  example	  from	  the	  West	  -­‐	  the	  	  1941	  Jedwabne	  	  massacre	  	  of	  the	  
Jewish	  population	  .	  Official	  and	  vernacular	  versions	  of	  events	  were	  radically	  	  different,	  a	  
difference	  which	  opened	  up	  a	  vacuum	  	  opposing	  political	  ideologies	  rushed	  to	  	  fill. There were	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themselves in local cultural variables including myth, folklore, and religion.   
Quasi-mythologized persons become representative of an entire massacre site ; 
through them  discussion is framed. Often these vernacular forms of memory 
deviate considerably from historical facts such as locations, or numbers of people 
involved. 
 
  Holt more generally identifies Phchum Ben as the principal cultural repository 
for DK era traumatic memory. He points out that that the period represents a 
space where the dead and the living can be brought into the same space for 
interaction. The living  offer food, prayers and so on .   He stresses that Phchum 
Ben differs from  Vietnamese tradition (influenced by Chinese Confucianism), 
and from Mahayana Buddhism where ritual interaction with one’s ancestors is 
almost a day-to- day event, with shrines dedicated to a family’s personal lineage.  
Khmers’ interaction with the dead is  timebound, occurring very soon after death, 
or within the window of the  Phchum Ben festival, when living and dead can 
interact. 21 A point that should be made is that spirit religions are not, according to 
most metropolitan, Phnom Penh-based monks, ‘properly Buddhist’.  
 
This is just a …we can say kind of belief,  but not really according to Lord 
Buddha . When people’s parents pass away badly,  or not properly 
prepared for the ceremony or the funeral... but according to the teaching 
of the Buddha it’s not like that . But to be born in good or bad state is not 
dependent on the funerals - not on ceremony, but on the deeds of that 
person. So the Buddhist Monks teach the people not to worry about that; 
but we still have... every country and culture has some kind of 
superstition… this kind of belief in this ... It’s OK - you don’t need so high 
attachment with that.... they just come and offer to the monks to dedicate 
to the dead. 22 
 
However, while such a view is expressed by highly educated metropolitan elites, 
practice, in both countryside and city,  is more fluid. Another monk in Phnom 
                                                                                                                                 
sites	  in	  Jedwabne	  where	  local	  cultural	  myths	  about	  Jewish	  persecution	  grew	  up	  (morality	  tales	  
about	  a	  single	  Jew	  who	  was	  persecuted,	  followed	  by	  his	  persecutors	  receiving	  divine	  retribution);	  
but	  the	  site	  of	  the	  actual	  massacre	  (a	  barn	  where	  the	  town’s	  Jews	  were	  burned	  alive)	  did	  not	  
figure	  in	  these	  ‘vernacular'	  myths	  at	  all.	  Only	  mythologized	  Jews	  were	  commemorated	  in	  the	  
vernacular	  discourses	  about	  anti-­‐Semitism,	  not	  the	  real	  people	  with	  real	  names	  who	  died	  in	  the	  
barn.	  The	  process	  is	  discussed	  in:	  Ewa	  Wolentarska-­‐Ochman,	  	  ‘Collective	  Remembrance	  in	  
Jedwabne:	  Unsettled	  Memory	  after	  World	  War	  Two’,	  History	  and	  Memory:	  Vol	  18,	  No1	  2006	  and	  
Slawomir	  Kapralski,	  ‘	  The	  Jedwabne	  Village	  Green?	  Memory	  and	  Counter	  Memory	  of	  the	  Crime’,	  
History	  and	  Memory:	  Vol	  18,	  No1,	  2006	  	  
21	  John	  Clifford	  Holt,	  ‘Caring	  for	  the	  Dead	  Ritually	  in	  Cambodia’,	  10	  	  
22	  Ven.	  10,	  Phnom	  Penh,	  interview	  with	  Tallyn	  Gray	  16	  August	  2012	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Penh, famed (and indeed patronised by senor cabinet level politicians) for his 
ability as a ‘spirit healer’, exorcist, fortuneteller and dream interpreter,  as well as 
traditional healer, says:  
 
When people die, in the first few one or two days they do not know that 
they are dead. They will know that they have died after 7 days.  Then those 
spirits will be kept for 40 days and nights waiting for trial and judgment. 
Those spirits will be waiting for food (like fruit) from their relatives as 
they wait for judgment.  
 
When Spirits leave the body they cannot bring anything with them, only 
their Karma they acquired during their lives, not property, gold, 
diamonds, anything like that. In the first day of death, the spirits will walk 
through a ‘forest’ that is filled with wild beasts. This frightens the spirits. 
They must walk though this forest on their journey to the ‘judge.’ As for 
the spirits, those who committed bad actions in life will be subject to angry 
attacks by wild animals.  The spirits that have good Karma in life will be 
assisted by those same animals - for example they will act as their guide in 
their journey to see the judge. 23 
 
Vernacular narratives : Neak Tas and transgressive nationalism in Anlong 
Veng 
 
Field Journal 5 October 2012  
I spent the Phchum Ben festival in the North of the country in several 
places in the Oddar Meanchey province, next to the border with Thailand, 
starting in Anlong Veng District (145 KM from the Thai border) and 
moving to Trapeang Prasat District, staying with two families. 
 
 Anlong Veng was the last KR stronghold in the late 1990s . It was here 
that the ‘Trial of Pol Pot’ occurred under the direction of Ta Mok .It is 
still an area whose population is mostly former KR and their families. This 
is important to remember,  as the stories collected from this part of the 
country will be very different in tone and sentiment  towards the former 
KR leadership than in many other places in the nation.  
 
Here I discuss the practices described by Guillou and Holt relating to Phchum Ben 
and the Neak Ta, to demonstrate   how such  discourses operate to form an 
alternative narrative of the KR.  I went to Pol Pot’s gravesite (plates 6, 7, 8)  twice 
- once before the climax of Phchum Ben,  and on the final day of the festival 
when it is customary for people to visit family graves .  I spoke to the woman 
tasked by the government to tend the grave of Pol Pot :    
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I got this job from the district government and the provincial 
administration, as they needed staff to take care of the Pol Pot 
grave...Before I worked to look after this grave,  it was not nice and 
covered in long grass and overgrown trees, it looked very bad.  [It is 
cleared and tended now.] I get a salary of 500,000 Riel ($125.00) a month 
to look after this place, from the government.24 
 
The grave is halfway up a mountain, in a currently developing area . Within  thirty  
metres of the gravesite is a new luxury Casino/hotel (see  plates 9 and 10). The 
choice of location is probably not coincidental. Since his death Pol Pot has re-
emerged as a ‘Neak Ta-esque ’ figure. King-father Norodom Sihanouk noted with 
disgust in 2006: 
 
Pol Pot (who died quietly in his bed) has become, in his grave in Anlong 
Veng, a ‘saint.’ In front of this grave, his compatriots queue every day, 
lighting candles and incense sticks. Thus, the worshippers of ‘Saint’ Pol 
Pot can win the Lottery and other gambling games (in casinos or 
elsewhere).25 
 
I returned a day after meeting the gravekeeper and met the staff of the Casino, 
sent by its owner to burn ‘hell’s money’ and incense at the grave. This is part of 
their job - ensuring  Pol Pot’s spirit is kept happy. 
 
Guillou hypothesizes that the more powerful a person was in life,  the more 
powerful they are understood to be in death.  Pol Pot had power of life and death 
over millions ;  such power is  now with him as a spirit. This hypothesis is borne 
out talking to his gravekeeper .26 
 
The day of his death, people took his ash and his bones. People wanted to 
cut his hair to keep it. And people wanted the bones - they wanted to steal 
his bones and his teeth. People thought that it would be helpful or 
protective.  Keeping his bones would perhaps ward off future conflicts. 
Also, all of the people keep his bones and ash - but his nephew came to 
gather up the bones. 
 
You know Excellency Lun Heng [the Casino owner]. 27 They made a big 
party when they inaugurated the Casino . The staff came here to pray to 
his [Pol Pot’s] grave. Nowadays the Casino staff still come and pray every 
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full moon day regularly,  to pray for good luck or success.  The casino 
owner still sends them here regularly. Some local residents come here 
from around the bottom of the mountain  …People know that Pol Pot was 
a powerful person. Mostly they want to gain a benefit from him, like good 
luck or success in business. Also, people pray for protection of the country 
from war with neighbouring countries such as Thailand. This is what we 
heard from peoples’ prayers. 
 
You know praying is like the culture of Cambodian people, especially 
people who follow Buddhist practice; so they always do prayer to any 
powerful spirit , because they want to get good luck and success. They 
believe that the spirits can bring them good luck and success.  Even high- 
up people believe this, like Excellency Lung Heng ; they still believe it and 
want to get good business. He spends a lot of money for praying for this – 
so everyone believes that the spirits of powerful people like Pol Pot can 
give them good luck and success. …This is a Buddhist place, all 
Cambodian people pray. When his Excellency Lun Heng came here to 
pray, he invited the monks to come pray with musical instruments. 28 
 
 
This clearly places Pol Pot in a narrative of spirit beliefs and the idea that after 
death a person is reincarnated  -  in this case as a spirit that can provide luck.   
Ven 16, the ‘spirit healer’, rejects such a narrative as ‘non-Buddhist’:     
 
Citizens that go to pray at Pol Pot or Ta Mok’s grave are maybe members 
of his family or his friends. In Buddhism we do not believe in praying or 
blessing from dead people. We believe in Karma; if you need help it’s up 
to you, you cannot get help from the spirit world. Gods and spirits can 
offer   only temporary assistance. 29 
 
The religious narrative  accumulating around Pol Pot’s grave situates him in a 
wider narrative of existence(s). It positions the presence/legacy/being of Pol Pot 
on a plane traversing the Pali imaginaire and the Khmer mythos. In doing so it 
actively transgresses  the RGC/CPP political narrative. 
 
One former KR who lived in the area told me : 
These days, Thais are taking Cambodian land and parts of the mountain. 
When Ta Mok and Pol Pot were still alive the Thais would not dare to do 
this. 30 
 
This  was a recurring theme among my narrators in Anlong Veng. Several border 
dwellers complain that Thailand has effectively extended its border since the late 
1990s. They point out Thai houses built along the mountains  which did not exist 
                                                
28	  Pol	  Pot’s	  Grave	  Keeper,	  Anlong	  Veng,	  interview	  with	  Tallyn	  Gray	  13	  October	  2012.	  
29	  Ven	  16.	  Phnom	  Penh,	  interview	  with	  Tallyn	  Gray	  23	  November	  	  2012	  
30	  Former	  KR	  Cadre	  6	  (male),	  Anlong	  Veng,	  interview	  with	  Tallyn	  Gray	  13	  October	  2012	  
 205 
several years ago. It is also worth noting that it is illegal for Cambodians to 
gamble in their own country. The Casino is exclusively for the use of foreigners – 
mainly Thais, given its proximity to  Thailand , where gambling is illegal.  
 
As a former KR stronghold,  Anlong Veng reflects a nationalism conflicting with 
that of the RGC. Hun Sen made efforts to re-integrate former Khmer Rouge into 
the Cambodian body politic with a ‘win-win’ policy , a combination of amnesties, 
promised development to a better standard of living, and integration into the 
national economy.31 One former cadre explained to me how he saw the policy : 
 
I don’t remember the year. It may have been in 1998 that we joined the 
Hun Sen government. The government announced there was no Red 
Khmer, no Blue Khmer,  no White Khmer: everyone can now live the same 
as the rest of the nation. Most of my family defected around 1998 - not all;  
some escaped to live in the mountain in Anlong Veng. 32 
 
The era also saw a concerted effort to integrate former KR into a national 
narrative. 33 However, I would argue that  former KR are not convinced Hun 
Sen’s narrative is  in the national interest. They see themselves as a defeated 
movement and acquiesce in the prevailing political mood for the economic 
benefits it brings their (grand) children. They still regard the Hun Sen government 
as virtually  Vietnamese stooges . To many in Anlong Veng , the CPP/KPRP , 
Hun Sen and Vietnamese imperialism are synonymous. Astrid Noren-Nilsson 
argues this is because many former KR and their children spent years cut off from 
the national narrative , as they existed in ever-diminishing KR-controlled zones, 
even spending large amounts of time in in Thailand. Thus their imagined notion 
of Khmer Nationalism stands  apart from the rest of the country. 34 
 
One former KR from the area told me : 
 
Pol Pot also had a house in Thailand and then the border was limited 
from there [points to a place on the mountain];  but when he died they took 
500 kilometres.35   The Thais build houses along the border for their 
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people,  but Khmer families are not allowed to . Thais can build there but 
Khmer cannot. That casino is running with Thais, but cooperating with 
Khmer.  
 
Thais are more powerful than Cambodians . Last year during the Khmer 
New Year, Khmers put up the national flag on top of the mountain and this 
offended the Thais . The Thais told the Cambodian government that they 
would shut off the border. That would mean that Khmer people would be 
unable to cross it to go work or to buy things (like goods) – unless the 
Cambodian authority takes the flag off the top of the mountain. In the 
future,  I think that the Thais may take more of the mountain . The Thais 
can do everything, no one tells them not to . But if Khmer do something in 
our own land we can be stopped. 36 
 
In keeping with the notion that a man with powers of life and death in life can 
retain them after death, Pol Pot can be seen here as a nationalist symbol in a 
community traditionally suspicious of the CPP and Hun Sen.   
 
We never hated Pol Pot, we love him and regard him as a person who 
tried to protect out territory and our land. The officials said to us, ‘You 
should often do prayers to the spirits,  as often as you can in order to rely 
on his spirit to protect the country.’  When Pol Pot died the Thais took 
100km from Cambodian land, but when Pol Pot was still alive the Thais 
would not have dared to do that.  37 
 
Pol Pot’s gravekeeper  told me : 
 
Praying here is mostly from businesspeople praying for luck and success 
in their business;  or  we get people involved with politics coming to pray 
here and come pray to the spirit [Pol Pot] to protect the country.38 
 
These local politicians would probably have been officials when the KR   
controlled the area.   If Pol Pot is perceived as having powerful Neak Ta-esque  
qualities , then a permanent caretaker to tend the gravesite could be viewed as a 
means to combat foreign influences and protect the nation. The fact that Pol Pot is 
turned to,  rather than the Phnom Penh government , indicates a perception here  
that the Hun Sen government is weak and failing to act in the national interests:  
and that true nationalism resides here,  amongst the former KR.  
 
Yet , as Pol Pot’s gravekeeper  says: 
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Pol Pot is a sad spirit,  because people do not come and see him very often 
compared to Ta Mok’ s spirit and stupa . Lots of people go see him,  and 
from all over the country and from Thailand too,  and he has many 
relatives who pray to him very often. Pol Pot is a sad spirit , and a sort of 
lesser spirit than Ta Mok .39 
 
 
While Ta Mok only led the  KR for a short period after ousting Pol Pot, he was 
more visible locally, and a popular politician.  Indeed my narrators   present at the 
trial of Pol Pot  said neither they nor their friends had seen Pol Pot before his trial. 
  
Field Journal 13 October 2012 
 
As one descends the mountain towards Ta Mok’s Stupa and house, 
another sign of the shift from Khmer Rouge to Neak Ta is obvious in the 
form of a former war memorial  built by the KR (see plate 11). One can 
make out the soldiers’ uniforms carved on the stone , which mark it out as 
a KR memorial. This is now less easy to make out,  as the stone is 
damaged and it has been adorned with spirit houses and  flags,  and the 
figure of the soldier is now  decorated as a Neak Ta. At the bottom of the 
mountain is a Wat; inside there is an elaborate stupa to Ta Mok, (‘Brother 
Number Six’). This is in marked contrast to Pol Pot’s grave, which is a 
mound of earth with a rusting corrugated iron roof , a few flowers planted 
around it by the  state-appointed gravekeeper .   
 
I was staying with a family who let me share part of the Phchum Ben festivities. 
The female (head of the family, mother of six, grandmother of six) explained the 
ceremonies. She was rather flattered when I asked for her life story. We talked 
about her family, her businesses, her farming. I went with them to Ta Mok’s stupa 
( plate 12) and watched the Phchum Ben events around the Wat and even  some 
prayers at Ta Mok’s stupa.   
 
I used to be a Khmer Rouge soldier since thirteen years old.  When I was 
thirteen years old I was a waitress in Battambong province, and then in 
1979 the Khmer Rouge taught me to shoot a gun.40  
 
She and her family go to pray at Ta Mok’s grave every year at Pchum Ben : 
 
I go up for  Phchum Ben, maybe with 30 others. We bring  bananas,  
flowers , candles, food, ‘hell money’ to go to pray. We pray for good luck 
and successes, and protection from problems , specifically with Thailand ; 
and also I dedicated to his  spirit that he has a good rebirth or lives in 
heaven and not going to hell.  I pray for success, and a healthy and rich 
family for him in his new life… Because we regard him as a good person, 
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and hopefully he will be able to bring us good luck and success and help 
people with getting a good job and a good future. Because we believe his 
spirit still stays.  And especially with the Thailand border conflicts - so 
many people want peace and don’t want to see the wars again and worry 
about the Thais.  When Ta Mok was still alive here, the Thais dared not do 
anything like fighting or wars along the border. That is why a lot of people 
come to pray with him. Some media spread odd rumours about his food 
being made of gold. Or that he faked his death to escape the ECCC, or 
that he was poisoned . This is all nonsense. He can be seen publicly here. 
You know, a lot of people from the government also came to the funeral, 
like the district governor or the commune chief. Before,  they were his 
staff.  They went back to work with the government - but they still came to 
join. He was 84 years old when he died.41 
 
I asked her to tell me about Ta Mok. What he was like? 
 
Ta Mok was a leader of many different places in Cambodia …. His 
personality was like ... well, if he got angry he would react quickly,  but 
not hold grudges in his mind. He would get angry, but it would subside 
quickly, if there were some people he had problems with. He did love to 
help the people and his staff - this was his attitude.  
 
The day he was buried at the Wat, it was raining heavily the whole day. I 
think it was July 2000-something - can’t remember the precise year. On 
that day many people came to help bury him and join the funeral party. 
Maybe like 1000-2000, from all over, especially those who stayed with 
him. 
 
So this is why the people still highly regard him and pray at his grave 
every year in this Wat [points to the nearby Wat].  As for what people in 
other countries think about him,  I have no idea what people think of him-  
but here we pray, love and trust him a lot .  
 
Also,  Ta Mok has left a good legacy here -  streets, roads, the hospital, 
and the school. For example, this road and the hospital they have only just 
recently  changed the name .[The schools, hospitals and roads Ta Mok 
built were named after him until recently.] Everything came from him 
when he was in control and had power –all places he worked, he built 
road, streets, hospitals and everything good to his people;  so this is why 
people love him. 
 
Politically Ta Mok focused on economics,  and always said to all of his 
people, ‘All of you - it may be fifteen  years more and Vietnam will take 
your land.’ He hated Vietnam and Vietnamese people so much and always 
stated so in public.42 
 
Ta Mok’s   house is preserved in the centre of town. It’s large and pleasant, with a 
few KR era artefacts dotted around, including the cages in his garden in which he 
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kept his enemies/those he was punishing. The house (like Pol Pot’s) is 
administered by the Ministry of Tourism. However, Pol Pot’s   is dilapidated and 
highly inaccessible, is not signposted and has no caretaker.  Ta Mok’s, by 
contrast, is a well-kept heritage site; one must pay $1 for admission, there are 
gatekeepers, cleaners, and information boards. Within the context of so much 
local veneration of Ta Mok (and comparatively little of Pol Pot) the official stance 
is that Anlong Veng should be an ‘historical site of visit and learning’ (sic). 43 
 I imagine that to an international audience and most of the domestic one,  Pol Pot 
is of greater interest. I would also hypothesise that the reason for keeping Ta 
Mok’s house better preserved is to provide nostalgic tokens of the past to keep the 
people of Anlong Veng  happy in their new life. A locally unpopular national 
government thus maintains heritage sites as a concession to former KR who resent 
the Phnom Penh government, seeing their country ‘sold out’ to Thailand by 
Vietnamese-appointed politicians,  and require a site on which to project their  
nostalgic vision. 
 
By engaging with these forms of vernacular memory construction/expression 
through the discourses surrounding Neak Ta and Phchum Ben , former KR are not 
- as Guillou hypothesizes -  simply paying respect to a person powerful at the 
time,  whose power is transferred onto the spiritual plane.    Sihanouk’s  disgust is   
shared by many other Cambodians, (as those with family killed by Ta Mok when 
he acquired his ‘butcher’ nickname would attest). To elect Ta Mok/Pol Pot as  
Neak Ta-esque figures is to choose to venerate  not some ancient warrior or prince 
to whom modern meanings can be ascribed, but  someone in living memory,  who 
despised,  and violently opposed with a guerrilla army,  the current Prime 
Minister, and  someone who, as a designated defendant at the ECCC, was  
identified by the international community as having a case to answer for violating 
international norms. Choosing such figures even transgresses the narrative 
interpretation of the King - the ultimate embodiment of the official national 
narrative. All this reflects a particular brand of nationalism, rejecting the new 
Cambodia. Local former KR cadres, politicians and businessmen choose to pray 
at these graves, drawing on the power of the two men as patriots. Eng Kok-Thay’s 
study of former cadres in Anlong Veng concurs with my interviews, that the 
                                                




overriding sentiment of most former KR is fond memory of Ta Mok, but also 
contentment with the more free and prosperous society they currently live in.  44 
 
I  found that the general estimate of the ECCC in Anlong Veng lies between 
ambivalence, disinterest and grudging acceptance that this is how things are now.  
Most of my narrators had heard of the ECCC, but said they were uninterested in 
it. Some did express sentiments similar to this former cadre’s :  
 
 I accept to have the ECCC in Cambodia, because in  Cambodia 
especially during Democratic Kampuchea,  those who were high 
responsible were in charge and they did a mistake. … So they are in 
charge of this. So they should face the Law – it is fair and good to have it. 
45 
 
However this is not a  widely expressed sentiment . Most were ambivalent .  
There was no desire to return to guerrilla warfare, or DK , nor did anyone express 
disbelief  that mass killings took place, or imply that no one from the CPK should 
be held to account for the deaths during that time.  This community  has certainly 
transitioned  from one regime to another. But it is a transition  whose narrative 
falls outside the TJ praxis of ‘from  authoritarianism to liberal democracy’.  
 
  The whatness of what is  
 
The nature of this transition into grudging acquiescence  is best explored via 
Boltanski’s  ‘sociology of emancipation’. 46 This allows me   to frame, through 
the understanding of social actors like my narrators, an analysis of the process of 
socialising  former KR, like those of Anlong Veng, into the social institutional 
realities  of the RGC, parallel to the policy of ‘inducing amnesia’ among the 
general population. 47 Boltanski argues that through ‘saying and confirming’ 
themselves, ‘institutions’ such as national narratives  take up the task of 
socializing   people  into constructed /imagined ‘social realities’,  which order, 
coordinate , control and justify behavior. 48 Institutional   survival is dependent on 
social  actors becoming subject to the  narratives the state projects to them as 
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‘reality’ – a reality  which  ‘hangs together’  because  it ‘succeeds in getting actors 
to believe in its solidity and internalize their powerlessness to change … 
formats.’49 
 
Former KR acceding to what Boltanski terms the ‘whatness of what is’ of the  
Hun Sen government  explicitly recognise their own subjection. 50  The former 
cadres of Anlong Veng are fully aware of their acquiescence to the Phnom Penh 
government  and its institutional infrastructures. As their own movement became 
defunct over the 1990s RGC institutional realities overwhelmed them. The RGC’s  
institutions  provide ‘confirmation’ of the new realities, justifying and 
legitimizing  itself in a  process of ‘making visible the fact that there is a norm’. 51  
Boltanski’s term for the way this is done is ‘ceremonies’. These make visible ‘the 
relationship between the order of symbolic propositions and the order  of the state 
of affairs’.52 The process can be illustrated by a literal ‘ceremony’ described in a 
newspaper story from 1999 : a ceremony undergone by ‘the last of the KR 
hardliners’  in Anlong Veng who defected to the RGC:  
 
Four anti-aircraft artillery pieces were hauled out and lined up as props for 
Tuesday’s ceremony, as were dozens of Chinese and Russian assault 
rifles, some bearing bayonets.… officials [top level defence officials  from 
Phnom Penh] handed the defecting troops green nylon backpacks 
containing new RCAF uniforms. 
 
‘The Khmer Rouge is dead,’ noted one former guerrilla. But he said he 
would keep his old uniform ‘just in case.’ One KR comments , ‘I trust the 
government, I defected to the government, I believe in the government. 
Now it’s time for the government to help develop my home.’ 
 
Rebel representative Sang Kong, in his address to Phnom Penh officials, 
said troops would change their rallying cry from the communist-inspired 
‘pdach-nha!’  meaning ‘promise,’ to ‘Chaiyo!’ commonly used today in 
political rallies to mean ‘long live.’53 
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This  can be characterised as a tautological ‘truth test’. 54 The state demonstrates 
itself and demands  participants prove the ‘reality’ of the RGC institutional 
infrastructure by engaging in the ‘ceremony’ of donning new uniforms. What 
reveals the weakness of  the  ‘reality’  tested here is the soldier keeping his old 
KR uniform  ‘just in case’ and the statement ‘Now it’s time for the government to 
help develop my home.’  Both men cite clear reasons for their actions which 
demonstrate that the ‘reality’  of  the institutions  constructed by the RGC  is  
precariously  foundationed in ‘the world’. 55 Both are aware of the process of 
acquiescence to the RGC. 
 
In contrast to the state’s self- affirming ‘truth tests’ are  ‘existential tests’, external 
to institutions,  in which social actors can critique those institutions.  56   The CPP 
has a political and national  history to  promote.  It needs ‘induced amnesia’ for 
that. It sets  up truth tests to affirm these former KR  as part of the modern 
Cambodian body politic . Former cadres in Anlong Veng recognize themselves as 
social subjects by the law, and also as subjugated to the law.  They do not openly 
defy the CPP by expressing desire to return to the old nationalism as understood 
by Ta Mok or Pol Pot. (And it should be noted that none of my narrators 
expressed any interest in communism.) However, through their actions they 
favour the previous nationalist discourse.  Commemorating Ta Mok or Pol Pot , 
visiting their graves, or appealing to them to protect the nation against foreign 
incursions ( Thais moving across the border, Vietnamese influence over the CPP) 
creates an implied narrative transgressive  to that of the CPP, an ‘existential test’. 
My former KR narrators  thus site themselves on the margins of the ‘reality’ of  
the RGC  narrative institution. Their chosen mode of expression is  one where  
Boltanski notes ‘critique is frequently based … expressions used in forms of 
creation – such as poetry, the plastic arts or the novel - where it is socially more or 
less permissible….to confine to the public personal experiences and feelings and 
whose aesthetic orientation makes it possible to bypass the constraints of 
consistency and legal or moral justification imposed by argumentative discourse’. 
57 
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These former KR simultaneously enact their incorporation into the structures of 
the state with a change of uniform, while projecting  their idea of nationalism, 
divergent from that of the government, into religious phrase regimes,  re-
imagining the very figures who violently opposed the Hun Sen government into 
spiritual discourses . Such a  critique of the national state narrative - an outright 
offence  to the King – is,  I contend, a specifically regional interpretation.  (Other 
regions where many former KR live, such as Pailin , may have similar  outlooks.)    
The  KR of Anlong Veng not only  interrogate the smooth running of the 
narratives of the state and of TJ, but can also be read as a community on the   
reverse side of the ‘induced amnesia’ promoted by the RGC in the 1990s . These 
are the people   the nation was asked to forget as the KR were demobilised  and  
shown as ‘integrated’ into the Cambodian body politic. 
 
Silence and Forgetting.  
  The KR and the temporal  borders of narrative – ‘magic dates’. 
 
 Im Chem (also from Anlong Veng), a former mid-level cadre and a suspect in 
Case 004, argues:  
 
The responsibility of the death of the Cambodians does not lie on the 
Khmer Rouge alone. Why does nobody recall the fact that soldiers of the 
pro-US Lon Nol military regime [1970-1975], as well as the US bombings 
between 1973 and 1974, led to numerous civilian victims?58 
 
This is a not unreasonable  question :  if Henry Kissinger is responsible for 
orchestrating a bombing campaign that killed over 100,000 Cambodians, why 
should Im Chem be tried for alleged  responsibility for the deaths of 10,000?  At 
least , should Kissinger not be tried with her?   And what  of  other former KR in 
her community  who may have committed similar atrocities in the 1980s ? Some 
are prominent people who built up successful businesses with war profits made in 
the 1980s.  Why should she be singled out?  Sum Rithy makes a different point, 
but it poses a similar question. He  told me how KR guerrillas ruined his life a 
second time in the 1980s:   
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In 1983, the Khmer Rouge burned my house in Siem Reap.  I thought I was 
going to die;  they wanted to shoot me and I had to run away.   At that 
time I lost everything again.  They came to my house and then I kneeled 
down and begged to them, and say,  ‘If you search my house you will not 
find a military uniform.’ But they still burned down my house when they 
came out…. I remember there was a friend of mine who did business with 
the Khmer Rouge. He would transport  cows or buffalos to the Khmer 
Rouge. The Khmer Rouge shoot him to death. No one tried to arrest the 
KR or take them to court. My friend was killed in Pou District. He was my 
close friend, before he… When he did business with the Khmer Rouge, I 
told him it was dangerous, he said he still want to do it and later on he 
was shot by them. This was before,  errm,  maybe 1983. 59 
 
The point both Im Chem and Sum Rithy make is  that   stories have been 
expunged  - the first, about the Lon Nol regime and  the American bombing,  
following its exclusion from the ECCC’s jurisdiction, and the latter, concerning 
the 1980s,  in the ‘induced amnesia’ of CPP policy.  As Karnavas says of the 
ECCC, it ‘plucked two magical dates – the fall of Phnom Penh [1975] and the fall 
of Phnom Penh [1979] as if nothing happened before and nothing happened after 
– so the biggies, China, the United States, the UN are not in the scope.’  60 This 
prompts a question. At what cost does such a jurisdiction come?   
 
I  now discuss how the joint process of ‘inducing amnesia’ and ‘bringing the 
former KR into the RGC’s ‘reality’ has wider conceptual applicability in terms of 
domestic narrative formulation and internationally.  
 
Former cadres : forgotten victims? 
 
A former Cadre in Kompong Thom province explained to me why he joined the 
KR at around fifteen or sixteen years old. He went to  fight in Preah Vihear  : 
 
I was a Khmer Rouge soldier ...at that time, 1981 or 1982, I was still 
young. At the time the country was still divided and we were collected to 
be Khmer Rouge soldiers because of this situation.  I was a KR soldier 
because of my family situation. We were poor, and there was no work at 
home [in his home village in Kompong Thom] so I became a KR soldier… 
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I was also in conflict with one of our neighbours;  someone cursed at my 
family and I intended to kill him but I did not, I hit him.61 
 
To this cadre the idea of a period of Khmer Rouge rule over 3 years, 8 months, 20 
days does not reflect his experience. He, like millions of others, lived under KR 
rule for significant portions of time preceding and following Democratic 
Kampuchea.  
I’m not sure what it was like in the other parts of the country, but here we 
were always under KR for a long time, not just the length of what is 
termed Democratic Kampuchea. 62 
 
His experience can be read in  Ricœur’s  three-stage Mimesis model discussed in 
Chapter Two.  To recap:  
 
• Mimesis 1 (M1) preconfigures our understanding of  human action   which 
colours our understanding of narrative.63 
 
• M2,  emplotment, orders relations between events  into an ‘intelligible 
whole’ so the  story can be seen as heading to an end point. 64 
 
• M3, ‘configuration, reconfiguration and reading’ enables the ‘reader’ to 
see the whole, establish a hermeneutic understanding  and  ascribe 
meaning  to the narrative. 65 
 
When the CPP  induces amnesia  or endorses/writes a historical narrative 
excluding certain parts, it prevents individuals like this former cadre from 
establishing  hermeneutic understanding - at least in terms of finding a wider set 
of reference points onto which his narrative of being  KR in the 1980s can attach 
itself .66 While those in his position (or Im Chem’s, or Sum Rithy’s )  can read 
back the events, the scope of their own narrative of the KR era stretches beyond 
the cut-off dates of the ECCC and CPP narratives.  Configuration, reconfiguration 
and reading have been performed by another reader - the state, a ‘reader’ whose 
version is imposed on all .  
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Discussing   temporality , Ricœur argues there must be an end to narratives to 
facilitate hermeneutic understanding . Emplotment (M1 and M2) requires this end 
point. ‘Narrative time’ must lead to a place where it can be read in its hermeneutic 
circle.  This cadre has a personal (although not uncommon)  narrative which does 
not fit  the official narrative. The temporal limits of his story as he conceives  it 
(the mid 1970s to mid 1980s) do not fit  the temporal narrative limits of the RGC 
or ECCC (1975-1979). His story is out of time. Within the CPP ‘induced amnesia’ 
and the ECCC  sjuzhet of ‘magic dates’ there is no place to deposit his narrative 
within a historical  context.   
 
There is, of course, the possibility of doing so in personal, reflective terms within 
a locally relevant genre of discourse, that of Buddhism. However, as described in 
Chapter Four with the experience of ‘Grandma’, it is difficult to deal alone with 
its complex demands.    Though a person understands a general principle or  text, 
without  any kind of process it is difficult to conceptualise one’s situation in a 
helpful way.  The cadre above became a monk. However, the knowledge 
applicable to his situation was not available  :  
 
I spent two years as a Monk….In our Wat we didn’t have that many 
monks,  especially in the countryside.  So….I was head of the monks after I 
was appointed by the villages to do this. As I said, there were few monks,  
and the rest of the monks were very old,  so they could not be the head 
monk in this Wat… When I was a monk I stayed in the Wat. We didn’t 
really study Buddhist teaching much. Most of our time was on trying to 
build the temple with the achars and people. The Wat was poor. As for the 
teachings of  the Buddha,  we did not go deep into it. But it was good to 
teach people about no killing and no stealing .  I do not remember much 
more of the teachings. 67 
 
The value of processes like ‘testimonial therapy’ or  VFKRDP  mediation  
described in the previous chapters is in bridging the gap between personal  
memories and narratives.  They employ the familiar genre of discourse, that of 
Buddhism, while  recognising  that  participants needed  help to find their voice 
and have it affirmed within a process. Former KR of the 1980s, who were  cajoled 
into the movement and need to deal with issues running counter to government 
narratives, do not have this opportunity. Like the narrator above, labouring rather 
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than learning a  discourse that might help him,  they manage with ( to paraphrase 
Karnavas) ‘the transition they can afford’.  
 
 
It is  useful to return here to Lyotard’s view. If justice is to be ethical there  must 
be  a recognition of the rights of others to use their own language games and  
modes of thought . If hegemonic discourse silences or marginalises,  an additional  
injustice occurs .  Exclusion from the discourse of the just is a further injustice or,  
even, an act of further violence 68. Iris Chang’s The Rape of Nanking  exemplifies 
this,  narrating atrocities  by the invading Japanese army against  300,000 Chinese 
civilians and military in the Second World War. 69 The final part of  Chang’s book  
deals with what she terms the ‘Second Rape’ : that the Japanese government (and 
even academics ) ignore it, alter it, lie about it, and never  acknowledge it,  and 
that   Cold War politics contributed to a similar  neglect in  mainland China also  
across years of communist suppression of information . 70  Chang argues   that this 
attitude is an act of violence in denying victims their rightful voice in history.71   
Many of those discussed in this chapter are losing their chance for historical voice 
to the state narrative - they are on their own.  
 
The previous narrator – the  ex-cadre and former head monk – is aware of how 
this impinges on a community:  
 
The villagers here are nearly all ex- Khmer Rouge;  many will not talk 
about the Communist party, or the leaders etc. Because …in some villages 
around 80% were KR and now some of their children,  their sons,  are 
[government] soldiers also.  So people never say bad things about the 
cadres or the staff. About 20% are government soldiers now.72 
 
Thus  experience is silenced. The local villagers cannot talk about the events .  
This silence means that history fails to be intergenerationally communicated .  
There are many possible  reasons, including shame at  involvement in a 
movement many forcibly recruited KR  always resented.  My narrator himself 
stressed,  ‘ I just want to let you know that while I was a Khmer Rouge soldier, I 
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was so only after 1979’ - specifically to detach himself from the grotesqueness  of 
DK. 73  Sabine Reichel,  of the first post-war German generation, declared: ‘I 
hated Germany…I hated being German…Can anyone understand the experience 
of growing up among a people with such a gruesome past? Referring to my age 
never relieved me from the burden of my father’s generation.’74  Wanting  to  
spare your children  the burden of  guilt is one motive to keep  quiet.    Noren-
Nilsson noted   a former cadre asking his son,  ‘Why are you interested in those 
old stories?’ She points out from her ethnographic findings that former cadres 
often stay silent as they want their children to be  integrated into the new 
Cambodia without problems.75 I explore this intergenerational dynamic in the next 
chapter. The issue here is that a lengthy, violent and traumatic history of civil war 
outside the ‘magic dates’  is ignored  by the ECCC, which provides the  only 
official narratives counter to the CPP’s claim to have saved the nation from civil 
war. 
 
As previously discussed, silence can be disturbing . It can indicate semiotic 
paralysis. In a world riddled with signs,  silence may signal  deliberate 
withdrawal. 76 Silence is  difficult to read as it has many meanings. However, one 
can discuss its effect. Lee Ann Fujii shows how social taboos on  topics  leads to 
their eradication in history - notably how  lack of discussion on sexual violence 
during the Rwanda genocide has led  some communities to believe it never 
happened, because no-one has  heard about it . The climate is such that discussion  
is off-limits. This cycle of silence and increasing taboo  leads to the disappearance 
of the fact from histories. 77  
 
The alternative mechanisms of commemoration , memorialisation and justice 
discussed in the previous chapters are contained, and favour a particular telling of 
the story  which employs the victim-perpetrator binary. This cannot work here. 
The counterhegemonic, transgressive memorialisation  process  and its implied 
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pro-KR  narrative in Anlong Veng is also  unsuitable in the case of  these lower 
cadres;   they  despise the regime and have no desire to venerate the graves of the 
KR leadership.  In a way these cadres are most susceptible to falling through  
narrative gaps, as they are  unaccounted for in the historical telling of the story at  
either an official or an alternative level. They exist both in the category of victim 
(I was abused by the KR and they forced me to do things I did not want to) and 
perpetrator (I carried out atrocities under the KR that I regret).  The previous 
narrator, and another former cadre  I interviewed both expressed  loathing for  the 
regime. Both became monks after their experience with the KR:  
  
I wanted to be a Monk because I wanted to make good Karma after 
joining the Khmer Rouge -  because it was a group that worked on the 
basis of ‘an eye for an eye.’ It was a bad group. 78 
 
 The other, who eventually became a farmer, told me:  
 
Sometimes I think about the past during the Khmer Rouge ; it is very 
difficult and especially because they forced us to labour;  we had no place 
to stay,  just in the forest fighting, fighting, fighting. Now we have 
freedom. 79  
 
These are  people the Angulimala story  in the previous chapter might situate in a 
relevant narrative framework. However, they have no  access to  monks with the 
education to tell them.   
 
Most of the narrators in this chapter were teenagers or children at the time. The 
KR routinely used children, took them  from their parents or encouraged them to 
spy on them, or made them watch their executions. Children went to 
indoctrination school at twelve, to keep them free of previous cultural influence. 
They were taught to enjoy killing, learning how to torture animals to ensure 
prolonged agony. 80A woman who was a KR staff member (rather than  a soldier) 
told me: 
 
In 1976 I was in the ‘Children’s Group.’  I was about fourteen years old at 
that time … The children lived in a group,  maybe 100-150 of us. We had 
                                                
78	  Former	  KR	  Cadre	  5	  (male)	  and	  former	  Head	  Monk,	  Kompong	  Thom	  Province,	  interview	  with	  
Tallyn	  Gray,	  18	  September	  2012	  
79	  Former	  KR	  cadre	  4	  (Male),	  Former	  Monk,	  Kompong	  Thom,	  interview	  with	  Tallyn	  Gray,	  18	  
September	  2012	  
80	  Kenneth.	  M	  Quinn,	  ‘Explaining	  The	  Terror,	  ’Cambodia	  1975-­‐1978:	  Rendezvous	  With	  Death,	  ed.	  
Karl	  D.	  Jackson	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1989)	  .237-­‐238	  
 220 
to get up early every morning to work the land;  we slept and ate as a 
group, we were not allowed to see our parents at all.  There were three old 
men in charge of our group;  maybe they were , forty, forty-five years old, 
they took care of the children. …I really hate the Khmer Rouge leaders 
and hopefully the court will work well. I don’t have time to watch or 
follow the ECCC process. 81 
 
As I have noted previously, Sum Rithy distinguishes between types of victim. I  
repeat his words here in this context : 
 
You know they regard me as a victim, but I am a direct victim, different 
from the normal victim . You know when you were sent to the prisons,  
mostly they would die of starvation or be taken to be killed. If you are a 
normal victim you worked in the fields;  but those of us who stayed in the 
prisons know more than most of the normal victims. We know how torture 
was used … I was seen as a ‘17 April Person’ – a ‘new person’ – other 
victims of the KR were not seen as this. 82 
 
Sum Rithy,  a direct torture victim,  distinguishes between victims who were not 
even KR cadres. The notion of a cadre being  a victim is not, however, completely 
alien . One monk outlines here the commonest answer     to my question about the 
use of children by the KR.  
 
They know nothing; they kill because they receive 
instruction/indoctrination;  they do not have capacity to understand –they 
do not have responsibility.83 
 
The complex relationship between being a victim of the regime and one of its 
enforcers is discussed by Meng-Try Ea and Sorya Sims ; their   study of  this dual 
identityconcludes that former cadres are  both. 84  However, I  argue that the 
ability of such people to construct their own narratives, or  feel part of one, is 
restricted.  The notion of the ‘cadre as victim’ is not widely addressed by the 
ECCC, the CPP/RGC or in the NGOs. There is no outlet for those in the 
conceptual gap between  ‘magic dates’  ‘induced amnesia’ and the ‘reality’ of the 
RGC, except tor the few who can access mediation  processes such as the VFKDP  
–   due to budget constraints  a very small percentage . The result for many  is 
silence and a lost set of incomplete narratives . Their experience and stories are 
lost.   
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China: a  silent history of  events that never happened and people that did 
not exist 
 
To return to the silent gestures at the beginning of this chapter :  that cadre 
worked with a Chinese technical advisor in DK, and was thus  a   direct example 
of  former KR  fully aware  of their acquiescence in ‘the whatness of what is.’  
Cadre and  spouse  situated themselves as subjects  in a much larger structure, one 
of  Chinese power in modern Cambodia.  However, doing so  literally brought 
their narrative to a halt  and necessitated some re-framing. Some scholarship 
around   the Chinese in DK is now emerging.85 86 87 Liu, Mertha and Ciorciari  
examine the experience of  Chinese and Cambodians working on projects such as 
the Trapeang Thma Dam, Kompong Chhanang Airport, Kompong Som Oil 
refinery, to provide a more person-focused social history rather than a study of 
bilateral international relations. In doing so they uncover  narratives and social 
histories previously unaddressed.  The emerging   consensus is that  the Chinese 
state may have been complicit in the atrocities by ignoring humanitarian concerns 
(as it does  in places such as Sudan). 88   Chinese ‘technical advisers’ and officials 
on the ground  were stuck, helpless to act against the cruelties of  DK and 
themselves under a regime which killed dissenters. 89  Liu quotes a Chinese 
intelligence worker who describes his experience of  ‘a group of insane people 
soaked in extreme leftist ideology, drenched in blood, who treat people like 
animals’. 90 
 
Yet narratives of the Chinese are far from being included in  official accounts.  
Just as the ECCC ignores the US bombing, it  ignores Chinese compliancy  and 
technical support for the genocidal DK state. On 30 March  2012  Chinese 
President Hu Jintao made a state visit to Cambodia. His pictures were on 
government-sponsored billboards all over the city, Chinese flags waved alongside 
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Cambodian ones on every lamppost from Phnom Penh international airport to the 
city center. Banners proclaimed, ‘Long Live China-Cambodia Solidarity and 
Friendship.’ The Chinese Foreign Affairs website narrates events I also witnessed:  
  
Along the road from the airport to the downtown, the local teenagers and 
people were waving national flags of China and Cambodia and flowers , to 
warmly welcome distinguished guests from China and express their 
friendly feelings toward the Chinese people and their best wishes for 
Cambodia-China relations.91 
 
Events were well choreographed ;  there were indeed school children lining the 
street waving flags. The discourse surrounding US President Obama’s visit the 
same year, as part of an ASEAN summit, is a  contrast. Eight people living near 
Phnom Penh airport put a picture of Obama on their roofs with ‘SOS’ painted 
underneath, so that as Air Force One came in to land the President would  see the 
plea. The ‘SOS’ was a call to address Human Rights abuses by the Hun Sen 
government. The pictures were taken down by security forces and the persons 
who put them up arrested .92 The meeting between the two heads was described as 
‘tense’.93 In China, the Hun Sen government accesses a regional and global power 
providing huge sums of aid, protection and patronage without demands 
concerning human rights.94 Obama’s human rights lectures can be dismissed more 
blatantly as the liberal-democratic narrative forged by the West/US becomes less 
dominant,  and China’s power/influence/money takes a central role in the 
Cambodian state.  
 
China was against the ECCC in the first place. 95 Alexandra Kent discusses the 
developmental impact of China’s power  on domestic political actors.96 In a 
personal communication  Kent hypothesized  that the court is the  site of  a  proxy 
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fight for influence  between the legal liberalism of the 1990s   and the political 
realities of a state  attempting to please its patron by keeping the Chinese out  the 
narrative. Expunging  China’s role  means the Chinese state can  lavish aid, trade 
and military equipment, freeing the CPP/Hun Sen government from the 
constraints of the liberal democratic/ anti-corruption discourse of the 1990s – 
incidentally providing China with a malleable ally to do its bidding :  for example, 
recognizing the ‘one China policy’,  and providing  access to Cambodia’s natural 
resources. 97 Certainly discussion of Chinese support for the genocidal regime 
would create a hostile environment for Chinese investment  and  interfere with the 
process of making Cambodia  a Chinese client state.  
 
My narrators, uncomfortable discussing their contact with the Chinese  as cadres, 
situated themselves in the knowledge of Hun Sen’s pro-China  narrative of 
development. Kent’s  informants also recognize China’s power,  opining, ‘Hun 
Sen has become the puppet serving the interests of Chinese businessmen in 
Cambodia,’  and describing China as ‘the real strong man of today’.98 Such voices 
suggest legal liberalism  / liberal democratic values are losing narrative impact on 
the ground. Even former cadres in the  countryside know the narrative excluding  
China from the DK story  is the most powerful in Cambodia today.  With China 
ruled out as an avenue for discussion,  an aspect of history is silenced, and 
narrations never spoken of fade away. 
 
In the final section of this chapter I address a third category, which   I define as  
marginalized , a group whose story is in the contested Case 004. 99  
 
The Trapeang Thma Dam 
Adapted from my Field Journal 15  October 2012 
The Trapeang Thma Dam is a vast concrete irrigation system built by the Khmer 
Rouge using the slave labour of thousands , and costing thousands of lives. I 
expected to interview two men ; eight turned up. I quickly changed  the discussion 
to a focus group. The men drew me a map of  the place before the dam’s 
construction.  One  took me around the lake, pointing out items of interest; our  
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interview is my major source here ,  as it  explored issues in  most depth. All  the 
men worked on the dam’s construction. Plastic chairs were set up  next to the 
reservoir  at the head of the dam and the men talked about working on it . 
Thousands died making  it. It is staggering in scale. Today its construction would 
cost millions of dollars and take years. 100   It is still in use, integral to 
contemporary livelihoods,  as it irrigates huge swathes of farmland.  
Around the Khmer Rouge time I was a farmer around here, like a mobile 
farmer in a group. At that time I was about 14, 14 or 16 but I’m not sure;  
and one of my jobs was to carry the soil. In about 1975 I was not that 
useful as a farmer, because I was still a boy. All of the people were here at 
this dam.  The dam started to get built in about 1976, and also many of the 
people were working as part of the youth groups, but every type of person 
built this dam. This dam was built January 1976. It took six months to 
build under the order of the KR leaders - you know,  because the way the 
water flows is too high, too dangerous for the low lands. The reason Pol 
Pot wanted to make this dam was to flood the rice paddies on the 
lowlands, two or three times a year. So this place was deemed a good 
place to carry out this irrigation. So this is why they ordered the farmers 
to build this. In 1975 Pol Pot built all these water channels;  in 1976 this 
thing started to be built to protect the water for the low land…. People 
came from  four districts around here to come build this, so it may have 
been a million people who came to build this dam. [The actual number is 
around tens of thousands – however, he is trying to get across that this 
pace was a hive of activity teeming with people.] They needed it in a 
hurry,  to get it done in six months,  so they transferred farmers from other 
places to build it.  I don’t know how many people died to make this, but 
many died of starvation, overwork. Some were not thought to be working 
hard enough,  so Pol Pot killed them or beat them to death. But the 
specific number who died I do not know.  We were forced to work very 
hard form 6AM to 12PM and then 1PM to 7PM no break [except for that 
one hour]. They divided us into two groups; some had a problem with their 
eyes. We had to work daytime and night time… You know after the regime,  
we collected many of the skulls and the bones of the victims, the people 
who died making the dam,  to put it all together in the Wat to 
commemorate them.  But now they are all destroyed because there was no 
one to preserve them. 
 
The farmers at the time in Pol Pot were taken to be killed, but not seen 
directly; they were maybe sick or not hard workers,  so they  were taken 
for ‘treatment’ or ‘re-education.’ We heard that ‘re-education’ meant 
being taken to be killed . We never saw those people again.  
 
They were taken to the forest behind the Wat; this is what we heard ; after 
the Pol Pot regime we found all the skulls there.  101 
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 In Chapter Three I discussed the obstacles and blatant interference   by the RGC 
to cases 003/004 .   In Chapter Five I also discussed  Christian Oesterheld’s ‘elite’ 
category, who have their suffering publicly acknowledged by the ECCC, in 
contrast to a ‘mass’ of other traumatised victims. 102  The men at Trapeang Thma 
Dam embody a gap between these two . The International Co-investigating Judge 
Mark Harmon  (the fourth, following the resignations of the previous three) is still 
investigating cases with which the men at Trapeang Thma Dam could have direct 
involvement, in that they would be eligible to file as civil parties.103 Yet given the 
vocal hostility towards the case expressed by the RGC and Hun Sen, and the 
opposition of Hun Sen’s appointed national counterpart to the internationals,  
Judge You Bunleng, it is unlikely further cases will proceed. Despite the right of 
civil parties to file for Cases 003/004, You Bunleng is not co-signing their 
admission. 104  The narrative of the Dam  is a site of contestation between 
‘wings’/factions of the court discussed  in Chapter Three , a clash between the 
narratives of the CPP and legal liberalism.105 The contradiction  for the men who 
were enslaved  is that their government’s selective sjuzhet of DK,  restricting the 
actors to the  top CPK leadership, frustrates bringing their direct persecutors to 
account, according to the desires of the international community.  As long as  
Case 004 is contested between local and international elements at the ECCC ( and 
will probably not go ahead) the small  narratives of these men fall  into the RCG’s 
generalized narrative of national suffering, Oesterheld’s  ‘mass’ of victims.  
 
The  dam –  and the presence of  those personally involved, with  their   mixed 
attitude towards it  -    is both a reminder of atrocity, and a means of sustaining  a 
livelihood for the next generation.  I visited the day after the end of Phchum Ben. 
On my way to the Dam the night before,  I met several people returning home 
after spending the day around the dam to  pray .  
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They do it almost every year,  especially during the Phchum Ben festival, 
but mostly the local people here dedicate, like, food,  or pray, to the spirits 
of those who died in this place.  106 
 
Despite this there is no official memorial plaque, no indication  this is a place 
where the bodies of hundreds , even thousands, worked to death were discarded in 
the reservoir. There is one sign telling people this is ‘Thapang Thmar Irrigation 
Rehabilitation Project. Under the Japanese Non-Project Grant, Ministry of Water 
Resources and Metrology, August 2004’ (see plate 13). Thus the Japanese 
government’s contribution to restoration work /upkeep is acknowledged ; the 
deaths of  the thousands  who built it are not. The ECCC is not   perceived as the 
agent of justice here, at least according to my narrators (who, it should be noted,  
are CPP supporters).   
 
We do not know the processes of the ECCC court very well,  but the ECCC 
should not be taking a very very long time to prosecute the Khmer Rouge 
leaders. We are not happy or supportive of the prosecutors of the court,  
because it’s taking too long,  and the money that is being spent on this 
court process is so much,  so the longer it take the less happy we are. 107 
 
Whatever the political allegiance of the narrator , this is not an uncommon 
sentiment : the length of the process is a  source of constant concern. The failure 
to acknowledge the dam as a site of KR atrocity  perturbs people:  
 
In order to bring justice to survivors here, the government or NGOs that 
work on the Khmer Rouge story should build a stupa or a monastery, like 
a memorial site,  to allow the people here to have a day to pray , or a 
specific holiday to allow the next generation to pray. This place is a 
memorial site;  lots of people died working in this place, and this would be 
justice. 108 
 
If this were a site of contestation at the ECCC, would a memorial bring to 
attention a narrative the pro-RGC narrative of the KR era is trying to suppress?  
Would it at least thwart an attempt to imply that this site is only one of many ? 
People who come for Phchum Ben do so on their own initiative,  an organic 
process. Even without official recognition  to commemorate the dead, people 
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come to offer prayers, though they say them around the lake rather than at a 
formal memorial.  By indicating his awareness that  NGOs carry out 
memorialization projects in other sites, and suggesting something similar, or  
implying that the government should memorialise the dead here, this narrator  
identifies an injustice. He asserts a  lack of recognition that thousands died in the 
construction of a facility still used  to benefit the nation . Even the  sign attesting 
to Japanese aid explicitly  reworks the narrative origin of the dam.  The site is part 
of the DK atrocity narrative, yet its origins have been obscured by  reworking its 
existence into a ‘development’ narrative. My narrators’ notion of justice locates 
itself in opposition to the way the RGC narrates justice through the ECCC.  To  
repeat  Lyotard :  exclusion from the discourse of the just is a further injustice. 109  
The story of the dam is undeniable, but marginalized in the overarching  RGC 
narrative. If Case 004 proceeded, the ECCC  would develop a narrative around 
this site breaking those parameters set by the RGC for the official history of 
DK.110 The image of the figures  standing around the lake to pray , rather than a 





This chapter has been about people who do not fit . I identified at the beginning  
the two concepts of  state control, ‘induced amnesia’ and bringing  former KR 
into the RGCs ‘reality’.111 Both of these control, contain and produce history and 
memory. The chapter discussed further models of anthroposemiotic expression    
transgressing the official history through culturally specific discourses and 
symbols narrativizing an interpretation of history counter to the official narrative. 
I discussed how the ‘induced amnesia’ policy obscures the roles of cadres and 
other staff whose stories fall outside ECCC jurisdiction and are disabled in their 
capacity to hermeneutically read their  story, as the state overrides it with its own. 
The designated vessel for  depositing  memory (the ECCC) fails to provide 
freedom for multiple kinds of narrative, and offers no  inclusive space for the 
complex narrations of the history of the KR  and modern Cambodian history.  
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While in many cases alternative narratives are enabled in their expression ( by the 
means discussed in Chapters Four and  Five for example), for others, particularly 
former cadres, history outside the immediate DK period is not for discussion . DK 
in this narrative sits isolated in history, divorced from its context. This has the 
effect of silencing some stories. Political power (in particular China’s) works to 
silence a narrative for some as modern political realities saturate the nation’s 
discourse.  
 
Within the official discourse, it is possible to identify as part of the amorphous 
‘mass’ of victims the RGC narrative permits. One may situate oneself  in this 
loose ‘victim’ category, but few get the chance  to bring their narrative directly to 
the ECCC. The example of the Trapeang Thma Dam  demonstrates that  the 
government narrative  cannot necessarily  find a place for individual persons and 
locations, even at  atrocity sites  with vast numbers of dead. If the RGC is 
unwilling to engage, only  anthroposemiotic communication, or linking to a very  
unspecific national narration,  is possible.  
 
To link  to the next chapter,  it is useful to recall  the discussion in Chapter Two of 
Assmann’s  distinction between ‘communicative memory’ in daily discourse, and  
‘cultural memory’, linking generations long dead to the present. 112  As the eldest 
of a society die away, there comes a turning point, at which communicative 
memory becomes cultural memory. Once this happens, those memories have to be 
deliberately maintained within the culture. If people do not discuss, and pass the 
story to the next generation , then the story will be lost.  If the communicative 
ability is shut down/silenced, it cannot function. As people let their stories slip 
into enforced or self-imposed silence they will be forgotten.  
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Ricœur, discussing Arendt’s view that one meaning of being human is to be 
remembered and recollected in narrative discourse – ‘to be memorable’ - links the 
power of making memory to justice. ‘The history of the vanquished dead crying 
out for justice demands to be told.’ 1  This final chapter stands apart from the 
previous sections in that it addresses the material they cover from a broader 
perspective. It discusses not how narrations are communicated, nor the process 
and narrative frame in which this is done, but rather why the narratives are 
communicated and what meaning the act of communication has.  I discuss this 
meaning using the themes of Time, Imagination and Memory. I use these as they 
address the issues raised most often by my narrators.  
 
‘The Big Surprise’ 
 
  Time is significant in that it presents a particular set of conceptual problems in 
the Cambodian context. The thirty-year gap between the end of DK and the 
establishment of the ECCC has created problems around memory, communication 
and the ability to re-envision events from thirty years ago and instil a sense of 
historical continuity between the generations, through the process of getting the 
younger generation to imagine their communities/nation and develop a 
cultural/social memory. Discussing this gap one of the Court spokespersons told 
me:  
 
It is a big surprise for people to see such a process in Cambodia. Because 
in the 1980s and 1990s no one thought there would be a court in the 
country … Some Cambodians come to the trial today and say that they 
never thought that there would be a court at all. And they are very happy 
to see the process and think it’s good. This is the new hope for them. 
Thirty years after, we have the trial, and the past can be learned. It is 
something good for them but also surprising. If you talk to the provincial 
villagers, tell them about the trial, they will want to come. Like a 
Cambodian proverb goes, ‘ To hear a thousand times is not to see once.’ I 
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think you will see in the website that the University of California surveyof 
the people shows over 80% support the trial; they believe it to be fair and 
in reconciliation and brings justice. 2  3 
 
This is the self-image the ECCC tries to promote: that after thirty years waiting 
for ‘the big surprise’,  society can begin again and learn from the past. This 
typifies the ‘transitional justice’ narrative.  Exponents of this view point to 
quantitative academic studies (the inadequacies of which I discussed in Chapter 
Five)4 to provide a justification of the ‘good’ done by the institution. This view of 
the ECCC highlights a problem.  Several interviewees noted that their own 
attempts to redevelop cultural memory and re-imagine their community had 
perforce to do without any kind of large-scale external assistance throughout the 
1980s and 90s. Two of my narrators from the Cham Muslim community described 
the process of reconstructing their culture and community at that time:  
 
 We have had to do this internally, from ourselves …in terms of identity 
and culture; it is on us that we have to reaffirm this. 5 
 
 We had to do everything ourselves. People donated rope or wood or some 
money to rebuilding. The UN did not help. Buddhists and Muslims worked 
together at the time. Many countries recognised Pol Pot’s government as 
the real government of Cambodia; this is why they gave us nothing.6 
 
Life had to carry on in the 1980s. Society had to rebuild with minimal resources 
in the context of war, food shortages and global political isolation. Hence the 
ability to create and pass on the social knowledge enabling continuity of cultural 
identity from the pre-1979 period was impeded. 
 
The story of the DK period is one of ‘rupture’.  I explore this term later, but it is 
worth noting here that this ‘rupture’ has moved, as Gottlieb puts it, ‘toward the 
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stream-bed of cultural memory’7 in a particular way, which it is important to 
evaluate. The struggles of the 1980s marginalized not only the process of 
reassembling pre-1975 culture, but also the experience of the older generation 
who lived through DK. They were unable to find any vessel in which they could 
deposit their memories of the DK periods  - their versions of the story so intrinsic 
to understanding modern Cambodian society. As one monk told me in relation to 
Buddhist culture:  
 
As for their ideology, what was it Karl Marx said? ‘Religion is the opium 
of the people.’ And they [the KR] said that monks were like parasites - and 
once such a parasite is perched on anything, it can kill what it is attached 
to. This is what they believed … Buddhism [was the] main obstacle for the 
KR. So that’s why the first thing they targeted were Buddhist monks, and 
forced them to disrobe, and in some cases they just killed them. And many 
learned scholar monks were killed, including some sangha leaders – the 
scholars, the PhDs, those who had just returned from education abroad. 
Tou Ann was one of the brightest scholars at the time; he had a PhD in 
Sanskrit; he was killed. Ban Kat was one of the erudite scholars of the 
previous regime, before the KR time - he was also killed. There were over 
about 23,000 monks killed, excluding those who were forcibly disrobed. In 
most cases these monks were disrobed at gunpoint. Justice is important for 
Buddhism as well. Not just for Cambodian society and the victims, but for 
Buddhism itself, as now we are still feeling the repercussions of the regime 
- even now, thirty years plus after.8 
 
This monk (Ven.14) is mourning the immense loss to the Cambodian intellectual 
Buddhist tradition, and making the point that even today the impact of DK on the 
nation’s intellectual development is still felt. Knowledge was irrevocably lost.  
The problem emerging from this near-wipeout of an intellectual tradition is to find 
a way to link the pre-1975 lifeworld of a generation, one third of whom died, to 
the generations of those born after the regime.  
 
Hence I situate the reconstructive experience of the nation from January 7 1979 to 
the late 1980s/early 1990s within the praxes of Time, Memory, and Imagination.  
Survivors of DK and the post-DK generations occupy a common ‘present’ while 
on different planes of experienced time. The ‘present’ of the DK survivors’ 
generation and the ‘present’ of the post-79 generation are completely different.  
This would be true, up to a point, for any mix of generations; however, the DK 
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period has, I argue, had a more profound effect on continuity between generations 
than would be the case in a society not ruptured by mass atrocity.   
 
Justice as narrative practice 
 
Chum Mei stated to me:   
 
For me, the court doesn’t have any meaning to me, nor for some of my 
friends who were victims of the Khmer Rouge, because the court will only 
reveal a small portion of our story. But it is very important for the young 
generation. But not for the old generation.9 
 
Bou Meng also argues:  
 
The Khmer Rouge story is important to tell to the young generation, 
because we want them to learn from this, to think to the law and the 
mistakes of the past. We want to show them the great mistakes of the past, 
so that those in power can learn. For my own story, the KR arrested me 
for no reason.10 
 
Of my narrators alive during DK, the youngest was then twelve; thus my youngest 
narrators are middle-aged and some are in their 80s.  Chum Mei, Bou Meng, even 
some of the cadres who committed acts of violence, shared the narrative focus 
Bou Meng describes here: 
 
Mostly if I tell to the young generation, I start at the beginning of the 
story. Like how they [the KR] collected the youth, or they make the 
promotion that they were to be soldiers. I tell the whole story - like the 
torturing, the way of doing, the leaders, and how people have no rights. If 
I was to sum up the most important part of the story, I want them to 
understand the whole story as well. The young generation doesn’t believe 
you so much:  even my son doesn’t believe. 11  
 
Bou Meng also stated:  
 
I do not think ECCC can bring me justice … The situation for me in the 
Pol Pot time and the situation in the ECCC prison is different:  so where is 
justice for me? Justice is like, when I was imprisoned in Pol Pot time I 
slept on the ground, and now Khmer Rouge leaders should also sleep on 
the ground.  This is justice. The Khmer Rouge leaders now are the 
prisoners, but they have everything - nice clothes, nice room, and nice 
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healthcare. But for me during the Pol Pot time, I had not many nice 
clothes, not nice healthcare compared to the Khmer Rouge leaders now.12 
 
In these statements three things are apparent.  First, a perceived lack of meaning 
in the ECCC in itself, in terms of offering justice directly to the survivors. 
Secondly, any concept of justice for the speakers must develop out of the process 
of communicating the narrative to a younger audience. Thirdly, a conviction about 
the importance of the story and its assertion  - and the special need for such 
assertion in the face of disbelief. Such statements seemingly echo the maxim 
‘people who do not learn from the past doomed to repeat it.’ Langer dismisses this 
as a ‘tiresome cliché’in relation to the Holocaust, arguing that meaning cannot and 
should not be drawn.13 To ascribe ‘meaning’ to the Holocaust (or any genocide) 
detracts from the horror of the experience and denies the utter barbarism of mass 
murder. ‘Heroic’ / ‘romantic’ stories  lead to situating survivor narratives in a 
grand narrative of ‘human progress’ – experience learned from and overcome. 14 
 
Langer is (in my view correctly) concerned with the problem that lies in attaching 
meanings to atrocities, and the possible ideological underpinnings of such an 
exercise. It is important to question the motives of anyone attempting to draw a 
‘positive’ lesson from atrocity.  He warns against lazy thinking about learning 
from history’s mistakes and falling into the progressive optimistic narratives, 
which dull the senses to humanity’s brutal and cruel nature towards itself. 
However, Langer is even critical of Holocaust survivors who attempt to do this, 
and I would not want to echo this rather   judgmental stance towards my narrators. 
Rather, I contend that narrators maintain an ownership over their story scholars 
cannot claim. This does not undermine Langer’s contention rejecting ‘grand 
narratives’ of progress as infused with mindless optimism. His concern is with 
how the events of atrocity are to be represented, returning us to the points raised 
in Chapter Six about how people communicate the incommunicable. As Chum 
Mei says,  ‘the court will only reveal a small portion of our story.’  Facts alone 
are not enough: details of who died where, on what date, do not convey an 
experience. Langer is not deriding his narrators, but is anxious to force theory to 
abandon its misleading optimistic idealism. We are brought to the point of a 
classic crisis of representation and the failure of the grand narratives to provide a 
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discourse adequate to contain the story. The PRT (Communism/Marxism), the 
ECCC (Liberalism/Transitional Justice) even the (‘contained’) activities of the 
Buddhist remembrance ceremonies, all   imply some form of wider grand 
discourse. Ricœur, on the other hand, lays stress on the importance of the small 
voices of history, ‘the powerless and dispossessed. The history of the vanquished 
dead crying out for justice demand[ing] to be told’. 15 These, he suggests, should 
be the driving force of any representation. 
  
Discussing genocide in terms of a grand narrative, or considering such experience 
as if it were possible for a culture to ‘adapt’ to it, as it might ‘adapt’ to phenomena 
like new technologies, is effectively to normalise it. Uniquely aberrant, genocide 
cannot be placed within the normal discourses of cultural encounter. Langer 
contends the only viable outlook following ‘the death of hope’ inevitably 
produced by events such as the Holocaust is to assume they will inevitably 
recur.16Thus the only viable mentality is that of an ‘alarmed vision’ alert to this 
certainty; and the only viable act is to prepare for a response. 17  While Langer 
uses this term in a general theoretical sense (we as a society must move forward in 
the state of alarmed vision), it can be   employed to describe some DK era 
survivors who maintain a state of alertness to the perceived inevitable return of 
the KR.  Indeed such a mood was prevalent in the period after DK, despite the KR 
being a defunct group. One of my narrators works for an NGO, which trained 
Buddhist monks to facilitate reconciliation between former KR and others in the 
community. He describes how survivors of DK moved into the 1980s with a 
strong fear (one that exists even to this day) that the KR will come back: 
 
It’s an indication of trauma, when the survivors, you know, like the old 
ladies, they still worry and don’t want to talk.  We have to motivate them 
to talk. Because during the Khmer Rouge they suppressed what they knew. 
For example, in Khmer Rouge if you revealed parts of yourself [such as 
various forms of knowledge] this would mark you for death. This culture 
still exists. 
 
You know, like my mother told me, ‘ Don’t speak about the politics - it’s 
not good for you, my child.’ My mother said like that; all the people I’ve 
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provided training to have been told the same. And they told me,  ‘My 
parents told me not to talk about that, or about Khmer Rouge.’ Because 
some of the former Khmer Rouge are currently ministers, or officials in 
the government.  You can see why this is not a good situation. But we 
don’t encourage people to name names, but rather just talk about the time, 
so as to prevent a genocide again, so that regime does not come back. But 
they still worry about that, because after the Khmer Rouge finished we had 
civil wars in 1979,1995, 1997. Most people who saw that think that 
genocide will come again. So they say, ‘ Don’t speak about that.’ They see 
officials in the government who have to power to do that.  18 
 
Varieties of Time  
 
Langer argues that for genocide survivors time ceases to have normal temporality; 
time for survivors of   massive atrocities   exists on two planes. Firstly, there is  
‘Chronological Time’ (temporal) time, which represents the normal flow of time. 
Bruce Mazlish describes the ‘chronologicalizing tendency’ of some historians to 
‘draw a smooth line through the past’ as the dominant mode of conceiving time. 
Eras are segmented and brought to neat ends.19 This way of envisioning time is 
not shared by individuals caught up in the events subject to that segmentation. In 
this ‘chronological’ narrative frame the   Holocaust would be said to have finished 
in 1945, with the liberation of the camps and the Nuremberg   trials as the end of 
the event for the survivors.  Whatever the flaws in his argument, Langer does 
highlight that the Holocaust did not end so neatly for those who lived through it.  
Rather, they inhabit the second kind of time,  ‘Durational Time’, which refers to 
the duration of the atrocity as it is experienced. For Langer, survivors never leave 
the event they have lived through, but rather continue to exist within its bounds. 
Chronological Time is an historical ‘flow’ of events. Durational time may have its 
events situated ‘in the past’, but there is no closure. The mentality adopted during 
atrocity fails to fade away. If you believe for over three years that your death will 
occur shortly, shaking off such a feeling becomes impossible, even as the external 
possibility of its realization diminishes. Individuals inhabiting this mentality often 
have a   sense of ‘missed destiny’. As they see family and friends murdered 
around them, they enter a mindset which assumes that the same will eventually 
happen to them  - that the Camp is where they will die. Sum Rithy told me: 
 
 It’s only me who remembers where the bodies were buried, as the KR 
made me dig the graves .The Khmer Rouge, at the end of the war, took the 
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last of the prisoners in the cell and took them to kill, and buried the bodies 
behind the Wat.  I left ten days before the KR left the prison.  I was lucky. 
If I was still there I ….  I ‘should’ be dead. 20 
 
Indeed several Holocaust survivors have asked to be buried at the camps, so 
strong is the sense that this is where they were ‘meant’ to have died.  For Langer’s 
narrators, though they have gone on to have families and a life outside, their 
experience of the camps has never ceased.  21 As Lyotard states, they are in a state  
‘where the present is the past and the past is always present’.22 This is illustrated 
vividly   by the way that both Chum Mei and Bou Meng spend day after day in 
the place where their wives and children were killed. Bou Meng sometimes even 
sleeps at S-21.23  Chronological time is irrelevant; people will always carry the 
fears of the past with them. 24 
 
Peg LeVine arguesthat the perception of Angkar as quasi-supernatural means that, 
for some of the generation who lived through DK, it remains a present lurking 
threat. 25 The discourse of Angkar’s omniscience and the panoptic society the 
CPK projected into the minds of its people still affects them today. For LeVine’s 
respondents, Angkar could make Khmer people commit unimaginable cruelties on 
other Khmers, to do things they would normally find evil, (almost as if they were 
possessed by something) and was thus felt to be omnipresent. LeVine’s 
respondents felt even their own minds were read by Angkar. Thus Angkar is 
perceived, not as a defunct political movement, an ideology, or an ageing group of 
leaders, but as a phenomenon, something dwelling beneath the surface that can 
return. LeVine concludes that Angkar is an ‘it’, an underlying elusive entity alive 
in the collective psyche. No court can put an entity on trial. Within the ECCC 
genre of discourse, or indeed any discourse of the secular legal world, there is no 
way to convey this. LeVine finally reports that her narrators, while able to be 
happy even while they endure this lifelong fear, perceive their happiness is a 
‘trick’ - an illusory mental state which distracts from the inevitable return of 
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Angkar.  Angkar clouds all moments of joy with the anguish of the past and has a 
continued existence in ‘Durational Time’ through the anxiety of a people who 
also feel the obligation to maintain an  ‘ alarmed vision’ of the future for their 
children.  
 
Ricœur conceptualized the present as the point where understandings are 
rearranged   in context of what has been, and what is expected to come.  Historical 
Time becomes a  ‘human time’ (rather than an existential concept) when and as it 
is understood through narratives. Narrativity and temporality interact; indeed the 
limitations of language constrain discourse to temporality.26  Narrative attains its 
significance and meaning because it emanates from temporality. The timebound 
nature of human existence is what allows us to read it hermeneutically and 
interpret ourselves in temporality.27  Emplotmentis a sequencing device whereby 
causality can be established between events.28 Time is not a linear series of 
events, but rather a subjective concept, whereby events are highlighted according 
to the significance a particular narrator attributes to them.  The present, in which 
stories are told, is the space of reconfiguration of ‘readings’, which change 
according to the ‘present’ we occupy. 29   Narration is an act of reading 
phenomena/history hermeneutically through semiotic infrastructure and discourse, 
thus enabling meaning to be deposited and negotiated through religion, art, 
language and so on. Narrative establishes human actions in what is subjectively 
understood as time, within memory and in contrast to histories.  30 31 Narrative is 
performed through its telling in time, through the unfolding and speaking of 
words, and simultaneously creates a structural framework. Narratives relate to the 
past, the present and the expected future. 32  
 
As discussed in Chapter Seven, within Buddhist soteriological narratives time is a 
construct, a framework enabling one to understand the Buddhist cosmology as a 
set of concepts, rather than as literally understood entity. Time is a metaphor.  
Buddhism has no creation myth, no explanation as to how  dukkha originated, nor 
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is there a collective end like the Christian parousia .   Collins argues that in 
Buddhism there can be no end of history.33 Attaining Nirvana is an individual 
experience.  The performance of texts (literally the reading of them) is only the 
‘end’ insofar as the reader has stopped. 34  The structural mechanism of 
emplotment imposes ‘the ending’. 35  Thus time is configured in the Pali 
imaginaire as a device to enable understanding, rather than as the underpinning of 
a fabula.36 Indeed Collins argues that in Buddhism there can be no end of history, 
since there is no beginning to it; time in Buddhism is both non-repetitive (linear, 
unfolding) and repetitive (like a pulse or the ticking of a clock across eons).  
Collins stresses these metaphors must be seen as complementary.37  
 
 Before addressing this issue of Buddhism and the way it narrates time, it is 
necessary to consider its relevance for Cambodians. As seen in the previous 
chapter, there are other religious concepts and practices, which may be described 
as animistic rather than Buddhist. I would contend that there is some fluidity 
between the two.  One senior monk expressed a view I have heard repeatedly:  
 
Cambodians need to learn these things [Buddhist principles]. Most of them 
never learn it properly, or only very little.38 
  
While I will not go into what a definition of ‘proper Buddhism’ would constitute, 
the concern expressed by this narrator is that textual knowledge of Buddhism is 
not widespread. Indeed whatever traction the   Buddhist philosophical outlook has 
in Cambodia is a function of what is orally communicated through the schools, 
which are run by monks, and of the rituals, ceremonies and events intertwining 
Buddhist discourse into daily life - even if Buddhist scholars and senior monks in 
Phnom Penh are concerned that this discourse is ‘not properly’ transmitted.  
 
Lyotard’s description of how knowledge is transmitted demonstrates that it is 
communicated through narrative, without the recipients of that knowledge (the 
audience of the narrative) necessarily being aware of the narrative as transmitter. 
What is carried in narrations are the concepts, characters and place of the 
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narrative.   39  From this framework understanding of Time, we can move into a 
discussion of Memory and Imagination.  
 
Memory and Imagination  
 
I went to speak to a ‘smot’ poet. Smot is a traditional form of poetry sung mostly 
(but not exclusively) at Buddhist events.  It is a traditional type of singing. The 
smot poet I spoke to does not compose the songs , but memorises old texts and 
ways of singing. She learned the skill from her father, Initially she had little 
interest , but decided after her father died when she was a child to learn it ‘as a 
kind of way to pay tribute to my father’. Learning is based on repetition, reciting 
and singing over and over until it is learned by ear; the melody is not written 
down. She does less work these days and concentrates on teaching smot poetry to 
younger people. She is also blind, so prefers not to leave her village too often. 
 
I’m old  - so I just want to keep to smot heritage… Mr Ieng Sithol, another 
Khmer Traditional singer, who is famous for singing at wedding parties, 
he introduced me to Cambodian Living Arts [an NGO that is trying to 
preserve the traditional Khmer arts] and they asked that I teach this to 
younger generations about ten years ago… They wanted me to teach 
because they wanted to keep the ancient Khmer music and arts etc. alive. 
There were few smot singers left in Cambodia – so it’s a good idea to keep 
the smot. So I have students who are now more famous than me! They are 
young and have a chance to sing overseas in England, Australia or the 
USA and I also have a former student who works in Phnom Penh as a 
Smot teacher. 40 
 
The smot poet was imprisoned by the KR during DK, but is not sure why.   Now, 
as well as singing at events like weddings, she has been asked several times to 
sing at events commemorating KR victims. She explained to me the meaning of 
the poems:  
 
Often they are discussing natural Karma: once born you are bound to die, 
and there will be suffering in life, sickness etc. Sometimes when we do this 
at funerals, they think that the ghosts listen – but it’s not sung for them. 
It’s sung for the living to help them consider life, to reduce their bad 
actions in life, to understand Karma and understand the meaning of each 
verse, and to teach people about Buddhist ideas. … 
 
I studied the books of the Buddha, and never took new poetry for 
recitation- mostly songs from the ancient texts. There are songs about all 
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sorts of subjects, mothers, fathers, suffering, everyday life, different 
meanings … I used to join with the gatherings that NGOs organised to 
sing at S-21 and the Killing Fields [Choeung Ek]. I chose this song. It 
relates to the suffering of life and karma, it’s called ‘ The suffering life.’ 
It’s about…it’s a song to describe life and Karma.  The other is called 
‘Sad life.’  The meaning in this song is that there is no guilt of those who 
suffered in this life, but that they may be having Karma from a previous 
life.  It was a song that made many cry, and they saw the skulls of the 
victims, and they compared their life now. It is talking about how people 
did not do anything wrong, but they receive the Karma from their previous 
life. 
 
The reason I chose this song was because it was a sad song and I thought 
it had a good meaning for the living and the spirits. We already know they 
died unjustly, so this song relates to this.41 
 
This song can loosely and unpoetically be translated as 
 
 Life always changes, to be sad, happy, unhappy, upset - joy and misery 
for all human beings, and there is nothing at the end of it. Life absolutely 
changes for all, even kings, and beggars, animals, birds.  All will die; 
consequently, no one can avoid dying, it is a natural Karma. Life always 
has suffering; tragedy, terror, sickness, age all apply to everyone.  So 
please, human beings should be ready to realize this.  Don’t be scared, 
afraid, satisfied or unsatisfied when it happens to you. 
 
I use this poem/song as a micro-example. My narrator here is directly making the 
point that those who attended the ceremonies at S-21 and Choeung Ek where she 
sang were able to reconfigure memory/ narrative and experience hermeneutically. 
To briefly return to the ceremonial theme of Chapter Five, the use of the Smot 
discourse is an anthroposemiotic mode of expression. The issue this particular 
instance raises is how Time, Memory and Imagination function. The Smot poet is 
describing a multi-layered process, in which those who listen to her song project 
themselves into the song’s narrative to situate their experience of Durational Time 
in the present. 
 
 The poem she sings situates the survivors in the present. Indeed the explicit 
function of the singing is to benefit the living, not to commemorate the dead.  
According to the smot poet the survivors are ‘looking back’ on their past in the 
present space (the ceremony). They are thus existing in Durational Time and 
reading it in terms of Chronological Time (temporality). This discourse of sung 
Buddhist funeral poems situates the entire story within the Karmic time narrative. 
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Once again, the notion that one is receiving the Karma of the past life in DK is 
raised, as it was in Chapter Five in discussing the notion of  ‘blame’. However in 
this case the smot poet shows that this is not a notion which needs to tie the 
survivor into further feelings of self-blame. Victims receiving back their Karma 
are, in this incarnation, innocent.  It is not a question of blaming oneself, but of 
situating oneself in a wider narration of karma /dukkha, whereby specific 
incarnations of existence are not responsible for their situation - in a way releasing 
them from guilt for what happened to them. Karma is externalized and placed in 
dukkha. This  chimes with  Langer’s description of the guilt experienced by 
survivors about events they could not  control.  They feel guilty even though they 
lacked any agency to effect change ;  the choice had already been made by the 
Nazi high command.  42 In the same way, for DK survivors in the context of the 
smot poem, they are shown to be a product of uncontrollable circumstances in a 
cosmology of suffering. One can put this differently by adapting Ricœur’s 
concept of forgiveness, the notion of separating the act (sin) from the person  
(sinner). 43 The argument within the poem that ‘life is unavoidable suffering’ is 
compounded with the notion that you (in your present incarnation) are separated 
from the Karma accrued in previous existences. Karma is not a cosmic 
punishment for sins but a rebalancing. The Buddhist narrative is about escaping 
this dukkha/karmic time. Thus through the recitation of the song, the smot poet 
facilitates the   placing of DK survivors within Chronological and Durational 
Time, allowing a hermeneutic reading of their experience in a reconfigured 
present. 
 
She is also establishing an imaginative space in which survivors can orient 
themselves chronologically and durationally; at the same time she is   facilitating 
intergenerational knowledge transmission through use of the poetic discourse. 
That is to say that the song’s meanings, and the readings of those meanings, can 
be seen by the post-1979 generation. 
 
Memory, community and the next generation 
 
Imagination is described by Ricœur as   located at ‘the lowest rung of the ladder 
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of knowledge’.44 Memory and imagination overlap as recollection, which is an 
attempt to remember a prior reality. However, since we are unable literally to 
move through time, imagination is the principal tool by which the mind re-
experiences an event . 45  In a sense, making a remembrance of ‘objective’ 
recollection is extremely difficult. Yet there is nothing better than memory that 
historiography can access.46 History relies on the memories of those who lived 
through it, how they tell it and how they write it.  Ricœur argues that the 
memories of individuals   are fallible; collective memory is not the same as 
history. Collective memory should be understood as a set of processes of 
collective reconstruction and interpretation  based on events in the past. Collective 
memory should be studied in relation to how individuals and societies try to 
represent the past in the present through memory and history. 47 
Imagination is also the core element of what carries memory through the 
generations via cultural, collective and collected memory. As well as ‘a province 
of imagination’, memory is the means by which the new generation can connect 
to their community’s past. 48 I   characterise the three years, eight months and 20 
days of DK as a period of rupture in the nation’s capacity to construct reality.   
David Gottlieb first developed the idea of ‘rupture’ in relation to the Shoah, 
exploring it in terms of the ‘intersection of the mystical and the socio-theoretical’ 
on a vertical (mystical/religious) axis and a horizontal axis (the ‘line’ of history).49 
For him, the effects or rupture on a culture are profound and irrevocable. ‘Rupture 
most often can be seen as a spike of “vertical” energy into the flow of 
“horizontal” history, where it initiates a cascade of ruptures and begins its flow 
toward the stream-bed of cultural memory’, with which it interacts. 50  Gottlieb 
argues that, following the Shoah, the Holocaust became an intrinsic part of Jewish 
cultural memory.    
I have discussed both Anderson’s idea of  ‘imagined communities’ constructing 
narratives of collective identity  - the ‘biography’ of the community - and the two 
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kinds of memory distinguished by Assmann in this process : ‘communicative 
memory’ between generations, and  ‘cultural memory’ linking the long dead to 
the present. 51 52   As generations die, there is a turning point when communicative 
memory becomes cultural memory in an organic process, and memories are   
maintained by the new generation to interpret the distant past  - the foundation of 
contemporary identity - in light of the present.   The ‘rupture’ of DK was a near-
fatal assault on the imagination of a country, forcing ‘communicative’ and 
‘cultural’ processes to overlap and accelerate intolerably.  Anderson and Assmann 
assume the possibility of socialization, that the binding chronological sequence of 
events in a community’s history can be ‘emplotted’ into a linear narrative 
nourished by personal and public memories.  This, however, was effectively 
frozen by DK, not only by 1.4-2.2  million  deaths, but by the way it consciously 
operated to replace  the social stock of knowledge’ with the ‘reality’ of Angkar.53 
Neither socialisation nor binding could take place. As Ven. 14 says, too much was 
lost.  The post-DK period was also too chaotic for communication about recent 
traumatic events to occur. Unlike the period following the Nazi Holocaust, when 
memories of the Shoah could be deposited in cultural institutions - especially 
following the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 – initial attempts at 
reconstructing Cambodian culture took place in context of an ongoing war, 
famine, a Soviet-backed Vietnamese government, and fear of a KR return to 
power. 
At this point it is useful to present a case example of one community of whom I 
have some experience, the Cham, as a microcosm of the near wipe out of 
traditional culture and its re-construction, also exploring the issues specific to 
them. A predominantly Muslim group, the Cham do not exist in a cultural vacuum 
from the Khmer Majority. Indeed as a community they are very proud of being 
fully integrated into the whole of Khmer society, many expressing admiration for 
Hun Sen. All the Imams I met were CPP supporters, one, as I quoted earlier, 
stating explicitly,’We can have freedom to practice our religion, to do business, 
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and also I would like to bless Hun Sen and his family.’ Community leaders also 
express pride in their ecumenical co-operation with the Buddhist Sangha.  
Buddhist/Muslim cooperation after DK was a necessity, but also part of the long 
history of the community in the nation:  
 
Buddhist and Muslims worked together at the time…. I remember when 
King Sihanouk (this was a long time ago) regarded Cham Muslims as 
Cambodians. We will sacrifice to our country the same as every other. We 
live well with the Buddhists and there is no animosity. For instance, in 
2011 we had a border dispute with Thailand. Many Muslims signed up to 
army to fight for their country this is our country.54 
 
The Cham majority practice Sunni Islam. Broadly speaking one can identify two 
forms of Islamic practice among them, within three groups tracing their origins in 
Cambodia separately.55 The majority practice an ‘orthodox’ Islam, praying five 
times a day and adhering to the five pillars of Islam, like the majority of Muslims 
in Malaysia, Thailand and the Gulf States. 56  There is also a ‘Traditionalist 
Cambodian’ Islam, with distinctive practices  - for example, once-weekly rather 
than daily prayer, circumcision for boys at approximately fifteen, no obligation to 
make pilgrimage to Mecca and retention of some ancestral Hindu and Buddhist 
traditions.  Such variations exist across Southeast Asia.  57 58 
 
I preface my discussion by stating that I am not drawing this thesis into the debate 
surrounding the question of whether the Cham were targeted because of their 
ethnicity.  (This is a point of contention among scholars and one of the charges 
against the accused currently on trial.)  I would rather simply direct the reader to 
the Co-investigating Judges at the ECCC who accept the figure of 36% of Cham 
who died in DK (as opposed to 18.7% ethnic Khmer).59My concern in discussing 
this community is that as a small minority   they had even fewer resources after 
DK than the majority. I also contend that, whether or not one argues that the 
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Cham were subjected to a policy of ethnic cleansing, any minority community 
swept up in a general policy of traditional cultural eliminationism will 
proportionally suffer greater cultural haemorrhage. 60 If all one minority are 
concentrated in one location, and their mosques are destroyed, the experience of 
cultural destruction will inevitably be proportionately greater than in the rest of 
the society where there is more to destroy.  
 
The  ‘social stock of knowledge’ within this community was brought to the brink 
of annihilation for the Chams, who traditionally lived as a group rather than 
scattered among the wider community. 61  The process of memory production, the 
transmission of knowledge and cultural memory, and the ability to construct 
personal and communal reality had to begin with the most basic element – a 
community of people have to be together in the first place.  Following this 
immediate need just to be together again, the question ‘what makes us Cham?’ 
had to be affirmed. 
 
The religion was almost totally destroyed by the Pol Pot regime. Not many 
Muslims with a high education were left alive.  In some villages they had 
some older people who would try to pass on their knowledge to the 
younger generation. For women they explained about the hijab. They 
explained what they knew of the religious teachings.  At the time we didn’t 
have a mosque. We had to do this all in each other’s homes, or maybe 
build a small house that acted as a kind of mosque in the village. We had 
to update and develop from day to day, year to year.  After 1979 there 
were no written records left in the country; mostly everything had to occur 
from one person passing it on orally to another. This included the Koran; 
people had to pass on what they could remember from the past to the 
young generation. 62 
 
Only a few places in Cambodia still had any documents or Korans … we 
tried to copy it by hand.  63 
 
Cham identity is complex and constitutes more than simply practicing a different 
religion from the majority; however, after genocide the Cham reached out to their 
religion as the most significant factor in rebuilding their sense of themselves. 
The Cham had to recoup as much of their pre-DK cultural knowledge as they 
could. Often this meant identifying elements of that could be recalled out of the 
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‘ruins of memory’. 64  This comprised small scraps out of context, personal 
memories, and an imagined version of their pre-genocide culture. A scrap of 
knowledge is a starting place.  In a context where few Imams had survived to 
explain details of practice, the community had to find the most basic elements of 
their culture; diet and clothing were the first available ways to demonstrate faith 
and reclaim culture, especially as no mosques and very few copies of the Koran 
remained to reinforce them.  
 
Some scholars contend that Cham culture, particularly among ‘traditionalist’ 
adherents, has latterly been subjected to an influx of foreign Islamic practice, 
undermining Cham tradition. 65  Agnès De Féo, for example, argues that the influx 
of foreign proselytisers treat cultural variants of Islam with disdain in their quest 
to bring ‘true’ Islam.66   Islamologist Oliver Roy also argues that the globalisation 
of Islam promoted by foreign proselytizers actively seeks to ‘de-culturalize’ 
Islam, advocating a non-territorially bound universal Islam, which advocates for a 
‘delinking of Islamic religiosity from ethnic cultural identity’. 67 68 While it is a 
source of pride that the young receive such knowledge, and the Imams I 
interviewed were pleased to feel part of the global Ummah in a way they had not 
in the pre-DK era, there was, as the above quotation illustrates, some anxiety 
about practicing Islam ‘properly’. There is even a sense the foreigners do this 
‘better’ than the local population, a welcoming of foreign influences because older 
domestic actors do not feel so well qualified to teach Islam. The older generation 
were perhaps anxious to embrace the universalising form of Islam offered by 
proselytisers as the most readily available connection to the Ummah. Chams were 
able to find some manifestation of their religion, without necessarily making a 
conscious choice to override local tradition. Given the cultural destruction of the 
KR, foreign proselytisers were able to fill a vacuum without the necessity of 
contending with local cultural forms to the extent they may have experienced in 
other locations. The younger generation have been educated in this newer mode, 
which does not conceive religion as something one is culturally born into, but as 
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an abstract, deculturalised philosophy/ practice de-linked from ethnicity. This has 
consequences for the way they understand their Cham identity.   
  
This example illustrates the case of cultural destruction and reconstruction in a   
globalized context, an example of how culture can be broken down and what fills 
the vacuum can   significantly differ from what existed previously.  
 
 
Narrative and Belief 
 
The problem for the younger generation is that such a   radical rupture in the 
continuity of the social construction of knowledge can mean issues of 
believability. Amongst the post-1979 generation there is a widespread ignorance 
of the Cambodian holocaust. There may be disbelief, or the assumption the older 
generation are exaggerating.  Two Cham Muslim DK survivors gave similar 
accounts of this:   
 
Sometimes some families have told this story as they think it’s important for the 
young generation to know, to understand. But for the young generation, I do not 
think they are so interested…. Because they have never themselves encountered 
such an experience, some of the experiences that they are told they find 
unbelievable:  like for people to eat trees, or eat one corn for two people over a 
day. To eat pig … the grandparents will say, ‘I eat the pig meat.’ The younger 
generation don’t believe it. For now they do not eat it.  They say that,  ‘Pork is not 
for us.’ The young never see this themselves, so they can’t believe.69 
 
Often I tell the younger generation in my village, and also I have taken them to S-
21.70 Before, they do not believe, but afterwards, when I took them to see, they 
believe the story. Also, in Pol Pot there was no mosques, no religion at all. So 
sometimes when I’m talking to young people they can’t believe me:  but after 
showing them they believe.71 
 
TG: Why do you think that it is difficult for young people to believe it happened? 
 
Imam:  Kids who are teenagers or twenty-somethings just only hear [about what 
happened].  They have never seen this kind of thing, so are reluctant to believe. 
But if they see some evidence, it builds up their ability to believe.72 
 
 
The young are unable to reconcile what they see today with the past described to 
them by their (grand) parents. In their lifetime they have never experienced or 
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seen Cambodia as it was in the late 1970s- mid 1980s. It is difficult to imagine 
their nation in such a state.   One Cham Imam told me: 
 
We listen to the court mostly from the TV. Mostly they talk about all the 
killings in the court, [the criminal charges of murder, genocide] but not 
much about the religious persecution or the destruction of traditions…. 
The young generation know that the Khmer Rouge killed, but they do not 
know the experience of that time  … the way the practice and tradition was 
attacked. 73 
 
This expresses the difference between simply knowing the body count and 
discussing the impact of so many deaths. Langer argues that numbers and 
concepts   (the six million, the ‘final solution’) are remote from what needs to be 
put across to educate the next generation about genocide. Graphic and detailed 
narratives must be presented about the murder, torture and obliteration of an entire 
people; their culture and its loss must be conveyed to make ‘…an indelible and 
subversive impression on their moral, political, philosophical and psychological 
assumptions about individual behavior and the nature of reality’.74  
 
I had planned to talk to young people about their opinions of the KR time.  
My interpreter Sina Thor, a 26-year-old former monk, now a freelance journalist, 
told me:  
Young people will tell you as a ‘barang’75 that they care about the Khmer 
Rouge time, of course they will. But the interest is in fact minimal. We can 
talk to students if you like but whether or not you will get the real answer 
from them [as opposed to the answer they think I want] is going to be a 
problem. Let’s face it; most of Cambodia’s youth are more concerned with 
Apple’s latest product than talking about genocide.  76 
 
 
I asked two NGO workers dealing with ECCC and Khmer Rouge related issues 
about the reasons for this apparent lack of interest, or even lack of belief that the 
atrocities of DK took place:  
 
I think the parents say things like, ‘ You know, in Khmer Rouge time we 
were worked very hard, or we had no food, no rice, only one bowl of 
porridge a day,’ or, ‘I saw many people shot.’ It’s completely different 
from right now in contrast. They cannot imagine their parents’ past. I 
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myself - my parents told me that during that time they walked from Phnom 
Penh to Preh Ven. This is over 100km.  I asked,  ‘Why you not use the 
bicycle?’  I almost did not believe them too.  But based on my readings 
and other knowledge, I have ways to know their story is a true one. 77 
 
 
Rothany Srun argues that Pol Pot attained a ‘bogey man’ status in the minds of 
younger people, an almost mythical figure used to threaten children who do not 
eat up their vegetables:  
 
 When parents talk to their children about KR the younger generation 
don’t believe. Parents will say things like, ‘Eat up all your food, during 
Pol Pot we had none,’ or, ‘You’re being lazy, under Pol Pot if you were 
lazy you would be shot.’ The young don’t take the older people seriously 
… many of the kids want actual evidence, rather than old people 
complaining about how hard life was in the old days.  78 
 
While I have previously discussed problems with the cliché  ‘those who do not 
learn from history are doomed to repeat it,’ the question of how violence is carried 
through the generations is important to any discussion of memory and 
intergenerational communication. Approximately two million people in Cambodia 
suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).  PTSD is related to drug 
addiction, alcoholism, suicide, domestic and child abuse, in a country with almost 
non-existent mental health services. 79   According to numerous reports to the 
NGOs, PTSD appears to be passing through from one generation to another. 
Rothany Srun of the ICFC is convinced that ‘trauma is going through the 
generations.’ 80 Ven. 10, a senior monk and academic at a Buddhist University 
describes how this happens:  
 
What happened in communist society [DK], right now has the impact from 
the past, right now with violence so when – even with domestic violence, I 
always observe about that. The parents always do something not so good 
upon their children, because the parents used to suffer from the brutality 
of the past. So they have passed on that violence to the next generation. 
This is why I lead the youth to ask about this, to ask their parents about 
what they faced in the Pol Pot regime. Why our family has domestic 
violence - is it because of the past? Or not because of the past? So 
according to our research and observation, most of the people at that time 
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saw violence and all the brutal acts people committed on each other, 
killing of each other, and this impacts on the young generation.  
 
I used to say in the youth workshop – I would use this example: one boy’s 
parents committed violence on him. He was around 14-15. Every day the 
parent would always commit violence on him. He hated his parents very 
much.  And one day they asked him to take his sister to go for a walk, and 
when they went and she was in the playground at the school and his sister 
went on the swings, he let his sister do it alone.  Suddenly, his sister fell 
from the swing to the ground and he ran over to take his sister up and 
punched her, yelling, ‘Why are you so stupid? Why you don’t hold the 
swing not to fall?’ It was a kind of instinct of his because of the past, 
because   of the violence from his parents. Actually he does not want to do 
that; but the impact of the violence … He can stop that. He must have a 
strong commitment that he must not do this kind of violence to anyone. ‘ It 
must stop from me,’ [he must resolve to say to himself].  ‘When I have 
children I will never commit this violence on my children. I will not 
commit this kind of violence on other people.’  
 
So I tell these youths from different communities,‘If you want to stop 
violence in our society it is the same. You must learn from this past and 
stop from now on.’ 81 
 
Another disturbing trend is that of intergenerational factionalising:  
Children of former KR and the children of victims saw the problem carries 
over. Victims told their children they could not be friends with the children 
of former KR. 82 
 
There are conflicts in school between the former KRs’ children and the 
victims’ children - fights breaking out because the parents told them of the 
bad things the KR parents did their family. 83 
 
I asked Ven. 10 if he had heard of this phenomenon:  
 
Oh yeah, this has been a problem.  Yes, the impact of the violence has led 
not just to Khmer Rouge families seeing their children in conflict with 
other students… 84 
 
Communicative and cultural memory have had to develop simultaneously with 
the social ‘re-construction’ of reality, following the period during DK in which 
the processes described by Assmann and Berger and Luckmann were radically 
inverted and collapsed.  Cultural memory and communicative memory processes, 
the assemblage of the  ‘social stock of knowledge’, have crashed into each other, 
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and neither has been granted the space or time to operationalize in the way the 
theorists who devised the models proposed.  Cultural memory has been impressed 
on the next generation without significant focus on the   ‘rupture in the process of 
the construction of reality’ that was DK.  The next generation are having parts of 
the history communicated to them, but not in a way that enables them to imagine 
themselves in the ‘biography’ of the community.  
 
The post-1979 generation share a present with the generation that lived through 
DK. Yet if members of that surviving generation exist in durational time they 
inscribe that ‘durational’ period onto that present they share with the younger 
generation, drawing them too into durational time. Yet the post-1979 generation 
lack knowledge of the DK period, as it was never effectively communicated to 
them. Hence what is communicated is a set of emotions, traumas and fears. 
Traumatized parents are bringing up children and impressing their trauma on 
them, telling them not to associate with the families of their enemies, to fear a 
group of people (the KR) of whom younger generations know little. Younger 
people see violence in their lives and do not know from whence it stems in their 
(grand) parents.  
 
Inadequate narrativisation has occurred for the post-1979 generation, because the 
generation that lived through DK have in many ways been unable to 
hermeneutically reassemble the present they occupy.  This is compounded by the 
fact that the ‘expected future’ is an ‘alarmed vision’. Major nationwide memory 
assemblage initiatives have been so obscured by the political message hammered 
across that imaginative space is shut down.  For example, the National Day of 
Remembrance (20 May) in Cambodia was only brought into existence in 1983 by 
the Vietnamese occupying government as  ‘Day of Maintaining Rage Against the 
Genocidal Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan Clique and the Sihanouk-Son Sen 
Reactionary Groups (also against the Americans, and Chinese).’ The focus of this 
holiday (only named ‘Day of Remembrance’ in the mid-1990s) was on 
legitimising the government, not on commemorating the events of DK. The nation 
was too preoccupied by war and famine in the 1980s for effective narrative to take 
place. The 1990s saw the period of ‘induced amnesia’. Thus only in the recent 
period have the post-1979 generation been told about this history in such a way as 
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to impact significantly on their moral, political, philosophical and psychological 
assumptions; in the present, history, memory and imagination are enabled.  
 
While I contend that religious discourse has discussed this at length, such a means 
of vernacular remembrance is too abstruse when there is a need for graphic 
representation of that time. Just as the survivors described in Chapter Five 
discussed their frustration with artistic media when trying to represent what 
happened in DK, Langer’s call to provide an ‘indelible and subversive impression 
on their moral, political, philosophical and psychological assumptions about 
individual behavior and the nature of reality’ is too difficult in face of the 
politically controlled narrations of DK. 85 This is an academic hypothesis about 
the nature of narrativization following atrocity. However, the difficulty of 
communicating the story has been diagnosed as a problem by monks and NGOs 
working upon the difficulties of intergenerational communication. One of my 
interviewees was a young Khmer NGO worker (NGO worker 1); his NGO, along 
with the other NGOs, is attempting to fill the gaps:   
 
I think the first thing we can do is memorialization. The second is really 
education and integrating memories into the education and history at 
schools. We should gather testimonies of survivors and perpetrators. And 
also we can do various activities.  Like the water ceremony - we can bring 
former KR and a survivor together and with the monks. The young 
generation do the water ceremony to the survivor, meaning they clean the 
killing by washing it away. Next year, we want to do something with 
children of the perpetrators and children of the survivors, to sit and talk 
together, to help the next generation- even though their parents will not 
deal with this. 86 
 
However, budget problems and lack of domestic political will effectively close 
down activities like this.  
 
We encourage the monastic community to work at reconciliation, as we 
see Buddhism as having a key social role in the Cambodian context. So we 
train monks and operated the program in 4 provinces. Funding for this 
project dried up.87 
 
Attention to believability is key. The younger generation do not believe, or at least 
struggle to understand. Between generations there is a gap, across which the older 
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surviving DK generation feel the need to communicate the narrative of the DK 
time to the next generation, for the story to enter the cultural memory. The telling 
of the story is the meaning of justice.   As I noted at the start of this chapter, 
Arendt and Ricœur assert that the core justice need is ‘to be memorable’.88 Sen’s 
continuum of justice, along which one can plot in evaluative comparison the state 
of justice towards an ultimately unachievable transcendental ideal, is useful in 
making an assessment of what is and what is not seen to be just. 89  While 
‘perfect’ justice in relation to mass atrocity is unobtainable, what is to a degree 
achievable, and possible to plot on Sen’s scale, is believability in communication 
that will fulfill the need to be ‘memorable’. 
 
 Throughout this study, justice in the Cambodian context is communication to the 
younger generation:  the struggle to get them to believe, to remember the story.  
What is significant to the narrators is the mode by which the story is 
communicated and the satisfaction it has been adequately transmitted. This is 
especially important in a country where books are not read as widely as they are 
in neighbouring  countries. 90 While survivors of the DK regime acknowledge that 
there will never be a full story and representation of experience which could be 
adequately conveyed, there is the possibility that enough can be conveyed for the 
story to be installed into cultural memory.  The meaning of Justice emerges from 
the way the story is expressed. Inevitably, limitations will be imposed, but some 
modes of expression are nevertheless more satisfying than others. The more 
constraints placed on the ability to tell the story, the greater restriction the grand 
narratives impose, the more exclusive the genres of discourse and their phrase 
regimes, the slighter the ‘space’ for the small narratives to speak, the more the 
injustice of exclusion becomes apparent.91 Justice in this sense is not based on 
consensus and or communitarian values alone, but on the practical ability of the 
small narratives to have space on their own terms.92 
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 There will never be a completely satisfactory way to narrate this story. However, 
we can place the ability to tell the story and the satisfaction derivable from its 
telling on a continuum where ways and means of telling can be compared. 
Although the highest end of the continuum (the ideal) is unobtainable, ways 
which allow greater room for ‘those whose voices are powerless, marginalized, 
vanquished, cry[ing] out in history for justice, through recognition’ may compare 
more favorably than the ways that narrate the idea and story of justice in phrase 
regimes and genres of discourse shaped by the imposition of powerful, 




The telling of the story requires that both the survivors and the post-DK 
generation enact a threefold process, which Ricœur describes thus:  
 
The future, which [the mind] expects, passes through the present, to which 
it attends, into the past, which it remembers…yet expectation and memory 
are ‘in’ the soul as impression-images and as sign-images …it is in the 
soul, hence as an impression, the expectation and memory possess 
extension. But the impression is in the soul only insomuch as the mind 
acts, that is, expects, attends and remembers. 94 
 
For DK survivors the mind needs to exist at the present moment in both a 
remembered past and an imagined future ; for the post-DK generation their minds 
must exist in the imagined past, the present, and an imagined future.  Yet one 
thing that has emerged throughout this chapter is the frustration of my narrators, 
their awareness that they will never be able to ‘tell the full story’. 
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Concluding Chapter  
 
This thesis has not taken a normative comparative approach, but began with an 
open-ended set of aims, which sought to understand the socio-cultural meanings 
of transition and justice, how these two concepts are narrated in official and 
unofficial processes, what meaning the process of narrative has in terms of justice, 
and what can be said about processes as means to deposit cultural memory. This 
offers a way to determine the Cambodian experience of transition and justice 
outside the normative TJ paradigm. 
 
 
The thesis thus argues that there is no justice or transition without narrative. It 
is narrative that performs both of these functions; it is also narrative that inhibits 
them, should a single narrative overpower all other tellings.  
 
The previous chapter concluded that Justice is not containable (although it is often 
contained) in any single representation or narrative institution, but rather is always 
plural and fluid. Different ideas overlap, converge, even contradict, in an ongoing 
process of narrating justice. Indeed the chapter reads in part like a conclusion. 
However, to end at this point would be to have wrapped up a narrative much too 
neatly. This thesis is underpinned by the notion that justice and transition are 
liquid and multiple, without clear beginnings or ends. Indeed the principal issue I 
have tried to demonstrate is that the many official (and unofficial) ways in which 
the DK period has been narrated have all been performed within narrative 
parameters that limit how justice can be articulated. To end with a normative, 
neatly wrapped view would be contradictory. I instead conclude that we are still 
seeing narratives unfolding, that this is a process without a fixed end point.  
 
Throughout I have explored how official and unofficial, communal and individual 
narratives are related.  The emergent narrative of the thesis is thus inevitably 
‘messy.’  Hence the conclusion will not tie up as if the thesis were utilizing 
normative theoretical frames (Liberalism, Marxism or Transitional Justice). 





Throughout, I have curated and arranged some of ‘the ubiquitous numberless 
narratives’ making up the  ‘quintessential customary knowledge’that links the 
generations. 1  2  3   4  5  6  7   I have explored narratives as  ‘institutional 
infrastructures’ (such as national narratives, TJ, Marxism, Buddhism, mythology, 
nationalism), which take up the task of configuring a narrative of justice in a 
process of emplotmentwithin the variously designated ‘phrase regimes and genres 
of discourse’of the institutions. 8 9 10 I have shown that in doing so social actors 
are variously in/ex/cluded, exposing a Differend  or a process of narrowing the 
narrative so as to exclude parts of the ‘whole’. 11 I have throughout demonstrated 
that social actors, while possibly acquiescing to the domination of the hegemonic 
narrative, are nonetheless aware of this, and are able en situation to produce 
critiques about their own society, culture, history and politics within their own 
critical frames, not just passively blown about by powerful discourses. 12  I have 
attempted to grasp the discontents of actors and carry out theorizationthrough 
them, by asking those watching the grand narratives unfolding in their nation 
about what they think. 13  In short the Differend is attested to through the voices of 
social actors en situation.14 Such critiques interrogate official narratives and / or 
are usurped by the powerful metanarratives that interfere with the capacity for 
hermeneutic readings.  15 
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One can also think about the processes discussed in terms of how fully a narrative 
is, or is not, able to be expressed by a social actor, or how feasible a narrative 
makes entry into itself, by placing it on a comparative continuum. 16    This might 
appear to be making a normative claim about narrative - as though to say that the 
telling of the story will have an end. It will not. But this does not mean that the 
attempt to tell the story is meaningless or that all tellings will be the same. While 
fabula and sjuzhet may be a structuralist/ modernist conceit, they are useful in that 
they provide a toolset for the dissection of narrative. 17  Post-structuralist narrative 
theory operations are, as McQuillan argues, haunted by structuralist practice; the 
usefulness of the terms is as academic shorthand which aids in the 
conceptualization of heterogeneous ideas. 18Through such shorthand a resolution 
can be obtained – even if that resolution is in itself artificial/temporary 
/constructed. Put shortly, it is a way to order chaos – even if the ‘order’ is 
imaginary.   
 
The telling is an endless process. Grand Narratives - Marxism, Liberal 
Democracy/Transitional Justice, and even the narrative metaphors of Buddhism - 
establish normative measures that will forever create some kind of  ‘Differend’. 
Put starkly – there is no universal story of justice. The infinite plurality of 
speaking history and phrases must and will not be finally ended.19   What I hope 
this thesis has done is to demonstrate that actors do stand up to the hegemonic 
domination of singular narrative .20 And in passing the story to another generation 
they forge another ‘link in the chain’ that connects generations. 21 
 
Lyotard was an obvious theoretical starting place for this thesis, in that the story 
of the collapse of the grand narratives  has an obvious case example in the history 
of Cambodia. 22 Cambodian history clearly attests to the way that the western 
grand narratives have collapsed in the country. Marxism, liberal democracy, 
                                                
16	  Sen,	  The	  Idea	  of	  Justice,409	  
17	  Todorov,	  	  ‘The	  Typology	  of	  Detective	  Fiction,’	  70	  
18	  McQuillan,	  ‘Aporias	  of	  Writing:	  Narrative	  and	  Subjectivity’,	  6-­‐7	  
19	  Jean-­‐Francois	  	  Lyotard,	  	  ‘The	  Sign	  of	  History’,	  The	  Lyotard	  Reader,	  ed.	  Andrew	  Benjamin,	  
(Oxford:	  Blackwell	  1998)409	  
20	  Boltanski,	  On	  Critique,	  5	  
21	  Trin,	  Woman,	  Native,	  Other,	  	  122-­‐130	  
22	  Lyotard,	  	  The	  Postmodern	  Condition	  ,66	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nationalism have all variously and with differing degrees of disaster fallen apart 
on encounter with Cambodia - perhaps because all such ideas have been imported 
and imposed on the nation.    
 
This use of Lyotard has also enabled me to move between the macro- and the 
micro-, to oscillate between the grand tellings (for example the PRT, the ECCC) 
and the smaller narratives of individuals. This is important as it is to these grand 
narratives that smaller ones are usually set in relation, in the sense that many 
people are aware of their own story’s inclusion/exclusion from the grand narrative 
that creates a dominant narrative.  Lyotard envisages a postmodernist justice as 
attention to those points on which the Grand Narratives crash, and hearing the 
voices of those silenced and crushed by the Differend.  ‘Little stories’are vital 
precisely because they do not fit into great histories. 23 It is in these little stories 
that  ‘the history of the vanquished dead crying out for justice’ can be told.  24 The 
meaning for the telling of small stories lies in the need for one generation to 
communicate to another. This answers Arendt’s point that one meaning of being 
human is the need to remembered and recollected in narrative discourse –‘ to be 
memorable’.25 26 Indeed this is the nature of both transition and justice. One 
cannot let the past slip into memory if it is felt to be in danger of being forgotten.  
 
My adaptation of Sen’s ‘continuum of justice’  has two roles here. 27 Firstly, it 
allows me not to place a transcendental and/or normative goal against which to 
measure the empirical material, instead allowing me to keep the idea of justice as 
something open-ended. Secondly, it is a useful tool to make comparisons of the 
processes discussed: trials, rituals, and memorials. Comparison here is a 
subjective exercise; but it lets me make the conceptual point that not all tellings 
are the same, and that some people may place greater value on some tellings than 
others. As a demonstration (it is not my place to do this, but I make it to enable 
the reader to see how such a comparative assessment may work) I would arrange 
                                                
23	  Jean-­‐Francois	  Lyotard,	  	  ‘Lessons	  in	  Paganism’,	  	  The	  Lyotard	  Reader,	  ed.	  Andrew	  Benjamin,	  
(Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  	  1993)127	  
24	  Paul	  Ricœur	  ,interview	  with	  	  Richard	  F.	  Kearney,On	  Paul	  Ricœur:	  the	  Owl	  of	  Minerva,	  
(Aldershot:	  Ashgate	  Publishing,	  2004)127	  
25	  ibid.127-­‐128	  
26	  Paul	  Ricœur,	  Figuring	  the	  Sacred:	  Religion,	  Narrative	  and	  Imagination,	  translated	  by	  David	  
Pellauer	  (Minneapolis:	  Fortress	  Press,	  1995)	  	  
27	  Sen,	  The	  Idea	  of	  Justice,	  409	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my own assessment of the different processes used in discussing the DK period 





 I contend that the most discernable meaning for the generation that survived DK 
is to be ‘memorable’ (in Arendt’s sense of the term). 28 Hence I have placed the 
rituals of memorialization ahead of all the trial processes - others will have 
different views.    
 
This way of conceptualizing narrative, justice and transition allows us to think 
about what these processes did, and how they enabled a narrative to the 
satisfaction of the narrators. Since I am stressing that there is no justice without 
narrative, the emergence of such a narrative is vital. 
 
 
Getting away with Genocide? ‘Don’t bother talking to Cambodians, they will 
only confuse you’ 
 
Fawthrop and Jarvis’s 2004 book  argued that the USA, Thailand and China put 
pressure on the UN and thus the CPK leaders were ‘Getting away with Genocide’ 
for many years. 29 Several years into the ECCC process, with only one conviction, 
only two of the original four Case 002 accused still standing trial (thus far) and 
Cases 003 and 004 in limbo, former mid-level KR (responsible for the deaths of 
many) are currently serving as officials. No American, British, Chinese or other 
decision makers complicit in or liable for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of 
Cambodians are likely ever to be held to account for their atrocities under 
international law.30  The question at this stage that arises is, ‘Is “the forgotten 
genocide” still being “gotten away” with?’ In the strict legal sense, the genocide 
                                                
28	  Ricœur	  interview	  with	  	  Kearney,On	  Paul	  Ricœur,	  127	  
29	  Fawthrop,	  and	  	  Jarvis,	  	  Getting	  Away	  With	  Genocide?	  
30 John	  Pilger,	  ‘How	  Thatcher	  Gave	  Pol	  Pot	  a	  Hand,’	  New	  Statesman,	  	  17	  April	  	  2000<	  
http://www.newstatesman.com/node/137397>	  <Accessed	  31	  March	  2013> 
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charge will not be addressed until the next section of Case 002(002/02) - 
whenever that will be. 31 
 
Peter Maguire discusses a conversation with a UN official while researching his 
book in the early 1990s:  
 
 When I described my current interest in Khmer Rouge War Crimes…she 
grew defensive and dismissive.  ‘Well, nobody is really interested in those 
questions anymore.’…When I politely reminded her that …the war crimes 
impunity in Cambodia raised serious questions about war crime 
accountability in the late twentieth century, she sharply rebuked me for 
using the word ‘genocide’ as the official term was now ‘autogenocide’ 
…Her final piece of advice to me: ‘Don’t bother talking to Cambodians, 
they will only confuse you.’  32 
 
The last sentence epitomizes the attitude of the global community towards 
Cambodia – the confusion that the Cambodians ‘cause’ is that they do not align 
neatly in ways that institutions, politicians, some academics and all those pushing 
a grand narrative understand or prefer. For anyone seeking to fit the telling of this 
history into a grand narrative, talking to Cambodians would be confusing.  
Politically, Liberal and Marxist academics want the history to fit into their telling. 
When individuals tell their stories that do not fit, the political frame of the 
authors’ narratives becomes askew. Trials try to perform their ideologies/ 
narratives, but non-canonical stories disrupt the flow of the narrative and are 
necessarily marginalized. Alternative tellings, in locally more accessible phrase 
regimes and genres of discourse, can exist along side the official tellings, but only 
if they fit with the constraints imposed. Those who have no place can only 
transgress, become marginalized or silenced.  
 
What is left are the ‘confusing’ Cambodians battling to deposit their own 
memories into cultural memory. This, to many of my narrators, is the most 
important meaning of transition and justice: transition is being believed by the 
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  ECCC	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  89	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  the	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  of	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  doc.	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  The	  Trial	  
Chamber	  separated	  proceedings	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  Case002	  into	  segments	  .	  	  




succeeding generation and the wider world in order to make a ‘move’ out of the 
former time; and justice is the ability to narrate and not be ignored. 
 
 
Today- contemporary developments in telling the story of Justice and 
Transition.   
 
Concurrent to the final arguments at the ECCC in case 002/01, a modern political 
crisis of immediate relevance was playing out. On 28 July Cambodia held its fifth 
general election since the installation of the 1993 Constitution. The results of the 
election have been resolutely contested by the opposition Cambodian National 
Rescue Party (CNRP), led by Sam Rainsy, since the announcement made by the 
National Election Commission (NEC) on the same day.  The ‘preliminary result’  
declared Hun Sen’s  Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) narrowly  the victors with a 
small majority in the national assembly , a result the NEC would later confirm.33  
 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) has accused the ruling party of orchestrating a huge 
electoral fraud.34 Complaints of election fraud have been widespread, even on 
polling day itself. At a polling station, I personally saw people deeply unhappy 
with the behaviour of the election overseers, telling anyone who would listen (me 
included) that they felt the process was a joke.  
 
The most significant domestic election monitoring group was comprised of the 
many NGOs gathered at the offices of the Committee for Free and Fair Elections 
in Cambodia (COMFREL) in the ‘situation room’; they established themselves 
there to receive results and for the NGOs to make comments on/ to the media.  
COMFREL monitors observed more than 10,000 irregularities at polling 
stations,35 including duplication, the non-appearance of names on voter lists, and 
people being turned away from the polls, amongst other serious allegations. The 
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  National	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34	  Human	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CNRP has rejected the official resultsand boycotted parliament, refusing to take 
up their seats in the national assembly and have demanded an independent 
commission to investigate alleged fraud. 36 37 The Royal Government Cambodia 
(RGC) has rejected this demand . 38  The NEC has maintained that following 
 
thorough examination and verification, the reported irregularities could 
really happen, disturb, and have an effect on voters, on polling and ballot 
counting only at some extend level, (sic) but there was no serious 
impact.39 
 
The NEC however, lacks credibility. The CNRP do not accept it as a neutral body, 
while HRW dismisses it as failing to address serious allegations.40 41  Following 
the disputed result, the CNRP has called many popular protests (upwards of 
15,000 attending each time) and mass gatherings  (including three-day 
consecutive ‘sit-in’ demonstrations), which I have regularly seen since the 
contested election result in July.   
In response to this Hun Sen has brought thousands of troops into the capital. 42 
The RGC/ CPP has banned (then unbanned) protests, violently broken up protests 
and shot protesters dead. 43 44 The opposition leaders have been hauled in for 
questioning for ‘disrupt[ing] social order’. 45  
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Concurrent with the election-related protest have been protests by garment 
workers demanding a minimum wage of $160.00 a month, and ongoing protests 
about government-backed land grabs. 46  The overriding images of image of Hun 
Sen’s ‘democracy’ since his ‘victory’ in last year’s election are those in the 
Phnom Penh based English language papers of unarmed protesters shot dead, or 
bloodied bodies, or a young man caught in barbed wire being blasted with water 
cannon. 47  There has been a tangible change in Cambodian politics.  
Demonstrations on this scale have not been seen before.  
 
Elizabeth Becker discusses the impact of the ECCC on the changing political 
mood of the nation, arguing that despite the ECCC’s problems it has had the 
effect of putting the Khmer Rouge firmly in the past. 48 Hun Sen’s Party exploit 
the deep seated fear of a KR return to power, and indeed in 2013 he invoked the 
spectre of the KR with the threat that his losing the election would end in renewed 
civil wars. 49  It is a powerful strategy, a product of the quasi-divine self-
presentation of Angkar deeply engrained into peoples’ psyches. As LeVine 
argues, under DK people were conditioned to think of Angkar as almost 
supernatural, an ‘entity rather than a political party that lurks ominously almost 
within the soil of the nation, ready to re-emerge in the souls of its people’. 50 If 
Becker’s premise is correct, the trials may have gone someway to de-mythologize 
the Khmer Rouge for the new generation even if Angkar haunts their elders. The 
CPP’s attempts to invoke the KR to scare up support have not worked.51 
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This is a centrally important transition in Cambodia:  the way Angkar is losing its 
grip on imaginations, especially on the generation born after DK. For a 
government basing its narrative on the role of saviour of the nation from KR 
tyranny, this is an obvious problem.  I would argue that the RGC / CPP has now 
lost control of the narrative it has maintained for so long. And that a new narrative 
is being written by a younger generation.  If the election results are a clear 
indication, they are doing so with the participation of a disgruntled older 




The discourse of liberal democracy promised by UNTAC has been ringing in the 
ears of the generation born after the KR for their entire adult lives. Betrayal of 
those promises is a focus of the demonstrators’ anger. The KR has broken its hold 
on the mind of one generation and an uncertain future lies behind the barbed wire 
barricades put up by   the army. The KR are, as former cadres attest, a spent force. 
This is not to argue that the idea of liberal democracy has overtaken the popular 
sentiment of the nation.  However, there has been a change, a transition from one 
mentality to another between the generations. 
 
One NGO worker working to promote greater media freedom told me   what he 
had seen in the provinces concerning alternative and social media as ways for 
Cambodians to access information the state-run and controlled media do not 
provide. A young man watched the election results come in with his grandfather 
on his smartphone (which could access non-state-run media). The memories of 
war, atrocity and genocide must be transmitted to the next generation, but must 
not disable them. This picture of grandfather and grandson huddled over a small 
screen scrutinizing the future shows the generations in an act of joint imaging. It 
is from here that narratives of the past, the present and the future can be read.  I do 
not end by saying what those narratives will be, but simply by stating that the 
process of narrating transition and justice is continuing into an uncertain future.  
 
Final assessment  
 
From this point other work must build. The ECCC process is not finished. It is an 
important part of the narrative of the DK period. Any future work done on 
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transition and justice in Cambodia will need to look back on the role played by the 
entire institution, and the thousands of documents it has generated (an invaluable 
resource to future historians). It will always impact significantly  on how that era 
is narrated.  
 
In a way this thesis would be radically changed, and the views of my narrators 
would also change significantly, if, for example, the two remaining defendants in 
case 002 were to die before the case ends. There would also be significant issues 
if the UN were to pull out. I can predict at the time of writing that there will be a 
difficult end to the ECCC. It is an institution which will leave a precarious legacy 
by its own normative standards, let alone in terms of its cultural and historical 
significance to the nation it serves.  
 
The thesis also has clearly shown something about the notions of transition and 
justice: that there is a view from outside those international institutions 
dominating the narratives of transition and justice even to the point of 
marginalizing other voices.  This idea has implications beyond Cambodia. Indeed 
the very task of finding a method to discuss cultural contexts is important in order 
to have an idea of what transition and justice mean. I have set out how the big 
narratives of the past as told in dominant narratives interact with Cambodians’ 
own views of transition and justice. I have also shown that there is a wider and 
more complex idea of transition and justice in the Cambodian context than is 











 Plate 2: The picture painted inside the stupa, depicting the events that 
 occurred in the village during DK 
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 Plate 3: Detail of the picture/ mural . The temple with bullet holes  being 






 Plate 4: Detail of the picture/ mural. KR cadres use villagers as slave 






 Plate 5: Detail of the picture/ mural. KR cadres kill villagers  and  bones 















 Plate 8: The Grave of Pol Pot on last day of Phchum Ben. Offerings of 










   
 
 Plate 10: The hotel and across the road, a blue sign pointing to ‘Pol 













          
 
 Plate 13:The plaque at the Trapeng Thma dam, which highlights the 
 Japanese contribution  
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